Tag: Egypt
Peace picks 1-5
1. What´s Next for the Rohingya?| Tuesday, April 2, 2019 | 3:00 am – 4:30pm | The Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004-3027| Register Here |
In August 2017, security forces in Burma’s Rakhine state staged a harsh and extended crackdown on the Rohingya—a deeply marginalized and persecuted Muslim minority community. Thousands are estimated to have died, while more than half a million fled to neighboring Bangladesh. United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres described the tragedy as ethnic cleansing. At this event, Dr. Nehginpao Kipgen, a top expert on Burma, will discuss developments involving the Rohingya since the 2017 crackdown, including key recent events, and what might be in store next for the troubled community. Does the political will exist in Burma to improve conditions for the Rohingya and to address the underlying issues that fuel their persecution? What will become of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh? Dr. Kipgen will address these questions and more.
Speakers
Nehginpao Kipgen, Associate Professor and Executive Director at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies
Michael C. Davis, Fellow Professor of Law and International Affairs, Jindal Global University, Delhi, India
2. Ukraine’s Presidential Election| Tuesday, April 2, 2019 | 12:00pm| The Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC 20005| Register Here |
The March 2019 presidential election is a pivotal event in Ukraine’s history. Outside attempts to influence the elections have been documented, particularly by the Kremlin, which has employed a full-range of hybrid tactics in Ukraine in an effort to destabilize the country.
Recognizing the high stakes, the Atlantic Council, the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, and the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity have established the Ukrainian Election Task Force. Working with other Ukrainian institutions and analysts–StopFake, Razumkov Centre, and Detector Media–the Task Force is a rapid-response team with the ability to monitor, evaluate, and disclose the full range of foreign subversive activities in Ukraine and to propose suitable responses.
Agenda
Panel One Discussion:
Dr. Anders Aslund, Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Mr. Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy
Ms. Nataliya Bugayova, Director of Development and Research Fellow, Russia Team
Institute for the Study of War
Ambassador John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Moderated by:
Ms. Melinda Haring, Editor for Ukraine Alert, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Panel Two Discussion:
Mr. David J. Kramer, Senior Fellow Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy,
Ms. Laura Galante, Cyber Lead; Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Ukrainian Election Task Force; Atlantic Council
Mr. Jakub Kalenský, Disinformation Lead; Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Ukrainian Election Task Force; Atlantic Council
Mr. Oleksiy Melnyk, Kinetic Lead; Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security Programs
Moderated by:
Ms. Geysha Gonzalez, Deputy Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
3. Reform, Challenges and Adaptation: Egypt’s Evolving Economic Outlook| Tuesday, April 5, 2019 | 9:00pm- 10:30| The Middle East Institute | 1319 18th St. NW, Washington D.C. 20036| Register Here |
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel discussion on the future of Egypt’s economy. While Egypt’s recent economic reforms have made good inroads into improving the macroeconomic outlook, the pace of global development means that Egyptian businesses must work twice as hard to keep pace, and even harder if they want to pull ahead of the pack. Egypt’s state economy is huge, particularly in comparison with that of other emerging markets, but new reforms may give the private sector the opportunity to become Egypt’s growth engine.
Speakers
Sarah El-Battouty, Chairman and founder, ECOnsult
Girgis Abd El-Shahid, Managing partner, Shahid Law Firm
Tarek Tawfik, Chairman, Cairo Poultry Group; President, American Chamber of Commerce
Dalia Wahba, Chairman, CID Consulting
Mirette F. Mabrouk, moderator, Senior fellow and director of the Egypt program, MEI
4. Redefining U.S. national security: interlinkages with American society and foreign policy| Tuesday, April 5, 2019 | 9:00am- 19:00pm| Brookings Institution | 1775 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.Washington, DC 20036| Register Here |
President Donald Trump won the 2016 election largely by carrying Rust Belt states and doing especially well with a demographic skeptical of America’s role in the world regarding trade, investment, diplomacy, alliances, and immigration policy. His election has had consequences for U.S. foreign policy, from reducing foreign aid and pulling out of the Paris Climate Accord, to imposing highly restrictive immigration policies and questioning numerous alliances.
Yet, U.S. foreign policy remains in flux as President Trump’s approach evolves, with the 2018 midterm elections demonstrating that many voters are not satisfied with the direction of the country. This situation provides a rich backdrop for debate, now and in the run-up to the 2020 political season, about how to best advance America’s interests at home and abroad.
Introduction
9:00 AM- 9:05 AM
Bonnie Jenkins, Executive Director – Nonresident Senior Fellow -The Brookings Institution
Discussion
9:05 AM – 9:30 AM
DISCUSSANT
Bonnie Jenkins, Executive Director, Nonresident Senior Fellow -The Brookings Institution
Jenkinsbd
Arsalan Suleman, Chair – America Indivisible
Panel I
US voting and US foreign policy: Regional focus
9:35 AM – 10:45 AM
MODERATOR
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow – The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair
Panelists
Jeannine Scott, Board President – Constituency for Africa
Sylvia Mishra, India-US Fellow in Public Interest Technology – New America
Asha Castleberry, Adjunct Professor – George Washington University
Jung H. Pak, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Senior Fellow – Center for East Asia Policy Studies
Laura Kupe, Counsel – Committee on Homeland Security, US House of Representatives
Emily Mendrala, Executive Director – Center for Democracy in the Americas
Panel II
US voting and new national security issues
10:45 AM – 11:55 AM
MODERATOR
Liza Arias, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow – Center for Strategic & International Studies
PANELISTs
Uzra Zeya, President and CEO – Alliance for Peacebuilding
Daniel Lucey, Senior Scholar – O’Neill Institute, Georgetown University
Sean Shank, Vice President – BNY Mellon
Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, Member – Third Way Cyber Enforcement Initiative Advisory Board
Dr. Muhammad Fraser-Rahim, Executive Director – North America for Quilliam International
Closing
11:55 AM – 12:00 PM
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow -Director of Research, The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair
5. The Future of Statecraft | Tuesday, April 2, 2019 | 9:00 am – 4:45pm | Center for Strategic and International Study | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register Here|
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host another conference as part of the Future Strategy Forum, an initiative to connect scholars who research national security with its leading practitioners.
The 2019 focus is “The Future of Statecraft” and will examine the future of great power cooperation, international institutions, and economic statecraft. The conference will feature a keynote conversation with former National Security Advisor Ambassador Susan Rice.
Conference Schedule
8:30 AM – 9:00 AM Registration and Breakfast
9:00 AM – 9:15 AM Welcome Remarks
Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President; Henry A. Kissinger Chair
Dr. Francis J. Gavin, Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and Director Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs Johns Hopkins SAIS
Ms. Sara Plana and Ms. Rachel Tecott , PhD Candidates, Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
9:15 AM – 10:45 AM Panel 1: “Great Power Cooperation”
Ms. Lindsey Ford, Director of Political-Security Affairs, Richard Holbrooke Fellow, and
Deputy Director of the Washington D.C. Office, Asia Society Policy Institute
Dr. Angela Stent, Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Distinguished Resident Fellow in African Studies, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University
Dr. Irene Wu, Former Fellow, Wilson Center and Georgetown University
Ms. Meg Guliford (Moderator), PhD Candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
10:45 AM – 11:00 AM Coffee Break
11:00 AM – 12:30 PM Panel 2: “International Institutions”
Dr. Esther Brimmer, Executive Director and CEO, NAFSA: Association of International Educators
Ms. Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, CSIS
Ms. Naima Green, PhD Candidate, Harvard University
Dr. Kristina Spohr, Helmut Schmidt Distinguished Professor, Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Dr. Mischa Thompson (Moderator), Director of Global Partnership, Policy, and Innovaiton, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
12:30 PM – 1:45 PM Lunch and Talk
1:45 PM – 3:15 PM Panel 3: “Economic Statecraft”
Ms. Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Energy Economics and Security Program, Center for a New American Security
Dr. Sarah Sewall, Speyer Family Foundation Distinguished Scholar, Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Ms. Camille Stewart, Esq., Cybersecurity Policy Fellow, New America
Ms. Tori K. Whiting, Jay Van Andel Trade Economist, Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation
Dr. Radha Iyengar Plumb (Moderator), Adjunct Economist, RAND Corporation
3:15 PM – 3:30 PM Coffee Break
3:30 PM – 4:45 PM Keynote Discussion with Ambassador Susan Rice
Ambassador Susan Rice, Former National Security Advisor and U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Dr. Kathleen Hicks (Moderator), Senior Vice President; Henry A. Kissinger Chair; Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
4:45 PM – 5:30 PM Closing Reception
6. State capture: how Conservatives Claimed Power and How to Restore Balance| Tuesday, April 5, 2019 | 12:30pm- 2:00pm| New America| 740 15th St NW #900 Washington, D.C. 20005| Register Here |
Over the past forty years, conservatives have mastered the art of pursuing policy change at the state level, while similar liberal efforts have floundered. Today, conservatives fully control 26 state legislatures and governorships — one of the largest advantages either party has had since the New Deal.
What did the party do right? How have conservatives learned from their mistakes over the years? And why have liberals struggled to build similar cross-state organizing clout?
In State Capture: How Conservative Activists, Big Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States — and the Nation, Alex Hertel-Fernandez provides the first in-depth and accessible history of the rise of cross-state conservative lobbying groups, including the American Legislative Exchange Council, the State Policy Network, and Americans for Prosperity, documenting both their victories and their missteps over time. In his book, Hertel-Fernandez also spells out the specific policy consequences of conservative cross-state organizing, including its effects on labor market standards, unions, and the Affordable Care Act. The book also tracks liberal efforts to counter-balance the right and why they have frequently failed to match conservative scale and clout.
Presenters
Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Columbia SIPA
Lydia Bean, Fellow, Political Reform Program at New America
Mark Schmitt, Director, Political Reform Program at New America
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Riyadh impressions
I spent four days in Saudi Arabia last week, which is wholly insufficient to do anything but scratch the surface. But I’m not without those superficial impressions. The SAIS study trip was focused on the GCC conflict, but I won’t comment in detail on that today. Caveat emptor: I am not agreeing with the Saudi perspectives, only trying to render them faithfully.
Here are my more general impressions:
- Saudis in government and government-influenced institutions (which are the only ones I visited) sincerely support the domestic reforms the Crown Prince has undertaken and believe they will lead to profound and badly needed changes in opening up and modernizing the society.
- The Saudi elite is not prepared to question the Crown Prince on anything, including his foreign policy moves like the rift with Qatar and the war in Yemen. They emphasize forcefully the justice of the grievances against Qatar and humanitarian assistance provided to Yemen. They of course see Iran as a serious threat throughout the region.
- While appreciating the ample support of the Trump Administration and good citizen-to-citizen feelings (due mainly to the many Saudis who study in the US), Saudis have doubts about the Administration’s reliability that were not much alleviated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit last week. Many people in Riyadh view American withdrawal from the region as highly likely if not inevitable.
The inclination in Riyadh to accept top/down decisions on reform is palpable and often attributed to tribal attitudes: consultation and discussion are welcomed, but in the end it is the sheikh’s responsibility to decide and everyone else’s to obey. Constraints on executive power by an independent judiciary or other regulatory bodies, separation of powers, or a press free of government pressure are ideas that have little resonance.
Saudi Arabia’s justice system is viewed as fair, though many are aware that it is subject to scathing international criticism. The Saudi teenager who escaped to Thailand and has found refuge in Canada is viewed as someone who failed to take advantage of existing human rights mechanisms in the Kingdom. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is viewed as a matter for the courts, which will decide whether the accused are guilty in open hearings with adequate defense attorneys. The women activists who protested the driving ban stand accused, it is said, of other crimes having to do with passing information to foreign governments or accepting foreign assistance (no one seems clear about which). Protection for foreign workers, all hired under contracts approved by their own governments, has been enhanced.
There are discontents. The conservative religious establishment comes in for frequent criticism (again, by people associated with the government). The Muslim Brotherhood looms menacingly. Fear of youth radicalization is palpable. Anxiety about terrorism and disorder, both in the Kingdom and in the region, is high. Sectarianism is bad. The government is sponsoring active efforts to counter extremism and promote dialogue among Saudis of different stripes.
There are good things as well. Pluralism, even if more apparent in ancient ruins we visited in Al Ula than in Riyadh, is good. Islam and Sharia law are good, when properly understood. The solidarity of the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in the Gulf conflict is good, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially its military cooperation (which still includes Qatar, Saudis claim). Moderation, often defined as allowing everyone to modernize at their own pace, is good. Israel might be okay, but only if it does right by the Palestinians and accepts the Arab Peace Plan.
But above all, stability is good and worth sacrificing for. The nearby examples of Syria and Yemen are glaring. Even the one success of the Arab spring, Tunisia, is tottering. It is critical to counter the big de-stabilizing factor–Iran–and to avoid any new sources of Middle East strife. That Crown Prince is the key to stability as well as reform in the Kingdom and merits, the Saudis I talked with think, the wholehearted support he is getting, the internationals be damned.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Pompeo pontificates
Secretary of State Pompeo took the occasion of his speech in Cairo today to assert what few in the Middle East believe: that the US is a force for good in the region. Offering little evidence for this assertion that would be convincing to anyone but Middle Eastern autocrats, he instead focused on criticizing the Obama Administration.
He criticized it for failing to respond adequately to Sunni extremism, to the Iranian crackdown on the Green Revolution, and to Bashar al Assad. He also praised President Trump for destroying the Islamic State (ignoring completely Obama’s role in that fight) and for bombing Syria when it used chemical weapons (to little effect). The message was clear: American foreign policy is going to be unfailingly partisan. No more non-partisanship at the water’s edge. That’s for sissies.
Iran, Pompeo suggested while vaunting his evangelical credentials, is evil. He reviewed the full array of US efforts to counter Tehran, ignoring US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its negative implications for relations with Europe and its impact on America’s credibility in future nonproliferation efforts. He ignored the lack of progress in getting Tehran to renegotiate the agreement, which is what he has been pleading for.
While acknowledging President Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria and underlining that Middle Eastern partners will need to do more, Pompeo reiterated America’s maximal demands without considering the means available. The US won’t provide assistance to Syria until Iran withdraws and a political transition is irreversible. He also challenged Hizbollah and Iranian dominance of Lebanon, promised to work for peace in Yemen, and pledged an agreement on Israel and Palestine.
As Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass put it,
.
@SecPompeo articulated ambitious goals-to expel every last Iranian boot from Syria, to reduce Hizballah’s missile arsenal, to help build an Iraq free of Iranian influence-while backing reduced US presence in the Middle East. No policy can succeed with ends and means so divorced.
In concluding, Pompeo claimed that the US had never been an oppressor or empire-builder. That betrayed a serious lack of education on American history, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and insensitivity to how Washington is viewed in the Middle East, where US interventions are often viewed as imperial. Pompeo pledged allegiance to all the autocrats of the region except Iran’s and ignored even the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. How should Middle Easterners who want more open societies and freedom of expression feel about that?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
RSS - Posts
