Tag: Egypt

Preparing to observe a referendum

I’m in Egypt, preparing to observe the January 14/15 constitutional referendum.  This is more controversial than it sounds.  Some have argued that observing risks giving the referendum legitimacy it does not deserve.  No long-term observers are in place, one of the factors that caused the Carter Center not to send more than a technical mission.*  Some Egyptian Islamist observers have been denied accreditation, and the government is conducting a vigorous propaganda campaign in favor of approval.  Why would I lend my name to a process taking place in a country where nonviolent activists are jailed, the press is under serious constraints, the security forces are cracking down on secularist dissenters as well as the Muslim Brotherhood (declared a terrorist organization) and ample portions of the society are boycotting?

The answer is that I didn’t decide the referendum would be observed.  The State Department did and AID** funded Democracy International (DI), a non-governmental organization, to implement the decision.  A few other organizations, including the European Union, are also here, but DI’s 80-person team seems to be the largest.  What I decided was to get some first-person exposure to the situation in Egypt at an important moment.  If I were not here, someone else would be.  If I thought I were doing harm, I’d have opted out, but I dare imagine that my sharp eyes and ears might even do some good for a mission conducted under less than ideal conditions. Read more

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History is irreversible

Yesterday’s New York Times suggests “Power Vacuum in Middle East Lifts Militants.”  US withdrawal is of course the cause of the power vacuum.  For years however we’ve been hearing that US presence in the Middle East is what generates militant reactions.  American bases in Saudi Arabia and the American occupation of Iraq are often cited as prime movers of Islamic militancy.

Similar contradictory statements appear often about Bashar al Asad.  The Western press is now full of claims that getting rid of him will leave Syria open to the possibility of a Sunni extremist takeover.  But his continued hold on power all too obviously also encourages radicalization of the opposition to his rule.

The simple fact is that we don’t know much about what feeds violent militancy.  While William Pape and James Feldman claim that suicide terrorism–certainly a salient characteristic of some contemporary Islamic extremists–is rooted in foreign occupation, there are ample reasons to believe that it doesn’t stop with American withdrawal.  It certainly did not in Iraq and likely won’t in Afghanistan either.

With respect to Asad’s impact on militancy, we know even less.  He has benefitted from, and even encouraged, violent resistance to his regime, which empowers him to respond violently.  But would violent resistance end if Bashar stepped aside in favor of a transitional government with full executive powers (as foreseen in the June 2012 UN communique)?  I doubt it.

The world does not run backwards.  Removing a cause, post facto, does not get you back to where you started.  Washington pulled the rug out from under Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 and helped to force his resignation, but that did not reverse the effect in Egyptian minds of decades of US support for military rule in Egypt.  An Israel/Palestine agreement now may be highly desirable, but it is unlikely to have the same impact it might have had in the 1990s.  There is just too much that has happened since and won’t be forgotten, on both sides.

Violence is particularly important in preventing history from running in reverse.  People won’t forget Bashar’s use of mass violence to compensate for his lack of legitimacy, protect Alawites and bolster territorial control.  Syria when I studied Arabic there in 2008 was peaceful and tolerant, even though repressed and authoritarian.  Ending Bashar’s rule will not take us back there.  Any future dictatorship in Syria will have to be much more brutal than Bashar’s was.  Any future democracy will face problems that a democracy emerging from a less violent transition would not have to face.

Where does this leave us with respect to US behavior?  We are clearly going to need to find indirect and less expensive ways to influence world events than the military interventions we used so boldly from 1995 to 2003.  Bosnia and Kosovo were relatively cheap and killed no Americans.  The legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan is a gigantic tab–on the order of $6 trillion I read somewhere this morning–plus thousands of dead, military and civilian.  I don’t agree with Mearsheimer’s notion that America is unhinged (and responsible for militancy in Syria) but clearly we are not going back to large-scale military interventions, even if economic and financial conditions improve.

What we need is to be much more proactive, preventing unhappy events before they happen.  We clearly failed at that in the Arab world, where we were caught unawares despite a large and well-established diplomatic presence.  But American diplomacy has a pretty good record in recent decades of nurturing, or at least permitting, nonviolent change in Latin America and Asia.  Let’s remember how to do it, because history is irreversible.

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The 2013 vintage in the peace vineyard

2013 has been a so-so vintage in the peace vineyard.

The Balkans saw improved relations between Serbia and Kosovo, progress by both towards the European Union and Croatian membership.  Albania managed a peaceful alternation in power.  But Bosnia and Macedonia remain enmired in long-running constitutional and nominal difficulties, respectively.  Slovenia, already a NATO and EU member, ran into financial problems, as did CyprusTurkey‘s long-serving and still politically dominant prime minister managed to get himself into trouble over a shopping center and corruption.

The former Soviet space has likewise seen contradictory developments:  Moldova‘s courageous push towards the EU, Ukraine‘s ongoing, nonviolent rebellion against tighter ties to Russia, and terrorist challenges to the Sochi Winter Olympics. Read more

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Jail time

The news is full of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s release from jail of former rival Mikhail Khodorkovsky and members of the punk rock band Pussy Riot.  All concerned were due to be released soon anyway.  Their early release signals that Putin is feeling confident.  Neither Khodorkovsky nor Pussy Riot is likely to mount a serious challenge to his position and power anytime soon.  Russia’s pro-democracy protest movement has withered in the years since it fielded large crowds in Moscow.

Less noticed is the sentencing in Egypt of human rights activists, including my friend Ahmed Maher, to three years hard labor and substantial fines for organizing a demonstration defying a decree issued by the military-backed government that took over after this summer’s coup.  The tough sentences indicate that the military is not confident of its power and position.  It needs high turnout and high approval in the January 14-15 referendum on its recently proposed constitution before it can be certain the secular activists won’t be able to mobilize large protests.  Once their political edge is removed, they too may be released early or even pardoned. Read more

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The end is nigh, once again

2013 is ending with a lot of doom and gloom:

  • South Sudan, the world’s newest state, is suffering bloodletting between political rivals, who coincide with its two largest tribes (Dinka and Nuer).
  • The Central African Republic is imploding in an orgy of Christian/Muslim violence.
  • North Korea is risking internal strife as its latest Kim exerts his authority by purging and executing his formally powerful uncle.
  • China is challenging Japan and South Korea in the the East China Sea.
  • Syria is in chaos, spelling catastrophe for most of its population and serious strains for all its neighbors.
  • Nuclear negotiations with Iran seem slow, if not stalled.
  • Egypt‘s military is repressing not only the Muslim Brotherhood but also secular human rights advocates.
  • Israel and Palestine still seem far from agreement on the two-state solution most agree is their best bet.
  • Afghanistan‘s President Karzai is refusing to sign the long-sought security agreement with the United States, putting at risk continued presence of US troops even as the Taliban seem to be strengthening in the countryside, and capital and people are fleeing Kabul.
  • Al Qaeda is recovering as a franchised operation (especially in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and North Africa), even as its headquarters in Pakistan has been devastated.
  • Ukraine is turning eastward, despite the thousands of brave protesters in Kiev’s streets.

The Economist topped off the gloom this week by suggesting that the current international situation resembles the one that preceded World War I:  a declining world power (then Great Britain, now the US) unable to ensure global security and a rising challenger (then Germany now China). Read more

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The world according to CFR

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) survey of prevention priorities for 2014 is out today.  Crowdsourced, it is pretty much the definition of elite conventional wisdom. Pundits of all stripes contribute.

The top tier includes contingencies with high impact and moderate likelihood (intensification of the Syrian civil war, a cyberattack on critical US infrastructure, attacks on the Iranian nuclear program or evidence of nuclear weapons intent, a mass casualty terrorist attack on the US or an ally, or a severe North Korean crisis) as well as those with moderate impact and high likelihood (in a word “instability” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq or Jordan).  None merited the designation high impact and high likelihood, though many of us might have suggested Syria, Iraq  and Pakistan for that category. Read more

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