Tag: Egypt
Put aid to Egypt on viagra
I spent a couple of hours last night in mild pain watching “The Square,” a documentary tracing the main turning points of the Egyptian revolution since early 2011. The film is a good one, but the ground rules prohibited reviewing it. Opens in January I think. It’s the revolution I have doubts about.
Knowledgeable colleagues at the event disagreed with me. Yes, they said, mistakes have been made, but the Egyptians are learning and things will come out all right, because there are good people prepared to make good things happen.
Of course. Ahmed Maher, who spoke at the Middle East Institute conference last week, is clearly one of them. The producer, director and human rights lawyer who answered questions at the showing last night certainly count among them. So too do the nuanced and devoted revolutionaries they chose to focus on in the film. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Deal, or no deal?
The nuclear talks with Iran are officially with the P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China). But they are increasingly looking like a negotiation (at a distance) between Israel and Iran, with the P5+1 acting as mediators and looking for a mutually acceptable compromise. What are the odds of finding one? It depends on what we all call leverage. That comes from being able to walk away, because you’ve got a “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) that you prefer over the agreement on offer.
Iran’s BATNA is clear: it can continue its nuclear program, which entails continuing also to endure increasingly tight sanctions as well as the risk an Israeli or American attack. President Rouhani doesn’t like this option, because he has promised Iranians relief from sanctions, improved relations with the rest of the world, and an improved economy. Iranians are not interested in going to war. But Supreme Leader Khamenei can still veto any proposed agreement. There is every reason to believe he would do so if somehow his negotiators dared to bring home an agreement that completely dismantled Iran’s nuclear program, blocking it from any future enrichment (or reprocessing). Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks, November 11-15
The Federal government is closed Monday for Veterans Day but the rest of the week has lots of peace and war events. The Middle East Institute Conference (last item) is not to be missed:
1. How to Turn Russia Against Assad
Tuesday, November 12th, 2013
6:00pm
Rome Building, Room 806
1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Samuel Charap
Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS
Jeremy Shapiro
Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution
Chair: Dana Allin
Editor of Survival and Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, IISS
A light reception will follow
No RSVP Required
For More Information, Contact SAISEES@jhu.edu or events-washington@iiss.org
Samuel Charap is the Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in the IISS–US in Washington, DC. Prior to joining the Institute, Samuel was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow at the US Department of State, serving as Senior Advisor to the Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff.
Jeremy Shapiro is a visiting fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to re-joining Brookings, he was a member of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning staff, where he advised the secretary of state on U.S. policy in North Africa and the Levant. He was also the senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon, providing strategic guidance on a wide variety of U.S.-European foreign policy issues. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Untying the Turkish knot
Mort Abramowitz and Eric Edelman published this week a super Bipartisan Policy Center report “From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing US Turkey Policy.” Mort was US ambassador in Ankara 1989-91 and Eric 2003-5. It doesn’t get much more knowledgeable when it comes to US policy on Turkey than these two. Caveat emptor: Eric is a valued colleague at SAIS (his office is next door to mine) and Mort is a treasured regular lunch partner and occasional co-author.
They argue for something few sitting ambassadors would be keen on, though it seems likely that the current ambassador was at least forewarned if not approving. They want to shift from rhetoric about shared objectives in the Middle East to frank talk (with an Ankara already resenting US policy on Syria, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and other issues) about Turkey’s domestic situation.
The aim is to keep Turkey moving in a democratic direction, restore its economic vitality, and encourage it to play a leadership role in the region consistent with US policy. As diplomatic propositions go, this is pretty daring:
Practically, this means that Washington should be more open with Ankara about its concerns about issues like press freedom, freedom of assembly, rule of law, and the Turkish government’s increasing sectarianism.
Edelman and Abramowitz view such frank assessments as likely to produce good results and cite chapter and verse of Israel-related occasions on which American bluntness was productive.
The agenda they propose for Washington is an ample one: Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The gulf with the Gulf
Yesterday was Gulf day. I spent part of the morning reading Christopher Davidson, who thinks the Gulf monarchies are headed for collapse due to internal challenges, their need for Western support, Iran’s growing power and their own disunity. Then I turned to Greg Gause, who attributes their resilience to the oil-greased coalitions and external networks they have created to support their rule. He predicts their survival.
At lunch I ambled across the way to CSIS’s new mansion to hear Abdullah al Shayji, chair of political science at Kuwait University and unofficial Gulf spokeperson, who was much exorcised over America’s response to Iran’s “charm offensive,” which he said could not have come at a worse time. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was already at odds with the US. The Gulf was not warned or consulted about the phone call between Iranian President Rouhani and President Obama. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to occupy the UN Security Council seat it fought hard to get was a signal of displeasure. The divergences between the GCC and the US range across the Middle East: Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine, in addition to Iran.
On top of this, US oil and gas production is increasing. China is now a bigger oil importer than the US and gets a lot more of its supplies from the Gulf. Washington is increasingly seen as dysfunctional because of its partisan bickering. Its budget problems seem insoluble. American credibility is declining. The Gulf views the US as unreliable. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Blast from the past
Revisiting peacemaking in history, Professor Bill Quandt yesterday discussed the Camp David peace process at American University.
Quandt opened his remarks on the Egypt-Israeli peace by offering a timeless key to peacemaking. In order to have a successful peacemaking process, there must be more peacemaking and less process. The parties involved should see change that would convince them that the old ways and tensions can be put away and new ways adopted. It is not enough to have parties come to the negotiation table.
The Arab-Israeli conflict is often seen as an insoluble conflict, one that cannot be addressed by diplomacy. But there is one aspect of the conflict that was resolved with diplomacy, between Egypt and Israel. Egypt and Israel fought four wars that gave Israel the military upper hand. But how come diplomacy ultimately worked?
Quandt attributes the success of the 1978 Camp David Accords to four things:
Change of leadership in Egypt. When Anwar Sadat succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser, he was determined to try a different path. He wanted to shift his international relationship from the Soviet Union to the US and knew that he would not be able to do that without making peace with Israel. Sadat began sending costly signals to the US by expelling Soviet advisers in Egypt and using backchannel messages to Nixon. Because Sadat saw no movement towards peace talks, he launched the 1973 war with Israel in order to break the status quo. Thus, it was not simply Sadat coming to power that changed things; rather, there was a gradual change over a few years. Sadat’s constant signaling, and his willingness to travel to Tel Aviv, made him able to change the course of Egyptian-Israeli relations.
Global context. This was a period of détente between the US and Soviet Union. It looked as if the US and Soviet Union could resolve some of their issues. This was no longer an international environment in which one superpower or the other was giving unconditional support to countries such as Israel and Egypt. Quandt sees a parallel to the present day global context, in which the US and Russia were able to work together in order to come to a chemical weapons deal with Syria.
Role of the mediator. Sadat asked the US to be the mediator between Egypt and Israel in the peace negotiations. Israel could explain to its public that the US pressured it into signing a peace treaty. The US could guarantee Egypt that Israel would return land in exchange for peace. President Carter was important to the ultimate success of the Camp David Accords. As mediator, he invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David for the summit. When the meeting started poorly, he presented the US plan for peace between the two countries and discussed it separately with both parties. The US maintained control of the drafting process. Carter’s personal relationship with Sadat was important in convincing Sadat to carry on with the negotiations.
Clear and mutual understanding of the end game. Israel and Egypt understood what they wanted and what the other country wanted. Israel wanted peace and was willing to return Sinai to Egypt for a guarantee of that peace.
Ultimately, Sadat got peace with Israel, the Sinai Peninsula back and a relationship with US. Begin was able to achieve peace with Egypt without making concessions on the Palestinian issue. The US gained strategic position in the region.
Quandt does not see these same factors present in the current Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. In order for these talks to be more serious, Secretary Kerry needs to do more of the “heavy lifting.” There is also currently no common point between the Israelis and Palestinians. That needs to be established in order to have a starting point for negotiations.
RSS - Posts
