Tag: Egypt
The path of civil resistance
Thursday the United States Institute of Peace held a talk on “Civil Resistance and Peacebuilding: How They Connect.” The panelists included Maria Stephan, USIP Senior Policy Fellow, Manal Omar, Acting Vice President for USIP’s Center for Middle East and Africa and Kerri Kennedy, Associate General Secretary for International Programs at American Friends Service Committee. The event was moderated by Nancy Lindborg, President of USIP.
Stephan introduced the concept of non-violent civil resistance by comparing it to traditional peacebuilding. The former intensifies conflict in an attempt to shift power so as to get to a point of meaningful negotiation. Civil resistance ripens conflicts for conflict resolution. The latter mitigates and deescalates conflicts using techniques such as dialogue, mediation and problem-solving. Both approaches are different but fall under means of conflict transformation.
Stephan also produced empirical data on the efficacy of non-violent resistance compared to armed struggles. She looked at 323 campaigns in 1900-2006 in which at least 1000 people were involved in fighting against dictatorships and for territorial self-determination. She held constant any thing that would determine the conflict’s outcome, such as GDP, military might of the opponent or regime and socioeconomic divisions in society. The results showed that non-violent resistance campaigns outperformed their armed competitors by 2:1.
Additionally Stephan’s empirical research showed society is better off after the struggle if non-violent methods are employed. Non-violent campaigns are strongly correlated with democratic consolidation. The probability a country will be a democracy five years after a campaigns ends is 57% among non-violent movements against less than 6% among successful violence campaigns. Also, the likelihood of recurrence to civil war for violent campaigns is almost double that for non-violent campaigns.
Kennedy spoke about the relationship between civil resistance, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Although there may be tension among the three elements, Kennedy believes a strategy works best when all the elements are incorporated. She added that often peacebuilding and civil resistance are happening at the same time, as opposed to sequentially. For example, in Egypt it wasn’t just a quick social movement that lead to the fall of Mubarak’s regime—decades of effort led to the large social movement. Kennedy also advocated dialogue first to bring about a solution, but warned that it’s rare for dialogue to work on its own without the pressure of mobilization.
Omar elaborated on the challenges of civil resistance as a form of conflict transformation. One issue is redirecting people’s anger towards productive efforts. A person who uses his or her anger to call for social justice is a good thing, but it’s difficult to prevent that anger from morphing into violence. Similarly, defectors from the security apparatus don’t want to put their arms down when they join non-violent resistance movement, which leads to the lines blurring between violence and non-violence. Omar called for the international community to provide people more alternatives, so they don’t turn to violence. Too many people have been disillusioned with the failure of the “ballot box over bullet,” but lack peaceful, constructive options for conflict transformation.
Omar also commented on the importance of transitional justice in post-conflict situations. Many countries in transition begin state building without ensuring accountability, which prompts these countries to slide back into civil wars. Sometimes the international community pushes transitional states towards creating a constitution, holding elections and essentially meeting indicators of success without addressing transitional justice. The consequence is the loss of support from people who were dedicated to the non-violent cause from the beginning because they don’t see justice served.
All three panelists emphasized that the civil resistance path is long and obscure at times. Kennedy claimed the importance of small community steps should not be dismissed. It is necessary to debunk the myth that violent intervention is fast and effective, when it’s actually very messy. Omar added that the regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia were the result of years of mobilizing, organizing groups, training, making mistakes and learning from them. They weren’t merely 25-day struggles. Stephan said that civil resistance encompasses more than protests, demonstrations and boycotts, it also involves social audits, community monitoring and creating parallel structures and institutions, which can empower the nation-building process.
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Yes, a nuclear deal means trouble
I am a proponent of a good nuclear deal with Iran. But I have taken some time this week to appreciate Israel’s perspective. Here is what I have understood and how I react.
The Israelis are concerned with the geostrategic impact of a deal with Iran that will accept and thereby legitimize its enrichment program. Other countries in the region that have in the past been constrained from pursuing enrichment will now proceed, in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Whereas Turkey may be a more or less consolidated democracy, it is unpredictable who might come to power in the Kingdom or Egypt and what they might do with nuclear technology.
At the same time, Iran’s pernicious proxies in the region–until now deterred by Israel’s military capabilities–will be emboldened and enriched with resources once multilateral sanctions are lifted. Iran doesn’t much care about US sanctions. The ideology of the regime requires that the US remain an enemy. It will be sufficient for Europe, Russia and China to begin doing business with Tehran to put lots of money in its pockets. Any help the US gets from Iran and its proxies in fighting the Islamic State will be short-lived.
Everyone in the region, not just Israel, will feel less secure. An arms race will ensue. The buying spree will put advanced weapons into the hands of regimes that are not stable or reliable. No one knows where they will end up.
American reassurances are dubious. One hundred per cent access to Iranian facilities is impossible. No country has ever provided it. Iran won’t either. Nor can sanctions “snap back.” Neither the Russians nor the Chinese will agree to a mechanism that they are unable to block.
In my view, these preoccupations all have their validity. The trouble is the outcomes feared are likely whether there is an agreement or not. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are already under no legal restraint from enriching uranium whenever they please. Multilateral sanctions are unlikely to survive much longer, due to Chinese and European hunger for oil and gas as well as their interest in exporting to Iran. Arms have been pouring into the Gulf countries as well as Egypt and Jordan for years. There is already no lack of advanced equipment in hands that may or may not be reliable.
On top of all that, no agreement means no inspections and no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. That is worse than the ample access to Iran’s nuclear program, and serious constraints, that an agreement will have to provide.
It is hard not to see the Israeli preoccupations as nostalgia for a region that they dominated for decades. Iran was marginalized, the Arabs were under America’s thumb, and Israel could do, and did, as it liked.
But that is not the eternal order in the Middle East. There is no way to keep Iran in its diminished position, much as we might like to try. Nor are the Arabs inclined to remain under American control. The prospect of a nuclear deal is ironically inclining them more than ever before to make common cause with Israel against Iran, whatever the Americans think. Just think what would happen if the Israelis were to settle with the Palestinians!
The bottom line: Israel wanted Iran to be forced to give up enrichment and will be satisfied with nothing less. But that was unlikely at best and impossible at worst.
Provided the verification mechanisms in any nuclear deal reached in the next few days are robust, including accounting for past military dimensions, all of us will need to learn to live with a still non-nuclear-armed Iran that is less constrained and more flush with cash than in the recent past. We’ll also need to be prepared to deter and counter its troublemaking, at least until someone who doesn’t see America as an enemy governs in Tehran.
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Independence and interdependence
It is Independence Day in the US, which marks 239 years since the representatives of the thirteen colonies declared in 1776:
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.
The war that had begun the year before at Lexington and Concord (Massachusetts) continued, ending only in 1781 at Yorktown (Virginia). The peace was signed only in 1783 in Paris.
The United States and the United Kingdom fought again in 1812-15, but the UK did not intervene in the American civil war. By then British sentiment was mainly anti-slavery but the UK still relied on cotton produced in the Confederacy and feared industrial competition from the American north. It was only in the 1890s, more than a hundred years after the revolution, that America’s familiar friendly ties with the UK began to be established.
I tell this story not only because it is July 4, but also because it provides perspective on some of today’s problems. Kosovo and South Sudan are the world’s newest “independent” states. It would be easy to bemoan their current situations. Kosovo is suffering from economic doldrums and serious corruption. South Sudan is suffering a ferocious civil war that overshadows the economic doldrums and corruption that would otherwise be much in evidence.
Neither country is yet 10 years old. Kosovo has made good progress in normalizing its relations with Serbia, which is potentially Kosovo’s biggest market and its most obvious security threat. Khartoum may be aggravating South Sudan’s problems, but they are mainly internal. If only because of the Nile, which flows through both, Sudan and South Sudan will need eventually to establish what the Europeans like to call “good neighborly relations.”
Other trouble spots in the Middle East are also relatively young independent states: Libya (1951), Egypt (nominally 1922, but British troops didn’t leave until 1956), Yemen (British soldiers left in 1967, but the current state dates from the unification of north and south in 1990), Syria (1945) and Iraq (1932). They are suffering mainly from internal conflict, all too often precipitated or aggravated by outside powers. It is tempting to think that 100 years is still a reasonable time frame for state consolidation. Some of these states may not make it to that milestone.
Ukraine is in a similar situation. It achieved independence only in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It would have had internal problems in any event, but Russia has aggravated them by annexing Crimea and invading two of Ukraine’s eastern provinces.
Independence is hard, but many countries figure out how to govern themselves if left to their own devices. It is the interdependence dimension that often causes problems. The Saudi/Iranian rivalry has aggravated internal conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Egypt and Libya have generated most of their own problems, which Islamic State affiliates are exploiting.
I can only wish that the evolution in the Middle East will follow the course that US/UK relations took, with many ups and downs, during the 19th century. Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are doing so much to fuel conflict today, have good reason to come to terms. Both are spending too much to achieve too little in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. ISIS challenges them both. It is not hard to imagine a positive-sum outcome to their current negative-sum rivalries. Interdependence may be hard, but it is a lot better than war.
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Contrasting perspectives on Yemen
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Thursday hosted a panel discussion on “The Conflict in Yemen: Searching for the Endgame.” Panelists included Fahad Nazer, a political analyst with the intelligence consulting firm JTG and formerly at the Saudi Arabian embassy in DC, as well as Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani, the president of TAWQ (a democracy organization), the vice president of the Khobara Center (a Sana’a-based think tank), and an advisor for Human Rights Watch. The discussion was moderated by Ambassador Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington and the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen from 2007-2010.
Fahad Nazer and Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani presented different perspectives on the conflict. Nazer emphasized the Saudi view that the Houthis represent Iranian encroachment into Saudi Arabia’s backyard, while Al-Iryani expressed the view that the Houthis’ concerns are mainly domestic and that links between Iran and the Houthis are tenuous.
Nazer detailed Saudi Arabia’s history of conflict mediation in both Yemen and the Lebanese Civil War. The Kingdom has historically been reluctant militarily intervene in Yemen for fear of a repeat of Gamel Abdel Nasser’s disastrous decision to commit Egyptian ground troops there in the 1960s. The Arab Spring, Nazer asserted, caught Saudi Arabia by surprise. The fall of Mubarak, one of the Saudis’ closest allies, coupled with President Obama’s reluctance to intervene in Syria and increased Iranian influence in the Arab world, compelled the Saudis to take a more proactive foreign policy stance.
The combination of an unraveling Yemeni state, Zaidi militants in the north and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the south made Saudi military intervention in Yemen inevitable. Nazer does not view Saudi Arabia’s recent foreign policy shift as a product of Saudi Arabia’s new leadership, but argued instead that the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been more gradual. He cited Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the Bahraini uprising of 2011 as foreshadowing the shift.
Al-Iryani detailed three factors that had prevented Yemen from descending into civil war between 2011 and 2014: the legitimacy of President Hadi’s regime, the balance of power between opposing forces in Yemen, and the international consensus that Yemen’s stability must be preserved. In a national dialogue that occurred from March 2013 to January 2014, Hadi only offered the Zaidis control over limited resource-poor territory. In Al-Iryani’s view, offering so little to the Zaidis, who comprised Yemen’s ruling elite for centuries, was a grave mistake. Unified and led by the Houthis, Zaidis took up arms against President Hadi, whose legitimacy was undermined. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh capitalized on the situation by allying himself with the Houthis.
According to Al-Iryani, the Saudi military intervention could have had the positive effect of restoring the balance of power in Yemen and bringing the Houthis to the negotiating table. But it has gone on too long. Yemenis increasingly resent the Saudi intervention. The conflict in Yemen is not wholly sectarian like most other regional conflicts, because some Sunnis aligned with Saleh are fighting alongside the Houthis. If the conflict continues, it could take on an explicitly sectarian dimension.
Al-Iryani believes that the Saudis should stop their military intervention as soon as possible and enter into negotaitions with the Houthis. The Houthis would settle for dominance in the historic Zaidi strongholds of North Yemen. Their domestic demands can be accommodated through negotiations.
According to Al-Iryani, Iranian support for the Houthis is marginal and limited to intelligence sharing and the presence of some Houthi students in Qom. A Houthi delegation sent to Tehran to discuss economic assistance came back nearly empty-handed. The Saudi view that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy is exaggerated. This view damages the previous international consensus that preserving Yemen’s stability is paramount.
Nazer, by contrast, disputed Al-Iryani’s assertion that the Houthis would be willing to settle for control over the historic Zaidi lands. The Houthis are firing rockets into southern Saudi Arabia. According to Nazer, this fact–combined with bellicose Hezbollah-type rhetoric on the part of the Houthis–justifies the suspicions of the Saudi media that the Houthis are not interested in a power-sharing arrangement. Nazer also cited the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah personnel in Yemen as evidence of more substantial Iranian meddling in the conflict.
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A snapshot of Sisi’s Egypt
I’ve spent the last few days in Cairo, where little has visibly changed since my visits in September 2011 (something like a revolution was still in progress then) and January 2014, when I observed the referendum that approved the current constitution (over 98% of those 39% who voted were in favor). The city still bussles day and night, the Nile flows gently, the traffic is only marginally better behaved then in 2011, the air is hot, dusty and polluted, the contrasts of rich and poor are still dramatic.
I haven’t spent any quality time talking to ordinary Egyptians. Mostly I’ve been hearing from the educated and sometimes wealthy elite that supports President Sisi’s efforts to restore order and improve the economy, without (at least for now) expanding civil liberties.
The predominant sentiment towards the US among those I talked with is resentment. Egypt, they think, deserves better and more than it is getting from the US, which was slow to recognize that former President Morsi had lost legitimacy and quick to suspend aid. Washington follows a “double standard.” It provides too much support to Israel and too little to the Arabs, especially the Palestine and Egypt.
The Americans are also failing to counter Iranian troublemaking in the region, failing to stop financing for the Islamic State, failing to bring down Bashar al Assad or support the intervention against the Houthi (sic), and failing to recognize the peril of the Muslim Brotherhood. The US government, some think, may even be playing a role in supporting one or more of these malign factors in the region.
Lack of confidence in official America is coupled with an all too apparent affection for American society and hunger for American culture, education, technology, trade and investment. Sisi’s Egypt is hoping to upgrade Egypt’s technical and educational levels and improve its economy, in part through cooperation with the US, while continuing its crackdown on nongovernmental organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood, street demonstrations and media.
The model is a technocratic one: use expertise and money effectively while blocking political challenges.
Some Egyptians characterize the Middle East today as “a Fascist moment.” They argue there can be no compromise with the Islamic State, or those in the Muslim Brotherhood or elsewhere who take up arms against state structures, anywhere in the region. The Arabs need to reassert themselves, resist the American intention of empowering Iran, and join together to counter foreign hegemony, including by forming the united Arab army Egypt has proposed.
The Egyptians I heard from welcome the upcoming bilateral “strategic dialogue” with the US, which is supposed to meet in July. They hope this will be an opportunity to reframe the relationship in a way that will be more satisfactory to Egypt and less dominated by the US. Cairo will try to convince the Americans that the Muslim Brotherhood is in fact a terrorist organization and that a broad crackdown is therefore justified. Some might be ready to give a little on NGOs and street demonstrations, though resentment of American “interference” in these internal matters is strong. Building an effective regional counterweight to Iran will be an important part of the conversation, as will be moving the relationship more definitively in the direction of trade and investment (a free trade agreement is one possibility).
While privatization and other structural economic reforms seem still far off, the Egyptians are reasonably pleased with what President Sisi has achieved so far, including reduction of subsidies and his flagship project to expand the capacity of the Suez Canal. They hope a more stable and prosperous Egypt will mean return to a leading regional role in the future, even without more political opening.
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Peace picks March 30-April 3
- General Wesley Clark: Exclusive Briefing from Ukraine’s Front Lines | Monday, March 30th | 4:30-6:00 PM | The Atlantic Council| REGISTER TO ATTEND General Clark, former NATO Allied Commander will discuss his time in Ukraine from where he just returned, met with Ukrainian military commanders and President Petro Poroshenko.
- Salafists and Sectarianism: Twitter and Communal Conflict in the Middle East | Tuesday March 31st | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Social media has a powerful effect on much of what happens in the world today. From inciting people to join protests on the streets of Cairo to recruiting young girls to join ISIS, social media can be seen as both a blessing and a curse. A close analysis of their Twitter accounts opens a window into their universe and the strategies they are using to increase animosity toward the Shi’a, who they believe are not real Muslims. Speakers include: Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center , and Khalil al Anani, Adjunct Professor at School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
- To Vote or Not to Vote: Egypt’s Diverse Electorate | Tuesday, March 31st| 12:00-1:30 PM | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Egyptians have gone to the polls eight times since the 2011 uprising. The latest round of polling, set to begin on March 22, was delayed by a Supreme Constitutional Court committee ruling on the constitutionality of the election law. Voter turnout and enthusiasm has ebbed and flowed but coverage of Egypt’s voters has often painted them with a broad brush, categorizing the electorate as a heterogeneous mass. How will political parties tackle the challenge of engaging voters and exploiting the motivations of different factions? Speakers include: Sarah El Sirgany is a Cairo-based journalist and television producer, contributing to regional and international publications and networks including CNN, the New York Times, Al-Monitor, and Mada Masr. Reem Awny Abu-Zaid manages the “Egypt and Elections” project at the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute. Sahar F. Aziz is President of the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association.
- Europe and the Iran Negotiations: EES Seminar Series | Tuesday, March 31st | 6:00-8:00 PM | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND| Ms. Valerie Lincy is Executive Director of the Wisconsin Project, and will discuss the topic. She oversees the Project’s two principal projects, the Risk Report database and the Iran Watch website. She provides training as head of the Risk Report team that visits foreign countries. As the editor and principal investigator for Iran Watch, she bears the main responsibility for building, populating and maintaining the site, as well as writing articles for publication, organizing and presiding at roundtables, and conducting associated research.
- Deal or No Deal? Negotiating with Iran | Wedensday, April 1st | 10:00-11:30 AM | Brookings Institute |REGISTER TO ATTEND| Talks aimed at producing a political framework to resolve the Iran nuclear issue are likely to come down to the wire before the deadline at the end of March, but already leaders in the United States and Iran are facing an intense debate among key constituencies at home. Iranian hardliners have criticized potential regime concessions, while opponents of a deal in the U.S. Congress are advancing legislation that could undermine the Obama administration’s ability to implement an agreement.
- Making Sense of Chaos in the Middle East: Multiple Wars, Multiple Alliances | Wednesday, April 1st | 12:00-1:30 | Washington Institute for Near East Policy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Volcanic changes in the region are under way, with the outbreak of Sunni-Shiite wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, unprecedented tension between Washington and Israel, and U.S.-Iranian nuclear talks that appear on the verge of breakthrough. Speakers include: James Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, Dennis Ross, Robert Satloffis the Institute’s executive director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy and Michael Singh.
- Iraq: Now and After ISIS | Thursday, April 2nd | 12:00-1:00 PM | The Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ambassador Sumaida’ie, who recently returned from Iraq, will discuss the evolution of the struggle in Iraq is both complex and consequential. The outcome is going to be a major factor in determining the future shape of the region, and will have a significant impact on global geopolitics. The United States as well as other players should have a clear eyed assessment of where things are heading, and what needs to be done if the direction of events is not palatable.
- ISIS and al-Qaeda: Assessing Terrorist Threats to the Homeland and Beyond | Thursday, April 2nd | 12:30-2:00 PM | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND| The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (also known as ISIS) as a violent extremist group with global aspirations has raised concerns over a potential terrorist attack on US soil. As ISIS pursues its objective of establishing a state in various parts of the Middle East, it continues to recruit foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe in order to plan for attacks against the West. Recently, Belgian and Australian authorities uncovered ISIS-inspired cells on their territories and succeeded in foiling terrorist plots. So could the US homeland be an ISIS target? Speakers include: Bruce Hoffman, Director, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Bruce Riedel, Director of the Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution and a welcome by Barry Pavel, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council.
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