Tag: Egypt
Peace picks, September 16-20
A busy week ahead in the Nation’s Capital:
1. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and the American Strategy
Monday, September 16, 2013 | 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM EDT
Brookings Institute, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Lying behind the turmoil over Syria is another, greater challenge. It is the challenge of a nuclear Iran, which already haunts our Syria debate. President Rouhani’s election has revived the hope of many that a negotiated resolution of this issue is still possible. However, the history of U.S.-Iranian relations leaves room for considerable skepticism. Should these negotiations fail too, the United States will soon have to choose between the last, worst options: going to war to prevent a nuclear Iran or learning to contain one. A nuclear Iran is something few in the international community wish to see, but many fear that a choice will have to be made soon to either prevent or respond to that reality. Can the U.S. spearhead a renewed international effort to prevent a nuclear Iran, or will it be forced to do the unthinkable: to determine how to contain a nuclear Iran?
In his new book, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack tackles these daunting questions. Pollack delves deeply into what the U.S. can do to prevent a nuclear Iran, why the military options leave much to be desired and what the U.S. might have to do to make containment a viable alternative. On September 16th at 2:30pm, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Senior Fellow Kenneth M. Pollack to discuss these sobering issues. Robin Wright, a United States Institute of Peace distinguished fellow and author of several highly-regarded books on Iran, will moderate the discussion, after which the author will take audience questions. Copies of the book will also be available for sale at the event.
EVENT AGENDA
- Introduction
Tamara Cofman Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy
@tcwittes
- Featured Speaker
Kenneth M. Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy,Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Moderator
Robin Wright
Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace
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To whom it may concern
The Egyptian April 6 Movement yesterday sent around this note, which merits reading:
To whom it may concern, April 6 movement is one of the first movements that fought against Mubarak regime and fought against political corruption and despotism since its inception in 2008 . It’s main purpose was to establish a state based on the principles of freedom, dignity, democracy, justice, equality and citizenship .
April 6 movement had a major role in the spark of January 25, 2011 and the revolution against injustice and corruption. April 6 Movement faced a great challenges and severe attack from the SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Force) who took power after the resign of Mubarak. The conflict with us started when the movement criticized the ruling military council at that time, which led the military council to start a huge media campaigns and distortion against April 6 movement at that time. Read more
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Square one
Having written about nothing but Syria for the better part of a week, it is time to take a glance back at Egypt, where the wise-beyond-his-years Ahmed Maher is telling it like it is:
We view ourselves back at square one, because what is happening now could be more dangerous, more complicated than what was there before January 25, 2011
I fear he is right. The Egyptian army has taken back power and appears determined to repress the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leadership is to be prosecuted and whose membership is to be harassed to an even greater degree than under Hosni Mubarak. Guys like Ahmed, a leader of the April 6 movement that helped precipitate the revolution, aren’t safe either, because they speak up for the rights of Islamists and others.
Disappointed as I am by this turn of events, things are never quite the same as the first time around, as Ahmed implies. It’s a bit like turning up at “Go” in Monopoly. The board has changed a bit since last time you were there. It may be more dangerous and complicated, but there are also more people who have tasted something like basic freedoms and will be unwilling to let the savories disappear. I wish Ahmed well in forming a coalition that will harness that sentiment and push for a return to a democratic path.
That will take time and effort. One of the many shortcomings of the Egyptian revolution was that it failed to mobilize grass roots support for a clear roadmap to a democratic outcome. Instead it entrusted the country’s future first to the military, which failed to deliver, then to President Morsi, who failed to deliver, and now again to the military, which is likely to fail to deliver again.
With each failure, the Islamist/secularist divide in Egypt has widened, making it difficult at this point to imagine that the Muslim Brotherhood will participate in the referendum to approve a revised constitution and elections promised for early next year. Though they supported the July 3 coup, even Salafist participation is in doubt.
Breadth of participation matters, but apparently not to the Egyptian army, which is forging ahead with the expectation that its diktat will rule Egypt for the foreseeable future. General Sissi is definitely not the self-restrained George Washington of Egypt. It looks very much as if he is preparing for a long period in power.
What should the United States do in this situation? I really don’t see much point in cutting off military assistance, as the Saudis have vowed to replace whatever the Americans cut. We can of course still do it as a symbolic act, and there are many in Washington arguing that we have to in order not to be seen as complicit in restoring the Egyptian army to power. But the aid is tied to the peace treaty with Israel, at least in the minds of the Egyptians, which means the Israelis will be pressing us hard to maintain it.
If we do decide to cut off military aid, I hope we can do it in a way that sends a clear message in favor of a serious democratic outcome. I’d wait for some egregious act to which we could respond. More than likely, the Egyptian army will give us cause by committing another mass atrocity, conducting show trials, departing dramatically from the schedule for a new constitution and elections, or some other outrageous move.
In the meanwhile, we need to do what we can to protect people like Ahmed who are daring to speak out even under newly repressive conditions. We can’t want democracy for Egyptians more than they want it for themselves, but we can support those who are taking serious risks even as the country returns to square one.
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Peace picks, August 26-30
Still quiet in DC, but not for long:
1. Exploring Opposing Perspectives in Egypt
Wednesday, August 28 at 2:00 – 5:00pm
Johns Hopkins SAIS
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW ∙ Room 500
Salon 101: The antidote to the typical DC panel discussion.
With the Salon 101 series, IPSI and SAIS continue our thought leadership collaboration by providing dynamic and experiential events, bridging the gap between theory and practice. Participants at Salon 101 directly engage experts, ideas, and each other to explore diverse perspectives and pragmatic solutions to complex global events.
Exploring Opposing Perspectives in Egypt: Since the deposition of President Morsi, unrest in Egypt has dominated international news. The outpouring of public sentiment, mass rallies and protests, and conflicting ideologies have left observers scrambling for answers. In a situation characterized by extreme tension, charged opinions, and a lack of clear-cut responses, this Salon 101 event will bring together topic experts to grapple with participants for a way forward in Egypt’s current political crisis.
The featured panel of expert facilitators includes:
- Mohamed Elmenshawy Director of the Languages and Regional Studies Program, Middle East Institute
- Dr. Nancy Okail Director of Egypt Programs, Freedom House
- Dr. William Zartman Co-Founder & Chairman of the Board, IPSI; Professor Emeritus, Johns Hopkins SAIS
With special photo exhibit from 18 months in Egypt by Keith Lane.
Spots are limited and will fill up fast, so please RSVP with your name, affiliation, and one sentence on why you would like to attend.
2. The U.S.-Russia Relationship: What’s Next?
Summary
On August 7, the White House announced cancellation of the planned Moscow summit in early September between Presidents Obama and Putin, saying there were no prospects for significant progress on key issues at the meeting. The White House also said cooperation with Russia remains a priority, and on August 9 Secretaries Kerry and Hagel met with their Russian counterparts, Ministers Lavrov and Shoigu. While President Obama intends to travel to St Petersburg for the G20 summit on September 6 and 7, there has been no word on whether there will be a bilateral meeting with President Putin on the margins of the summit. Clearly, U.S.-Russian relations have entered troubled times.
On August 28, the Center on the United States and Europe will host a panel discussion to address these developments and future prospects for the bilateral relationship between Washington and Moscow. Brookings Senior Fellows Clifford Gaddy, Steven Pifer and Angela Stent will take part. Brookings Visiting Fellow Jeremy Shapiro will moderate. Following opening comments, the panelists will take questions from the audience.
Event Agenda
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Moderator
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Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy
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Panelists
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Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
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Solid kernels in a not so good idea
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph and Aaron David Miller earlier this week put forward a proposal for a Union of Arab Democracies that merits examination despite its deep and fatal flaws. There are nuggets therein worth preserving.
The idea in their words is this:
Egypt and its fractious neighbors desperately need a unifying vision that can inculcate respect for democratic norms across glaring differences. Although Arab nations have no interest in joining the European Union or NATO, the Arab world can draw on the model of Eastern European transition, with fledgling Arab democracies devising their own supra-national organization dedicated to advancing democracy. Like the E.U. in its infancy, this Union of Arab Democracies (UAD) could start with limited objectives and evolve toward ambitious goals, including, ultimately, pan-Arab political union.
Waving their magic wand, Ed and Aaron then tell us all the good things that would happen if such an organization were to come into existence, despite the shambolic history of pan-Arab political union proposals.
If Egypt and the other Arab uprising countries were capable of creating such an organization, they wouldn’t need it. The weakness of the proposal is all too apparent when Ed and Aaron get to proposing that Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority (known to me as Palestine) would be the leading democracies, with transitioning countries (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen) and supposedly “liberalizing” countries (Morocco, Jordan and possibly Oman) tagging along. What a democratic club! Several are more likely to find themselves joining an Islamic union than a democratic one.
Nevertheless, there is a core idea here that is important: transitions need a destination. When the Berlin wall fell, the former Soviet satellites of eastern Europe and the Baltic “captive nations” quickly set their aim on meeting European Union and NATO standards. This gave direction and impetus to countries that would otherwise have wandered as aimlessly as the North African revolutions are doing today.
The way to answer the question “transition to what?” is not to have nascent Arab democracies try to figure it out for themselves. They cannot reasonably aim for membership in NATO or the EU, but they should be able to aim at two easier targets: the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe or, as my Turkish colleague Aylin Unver Noi suggests, the Council of Europe.
OSCE comprises 57 states and plays an important role in the Balkans and the more Asian parts of Eurasia. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are already among its “cooperating partners.” Several OSCE members are no farther along in democratizing than their Middle Eastern partners. With 47 member states, the Council of Europe regards itself as the continent’s leading human rights organization. It has a human rights court with some real enforcement capacity that could provide minorities in the Middle East with real recourse if their mother countries were to join.
The idea of extending OSCE and the Council of Europe to the southern littoral of the Mediterranean may seem far fetched, but efforts to construct more ad hoc arrangements have not worked well. Neither the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership nor the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative gained much traction before 2011, Aylin says, and their relevance will be further reduced by the Arab uprisings.
Another of the world’s more restrictive clubs, the rich people’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , has opened its doors to newly developed states like Korea and Mexico, much to their benefit and the benefit of the organization. Opening the OSCE and Council of Europe to new Middle Eastern members, who would need to meet clearly defined criteria in order to get in, would be a worthwhile experiment. It would give the Arab uprisings, if they want it, a destination as well as a tough-minded qualification process, which is really what Ed and Aaron were calling for.
So “no” to the Arab Democratic Union. “Yes” to Arab democracy that aims to meet the not too exacting standards of the OSCE and respects human rights as defined by the Council of Europe.
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Leverage without a fulcrum
The International Peace Institute published this piece today on its Global Observatory under the title “With Democracy, Security at Stake in Egypt, How Should the West Respond?”:
Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the confrontation in Egypt have so far failed. The refusal of coup leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, now the defense minister, to go along with diplomatic de-escalation, and the excessive force used by security agencies signal that they do not aim at repressing only the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army is trying to frighten the general population and restore autocratic rule to an Egypt that has tasted freedom and expressed itself repeatedly at the ballot box since 2011.
The US and Europe want to get Egypt back on a more orderly democratic path. This entails restraining the Egyptian security forces, maintaining relative openness, and moving towards an inclusive polity with Islamist, and, if possible, Muslim Brotherhood, participation. It also means restoring a modicum of order and stability so that ordinary Egyptians can go about their business without fear of violence or intimidation.
The security forces are continuing their violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is pledging to continue its protests against the July 3 military takeover. Some Islamists are resisting with arms. About 1,000 people have been killed. What can the United States and the international community do to mitigate the situation?
Analysis
The civilian government the Egyptian army installed after the coup has pledged an amended constitution by the end of the year, to be approved in a referendum and elections early next year. This is a fast timeline. What can the international community do to try to ensure it is met?
The United States has already postponed delivery of F16s to Egypt and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for the fall to protest General Sisi’s crackdown. Inevitably the question of America’s $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt will now arise in Washington. It would make sense to refocus the civilian assistance of about $250 million tightly on democratic objectives. Those most concerned with getting Egypt back on a democratic path are recommending suspension of the military portion ($1.2 billion).
This will be opposed by those more concerned with security issues, including maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. A proposal in the US Senate to redirect all Egyptian aid to domestic American priorities was defeated last month by a wide margin (86-13), but that was before the worst of the crackdown. The margin would likely be much closer next month.
Even if the US Congress or the Administration acts to suspend military aid to Egypt, the financial impact will not be immediate. This year’s tranche has already been transferred. It will be the better part of another year before money can be blocked. More weapons scheduled for delivery can be delayed, but American industry will spend the year lobbying hard against a funding cut-off, as much of the money is actually spent on US contractors who supply the Egyptian military with materiel and services.
Europe provides much more assistance to Egypt than the United States. Its 5 billion euro (more than $6 billion) mainly economic package is now under review. This was intended to support the transition to democracy, which is now in doubt. Europeans concerned with their own economic problems may well see suspension of aid to Egypt as an opportunity.
The international financial institutions are another important part of the picture. Egypt has been negotiating for many months a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The US and Europe can block or delay that loan.
But both Europe and the United States need to consider the broader international context in deciding what to do about bilateral and IMF assistance. They are not the only players on the world stage. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have already pledged $12 billion, dwarfing both the American and European assistance packages. Russia will likely try to take advantage of any opening and provide military aid if the Americans suspend theirs.
Egypt clearly has alternatives to Western assistance, even if the Gulf states are notoriously slow and unreliable, and the Russians significantly less attractive to a military that has been getting advanced American weapons. If they want to see a democratic outcome in Egypt, the Americans and Europeans will need to convince the Gulf states—no paragons of democracy—to back the timeline for a return to democratic governance.
Widening the aperture farther, the Arab and Muslim worlds are watching what the international community does about Egypt. Will it insist on a return to a democratic path and an inclusive polity that allows Islamist participation on the timeline that Egypt itself has defined? Or will it settle for delay or a security solution that allows the army to remain the arbiter of Egypt’s fate? A lot depends on the skillful use of diplomatic and assistance leverage in a context where there are many players with diverse and even conflicting objectives.
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