Tag: Egypt
Solid kernels in a not so good idea
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph and Aaron David Miller earlier this week put forward a proposal for a Union of Arab Democracies that merits examination despite its deep and fatal flaws. There are nuggets therein worth preserving.
The idea in their words is this:
Egypt and its fractious neighbors desperately need a unifying vision that can inculcate respect for democratic norms across glaring differences. Although Arab nations have no interest in joining the European Union or NATO, the Arab world can draw on the model of Eastern European transition, with fledgling Arab democracies devising their own supra-national organization dedicated to advancing democracy. Like the E.U. in its infancy, this Union of Arab Democracies (UAD) could start with limited objectives and evolve toward ambitious goals, including, ultimately, pan-Arab political union.
Waving their magic wand, Ed and Aaron then tell us all the good things that would happen if such an organization were to come into existence, despite the shambolic history of pan-Arab political union proposals.
If Egypt and the other Arab uprising countries were capable of creating such an organization, they wouldn’t need it. The weakness of the proposal is all too apparent when Ed and Aaron get to proposing that Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority (known to me as Palestine) would be the leading democracies, with transitioning countries (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen) and supposedly “liberalizing” countries (Morocco, Jordan and possibly Oman) tagging along. What a democratic club! Several are more likely to find themselves joining an Islamic union than a democratic one.
Nevertheless, there is a core idea here that is important: transitions need a destination. When the Berlin wall fell, the former Soviet satellites of eastern Europe and the Baltic “captive nations” quickly set their aim on meeting European Union and NATO standards. This gave direction and impetus to countries that would otherwise have wandered as aimlessly as the North African revolutions are doing today.
The way to answer the question “transition to what?” is not to have nascent Arab democracies try to figure it out for themselves. They cannot reasonably aim for membership in NATO or the EU, but they should be able to aim at two easier targets: the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe or, as my Turkish colleague Aylin Unver Noi suggests, the Council of Europe.
OSCE comprises 57 states and plays an important role in the Balkans and the more Asian parts of Eurasia. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are already among its “cooperating partners.” Several OSCE members are no farther along in democratizing than their Middle Eastern partners. With 47 member states, the Council of Europe regards itself as the continent’s leading human rights organization. It has a human rights court with some real enforcement capacity that could provide minorities in the Middle East with real recourse if their mother countries were to join.
The idea of extending OSCE and the Council of Europe to the southern littoral of the Mediterranean may seem far fetched, but efforts to construct more ad hoc arrangements have not worked well. Neither the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership nor the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative gained much traction before 2011, Aylin says, and their relevance will be further reduced by the Arab uprisings.
Another of the world’s more restrictive clubs, the rich people’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , has opened its doors to newly developed states like Korea and Mexico, much to their benefit and the benefit of the organization. Opening the OSCE and Council of Europe to new Middle Eastern members, who would need to meet clearly defined criteria in order to get in, would be a worthwhile experiment. It would give the Arab uprisings, if they want it, a destination as well as a tough-minded qualification process, which is really what Ed and Aaron were calling for.
So “no” to the Arab Democratic Union. “Yes” to Arab democracy that aims to meet the not too exacting standards of the OSCE and respects human rights as defined by the Council of Europe.
Leverage without a fulcrum
The International Peace Institute published this piece today on its Global Observatory under the title “With Democracy, Security at Stake in Egypt, How Should the West Respond?”:
Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the confrontation in Egypt have so far failed. The refusal of coup leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, now the defense minister, to go along with diplomatic de-escalation, and the excessive force used by security agencies signal that they do not aim at repressing only the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army is trying to frighten the general population and restore autocratic rule to an Egypt that has tasted freedom and expressed itself repeatedly at the ballot box since 2011.
The US and Europe want to get Egypt back on a more orderly democratic path. This entails restraining the Egyptian security forces, maintaining relative openness, and moving towards an inclusive polity with Islamist, and, if possible, Muslim Brotherhood, participation. It also means restoring a modicum of order and stability so that ordinary Egyptians can go about their business without fear of violence or intimidation.
The security forces are continuing their violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is pledging to continue its protests against the July 3 military takeover. Some Islamists are resisting with arms. About 1,000 people have been killed. What can the United States and the international community do to mitigate the situation?
Analysis
The civilian government the Egyptian army installed after the coup has pledged an amended constitution by the end of the year, to be approved in a referendum and elections early next year. This is a fast timeline. What can the international community do to try to ensure it is met?
The United States has already postponed delivery of F16s to Egypt and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for the fall to protest General Sisi’s crackdown. Inevitably the question of America’s $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt will now arise in Washington. It would make sense to refocus the civilian assistance of about $250 million tightly on democratic objectives. Those most concerned with getting Egypt back on a democratic path are recommending suspension of the military portion ($1.2 billion).
This will be opposed by those more concerned with security issues, including maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. A proposal in the US Senate to redirect all Egyptian aid to domestic American priorities was defeated last month by a wide margin (86-13), but that was before the worst of the crackdown. The margin would likely be much closer next month.
Even if the US Congress or the Administration acts to suspend military aid to Egypt, the financial impact will not be immediate. This year’s tranche has already been transferred. It will be the better part of another year before money can be blocked. More weapons scheduled for delivery can be delayed, but American industry will spend the year lobbying hard against a funding cut-off, as much of the money is actually spent on US contractors who supply the Egyptian military with materiel and services.
Europe provides much more assistance to Egypt than the United States. Its 5 billion euro (more than $6 billion) mainly economic package is now under review. This was intended to support the transition to democracy, which is now in doubt. Europeans concerned with their own economic problems may well see suspension of aid to Egypt as an opportunity.
The international financial institutions are another important part of the picture. Egypt has been negotiating for many months a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The US and Europe can block or delay that loan.
But both Europe and the United States need to consider the broader international context in deciding what to do about bilateral and IMF assistance. They are not the only players on the world stage. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have already pledged $12 billion, dwarfing both the American and European assistance packages. Russia will likely try to take advantage of any opening and provide military aid if the Americans suspend theirs.
Egypt clearly has alternatives to Western assistance, even if the Gulf states are notoriously slow and unreliable, and the Russians significantly less attractive to a military that has been getting advanced American weapons. If they want to see a democratic outcome in Egypt, the Americans and Europeans will need to convince the Gulf states—no paragons of democracy—to back the timeline for a return to democratic governance.
Widening the aperture farther, the Arab and Muslim worlds are watching what the international community does about Egypt. Will it insist on a return to a democratic path and an inclusive polity that allows Islamist participation on the timeline that Egypt itself has defined? Or will it settle for delay or a security solution that allows the army to remain the arbiter of Egypt’s fate? A lot depends on the skillful use of diplomatic and assistance leverage in a context where there are many players with diverse and even conflicting objectives.
Egypt’s new autocracy
Motives can be hard to discern, especially if those who hold them say little. So far, the Egyptian army has not said much. It merely claims its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood is intended to fight threats to the nation, in particular terrorism.
But most of the violence against security forces came after the crackdown, not before. And there is no evidence that brutality of this sort will stem a terrorist movement or insurgency. To the contrary, few insurgencies yield to force. Most yield to law enforcement or negotiation.
We can try to infer the Army’s objectives from its behavior. The largely indiscriminate violence by the security forces suggests that the intention is not merely to disperse particular demonstrations but rather to intimidate. The target is not only the Muslim Brotherhood but the entire Egyptian population. The army is trying to reestablish the autocracy that fell in February 2011, with new leadership. That requires frightening all the citizens, not just the Muslim Brotherhood.
But it also requires chasing the Brotherhood out of the political game. Even under Hosni Mubarak, there were elections. Under strong international pressure, the army will have to hold elections sometime next year, if not earlier. What it cannot afford is for the Brotherhood to participate and gain a significant slice of the electorate, maybe even a plurality.
This may seem unlikely given the popular demonstrations against President Morsi, but it is entirely possible. The non-Islamists in Egypt seem hopelessly divided. The longer the army postpones elections, the more likely it is Egyptians will be disappointed with its rule, which has no real prospect of solving the economic and social ills that sent Egyptians into the street calling for Morsi to step down. The Brotherhood has a loyal and organized core following. A free and fair electoral contest in a year’s time might well have unpleasant surprises for General Sissi.
The way to avoid this is to make sure the Brotherhood goes underground and is unable or unwilling to participate in the electoral process. It won’t be surprising if the army declares the Brotherhood illegal, but it may not have to do so. Morsi and his minions are likely to say they won’t participate because the process is illegitimate. But there are less militant Brothers and supporters. The tougher the crackdown, the less likely a Brotherhood electoral effort in any guise will emerge. The Egyptian army knows Turkish history well: the Islamists returned repeatedly after military interventions, gained control of the state and are now taking revenge on some of their military antagonists.
Leaving aside the fate of the Brotherhood, can autocracy be reimposed?
The odds are pretty good. The more moderate Islamists and secular liberals in Egypt were never very good at getting votes. They will be glad to see the Brotherhood out of the competition. The Salafists are in a more difficult spot, but their all too apparent sympathies with the Brotherhood demonstrators have not yet made them split definitively from at least nominal acceptance of the military coup. Offered an opportunity to compete at the polls without the Brotherhood in play, the Salafists may well play along. Few non-Brotherhood Egyptians of any stripe are going to stand up for the Brotherhood, especially if it continues to resist the crackdown with ineffective violence of its own.
Of course the new autocracy won’t be the same as Mubarak’s. It is likely to allow greater freedom of the press, a safety valve that many autocracies find useful. It would be smart to allow broader distribution of the economic goodies than Mubarak did, building a real constituency of its own in the business community. It might well get smart about providing for the poorest of the poor, who don’t get much out of Egypt’s subsidies to middle class commodities like gasoline that they don’t use.
But autocracy it will still be, with clear limits on political organizing, protection for the army’s privileges and status, and a truncated ideological spectrum that tries to consign any but the most moderate Islamism to the margins. It will not be democratic in any absolute sense, but it may be a bit more open than the old autocracy. The question now is how many people the army will have to kill to make it happen.
Mubarak’s last laugh
My friends at the New York Times are repeating their call to cut off military aid to Egypt in response to yesterday’s “madness” (and proposing cancellation of military exercises as well). Until now I’ve opposed cutting off aid, but the time has come. Washington should suspend both military exercises and aid, while sustaining civilian assistance, pending return to civilian rule. Doing anything less will signal approval of a murderous and unjustified attack by the Egyptian security forces as well as the military’s continuing hold on power.
I hasten to add that it won’t do much good. As Eric Trager has noted (unfortunately behind the Wall Street Journal paywall, so don’t expect a link), the Egyptian army regarded the Muslim Brotherhood challenge to the military coup as an existential one. Our $1.3 billion just does not outweigh an existential challenge. General Sissi has surely calculated that he would lose this money if he cracked down. He went ahead anyway. No one should expect him to have any regrets. He is far more likely to denounce the US for hypocrisy for not supporting his war on terror and to look for additional support from the Saudis, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, Gulf states that have already ponied up pledges of well over $10 billion. Read more
Alas, poor Egypt
The big issue on everyone’s mind today is the crackdown in Egypt. Here is how I’ve answered a few of the press’s good questions:
Q: What’s your take on the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood? What might result from this confrontation?
A: The unnecessary and ill-advised crackdown will make it far more difficult for Egypt to heal the rift between Islamists and secularists and move towards an inclusive and democratic government. The military will now be quite clearly in charge, as the resignation of El Baradei confirms. Washington will have to decide whether to suspend assistance. It will be difficult not to do so, though suspension is unlikely to make things better.
Q: What might be the international implication of the crisis – for other Arab countries prospects of democracy there?
Bad but not hopeless
News from the Arab uprisings this morning is particularly grim:
- In Egypt, the police and army are attacking pro-Morsi demonstrators, causing what appear to be well over 100 deaths;
- In an unconfirmed report, Italian Catholic priest and opposition enthusiast Paolo Dall’Oglio is said to have been killed by opposition Islamists in Syria;
- The American mission in Yemen remains closed as the US continues its heightened drone war against militants.
Add to these items the Islamist government in Tunisia finding itself unable to protect non-Islamist politicians from assassination and Libya’s continuing difficulty in gaining control over revolutionary militias and you’ve got a pretty ugly picture.
I don’t want to minimize any of this. It is all real and problematic. But it is not catastrophic. Revolutions have their bad moments (and days, months and years). Some of them end badly. There is no guarantee that won’t be the case in the Middle East, with some or all of the uprisings.
Egypt is in the most peril. It has not found a steady course but lurches between extremes: either military-backed secularists or Muslim Brotherhood/Salafist dominance. Co-habitation of the two has proven unworkable. It is hard to picture how today’s crackdown can put things right. The Islamists will find it harder to compromise. Secularists and minorities will fear even more a return of the Brotherhood to power. Read more