Tag: Egypt
Egypt, the US and Israel
These are the (slightly amended) talking points I used today in a presentation about Egypt to a pro-Israel American group:
1. I’ll start with the bottom line: I am not optimistic about Egypt’s revolution finding its way to stability or democracy, objectives I would certainly like it to reach.
2. Egypt is a big, complicated, diverse and poor country that simply has not found a consensus on the rules of the road.
3. My colleague Marc Lynch calls this Calvinball, which is a game never played the same way twice in the comic strip Calvin and Hobbes. The rules are constantly changing.
4. I think of it a bit like Cairo traffic: everyone aggressively doing his own thing, to the detriment of the collective outcome.
5. The big divide is now between the coup—led by the army, the justice system and secularists with support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE—and the Qatari supported Muslim Brotherhood, with the Nour party Salafists somewhere in the middle.
6. If this divide is not bridged, I still anticipate the new revolution will proceed with revising the constitution and holding elections, at a pace forced in part by international pressure.
7. But that won’t fix much unless the Brotherhood rejoins the political game and agrees to play by democratic rules, which it has refused to do so far. Legitimacy depends on participation.
8. If the Brotherhood does rejoin, it may well capture a big part of electorate, which in six months or a year won’t be any happier with the economy and social conditions than it was when Morsi was in power.
9. So Egypt is damned if Brotherhood participates, and it is damned if the Brotherhood doesn’t participate.
10. I’d much prefer to see the Brotherhood inside the tent peeing out rather than outside the tent peeing in, but I can’t pretend to predict which way it will go, as most predictions prove incorrect.
11. What does this all mean for the United States and Israel?
12. Egypt is important to the United States, because it is the center of gravity of the Arab world.
13. If the revolution moves definitively in a democratic direction, that will show the way for Libya, Tunisia, Yemen and eventually Syria.
14. If it fails to move in a democratic direction, the cause in those countries will not be lost, but the odds of success will decline.
15. For Israel, the question is less about democracy and more about security. Morsi was not threatening the treaty, but his slipshod regime was nevertheless bad for security, especially in the Sinai.
16. We’ll have to see whether the present regime will do any better. The Egyptian military seems already to be destroying the tunnels into Gaza, something the judiciary ordered some time ago.
17. I assume this is welcome in Israel. The emergence in Egypt of anti-Palestinian sentiment is likely welcome there as well, though I hasten to add that anti-Israeli sentiment is also strong.
18. In any event, I see nothing to be gained at the moment by ending or suspending US aid to Egypt, which if the pledges are fulfilled will have ample cash from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
19. Influence flows in the same direction as money. You may have a one-time impact from shutting off the money flow, but then influence will rapidly decline. Relationships will be seriously damaged.
20. Better in my view to use the leverage the assistance provides to push for what the United States wants: an inclusive democratic outcome. Assistance should be conditional.
21. Will inclusive democracy in Egypt be good for Israel? That depends on which Israel you support.
22. It is clear that any truly democratic regime in Egypt, and in other Arab countries, will be more sympathetic to the Palestinians than the autocracies, which talked a good line but did little.
23. At the same time, the Arab street seems for the moment more interested in personal safety, jobs and bread than the plight of the Palestinians, so resources will flow to those higher priorities.
24. That said, the Egyptian revolution is taking a much more nationalist turn. I imagine this nationalism will include more belligerence against Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
25. I do not anticipate it will include renunciation of the Egypt/Israel peace treaty, mainly because the Egyptian military does not want the burden of the resulting security requirements.
26. For Israel the greater threat comes from instability in Egypt. If the Egyptian state continues to weaken, it may have real difficulty controlling extremists in Sinai and elsewhere.
27. Cairo’s political influence in Gaza is also likely to decline, since Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate.
28. Which brings me back to where I started: a stable and democratic outcome is unlikely. Both Israelis and Americans are going to need to learn to manage a much more fluid and uncertain situation than in the past.
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The popular impeachment thesis
Turmoil in Egypt continues to engage analysts and policymakers. Last week, Dr. Mona Makram-Ebeid, an Egyptian academic and former member of the Shura Council, spoke about the current situation in Egypt at her “favorite think tank” in Washington D.C., the Middle East Institute. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, the president of the Middle East Institute, introduced the speaker and moderated the discussion.
For Makram-Ebeid, being in Egypt during the second revolution constituted “the most exciting but terribly dangerous days” of her political career. While she was skeptical that the Tamarod movement would in fact be able to gather 15 million signatures, she signed its petition. Resigning from the Shura Council, Makram-Ebeid joined the millions of Egyptians in Tahrir Square calling for Morsi to step down.
On June 30, Makram-Ebeid was summoned for a meeting at (former) Minister Kafrawi’s house. General Fouad Allam, former deputy chief of Egypt’s internal security, as well as journalists and representative of various movements, were present. Minister Kafrawi mentioned that they have been in touch with the army, the Coptic Pope, Sheikh al-Azhar, and General Sisi. He added that the army had requested a “written popular demand” to intervene and prevent a bloodbath. The group present then wrote a request saying: “You gave everyone one week to resolve the problems and to come to a compromise, otherwise you would step in to prevent a bloodbath. So we are asking you to fulfill your pledges, because we are on the brink of a civil war and a real bloodbath.” The army intervened.
Asking whether Morsi’s downfall was inevitable, Makram-Ebeid replied that Egyptians view their country as Um al-Dunya: the mother of the world. It is possible that no government could have solved Egypt’s economic problems in a year. Nevertheless, any wise government would have instilled a sense of karamah, or dignity, among Egyptians. This is where Morsi failed. Not only did he not deal with the problems of poverty and unemployment, he also “was whatever the opposite of charisma is.” Egyptians felt humiliated at seeing him. This sense was compounded when Morsi installed his “cronies” in government offices, instead of forming a national government. Thus, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s downfall was not inevitable from the beginning, they intervened in the military’s budget, instigated sectarian violence, and marginalized the judiciary, intellectuals, artists, women, Copts, and other groups. This resulted in their downfall.
Many wonder whether the revolution constitutes a coup. Makram-Ebeid responded by asking: “How important is this?… whether this is a coup or not a coup, it’s over.” It is not intervention, but rather inaction by the army that would have been criminal, she added. The army responded to the popular demands of Egyptians, as evidenced by the 30 million Egyptians who took to the streets and prevented a bloodbath, which would have jeopardized Morsi’s own life. Thus, Makram-Ebeid prefers to describe the event as a “popular impeachment.”
As to the US role in Egypt, Makram-Ebeid recommended that it should not support Egypt only to maintain peace with Israel. Rather, the US needs to push for a democratic and inclusive government. It should also encourage the private sector and businessmen, and should even ask them to contribute more financial assistance and help reduce youth unemployment. What made America great, Makram-Ebeid asserted, is philanthropy. Moreover, the US needs to further engage different parties in Egypt and condemn the marginalization of groups such as women and Christians. Makram-Ebeid added that perception is stronger than reality. The prevalent perception in Egypt is America’s undeniable support for the Muslim Brotherhood. The US needs to change that.
Makram-Ebeid then added three things Egyptians need to do. First, they need to stop to the incitement and demonization of the Brotherhood. Egyptians should strive for reconciliation, not further divisions. After all, they worked together to bring the Mubarak regime down. Second, while General Sisi has several advantages over former General Tantawi, as he is younger, savvy, and trained in the U.S. (rather than the USSR), the military continues to have no real interest in democracy. It thus falls upon the seculars and liberals to unify under a common leadership and program and to implement the road map to democratization. And finally, the opposition needs to ensure that the transition period, run under military control, is as short as possible.
Ambassador Chamberlin then mentioned that democracy is a ground game. The youths of Tamarod have mobilized on their computers, but a lot of democracy requires getting into the streets, knocking on doors and building a party from the ground up. Should we expect to see that as a very important election approaches? Makram-Ebeid responded by saying this is an important challenge for Egyptians. After the 2011 revolution, everyone in Tahrir became an expert on the top TV shows, and no one was left to run for elections. Makram-Ebeid hopes this does not happen again. She wants the recent protesters to grow a grassroots organization of their own, rather than join an existing one. While she has nothing against elderly people, she wants to see some “fresh blood” in politics.
Asked if recent events could set a bad precedent by deposing an elected president who had lost popularity, Makram-Ebeid responded by saying this is unlikely. “This is not the Tea Party,” she added. Most Egyptians took lessons from the past 30 months, so such a move is unlikely to occur again. Egyptians would refuse any dictatorship. “Today, we have a past president, an ousted president, and no president.” This is in a country where presidents stay until their death or assassination, so everything is new for Egyptians, she concluded.
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Peace picks July 15-19
A busy midsummer week:
1. Real Politics of Iran: Views from Within, US Institute of Peace, Monday, July 15 / 2:00pm – 4:00pm
Venue: US Institute of Peace
2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, Kevan Harris, Farzan Sabet, Daniel Brumberg
Iran’s June 14, 2013, presidential election produced a result that surprised many Iran watchers: a first round win for Hassan Rouhani. A long-time regime stalwart who favors a political opening at home and abroad, his election may signal the return of a more contentious politics—one that could limit the growing influence of the security apparatus or create space for a more productive Western-Iranian dialogue. To probe the implications of these changes for Iran’s internal politics and its foreign relations, on July 15 the United States Institute of Peace will host three distinguished Iran analysts, one of which has just returned from Iran. Drawn from the United States Institute of Peace’s (USIP) Internal Iran Study Group, they will highlight a range of dynamics in the universities, opposition, the economy and even the security apparatus that often escape the foreign headlines. Daniel Brumberg, Senior Program Officer on Iran and North Africa at USIP, will chair this timely discussion.
Register for the event here:
http://realpoliticsofiran.eventbrite.com/
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Keep the aid and the influence
I expect flak for this, which was published last night by al-monitor.com under the heading “US should not cut aid for Egyptian military”:
The American reaction to the Egyptian coup (yes, it was a coup, no matter how popular) is schizophrenic.
The Obama administration, with significant support in Congress, accepts the new situation and is trying to make the best of it, pushing behind the scenes for the Egyptian army to re-establish civilian authority and move quickly to revise the Constitution and hold new elections, which have been promised within six months.
You’ll have to go to al-monitor.com for the rest, as they don’t allow me to publish the whole thing.
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US law on aid to Egypt
Delta Royalty Consulting President Jim Roy,* who left an informative comment on www.peacefare.net correcting some of my errors and omissions last week, offers:
Since the code of Hammurabi was carved in stone three thousand eight hundred and eight years ago, the presence of written law has distinguished civilized societies from barbarians. The tradition in the United States is that the Congress writes the law and the Administration implements the law. Separation of powers has protected Americans from the evils of dictatorships and police states.
Under US law, the coup d’etat in Egypt requires that US financial aid for military purposes be suspended, as well as financial aid for training of military and police. The coup does not require suspension of financial aid for economic assistance, but limits how such aid may be used. In particular, economic assistance may not be used to support police or security measures. The coup does not affect programs delivered directly by USAID. It also does not affect shipments of US-manufactured weapons that Egypt may acquire as a major non-NATO ally. Read more
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Process matters
Egypt’s latest constitutional declaration, which is intended to lay out a roadmap for elections within six months, is a mistake. Admittedly it is just the most recent in a long series, but that doesn’t make it any less serious.
First the bare facts: just before midnight Monday, the interim president, Adly Mansour, issed a constitutional declaration Read more
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