Tag: Egypt

Dare to dream

Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High  Strategy Conference, March 29 -30: 

A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem?  Madness,  or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:

Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences

The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.

The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.

The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.

Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making

The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:

  1. Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
  2. A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
  3. A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
  4. Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.

Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors

The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.

Proposal:  a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean

The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.

Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.

Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a  regional security arrangement, no matter how  impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.

We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”

We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the  Helsinki Process. China should also participate.

Nuclear proliferation

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.

Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good.  However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.

Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty

First : The elaboration and adoption of a  binding multilateral  treaty for  the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).

Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.

Ballistic missiles and conventional forces

Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.

Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”

This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”

We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international  inspections and observation of military exercises.

Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system

The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.

Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest.  Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.

Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated

Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global  risks, balance of power and capabilities.

Conclusion

We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.

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Hope is lost

There is no more Hope. Hicks, ultimate loyalist, is the latest announced departure, but dozens have already left, some voluntarily, others under pressure, and still others fired. Most notorious are the wife abusers, but there was also the head of the Centers for Disease Control who traded in cigarette stocks, the National Security Adviser who was in the Russians’ pocket, the head of the FBI fired for refusing to pledge personal loyalty to the Don, the Secretary of Health and Human Services who racked up a million dollar travel bill, and the Communications Director who never actually got a US government paycheck before getting himself cashiered for an interview he gave to The New Yorker. Rachel Maddow offered this version of the story in today:

She updates that from time to time.

Churn is pretty common in US administrations, but this one is setting records. On top of the political appointees, there is a massive exodus of Civil Service and Foreign Service officers, many of whom can’t stomach the President and some of whom figure their prospects will improve if they get out before the wheels come off.

This is happening in a moment where presidential leadership, both domestically on guns and internationally, is wanted and needed. The President is so erratic and nonsensical on guns that no one can follow him–yesterday he suggested just confiscating them from people deemed dangerous and worrying about due process thereafter. How well is that going to work?

The international scene is crying out for America to make itself clear. In Syria the military commander has said we plan to keep the troops on the ground to prevent the return of ISIS but not counter Iran or President Assad, even though that is what the Secretary of State says our objective is. In Israel/Palestine, everyone is expected to believe that son-in-law Jared Kushner has a magic plan he is about to reveal, but he no longer can even read classified material. I’d bet he’ll be going back to New York soon, without revealing his brilliant scheme. The North Koreans are ready to talk, but the President has said that is pointless, even while his Secretary of State signals that is what we want to do.

But the worst is Russia. President Putin spent a good part of his state of the Russian Federation speech today making it clear that Russia sees itself as a rival to the United States, which it is targeting with every weapon in its arsenal. But Russia is no superpower. It is a declining regional petropower suffering a demographic implosion even as its economy fails to keep up with the rest of the world’s growth. That is not to say it isn’t dangerous: it has invaded Ukraine, pulverized the relatively moderate Syrian opposition in order to support a war criminal president, and is trying to expand its footprint in the Middle East wherever would-be autocrats rule (for the moment that’s Egypt, Turkey, Libya, and Syria).

Trump’s people will claim he has done a great deal to counter Russia. What it amounts to is some limited lethal weapons for Ukraine’s army, some expansion of sanctions, and shutting down some “diplomatic” facilities. But President Trump has conspicuously avoided criticizing President Putin and has failed to speak up against, or even acknowledge, Russia’s blatant meddling in the 2016 presidential campaign. While we can suppose that some of the massive increase in America’s military budget is aimed to counter Russia, the President has nowhere said so. Leadership is silent on Putin and Russia, except to occasionally come to their defense.

It is all too clear why: Trump’s personal real estate empire depends on Russian money, much of it likely headed to the laundry. Today’s news that Kushner has been gaining massive financing for his personal real estate ventures from people who meet with him suggests he has jacked up “pay to play” to a whole new level: hundreds of millions of dollars for his personal pockets. Remember when Trump complained loudly that someone might have benefited from contributions to the Clinton Foundation, an allegation never proven? In my mind, there no doubt Trump is benefiting, invisibly but massively, from his reluctance to criticize Russia or to move more aggressively against interference in the US election.

Hope Hicks was wise to announce she is leaving this sinking ship. It may still take a long time, but it is going down.

PS: For a well-done but ultimately flawed argument that Russia is stronger than its statistics suggest and Trump less a patsy than he appears, see Benjamin Haddad’s piece.

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It may not last

I spent three days last week in Baghdad: two talking with people from all over the Middle East (with the important exception of Turkey) about the current situation and one talking with Iraqis.

First Baghdad: It is looking and sounding far more peaceful than it did six years ago, when I last visited. No detonations, lots of trees and other plants, heavy traffic, and bustling sidewalks. I didn’t get out of the Green Zone a lot, but we did stop in Kadhimia and Adhamiyah to see the main mosques. Apart from the all too evident sectarian character of both (the former Shia and the latter Sunni), there was nothing remarkable: just people going about normal life shopping, chatting, praying, strolling, and honking. What a change from 2004-2011, when I visited a couple of times per year. Adhamiyah during part of that time had to be surrounded with T-walls and checkpoints to protect its population from slaughter.

The Iraqi leadership: We of course only met a few people in high places, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of parliament, and one minister, in addition to a member of parliament and some of the prime minister’s staff. All are happy to see the Islamic State defeated on the battlefield and all are concerned not to allow it to revive. All are also looking to make cross-sectarian or cross-ethnic alliances in advance of next year’s May 12 election. None were waving sectarian or ethnic identity as their main calling card. This data suggests why (sorry for the size–Wordpress won’t scale it up):

In the general population, sectarian and ethnic identities are still terribly important. While Ayatollah Sistani’s call for volunteers roused some Sunnis to the cause of fighting ISIS, the Popular Mobilization Units he spawned are mostly aggressively Shia and believed to harbor political ambitions. Nor has the Kurdish retreat from pursuing independence reduced popular Kurdish enthusiasm for their own, independent state.

But the leadership has come to understand that gaining a majority in parliament and thereby control of the state requires, under the somewhat ramshackle 2005 constitution, coalitions. Besides, most Iraqis are looking for civil or secular technocrats to run the country. That reduces the relevance of ethnic and sectarian identity, of which Iraqis seem to have had their fill, at least as qualifications for governing.

None of this means the competition among the elite is finished, or even attenuated. To the contrary: all the main sectarian and ethnic blocks are fragmenting. The Kurds are no longer as united as once they were, among the Shia both the Dawa party and what used to be the Supreme Council are split, and there is no clearly dominant figure among the Sunnis. This should make cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian alliances a far more important factor than they have been in the past.

The other Middle Easterners: The mood among the other Middle Easterners attending this session of the Middle East Institute’s Dialogue was likewise more sanguine and friendly than I would have anticipated. All, like the Iraqis, are glad to see the Islamic State dealt defeat in Iraq and Syria, even if they anticipate that it will go underground and re-emerge as an insurgency. All disapproved but seemed more puzzled than angry about President Trump’s announcement on moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. All were happy to see Iraq in a better place.

There the commonalities seemed to end. The Iranians, who in the past have sometimes appeared irascible, were calm and analytical as well as concerned that their victory in Syria brought responsibilities they would rather avoid and anxious for a political solution in Yemen. They also seemed concerned that Iran’s effort to defend itself by supporting Shia proxy forces in the region was at its limit.

The Saudis and Emiratis were enthused about the new direction Riyadh is taking not only in Iraq but also in Yemen and in domestic Saudi policy. Others from Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) were more reflective and a bit unsure what to make of the “new” Saudi Arabia. Several were concerned that the war is not really over: an Israeli or American attack on the Iranians or Hizbollah there could renew hostilities, not to mention the risk of an American clash with the Russians.

Unfortunately there were neither Turks nor Kurds in these group discussions. Had there been, the atmosphere and substance would have been more contentious. The uncertainty about American policy towards the Syrian Kurds is still big: will the Americans restrain them from attacking inside Turkey, or helping the Kurdish insurgents there? Will the Americans try to take back the heavier weapons they provided? Will the Americans withdraw precipitously? There are a lot of known unknowns that could affect the situation in Syria dramatically.

The extra-regional great powers: While a Moscow-based participant was quick to suggest that Russia had defeated ISIS, the Russians and Chinese were concerned, not happy, that post-ISIS Syria is their responsibility. They want the US involved, for both political and financial reasons. The Americans are showing no such inclination. Their assumption is that the Astana/Sochi process run by the Russians with cooperation from Iran and Turkey has superseded the Geneva process run by the UN to resolve the political conflict in Syria. They see no reason beyond defeating ISIS and possibly countering Iran for the American presence in Syria.

Bottom line: Despite the war in Yemen and the uncertainties surrounding how the war is ending in Syria, there is more reason to be sanguine about the region than people in Washington perceive. The bad news is it may not last.

 

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Will they build it?

Three questions arise about President Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem:

  • why did he do it?
  • what will the consequences be?
  • will it ever get built?

The why is domestic politics. He promised to do it during the campaign and his deepest-pocketed supporters wanted it done. The move gets a lot of support in the Christian evangelical community and far less among Jews, but the President needs concrete examples of fulfilling his campaign promises, many of which he has abandoned in office.

The opposition of allies and friends in Europe and the Middle East had little impact beyond inclusion in the announcement the assertion that it is not intended to prejudice a future decision on the boundaries of Jerusalem. That is specious, since he also implied that Jerusalem would remain undivided, which is the key issue. The announcement included nothing attractive from the perspective of Palestinians, Arabs, or Muslims more generally, which is why they see it as vitiating any potential role of the US as an honest broker in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

As for other consequences, we’ll have to wait and see. Protests are the least of it. There are many other longer-term possibilities. Trump has certainly cast doubt on the viability of the two-state solution most Israelis and Palestinians as well as the US and most of the rest of the world have been supporting for decades. Palestinians don’t want a state that doesn’t have its capital in Jerusalem any more than Israelis do.

If Palestinians can’t have their own state, they will seek equal rights within the single one, which will bring into doubt the state’s Jewish character. Arabs are likely the majority already, or soon will be, in the area Israel currently controls, if we count Gaza as well as the West Bank. The Israelis might want to give Gaza to Egypt, which controlled it in the past, but the Egyptians won’t take it: they don’t want to absorb a destitute Palestinian population that is in part Islamist. They’ve got enough trouble already in continuous Sinai.

The Trump administration is a radical one that enjoys upsetting the apple cart. The President likes to think this will open the way to progress. It is far more likely to end his own peace initiative, which son-in-law Kushner is heading. I even wonder whether, having realized that initiative was going no place, Trump decided to do something that would distract attention and engender enough violence so that its demise could be blamed on the Palestinians. But I suppose that just shows I’ve spent too much time lately in the Middle East, which loves conspiracy theories.

It is far more likely that ignorance and bullheadedness led to the decision to move the embassy. Now let’s see if Congress, which pushed for it, is ready to appropriate the several hundred million dollars it will cost to build the kind of fortress the United States will require in Jerusalem. Is it possible that we’ll suffer the consequences of this decision, but not see the facility built?

PS: For interesting Israeli responses to the Jerusalem move, see the short statements from Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

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Women are driving MENA social change

On November 15, the Middle East Institute hosted “Women’s Activism and Social Change,” the final panel of its annual conference. It brought together speakers Wafa Ben Hassine of AccessNow, Hind Aboud Kabawat of the Syrian High Negotiations Committee, Rania Al-Mashat of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Fawziah Bakr al-Bakr of Al Jazeera, and moderator Nafeesa Syeed of Bloomberg. Given recent developments in regard to the status and rights of women in various Arab countries, Syeed prompted the panelists to discuss the reception and impact of the changes, the concept of a “model” country, and how the role of women has changed since the Arab Uprisings.

Ben Hassine emphasized that changes in Tunisia have happened in response to internal developments over the last decade. She mentioned four changes for Tunisian women: the abrogation of Article 274, which had allowed for a rapist to marry his victim, the criminalization of  violence against women, the passage of a law allowing Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men, and a change in Tunisia’s inheritance law proposed by President Essebsi that would allow women equal inheritance. These much-celebrated developments have primarily been driven by civil society organizations, but Ben Hassine asserted it is important to contextualize them. Reforms this summer occurred against the backdrop of discussions surrounding Tunisia’s controversial reconciliation law, heightened effects of economic downturn, and the postponement of municipal elections. The reforms, by extension, were an opportunity for the president to reconnect with his “betrayed base” and improve his standing.

Kabawat explained that though Syrian women had freedoms before 2011, these were largely surface-level and did not include political participation. Since 2011, women have had to bear the brunt of the Syrian conflict. Because many men have been imprisoned, killed, or driven out by other factors, women now constitute the majority in refugee camps and have also been drawn into economic participation. Kabawat also noted high enthusiasm among Syrian women to be included in political discussions. After Geneva talks, for example, Kabawat’s team deliver workshops to Syrian women, briefing them on developments. The talks themselves now impose a 30% quota on women’s participation, an achievement that was the result of a two-year struggle for inclusion. Besides being instrumental to meaningful reconciliation and justice, the involvement of women also decreased sectarian barriers. Describing Syria as a “mosaic society,” Kabawat explained that women’s organizations have always intentionally included members from across sects and religions.

Turning to Saudi Arabia, al-Bakr explained that when the Kingdom’s 2030 transformation plan was announced, it was considered unrealistic. With recent developments, however, many feel that they are “living the dream.” Besides the recent lifting of the ban on women drivers, other developments include the opening of the national stadium to women, the dismantling the guardianship law, which currently requires that Saudi women obtain permission from a male guardian to travel or access different services, and the discussion of a law in the Shura Council that would ban any discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or nationality. Unlike other countries where there is more enthusiasm on the social level for the changes proposed, Saudi Arabia is witnessing more government will to take the initiative. Social will, she explained, needs to increase, and value systems need to change. This includes engaging religious institutions as well as men, who presently hold all powerful positions in the country.

The issue of religion as an obstacle was one that all three panelists discussed. Ben Hassine and al-Bakr emphasized the undeniable importance of religion to their societies. Ben Hassine highlighted the importance of religious research and discouraged closing mosques, because it encourages people to turn to less legitimate sources of information. She also proposed that new developments not be presented as clashing with Islamic law. In the case of the inheritance reforms, for example, Ben Hassine suggested that equality in inheritance be considered the legal default, with the Islamic way of dividing inheritance an option for families who wish to follow it. Al-Bakr applauded the Saudi government’s recent efforts to limit the influence of conservative interpretations, saying that this creates safe spaces for women. She also mentioned other efforts to reconcile religion with reform, such as a center established by King Salman to re-study the Hadith, or teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Kabawat stressed that it is not religion that is limiting women, but rather the general refusal of men to include women. Men on both ends of the spectrum–those who are extremely conservative and those who are extremely “progressive”–are to blame.

Al-Mashat noted that women’s participation is an issue that the IMF has labeled “macro-critical,” referring to the immense boost that it would give to global GDP. If women were equal to men in labor force participation, the GDP of Egypt would grow by 34%, the UAE by 14%, and Japan by 7%. Efforts to achieve such gains have been made–take the UAE’s new 30% quota in government boards.The exclusion of women in rural areas is a universal issue, as is the effect of freedom of expression in advancing women’s issues. The challenges are great, but so too is today’s progress across the Middle East in increasing women’s participation and recognizing their importance in creating and advancing social change.

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Something or nothing

Two of my favorite commentators on the Middle East differ diametrically about the impact on the Palestinians of the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel motivated by common enmity towards Iran. Hussein Ibish says the Saudi moves are unavoidable and will inevitably benefit the Palestinians, one way or another. Ibrahim Fraihat says the Saudi moves will end the Arab boycott of Israel and hurt the Palestinian national cause. Both agree the Saudis will have to get something for the Palestinians to make it possible to proceed in improving relations with Israel, but beyond that they differ. Who is right?

Ibrahim thinks the necessary something will be tactical–prisoner releases, financial assistance, and possibly a settlement freeze outside the larger settlement blocks–while Israel will gain the strategic objective of normalizing relations with Arab countries. Ibrahim also thinks the Saudi moves will make reconciliation of Palestine’s two major factions–Fatah and Hamas–more complicated and difficult.

Hussein thinks that something will be better than nothing, which is what the Palestinians have been getting for years. He also assumes the Israeli gains will be limited to things like civil aviation cooperation, not the broader gains Ibrahim assumes. Besides, the Palestinians have little choice but to play along with whatever President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, comes up with.

Who is right depends on what the Americans are cooking. Ibrahim is right that the “outside/in” approach they are apparently pursuing fragments the Arab peace initiative the Saudis have advocated for more than 15 years. Instead of one big bang solution, Palestinian statehood in exchange for normalization, the process would be broken into smaller, reciprocal steps leading inevitably to the same end. Hussein views this as an advantage, not a disadvantage. After all, the Arab peace plan has gone no place for a long time. Motion in the right direction, if sustained, leads inevitably to the right goal.

I’m not sure the Americans are cooking much, at least for the immediate future. The initial steps could in fact be very small and reversible, which is perhaps more important. The key to sustaining them is something we’ll see little of in public, though it was glimpsed last week in an interview with an Israeli general published in the Kingdom: security cooperation. If Saudi Arabia and Israel find mutual advantage in sharing intelligence about their common adversary, it could lead to broader security cooperation.

That however is where and when advantages to the Palestinians might evaporate. The Israelis will aim for the kind of security relationship they have with Egypt and Jordan: one in which the Arab countries gain so much to benefit their own security that they will hesitate to do anything their benefactor opposes, including support for a Palestine worthy of being called a state.

Palestine will need far more internal cohesion and fortitude than it has today to resist the pressures that could descend on it in the future. The Palestinians have been fortunate that the Israelis have been cool to the Arab peace initiative. That has meant Ramallah did not need to worry much about what kind of state the Israelis would accept. But a fragmented version of the initiative–Hussein says that version is called “concurrence” in the trade–presents greater need for foresight, good judgment, and coherence. Ibrahim could be right in the end, even if Hussein is right for now.

 

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