Tag: Egypt
Islamic law and human rights
The relationship between Islamic law and human rights is hotly debated as we watch the various political projects launched by Islamist groups in the Middle East, from political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood to terrorist groups such as ISIS. In response to these trends the Atlantic Council has launched an Islamic Law and Human Rights initiative to explore human rights violations by Arab states and non-state actors committed in the name of Islam. They hosted Monday a panel with Moataz El Fegiery, a human rights advocate from Front Line Defenders, and Hauwa Ibrahim of Harvard Divinity School.
In El Fegiery’s view Islamic law and human rights can be compatible but in practical application it comes down to the behavior and interests of the political actors capable of implementing Islamic law. There are two major trends among Islamic scholars trying to resolve the tension between Islamic law and human rights. One attempts to reconcile the two from within existing traditions of sharia, but this approach has limitations, especially in issues not previously prioritized in sharia such as gender equality and relations with non-Muslims. The second trend, which El Fegiery believes has greater potential, is a transformative approach introducing new interpretative methods or entirely new contextual readings of Islamic sources. The primary challenge this view faces is the inability to discuss such issues in the public sphere given censorship, blasphemy laws, and the power of the religious elite to shape public discourse.
Ibrahim shared observations of her interactions with Islamic law as a lawyer in Nigeria, where her clients included women sentenced to death by stoning. She believes Islamic law and human rights are compatible, but was frequently reprimanded by the religious establishment for her views of contextual religious interpretation. She noted vast differences in the application of Islamic law across countries and urged that we consider the cultural attitudes that inform these differences. It is wise to acknowledge the diversity of the Islamic world and the number of non-Arab Muslims that make up the global community. In response to a question regarding freedom of the press, specifically publishing images of the prophet, she noted that there is no clear answer. Given that these articles often have violent consequences the question of where one person’s freedom of speech begins and another’s ends must be a judgment call.
Both panelists agreed that in recent decades we have seen a decline in the robustness of debate among Islamic scholars due to censorship from both state and non-state actors. El Fegiery believes that we must create the conditions for an inclusive dialogue, including allowing for freedom of expression in the Islamic world. He also worries about religious education, where students are more likely to be indoctrinated in sharia law than be taught critical thinking skills. He believes with the appropriate social and political conditions we will gradually see a reformation occurring in Islamic thought allowing for the peaceful cohabitation of divergent views.
He’s finished
There were a lot of things Trump said in this third presidential debate that I disagreed with and lots more that undermined his claim to have the temperament and judgment to be president. But the coup de grâce for his campaign was his refusal say he would accept the outcome of the election. Here is the suicidal candidate, making a mockery of American democracy the day after the debate:
It has long been apparent that Trump lacks liberal democratic values. Witness his claim that an American-born judge is biased because of his Mexican heritage. Witness his pledge to put Clinton in jail if he wins. Witness his willingness to accept the support of white supremacists and anti-Semites. Trump’s world is one in which white and male privilege is a good thing, taxes are for others to pay, and illegal immigrants are manual labor to be exploited and deported. He is a self-declared law and order candidate with no respect for equal rights.
None of his anti-liberal stances have much affected Trump’s attractiveness to something close to 40% of the electorate. He will get most of those votes, apparently no matter what. The Republican party, sadly, will be reduced not to its core principles of less intrusive government and more private initiative, but rather to arbitrary government power and no respect for individual rights. How they are going to get out of that trap I don’t know.
To win Trump would need more. That’s where he failed last night. And that’s where his refusal to make it clear he will accept the election outcome hurts him the most. He has no chance of extending his reach to independents without respect for the electoral process he is participating in. Failing that respect, he will also lose a lot of Republican voters who know that the election is organized at the state level, where Republican governors and legislatures have if anything been over-vigilant in their effort to prevent almost non-existent voting fraud.
On foreign policy questions, especially Syria, Trump was mostly incoherent last night. He continues to wish for a good relationship with Vladimir Putin, which is ironically an attitude Hillary Clinton initially took as Secretary of State, only to find that her “reset” was unsuccessful. Trump also continues to refuse to acknowledge that Russia is responsible for hacking American emails, something he has urged Moscow to do. Neither candidate had much to say about China, though Trump emphasized its unfair trade practices (against which Obama has been retaliating) and seemed to think the US could somehow approach its claimed growth rate of 7% (actually 6.7%, and no one seems to believe that figure).
Trump even promised 5-6% growth in the US, achieved by lowering taxes on the rich and vastly expanding government spending for infrastructure.
Lots of foreign policy issues went unmentioned: vast areas like Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, current crisis areas like Ukraine and Libya (though Trump mentioned the latter in connection with ISIS, which has been largely defeated there), North Korea, the pending trade pacts in Pacific and with Europe (TTP and TTIP to the cognescenti), Egypt and Israel…. I hardly need to mention that my readers’ favorite part of the world, the Balkans, did not make the cut.
ISIS was a big deal in this debate. Trump blames its existence on Clinton, which is clearly nonsense. Even if you think the American withdrawal from Iraq opened space for it and choose to ignore Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s contribution and the impact of the war in Syria, the agreement to withdraw and the timing were decided in the George W. Bush administration, not by President Obama or Hillary Clinton. Neither Trump nor Clinton offered much idea what they would do about ISIS other than what is already being done. Clinton said she would not put US troops on the ground to stabilize Mosul. Trump did not make that commitment but instead insisted that the attack on Mosul should have been a sneak attack.
He hasn’t got a clue. You can’t move tens of thousands of troops into place, carpet the civilian population with leaflets urging them to shelter in place or rise against ISIS, begin to soften up the defenses with air attacks and artillery, and prepare for the inevitable displacement of people by constructing shelters for them to live in without alerting the enemy that something is up. Trump’s knowledge of how war is fought seems grounded in playing Risk with his kids.
I’m not willing to see him play Risk with the United States. Nor it seems are most of the American people. It’s a shame the election isn’t today, but millions have already voted early and many more will do so in coming days. The only good thing that can come of Trump’s candidacy is a resounding defeat.
Ain’t happening
Bill Burns, Michele Flournoy, and Nancy Lindborg unveiled this morning a report on U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility. It says all the right things: we should be strategic in choosing where we engage, systemic and selective in our engagement, and sustain the the effort for however long it takes. Its all about partnerships (within the US government, between the US government and fragile states, and within fragile states). The aim is inclusive, legitimate, accountable states. What’s to complain about?
My main complaint is that isn’t happening. Asked about the considerable capacity the US built up in Iraq and Afghanistan in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Bill replied that yes, we need to make sure that the experience acquired in the last 15 years is preserved. I don’t think the State Department could name even its own officers who had PRT jobs, never mind the many contractors and Defense Department people involved. Asked about how to deal with a country like Turkey that is turning towards autocracy, no one had much to say. Never mind Egypt. Audience members, not panelists, were quick to point out that President Obama’s budget requests have not emphasized fragile states or the programs aimed at repairing them.
The sad fact is that the Obama Administration has dismantled many of the capacities in the US government to deal with fragile states and reduced use of diplomatic leverage (sanctions, conditionality, etc.) to counter human rights violations and other international abuses associated with them. Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are all enjoying to one extent or another immunity. All these states fail to provide full inclusion to portions of their populations, but at least in public Washington has pulled its punches in order to achieve high priority security objectives. We are seeing in South Sudan the results of immunity. When will we seem them in Rwanda? What do you do when local authorities simply aren’t willing to acknowledge or act on the problems we see all to clearly?
The two positive examples the study provides are instructive: Colombia and Myanmar. Plan Colombia was extraordinarily expensive and sustained over a long period, but the study group rightly emphasizes the importance of local political and financial commitment. The October 2 referendum on the peace agreement is still pending, but we can hope things will turn out all right. Myanmar has been far less expensive, but the outcome is still in doubt. It will be at least another 5-10 years before we can really say whether it has been able to overcome its internal conflicts and make the transition to a democratic state and society.
How do we get to the point of being able to make such long-term commitments?
The Study Group wants a strategic foresight cell at the National Security Council, consultation with Congress to identify priority fragile states and provide necessary resources, and personnel policies intended to enhance interagency cooperation. It also wants to expand the partnership model based on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, build local capacity in fragile states, and increase US government capabilities in a grab bag of areas: security sector reform, conflict mediation, anti-corruption, assistance to support peaceful elections, civil society support, public-private partnerships, sanctions implementation, international education and exchanges, as well as the de rigeur learning and evaluation.
I’m fine with all of this, even if I’d have included things this report skips. I’d certainly want to think about whether our current institutions–State, Defense and AID–are suitable to the tasks defined. I doubt it. I would also want a much clearer definition of the end states we should seek in fragile states–that among other things is what makes the New Deal compelling. “Inclusive, legitimate, accountable” are nice, but how would we recognize them? What is required to achieve them? What indicators are most appropriate, or are they entirely context dependent?
But my main concern is just that it ain’t happening.
This protest is not enough
I co-signed an “open letter” that protests media treatment in Turkey of Henri Barkey as well as other intimidation of scholars by Middle Eastern governments and media. It ends with this paragraph:
We find the Turkish media’s campaign against Henri Barkey, the latest in a series of outrages against academic and political freedom, offensive and personally threatening. We hope that Turkey’s leaders and the press that serves them will reverse course otherwise we will find it difficult to engage in any way with the Turkish government, its media outlets, or nominally independent organizations in Washington that work on behalf of Turkey’s leadership.
On reflection, there are two things I should have raised with my colleagues who drafted this letter:
- The focus on foreign scholars and journalists. There are lots of Turks, not to mention Egyptians and others, who are suffering even worse abuse than the foreigners. Solidarity with them is just as important as protesting mistreatment of Americans.
- Whether the threat to disengage from the Turkish government and affiliated media and other organizations is wise. My hunch is that the Turkish government doesn’t give a hoot about our engagement and might welcome cutting it off, as it would make repression of Turkey’s own dissenters easier.
Both of these shortcomings in the letter are reparable. I hereby set out to repair them.
The post coup failure crackdown in Turkey has gone too far in arresting and intimidating Turkish scholars and journalists, who have far less recourse than the foreigners. Academic and media institutions outside Turkey should keep the focus on this unwarranted repression and also prepare to welcome the refugees escaping it who are sure to begin leaking out of a country that is all too clearly establishing an illiberal electoral autocracy.
As for cutting off engagement, I’ll be inclined at least initially not to do that, but rather to use every interaction with Turkish officials and government supporters to express concern about the course their country has chosen. I know from my 21 years as a diplomat that such complaints do in fact reverberate inside an offending government and give courage to those who are oppressed. That is important too.
Liberal democracy at risk
The handwriting is on many walls. Liberal democracy and the world order it has built since World War II are at risk. Equal rights, political pluralism and rule of law are being challenged from several directions.
We see it in Brexit, which aims explicitly to restore borders, reject immigrants and implicitly to end the liberal democratic establishment’s monopoly on governing power. We see it in Trump, who aims at similar goals. We see it in Putin, Erdogan and Sisi, who are selling the idea that concentrated power and restrictions on freedom will deliver better and more goods and services. We see it in China, which likewise aims to maintain the Communist Party’s monopoly on national political power while allowing markets to drive growth. No need to mention Hungary’s Orbán, Macedonia’s Gruevski, Poland’s Szydło and other democratically elected leaders who turn their backs on liberal democratic values once in power, in favor of religion, nationalism or ethnic identity.
Among the first victims are likely to be two bold efforts at freeing up trade and investment and promoting growth by removing barriers and encouraging globalization: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the US as well as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was intended to do something similar in the Pacific Basin. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have said they are opposed to TPP. It is hard to picture TTIP proceeding while the EU is negotiating its divorce from the United Kingdom.
We have seen assaults on liberal democracy and its associated world order in the past. Arguably that is what World War II was about, at least in part. Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Mussolini’s Italy offered Fascist, autocratic responses to relatively liberal democracy in Britain, France, Germany and the United States. The Soviet Union, which fought with the Allies against Fascism, offered a Communist alternative that survived the war and engaged in the Cold War standoff with liberal democracies for almost 45 years thereafter, one that involved proxy wars, Communist and anti-Communist puppets, and the enormous risk of nuclear holocaust. The history of fights between liberal democracy and its antagonists is fraught with war, oppression, and prolonged authoritarianism.
It wasn’t that long ago, when the Berlin wall fell, that liberal democracy seemed overwhelmingly likely to win worldwide. The end of history didn’t last long. The two big challenges liberal democracy now faces are Islamist extremism and capitalist authoritarianism. These are both ideological and physical challenges. Putinism is an authoritarian style of governance that sends warplanes, naval ships and troops to harass and occupy its neighbors and adversaries. The same can be said of Xi Jinping’s China, which is making the South China Sea into its backyard and harassing its neighbors.
The Islamist extremist challenge comes above all from Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which are competing with each other even as they destroy fragile states like Libya, Yemen and Syria. Iraq appears to be winning its fight, though it is likely to face a virulent insurgency even after it ends Islamic State control over parts of its territory. The outcome is unlikely to be liberal democratic. Many other states face that kind of insurgent Islamist threat: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Somalia, and Tunisia, to name but a few.
But the biggest threat to liberal democracy today comes from inside the liberal democracies themselves. Islamist terror has killed relatively few people, apart from 9/11. Popular overreaction to Islamist threats, immigration and globalization could bring to power people with little commitment to liberal democratic values in the United States, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and elsewhere. They will seek to reestablish borders, slow or end immigration, impose draconian laws to root out terrorists, and restore trade barriers in the hope of regaining lost industries.
Another challenge, peculiar to the US, seems to be emerging: black insurgents with guns who think they are retaliating against police for abuse of black citizens. This is bound to elicit a law and order response the could even bring a real threat to liberal democracy in Washington: Donald Trump in the presidency. If the protests in Cleveland this week are not disciplined and peaceful, it could put real wind in his sails.
The menace to liberal democracy is real. If we want pluralism, human rights and the rule of law, we are going to have to take some risks. I find it an easy choice, but many of my compatriots seem inclined to lean in the other direction.
28 pages, the Turkey coup and Nice
Those are the issues dominating the headlines this morning. The common thread: they all reflect in one way or another the secularist reaction to Islamist politics.
Islamism has become the main political event of our time, because we have made it so. The Nice attacker, like the Orlando one, seems to have been only loosely, if at all, affiliated with the Islamic State or any other extremist movement. Both were more loser than Islamist. Until fairly recently, we might have attributed their acts to mental illness rather than politics. Today, it would be hard for a Muslim in the West to commit mass murder without its being attributed to Islam.
Turkey’s coup attempt likely originated within the anti-Muslim Brotherhood currents of Turkish politics, including the Gulen movement. Its failure will enormously strengthen the hand of President Erdogan, whose Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political party will continue to broaden the powers of the presidency as it reduces the opportunities for political dissent. There is nothing like an attempted coup to give an aspiring autocrat more opportunity to gain control over the levers of power.
The 28 newly published pages of preliminary investigative material on 9/11 shed little new light on possible connections between Saudi Arabia and the plotters of the attack. Despite the efforts of the Kingdom’s American public relations consultants, they will nevertheless stimulate the appetite of anti-Muslim forces in the US, who have already entertained us for several days with their approval of Newt Gingrich’s proposal for a Shariah litmus test for American Muslims. Like the attempted coup in Turkey, this Christian chauvinism is bound to strengthen those they attack.
We need to stop helping our adversaries. Islamic extremists are a real threat. But mistaking Erdogan, the Nice and Orlando attackers, and even the Saudis for the real thing is foolish and counter-productive. That lumps together apples and oranges and labels them extremists. It magnifies the problem and reduces our own capabilities to deal with it, by spreading them far too thin. We need to keep the focus where it belongs: on the weak states of the Middle East that are breeding social pathology, calling it Islam and killing mostly Muslims.
Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen are cases in point. These are the weak states whose collapse has made room for extremism to flourish. The Islamic State and Al Qaeda that exist there are not a bunch of crazed individuals, but rather well-organized insurgencies against the existing state system. They are doing far more damage in the Middle East than the occasional sympathizer or wannabe causes in France or Florida.
Erdogan should not be counted among the Islamist extremists. He an Islamist, but democratically elected. He proposes autocracy as the response to all threats, as does Egypt’s President Sisi. They are peas from different ideological pods, but peas nevertheless. As we have seen already in Egypt and will now see in Turkey, their answers to the Islamist threats will not be adequate. Autocracy may squelch secularism, but it is unlikely to stamp out Islamic extremism, as Sisi should by now have discovered. Islamic extremism has far deeper roots in the Middle East. It is there that it most needs to be fought, not only with military means.