Tag: Egypt
The Muslim Brotherhood’s bleak future
The Muslim Brotherhood experienced its fall from grace in Egypt just one year ago with President Morsi’s removal. The once highly organized and hierarchical party is now shattered, bringing into question the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party. On Monday, the Middle East Institute hosted “The Muslim Brotherhood: Between the Path of Ennahda and the Threat of the Islamic State” with panelists Alison Pargeter, Hassan Mneimneh, and Eric Trager. They came to a consensus that the Muslim Brotherhood has weakened, especially in Egypt, and its strategy has become disjointed. It is currently unlikely to succeed in gaining power either in Egypt or in Syria.
The future of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is questionable after the violent clashes and unprecedented crackdown this past year. Pargeter, author of The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, said that the party has faced significant challenges over the past twelve months in internalizing its overthrow and moving forward to regain legitimacy. It has had to face depleted finances, party leader arrests, and distrust from the public.
The current strategy has been to act defensively and shift blame away from the Brotherhood. The discourse of self-preservation has been far from successful. The international community has moved on—Sisi has taken power and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is crippled. It is trying to give the impression that the fight is still going on, but is it has not found a viable path back to political power.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has always struggled in articulating its ideology. It is now more important than ever, as the future of the party depends on institutional reform and transparency. A genuine change in political culture will be necessary if the Brotherhood is ever to gain power again. The cycle of competition between the military and political Islam will need to change if Egypt is to ever move forward, which Pargeter concluded could ultimately take more than a decade.
Trager, Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, discussed the role and future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The party was founded in 1946 and had a tumultuous history throughout the past several decades. It was exiled in 1982 after a violent uprising, which ultimately forced the leadership to reshape its chain of command and membership strategy.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has now had to focus entirely on organizational maintenance, such as funding livelihoods and housing for its members. It is still a wealthy organization but has become very weak within Syria since its exile. It faces significant long-term challenges and is preoccupied with maintenance rather than politics. The organization will have to gain significant support within Syria if it is to ever acquire political power.
Mneimneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, said that Tunisians don’t want what happened in Egypt and Syria to play out in their countries. Ennahda has been the only true success story among the three. It is making strides towards democratic practice.
The Ennahda leader has spoken with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regarding how to seek compromise. There ultimately needs to be an acceptance of diversity and inclusivity in Egypt rather than focusing on one party at the exclusion of the others. Ennahda is working to break the three main characteristics of politics in the region: paternalism, tribalism and elitism. It aims at broader pariticipation in government. This approach has proven far more successful than the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach in Egypt or Syria.
The Muslim Brotherhood has had a tumultuous few years and it is unlikely that it will gain power in Egypt or Syria anytime soon. It is preoccupied with its own survival. With no coherent strategy, there isn’t much hope for the Egyptian and Syrian branches moving forward.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Gaza agonistes
Israel early this morning approved a truce in Gaza, with talks in Cairo to follow. Hamas has not responded yet. It is time to ask what Israel’s week-long air offensive and Hamas’ rocket barrage have achieved. What military or political objectives were advanced?
Israel’s stated military objective was to end the threat of rocket attacks from Gaza once and for all. It still seems far from that goal. No more than 20% of Hamas’ rockets are thought to have been used or destroyed. Weeks, perhaps months, more of air attacks would be required to get close to the literal goal of Operation Protective Edge. Some think a ground invasion would also be necessary. The last time Israel did that the war lasted three weeks in 2008-9.
A possible alternative to a ground invasion is what Israel was preparing to do over the last few days in northern Gaza: urge the civilian population to leave limited areas and use special forces to attack only specific locations where rockets, launchers or their minders reside, without trying to hold territory. This approach might yield the results of a ground attack without its burdens, though the risks to the special forces are significant.
Hamas’ objective was to continue the rocket attacks as a signal of political resistance. Hamas has no clear military objective. The thousand or so rockets launched so far have caused no significant damage (and haven’t killed anyone). But the rocket fire unnerves the Israeli population and brings on air attacks that Hamas uses to rally both Palestinian and international sympathy and support. From Hamas’ perspective, prolonging the air attacks is a good thing, provided Israel is unable to stop or siginficantly slow the rocket fire. It is still possible Hamas will refuse the truce and talks Egypt has proposed.
This is a formula for a long war, even if the truce goes into effect. Israel will continue because it wants to destroy the rockets. Hamas will continue because it wants the support and sympathy the air attacks bring. Egypt and the United States, which combined forces to end the 2012 eight-day air/rocket war between Hamas and Israel, are less likely to be effective this time around: President Sisi because Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, the Americans because they seem to have lost their grip on Prime Minister Netanyahu. President Obama has offered American mediation, but no one has seemed interested.
What has all this got to do with last month’s murder of three Israeli teenagers and the apparent revenge murder of a Palestinian-American teenager? Nothing really. As in many other international incidents, the trigger that precipitated war is now mostly forgotten. The conflict has a dynamic of its own and is unlikely to stop until both sides start seeing diminishing returns.
Where does that leave those of us who think adding this war to the mess in the Middle East is not a good idea? And what comfort is there for the civilian populations involved?
The region is ablaze. Civil wars rage in Syria and Iraq, Libya and Yemen are a short step from joining them, Lebanon and Jordan are at risk, Egypt is restoring military dictatorship and repressing domestic resistance. The Americans are preoccupied with trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran (next Sunday is the initial deadline, extendable in principle by six months, if need be). This is not a good time for yet another Middle East conflict.
It is particularly bad for civilians. The numbers of casualties so far in the Israel/Gaza war are relatively small–according to the Palestinians, the Israeli air attacks have killed fewer than 200 people, about half of them allegedly civilians. Considering the amount of ordnance dropped, this is a remarkably small number, but more or less ten times as many have been injured. A few more weeks of this and the numbers would no longer look small. And each one represents a family tragedy, with future consequences.
Social conditions in Gaza were already dramatic. Its demographic, economic, educational, nutritional, and housing conditions were all worsening, from an already distressed state. The war will accelerate the deterioration. Israelis may get some relief eventually from Hamas rocket attacks, but the Palestinians can expect nothing to improve. Nevertheless, Hamas is likely to survive and even thrive on the resentments war generates. Rallying around the flag of the current government is a common reaction of those subjected to air attacks.
Gaza is in agony. While desirable, a truce will do little to relieve the underlying desperate conditions.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Flipping SecState the bird
It’s been a bad few days for Secretary of State Kerry, on top of many bad weeks. On Sunday, he expressed the hope Egypt would take advantage of a critical moment in its transition to turn towards democracy. Then an Egyptian court popped that bubble with a trumped up verdict in a trumped up trial on trumped up charges against three Al Jazeera journalists. By Tuesday, SecState was pressing Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan President Barzani to proceed quickly to formation of an inclusive government. By today, Maliki said he had no such intention and Barzani is talking secession, more seriously than ever before.
This comes on top of the failed Middle East (that is, Israeli/Palestinian) peace process and Russian rejection of Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s proposed ceasefire. Not to mention the mess in Syria, where the President’s reluctance to intervene is all to obviously not pleasing to John Kerry. He has said repeatedly that a political settlement depends on changing the military situation on the ground. I won’t even mention the Asia Pacific, where China is again daring its neighbors.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that things are going badly for the Obama Administration in foreign policy. That’s precisely what the American people have decided, even if they support some of the President’s decisions on what to do and not do.
Daniels Larison and Drezner have been engaged in the why of this puzzle. Larison thinks it is due to the failure of the President to provide the resources needed to achieve his goals. Drezner thinks it is double think on the part of Americans: they want the country in general less engaged abroad (the outcome) but don’t like the specific consequences (the outputs).
I’ll leave the other Daniels to resolve that puzzle. I’m interested in what John Kerry is thinking. His behavior strikes me as out of keeping with past Secretaries of State, who have either been far more cautious in what they say or far more determined to get foreign leaders to salute when they say it. Most days, a lot of the State Department is engaged precisely in trying to line up “yes” from foreign leaders, in advance of a SecState “ask.” Secretaries don’t ask if they are not guaranteed a positive reply.
Kerry seems displeased but not angered when Maliki or Sisi says “no.” His attitude strikes me as more like that of a Senator than a Secretary of State. Senators are used to colleagues disagreeing. They are also used to being taken seriously for what they say, rather than for what they can do. There is always another day to try to win over opponents. Senators state their case but try not to burn bridges.
Hillary Clinton of course was also a senator before she was SecState, but she was notably more cautious in what she said. I don’t recall her ever hinting that she supported arming the Syrian revolutionaries, even though it is now known she did in secret. Kerry has been particularly bold in what he says publicly, but shy in deed, perhaps because there is so little Secretaries of State can actually do on their own authority other than speak. I guess that puts me more in the Larison than the Drezner camp about what is going on.
But whatever the reason, it is not good when other countries flip SecState the bird.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The verdict and the Obama administration
Secretary of State Kerry in Cairo Sunday suggested that Egypt was in a critical moment of transition. On Tuesday, an Egyptian court handed down draconian sentences for Al Jazeera journalists accused of crimes allegedly committed in the pursuit of their profession. While standards vary around the world, I think it fair to say that in no democracy on earth is spreading of false rumors, even if they help “terrorists,” punishable by seven years in prison. Most of what the journalists were accused of would not make it into a courtroom even in many autocracies.
Egypt is not of course a democratic society. But the American administration has been pretending it is on course to becoming one. Nothing could be further from the truth. Egypt is on course towards restoration of the autocracy, this time dressed in civilian garb (only recently acquired). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have bought and paid for this counter-revolution. They want the full metal jacket, not blanks. General Sisi is giving it to them.
The problem for the Americans is that they want to continue aid to Egypt, which is not permitted by US law unless the administration can credibly claim that there is a transition to democracy in progress. The verdict gives the lie to that assertion. No doubt the Egyptian government will say it is a consequence of their independent judiciary. Both Foreign Minister Fahmy and presidential advisor Amr Moussa said as much about judicial decisions when they were in Washington a couple of months ago. But that is nonsense. The Egyptian judiciary was part and parcel of the military regime under Hosni Mubarak, and it remains the same today.
There are really only two serious options now for the US Government:
- Go to Congress and explain why at least some of the aid needs to continue, despite the law, and seek legislative relief of some sort;
- Cut off the aid, sending the Egyptians into the arms of the Saudis, Emiratis and Russians.
To me, the former course of action is more sensible than the latter. It might, for example, lead to reshaping the assistance package more in the direction of aid to the Egyptian people, as Michelle Dunne has suggested. But even that will offend the powers that be in Cairo, where there seems to be an insatiable appetite for American military hardware that gets put into storage and (thankfully) never used. One can only imagine what some of the motives behind that are.
The Administration may well prefer to try to continue to muddle through. After all, it has Iraq and Syria to worry about at the moment, never mind Ukraine. But failing to seek clarity on Egypt, with either option 1. or 2., will do nothing to improve an image of foreign policy hesitation and drift that is hurting a president once upon a time lauded as having deprived the Republicans of their traditional advantage on national security issues.
Egypt’s attempt to repress its way out of the chaotic revolution its now jailed activists launched more than three years ago is unlikely to succeed. Extremist violence is on the upswing, especially in Sinai. The Muslim Brotherhood has gone underground, where it survived and even thrived for decades in the past and will again now. The Obama Administration has said all the right things about the need for more inclusive governance. Now it is time to do something, one way or the other.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Great expectations
With General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi sworn in as president last week, many people are questioning what his term will hold for Egypt. On Monday the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted “What to Expect from the al-Sisi Presidency” to discuss the growing array of political and economic challenges that al-Sisi faces. Moushira Khattab, former Public Policy Scholar and former Ambassador of Egypt to South Africa, Marina Ottaway, senior scholar at the Wilson Center, and Emad El-Din Shahin, Public Policy professor at the American University in Cairo, shared their opinions as to how the new Egyptian president will respond to the tumultuous atmosphere.
President al-Sisi stated in his inauguration speech that there were many issues he sought to address in the coming years. In particular, political reconciliation is a pressing issue due to systematic political exclusion and violence.
Moushira Khattab contended that it is vital to national stability for al-Sisi to present himself as a leader of all Egyptians because political reconciliation is the only way the nation can progress. He should use his current popular support and practice inclusiveness in the broadest sense, bridging the current divisions between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood. Even with the trials of Muslim Brotherhood members approaching, al-Sisi should be looking to mend the rift and assist with the mediation led by the EU and Gulf States.
For the economy, President al-Sisi has been vague in his promises. The failing economy is a ticking time bomb for Egypt and al-Sisi has made a point not to detail how he is going to tackle it. Ottaway said that the Egyptian people are impatiently awaiting the president’s and the cabinet’s response to the ongoing energy crisis. Last week, al-Sisi emphasized the need to reduce oil consumption by using different means of transportation; however, he did not address the question of lowering energy subsidies. It is vital for al-Sisi to balance the pressing needs of the masses with the scarce energy resources and current state of the economy in a transparent manner.
Al-Sisi should also incentivize the return of foreign direct investment across all sectors of the Egyptian economy. This is pivotal to revamp existing businesses and boost production to provide jobs for unemployed youth. With the return of foreign direct investment, Ottaway predicts an economic restoration process that will in turn assist in bringing tourism back to Egypt. This ultimately will push al-Sisi to seek political as well as economic inclusiveness.
According to Emad El-Din Shahin, the president will need to appeal directly to various factions of the population in order to gain popular support for his political and economic agenda. In his first week, he visited a female victim of sexual violence in Tahrir Square. This was the first time that an Egyptian president made a direct effort to apologize and take a strong stance on harassment. President al-Sisi ultimately must make it clear that all human rights—whether they be social, economic, political, or cultural—are a top priority without any discrimination.
Egyptian youth pose a great challenge for the president. His youth support is fading, especially as they have seen their own power in standing up against past leaders. They are desperate for jobs, opportunities, and a better quality of life. It is questionable whether they will be able to exercise patience in awaiting his plans as president.
The situation in Egypt is still tense. People are unsure of what the future holds for the country. The Egyptian masses have high expectations for the president. They will not stand for a leader who does not swiftly address the pressing needs of the country.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Due for a rethink
As US policy towards the Middle East is floundering, the Center for American Progress (CAP) released a timely report Monday entitled “US Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition,” based on field research in four countries. At CAP to discuss the results of the report were Peter Mandaville of George Mason University, Haroon Ullah of the State Department, and Brian Katulis, CAP Senior Fellow and coauthor of the report.
Islamists are at the center of the regional struggle, but fissures within and between different groups are multilayered and run deep. The Sunni-Shia rivalry is only one element of the conflicts embroiling the Middle East. The intra-Sunni rivalry is another, if less prominent, aspect. The division between rich and poor countries is an additional ingredient, as wealthier states tend to fight out proxy battles in weaker and more divided nations.
In Egypt, for instance, Qatar and Turkey threw their support behind the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are backing the new military regime. Saudi Arabia sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential competitor, rather than just another disjointed Salafist group. A key dynamic is between countries with more resources and less division at home, who fear the success of an alternate model of governance. This complicates US policy, as it is difficult to execute a cohesive strategy in the region while Qatar and Saudi Arabia are locked in a struggle over Egypt’s future.
Mandaville said that the US must look beyond the Sunni-Shia frame to recognize that we are witnessing a potential unraveling of the entire post-Ottoman order. The aftermath of 9/11, coupled with Arab uprisings of 2011, has seen a withering away of post-WWI arrangements. The upheaval is comparable to what we saw in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when groups whose identities had been in check during the Cold War emerged and began questioning, and ultimately restructuring, the existing order.
One of the major weaknesses of US policy in the region is our tendency to oversimplify the debate. Whether or not American troops should have stayed in Iraq misses the larger picture. American diplomatic engagement needs to be better informed about the regional dynamics of movements in the Arab world. Even after many years, the Arab nationalist-Islamist divide is still not well understood. Americans are good at understanding groups who want to attack us, but we need to peer further into what drives these conflicts in the first place.
Katulis suggested that Obama has bungled his attempts to reengage with the Muslim world. By addressing them as a separate community, he signaled that they are a single constituency, one that should be handled with kid gloves, an approach comparable to George W. Bush’s. The implication is that all Muslims subscribe to a single, transnational identity, a message that is echoed by groups like al Qaeda.
Political Islam has always existed in the background. Partial openings in the political and media environment after the Arab uprisings have allowed some Islamist groups to come to the fore. Islamism, as a point on the political spectrum, has broadened significantly. Despite Egypt’s best efforts to silence Islamists, they are here to stay. Ullah noted that, while President Sisi wants to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood’s comparative advantage in Egypt and revert to the weaker Sadat-era Brotherhood, this is not possible in modern media environment.
He also noted one positive development in America’s attitude towards political Islam, pointing to Assistant Secretary of State Patterson’s comments last week:
Some people in this region conflate Islamists with terrorists and desire to eliminate the Islamists entirely from the political scene. Our difficult fight against violent extremists is made more complicated by this viewpoint. The need for compromise is underscored by political experience in the Arab world as well as our own.
One of the myths the report attempts to debunk is the so-called moderation thesis. This is the false belief that Islamists will moderate their positions if they join the political fray. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to accommodate more moderate positions. Islamist groups have fared better in other countries in the region, including Tunisia’s Ennahda party, partly because they had to contend with a large secular/liberal bloc. Nonetheless, many mainstream Islamists have internalized only the procedural spirit of democracy, without embracing pluralism.
Another myth is that socioeconomic conditions are the primary drivers of extremism. Research has found no causal link between poverty and extremism. The key constituency for Egypt’s Salafist al Nour Party, for instance, is that country’s urban-based middle class.
One persistent challenge to foreign policy is US counterterrorist doctrine, which relegates violence committed by Muslims to the “terrorist” category. This neglects the fact that in places like the Sahel, conflicts are based on ethnic, rather than religious, differences. In Obama’s speech at West Point, he called for additional funding of counterterrorism programs, but the real problem in many of these countries stems from long-running ethnic conflicts.
Mandaville noted that the US government still thinks about the world in terms of the blocs that arose during the Cold War. We would do well to shed these outdated notions of the Middle East, although it will be difficult in light of our current investments in the Gulf and rising sectarianism in the region. As Iraq and Syria descend into sectarian-fueled chaos, it is time for the US to reexamine its strategy in region.
RSS - Posts
