Tag: Egypt
An unhappy Eid
For most Muslims, today marks the begining of Eid al Fitr, the feast thats end the month of Ramadan. It won’t be an Eid Mubarak (Blessed Eid) for lots of people: there is war in Syria, Iraq, Gaza/Israel, Sudan and Libya, renewed repression in Egypt and Iran, instability in Yemen. The hopes of the Arab spring have turned to fear and even loathing, not only between Muslims and non-Muslims but also among Shia, Sunni and sometimes Sufi. Extremism is thriving. Moderate reform is holding its own only in Tunisia, Morocco and maybe Jordan. Absolutism still rules most of the Gulf.
The issues are not primarily religious. They are political. Power, not theology, is at stake. As Greg Gause puts it, the weakening of Arab states has created a vacuum that Saudi Arabia and Iran are trying to fill, each seeking advantage in their own regional rivalry. He sees it as a cold war, but it is clearly one in which violence by surrogates plays an important role, even if Riyadh and Tehran never come directly to blows. And it is complicated by the Sunni world’s own divisions, with Turkey and Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia opposing it.
The consequences for Arab civilians are dramatic. Well over 100,000 are now dead in Syria, half the population is displaced, uncounted more are dead in Iraq and millions more displaced. Egypt has largely reversed the liberation of its aborted 2011 revolution but still faces more violence than before it. Libya has been unable to tame or dissolve its militias, which are endangering its population and blocking its transition. While the total numbers killed in the Gaza war are far smaller than in Syria or Iraq, the percentage of civilians among the victims–and the broader impact on the civilian population–is causing anti-Israel revulsion worldwide.
Greg wants the United States to favor order over chaos. The trouble is it is hard to know which policies will do what. Will support for Iraq Prime Minister Maliki block the Islamic State, or will it incentivize extremist recruitment and make matters worse, perhaps even causing partition? The military government in Egypt, with which Greg thinks we should continue to engage, is arguably creating more problems with extremists in Sinai and the western desert than it is solving with its arbitrary and draconian crackdown against liberals as well as Islamists. The Obama administration is inclined to support America’s traditional allies in the Gulf, as Greg suggest, but what is it to do when Qatar and Turkey are at swordpoints with Saudi Arabia ?
Many Arab states as currently constituted lack what every state needs in order to govern: legitimacy. The grand failure of the Arab spring is a failure to discover new sources of legitimacy after decades of dictators wielding military power. The “people” have proven insufficient. Liberal democracy is, ideologically and organizationally, too weak. Political Islam is still a contender, especially in Syria, Iraq and Libya, but if it succeeds it will likely be in one of its more extreme forms. In Gaza, where Hamas has governed for seven years, political Islam was quite literally bankrupt even before the war. Their monarchies’ ability to maintain order as neighbors descend into chaos is helping to sustain order in Jordan and Morocco. Oil wealth and tribal loyalties are propping up monarchies in the Gulf, but the demography there (youth bulge and unemployment) poses serious threats.
The likelihood is that we are in for more instability, not less. Iran and Saudi Arabia show no sign of willingness to end their competition. They will continue to seek competitive advantage, undermining states they see as loyal to their opponent and jumping in wherever they can to fill the vacuums that are likely to be created. Any American commitment to order will be a minor factor. This will not, I’m afraid, be the last unhappy Eid.
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s bleak future
The Muslim Brotherhood experienced its fall from grace in Egypt just one year ago with President Morsi’s removal. The once highly organized and hierarchical party is now shattered, bringing into question the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party. On Monday, the Middle East Institute hosted “The Muslim Brotherhood: Between the Path of Ennahda and the Threat of the Islamic State” with panelists Alison Pargeter, Hassan Mneimneh, and Eric Trager. They came to a consensus that the Muslim Brotherhood has weakened, especially in Egypt, and its strategy has become disjointed. It is currently unlikely to succeed in gaining power either in Egypt or in Syria.
The future of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is questionable after the violent clashes and unprecedented crackdown this past year. Pargeter, author of The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, said that the party has faced significant challenges over the past twelve months in internalizing its overthrow and moving forward to regain legitimacy. It has had to face depleted finances, party leader arrests, and distrust from the public.
The current strategy has been to act defensively and shift blame away from the Brotherhood. The discourse of self-preservation has been far from successful. The international community has moved on—Sisi has taken power and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is crippled. It is trying to give the impression that the fight is still going on, but is it has not found a viable path back to political power.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has always struggled in articulating its ideology. It is now more important than ever, as the future of the party depends on institutional reform and transparency. A genuine change in political culture will be necessary if the Brotherhood is ever to gain power again. The cycle of competition between the military and political Islam will need to change if Egypt is to ever move forward, which Pargeter concluded could ultimately take more than a decade.
Trager, Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, discussed the role and future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The party was founded in 1946 and had a tumultuous history throughout the past several decades. It was exiled in 1982 after a violent uprising, which ultimately forced the leadership to reshape its chain of command and membership strategy.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has now had to focus entirely on organizational maintenance, such as funding livelihoods and housing for its members. It is still a wealthy organization but has become very weak within Syria since its exile. It faces significant long-term challenges and is preoccupied with maintenance rather than politics. The organization will have to gain significant support within Syria if it is to ever acquire political power.
Mneimneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, said that Tunisians don’t want what happened in Egypt and Syria to play out in their countries. Ennahda has been the only true success story among the three. It is making strides towards democratic practice.
The Ennahda leader has spoken with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regarding how to seek compromise. There ultimately needs to be an acceptance of diversity and inclusivity in Egypt rather than focusing on one party at the exclusion of the others. Ennahda is working to break the three main characteristics of politics in the region: paternalism, tribalism and elitism. It aims at broader pariticipation in government. This approach has proven far more successful than the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach in Egypt or Syria.
The Muslim Brotherhood has had a tumultuous few years and it is unlikely that it will gain power in Egypt or Syria anytime soon. It is preoccupied with its own survival. With no coherent strategy, there isn’t much hope for the Egyptian and Syrian branches moving forward.
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Gaza agonistes
Israel early this morning approved a truce in Gaza, with talks in Cairo to follow. Hamas has not responded yet. It is time to ask what Israel’s week-long air offensive and Hamas’ rocket barrage have achieved. What military or political objectives were advanced?
Israel’s stated military objective was to end the threat of rocket attacks from Gaza once and for all. It still seems far from that goal. No more than 20% of Hamas’ rockets are thought to have been used or destroyed. Weeks, perhaps months, more of air attacks would be required to get close to the literal goal of Operation Protective Edge. Some think a ground invasion would also be necessary. The last time Israel did that the war lasted three weeks in 2008-9.
A possible alternative to a ground invasion is what Israel was preparing to do over the last few days in northern Gaza: urge the civilian population to leave limited areas and use special forces to attack only specific locations where rockets, launchers or their minders reside, without trying to hold territory. This approach might yield the results of a ground attack without its burdens, though the risks to the special forces are significant.
Hamas’ objective was to continue the rocket attacks as a signal of political resistance. Hamas has no clear military objective. The thousand or so rockets launched so far have caused no significant damage (and haven’t killed anyone). But the rocket fire unnerves the Israeli population and brings on air attacks that Hamas uses to rally both Palestinian and international sympathy and support. From Hamas’ perspective, prolonging the air attacks is a good thing, provided Israel is unable to stop or siginficantly slow the rocket fire. It is still possible Hamas will refuse the truce and talks Egypt has proposed.
This is a formula for a long war, even if the truce goes into effect. Israel will continue because it wants to destroy the rockets. Hamas will continue because it wants the support and sympathy the air attacks bring. Egypt and the United States, which combined forces to end the 2012 eight-day air/rocket war between Hamas and Israel, are less likely to be effective this time around: President Sisi because Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, the Americans because they seem to have lost their grip on Prime Minister Netanyahu. President Obama has offered American mediation, but no one has seemed interested.
What has all this got to do with last month’s murder of three Israeli teenagers and the apparent revenge murder of a Palestinian-American teenager? Nothing really. As in many other international incidents, the trigger that precipitated war is now mostly forgotten. The conflict has a dynamic of its own and is unlikely to stop until both sides start seeing diminishing returns.
Where does that leave those of us who think adding this war to the mess in the Middle East is not a good idea? And what comfort is there for the civilian populations involved?
The region is ablaze. Civil wars rage in Syria and Iraq, Libya and Yemen are a short step from joining them, Lebanon and Jordan are at risk, Egypt is restoring military dictatorship and repressing domestic resistance. The Americans are preoccupied with trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran (next Sunday is the initial deadline, extendable in principle by six months, if need be). This is not a good time for yet another Middle East conflict.
It is particularly bad for civilians. The numbers of casualties so far in the Israel/Gaza war are relatively small–according to the Palestinians, the Israeli air attacks have killed fewer than 200 people, about half of them allegedly civilians. Considering the amount of ordnance dropped, this is a remarkably small number, but more or less ten times as many have been injured. A few more weeks of this and the numbers would no longer look small. And each one represents a family tragedy, with future consequences.
Social conditions in Gaza were already dramatic. Its demographic, economic, educational, nutritional, and housing conditions were all worsening, from an already distressed state. The war will accelerate the deterioration. Israelis may get some relief eventually from Hamas rocket attacks, but the Palestinians can expect nothing to improve. Nevertheless, Hamas is likely to survive and even thrive on the resentments war generates. Rallying around the flag of the current government is a common reaction of those subjected to air attacks.
Gaza is in agony. While desirable, a truce will do little to relieve the underlying desperate conditions.
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Flipping SecState the bird
It’s been a bad few days for Secretary of State Kerry, on top of many bad weeks. On Sunday, he expressed the hope Egypt would take advantage of a critical moment in its transition to turn towards democracy. Then an Egyptian court popped that bubble with a trumped up verdict in a trumped up trial on trumped up charges against three Al Jazeera journalists. By Tuesday, SecState was pressing Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdistan President Barzani to proceed quickly to formation of an inclusive government. By today, Maliki said he had no such intention and Barzani is talking secession, more seriously than ever before.
This comes on top of the failed Middle East (that is, Israeli/Palestinian) peace process and Russian rejection of Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s proposed ceasefire. Not to mention the mess in Syria, where the President’s reluctance to intervene is all to obviously not pleasing to John Kerry. He has said repeatedly that a political settlement depends on changing the military situation on the ground. I won’t even mention the Asia Pacific, where China is again daring its neighbors.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that things are going badly for the Obama Administration in foreign policy. That’s precisely what the American people have decided, even if they support some of the President’s decisions on what to do and not do.
Daniels Larison and Drezner have been engaged in the why of this puzzle. Larison thinks it is due to the failure of the President to provide the resources needed to achieve his goals. Drezner thinks it is double think on the part of Americans: they want the country in general less engaged abroad (the outcome) but don’t like the specific consequences (the outputs).
I’ll leave the other Daniels to resolve that puzzle. I’m interested in what John Kerry is thinking. His behavior strikes me as out of keeping with past Secretaries of State, who have either been far more cautious in what they say or far more determined to get foreign leaders to salute when they say it. Most days, a lot of the State Department is engaged precisely in trying to line up “yes” from foreign leaders, in advance of a SecState “ask.” Secretaries don’t ask if they are not guaranteed a positive reply.
Kerry seems displeased but not angered when Maliki or Sisi says “no.” His attitude strikes me as more like that of a Senator than a Secretary of State. Senators are used to colleagues disagreeing. They are also used to being taken seriously for what they say, rather than for what they can do. There is always another day to try to win over opponents. Senators state their case but try not to burn bridges.
Hillary Clinton of course was also a senator before she was SecState, but she was notably more cautious in what she said. I don’t recall her ever hinting that she supported arming the Syrian revolutionaries, even though it is now known she did in secret. Kerry has been particularly bold in what he says publicly, but shy in deed, perhaps because there is so little Secretaries of State can actually do on their own authority other than speak. I guess that puts me more in the Larison than the Drezner camp about what is going on.
But whatever the reason, it is not good when other countries flip SecState the bird.
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The verdict and the Obama administration
Secretary of State Kerry in Cairo Sunday suggested that Egypt was in a critical moment of transition. On Tuesday, an Egyptian court handed down draconian sentences for Al Jazeera journalists accused of crimes allegedly committed in the pursuit of their profession. While standards vary around the world, I think it fair to say that in no democracy on earth is spreading of false rumors, even if they help “terrorists,” punishable by seven years in prison. Most of what the journalists were accused of would not make it into a courtroom even in many autocracies.
Egypt is not of course a democratic society. But the American administration has been pretending it is on course to becoming one. Nothing could be further from the truth. Egypt is on course towards restoration of the autocracy, this time dressed in civilian garb (only recently acquired). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have bought and paid for this counter-revolution. They want the full metal jacket, not blanks. General Sisi is giving it to them.
The problem for the Americans is that they want to continue aid to Egypt, which is not permitted by US law unless the administration can credibly claim that there is a transition to democracy in progress. The verdict gives the lie to that assertion. No doubt the Egyptian government will say it is a consequence of their independent judiciary. Both Foreign Minister Fahmy and presidential advisor Amr Moussa said as much about judicial decisions when they were in Washington a couple of months ago. But that is nonsense. The Egyptian judiciary was part and parcel of the military regime under Hosni Mubarak, and it remains the same today.
There are really only two serious options now for the US Government:
- Go to Congress and explain why at least some of the aid needs to continue, despite the law, and seek legislative relief of some sort;
- Cut off the aid, sending the Egyptians into the arms of the Saudis, Emiratis and Russians.
To me, the former course of action is more sensible than the latter. It might, for example, lead to reshaping the assistance package more in the direction of aid to the Egyptian people, as Michelle Dunne has suggested. But even that will offend the powers that be in Cairo, where there seems to be an insatiable appetite for American military hardware that gets put into storage and (thankfully) never used. One can only imagine what some of the motives behind that are.
The Administration may well prefer to try to continue to muddle through. After all, it has Iraq and Syria to worry about at the moment, never mind Ukraine. But failing to seek clarity on Egypt, with either option 1. or 2., will do nothing to improve an image of foreign policy hesitation and drift that is hurting a president once upon a time lauded as having deprived the Republicans of their traditional advantage on national security issues.
Egypt’s attempt to repress its way out of the chaotic revolution its now jailed activists launched more than three years ago is unlikely to succeed. Extremist violence is on the upswing, especially in Sinai. The Muslim Brotherhood has gone underground, where it survived and even thrived for decades in the past and will again now. The Obama Administration has said all the right things about the need for more inclusive governance. Now it is time to do something, one way or the other.
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Great expectations
With General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi sworn in as president last week, many people are questioning what his term will hold for Egypt. On Monday the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted “What to Expect from the al-Sisi Presidency” to discuss the growing array of political and economic challenges that al-Sisi faces. Moushira Khattab, former Public Policy Scholar and former Ambassador of Egypt to South Africa, Marina Ottaway, senior scholar at the Wilson Center, and Emad El-Din Shahin, Public Policy professor at the American University in Cairo, shared their opinions as to how the new Egyptian president will respond to the tumultuous atmosphere.
President al-Sisi stated in his inauguration speech that there were many issues he sought to address in the coming years. In particular, political reconciliation is a pressing issue due to systematic political exclusion and violence.
Moushira Khattab contended that it is vital to national stability for al-Sisi to present himself as a leader of all Egyptians because political reconciliation is the only way the nation can progress. He should use his current popular support and practice inclusiveness in the broadest sense, bridging the current divisions between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood. Even with the trials of Muslim Brotherhood members approaching, al-Sisi should be looking to mend the rift and assist with the mediation led by the EU and Gulf States.
For the economy, President al-Sisi has been vague in his promises. The failing economy is a ticking time bomb for Egypt and al-Sisi has made a point not to detail how he is going to tackle it. Ottaway said that the Egyptian people are impatiently awaiting the president’s and the cabinet’s response to the ongoing energy crisis. Last week, al-Sisi emphasized the need to reduce oil consumption by using different means of transportation; however, he did not address the question of lowering energy subsidies. It is vital for al-Sisi to balance the pressing needs of the masses with the scarce energy resources and current state of the economy in a transparent manner.
Al-Sisi should also incentivize the return of foreign direct investment across all sectors of the Egyptian economy. This is pivotal to revamp existing businesses and boost production to provide jobs for unemployed youth. With the return of foreign direct investment, Ottaway predicts an economic restoration process that will in turn assist in bringing tourism back to Egypt. This ultimately will push al-Sisi to seek political as well as economic inclusiveness.
According to Emad El-Din Shahin, the president will need to appeal directly to various factions of the population in order to gain popular support for his political and economic agenda. In his first week, he visited a female victim of sexual violence in Tahrir Square. This was the first time that an Egyptian president made a direct effort to apologize and take a strong stance on harassment. President al-Sisi ultimately must make it clear that all human rights—whether they be social, economic, political, or cultural—are a top priority without any discrimination.
Egyptian youth pose a great challenge for the president. His youth support is fading, especially as they have seen their own power in standing up against past leaders. They are desperate for jobs, opportunities, and a better quality of life. It is questionable whether they will be able to exercise patience in awaiting his plans as president.
The situation in Egypt is still tense. People are unsure of what the future holds for the country. The Egyptian masses have high expectations for the president. They will not stand for a leader who does not swiftly address the pressing needs of the country.
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