Tag: Egypt
Masterful
Secretary of State-designate John Kerry was masterful today in his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing. It wasn’t so much the details of what he said, but the breadth and depth. This is a guy who really knows international affairs.
His prepared statement was notable for some high points: the emphasis on the importance of American economic health in determining the country’s role abroad, the clarity about preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons and the vigor of his defense of the State Department budget. I would also note that John Kerry regards USAID, whose functions he mentioned but not its name, as an integral part of the State Department.
Then Kerry showed a lot of agility in dealing with not only the questions but also a demonstrator, expressing respect for her cries to be heard. He defended Secretary of Defense-designate Hagel’s views on getting rid of nuclear weapons, which he said was an aspiration for a world different from the one we live in today. He described his own changed view of Syria’s President Asad, whom he now hopes to see go soon.
He showed his clear commitment to maintaining the high priority Secretary Clinton has given to gender issues. He was non-committal on the Keystone pipeline, deferring to the official process under way. He was gentle with the Russians, citing their cooperation on particular issues (other than Syria). He was supportive of American anti-corruption and human rights efforts abroad. He showed he knows what is going on in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan provinces. He parried accusations about Benghazi.
Of course part of the reason for this masterful performance is the attitude of the questioners, who showed enormous respect for their long-standing colleague. Gone was the idiot questioning of yesterday’s hearing with Secretary of State Clinton on the Benghazi murders. There was little “gotcha.” Certainly had the President nominated Susan Rice, who is far more combative, the tone if not the substance of the hearing would have been different. In a week’s time the Hagel hearing may be far more contentious, even if Hagel himself comes close to matching Kerry in knowledge and equanimity.
On Syria, Kerry advocated changing Bashar al Asad’s calculations, but he was unclear about the means to achieve that. He wants an orderly transition. The Russians appear willing, but differ on the timing and manner of Bashar’s departure. Kerry fears sectarian strife, implosion of the Syrian state and what they might mean for chemical weapons.
The Syrian opposition has not been ready to talk, Kerry said. In a sentence he struck–one of his few moments of hesitation in this long hearing–he started to say that we need to increase the ability of the opposition to do something unspecified. I’d sure like to know how that sentence was supposed to end: increase their ability to negotiate? increase their ability to strike the regime militarily? There’s a big difference. It sounded to me more like he wanted them to be more flexible on negotiations, but I’m not certain.
Kerry hit a lot of other subjects. On Afghanistan, he put his chips on a good April 2014 presidential election, which has to provide legitimacy to Karzai’s successor. Kerry wants “a metric” for stopping infiltration and attacks on Americans from Pakistani territory. He noted China is “all over” Africa (and America has to get into the game). Al Qaeda has dispersed at the urging of Osama bin Laden and is now a threat in the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb, where the solution is not only drone strikes but (unspecified) civilian efforts. We don’t like what Egyptian President Morsi says about Jews, but we need him to maintain the peace treaty with Israel. On Israel/Palestine, Kerry was cagey and refused to be drawn out, except to reiterate commitment to the two-state solution. The solution to climate change is energy policy, which will enable job growth. The “war on drugs” is ill-conceived. We need to do more on the demand side.
Here is the lengthy (four hours?) video of the hearing:
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Egypt two years on
The Egyptian revolution will be two years young tomorrow. What has it accomplished? Where does it stand? Where is it headed?
The revolution’s greatest accomplishment occurred two years ago: the fall of Hosni Mubarak from power. There ensued a terrifically chaotic year and a half, best described by Marc Lynch as Calvinball: a game in which the participants constantly change the rules. The period of military rule was particularly shambolic, but Egypt did not stabilize immediately after the election in June 2012 of Mohammed Morsi as president.
In the subsequent months, he managed however to push the army aside, preserving many of its prerogatives but depriving it of governing power and accumulating it for himself. He also managed to push through a December referendum on a controversial new constitution that leaves openings for Islamist rule. Parliamentary elections are to be held at a still unspecified date in April, under an electoral law prepared by a Shura Council (upper house) that he controls.
Muslim Brotherhood expert Eric Trager thinks Egypt will emerge from this process as a “competitive theocracy.” The main rivals will be the highly disciplined and hierarchical Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical and fragmented Salafi fundamentalists. It is not clear which will have the advantage, as the Brotherhood’s discipline and hierarchy is less appealing to the young than the low threshold to entry into Salafist ranks.
This discounts completely the secularists and liberals who more or less united against the parliamentary referendum, which they lost, and are trying to hold together for the parliamentary elections as the National Salvation Front. Divided, they have so far fared poorly in Egypt’s several rounds of voting since the fall of Mubarak but hope to do better united against the now dominant Islamists.
President Morsi, while riding high on election and referendum victories, is proving less than effective in handling the economy, which is still in a nose dive, and the Americans, who distrust his attitude on Israel and find his past and present bad-mouthing of Jews offensive. But neither Morsi, who needs American support at the IMF and World Bank, nor his critics is interested in creating too big a breach. Washington needs Cairo to maintain the peace treaty with Israel, act as a brake on Hamas in Gaza and remain stalwart against Iran.
Democracy, as anyone watching the U.S. Congress knows too well, is like making sausage: unappetizing in the process, even if the product is highly palatable. Some think the Egyptians are just learning to be democrats. I’m inclined in that direction. But then an Egyptian friend comes to visit and worries about whether Morsi will be deploying religious police to prevent young men and women from holding hands in public. The Saudi precedent hovers.
The best that can be said about Islamist domination of the political spectrum in Egypt is that a) it reflects the will of the Egyptian people and b) it may not last, since the split between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists is likely to continue. The April elections really are the secularist liberals’ last, best chance of gaining political traction for the next four years. If they fail, as seems likely, Egypt will experiment with a constitution that leaves a lot of room for Islamist maneuvering in a society that is more interested in economic results than theocratic correctness. But that is how most Iranians feel also, to no avail.
The Egyptian revolution is still young. The outcome remains in doubt. Morsi is no democrat: he has brought many more cases to court for supposed offenses to the president than Mubarak did. But Morsi is not alone in determining the outcome. The Salafists and the liberals will tug Egypt in other directions, as will the army and the business community. How these vectors sum to determine the ultimate direction will depend on many factors: election outcomes, the economy, the courts, relations among Egypt’s religious groups, threats to Egypt’s security, relations with its neighbors, the course of events in the region.
Ten years on we’ll have a clear picture. Tomorrow what we’ll see are massive demonstrations pulling Egypt in dramatically different directions.
PS: Bassem Sabry also still has hopes for democracy.
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Not a foreign policy Inaugural, but…
President Obama said little about foreign affairs in his Inauguration speech, but what he said bears more attention than it is getting. After a tribute America’s armed forces (and mention that we are ending a decade of war), he went on to say:
But we are also heirs to those who won the peace and not just the war, who turned sworn enemies into the surest of friends, and we must carry those lessons into this time as well.
We will defend our people and uphold our values through strength of arms and rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully — not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear. America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe; and we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation. We will support democracy from Asia to Africa; from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom. And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice — not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity; human dignity and justice.
This is extraordinarily general, or maybe tantalizingly vague. I think I know what it means for Iran: continuation of negotiations, at least for a while. But what does it mean for the brave Syrians who are fighting what is proving to be a frighteningly violent regime? It certainly aligns America with support for the Arab awakenings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, but what does it mean for Bahrain? Or Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states? Or, even more importantly, for China, where “those who long for freedom” are increasingly speaking out?
What we know from Obama’s first term is that he balances ideals and reality in each case based on specific circumstances. He is lawyerly in approach, treating each contingency on its merits rather than laying out a more generally applicable “Obama” doctrine (other than support for democracy and concern for the disadvantaged). This is very different from his predecessor, who set out general principles and tried to apply them to specific cases without much regard for the particular circumstances, with disastrous results.
My guess is that circumstances will force the President to say and do a great deal more about Iran, Syria, China and other situations in short order. His reference to American alliances and “those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad”–that’s presumably the UN, OSCE, OAS and the rest of the alphabet soup of international organizations, including non-governmental ones–is a clear indication that he will be looking for help from others when he decides to act internationally.
What he did not say–but none of us should forget–is that America’s financial situation and its internal politics will constrain what it can do internationally for at least the next four years. We are broke, as the Republicans like to say. But we’ll have to wait at least for the State of the Union message if not longer to see what the Inaugural message means for resources to support both our military and civilian efforts abroad.
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I didn’t have to wait long
I suggested last week that Jews might make comments as odious as Egyptian President Morsi’s, which I posted. I didn’t have to wait long for a sample. Here is Jeremy Gimpel, a right-wing candidate for the Israeli parliament, suggesting how overjoyed Jews would be if someone blew up the Dome of the Rock, the mosque that stands in Jerusalem on one of Islam’s holiest sites. Worse: he suggests that the Jews would then rebuild the Temple that stood there 2000 years ago and, to add insult to injury, that Jews would want to build Christian churches as well.
No, it’s not the same as calling Jews sons of pigs, but it is hate speech nevertheless, and delivered with a good deal more conviction than Morsi’s, who has been backpedaling. Will Gimpel do likewise?
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Frugal superpower puts on airs
With Senate hearings scheduled for January 24 for former Senator John Kerry as Secretary of State and January 31 for former Senator Charles Hagel as Secretary of Defense, the American press is wondering what their nominations portend. Will there be big changes in policy? Or will there be more continuity?
At least one of my colleagues worries that Hagel’s nomination will be seen as undermining President Obama’s commitment to preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but Hagel will also have a great deal of credibility the day he tells the Iranians the deal they’ve been offered is the very best they can expect. Even on Iran, I anticipate more continuity in attitude than abrupt change in direction. That is partly because Obama is still in charge. Hagel will not only conform what he says to the Administration’s policy, he will also want to maximize the chances for success in blocking Iran from getting nuclear weapons. That necessarily means making the military option credible, even if in private life he was inclined against it.
But for other issues circumstances may not remain constant. In particular the budget challenge is likely to be greater than in the past. The government ran on continuing resolutions throughout Obama’s first term, to the dismay of conservatives. That gives government departments relatively decent financing, compared to what they would get if Congress triggers the sequester or if the House Republicans get the dollar cut in expenditures for every dollar increase in the budget ceiling that they are demanding. If instead of continuing current expenditure levels, we head in the direction of big cuts, both Defense and State are likely to get hammered.
Defense, bloated after years of doubling its budget even without counting Iraq and Afghanistan war spending, can afford it better than State, though State (and USAID) are relatively flush as well. The problem is that both institutions have far-flung capital commitments to bases and embassies that are essentially fixed costs. Even if you cut back on personnel presence overseas, you can’t turn off the heat and electricity. It will take time and effort to de-accesssion unneeded facilities. Bureaucrats at both State and Defense will be more inclined to keep the heat and lights on, hoping for budget increases in the future.
Senator Kerry visited Rome once when I was Charge’ d’affaires ad interim there. He wondered why we needed 800 people in the diplomatic mission to Italy. I said we didn’t, but that 36 different agencies of the U.S. government had made separate decisions that put them there. He threatened to cut the Embassy budget. I noted that would leave more than 90% of the staff still screaming for State Department services–their salaries and benefits were paid by the mostly domestic agencies that put people in Rome.
None of this will be discussed in the confirmation hearings, which are conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). It has no budgetary responsibility–that is the purview of the appropriations subcommittees in both House and Senate. SFRC will focus not on budget and overseas presence but rather on “policy” issues. Right now that likely means the Benghazi murder of U.S. diplomatic personnel (Hillary Clinton will appear in Congress a day before Kerry’s hearing to testify on that unforgiving subject), the Al Qaeda push in Mali, the hostage crisis in Algeria, Iran’s nuclear program, maybe a bit of Syria and Egypt and a quick look at Asia (rising China, nuclear North Korea, America’s treaty obligations). My order of priority might be different, but that’s because I’ve got a 3-5 year time frame. The Congress has more like a one week-one year time frame.
There is little doubt that Hagel and Kerry will be confirmed. The question is how far they will have to go to satisfy Congressional critics in committing the United States to military action in Iran, Syria and Mali. The President seems determined to keep his powder dry for Iran, but there is a good deal of agitation for more military support to the Syrian opposition and for assisting the French intervention in Mali. Neither budgets nor domestic politics will warrant much more than that, even if the Senators give eloquent speeches advocating it. We are in the era of the frugal superpower, but you won’t know it from the upcoming hearings.
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Middle East: less grand, more strategy
Middle East Institute intern Aya Fasih, recently arrived from Cairo, writes in her debut on peacefare:
With the re-election of President Obama and massive transformations ongoing in the region, the Middle East Policy Council’s 71st Capitol Hill Conference focused Wednesday on “U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?” Related questions included:
- Is it even possible to formulate a grand strategy for the region amidst all the turbulence it is witnessing?
- Were past U.S. grand strategies for the region successful in achieving their objectives?
The prestigious panel, comprised of Chas Freeman Jr., William Quandt, Marwan Muasher and John Duke Anthony (moderated by Thomas Mattair), identified five main points of discussion: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, the Arab uprisings, the Syrian crisis, and the political-economic security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Chas Freeman Jr., Chairman of Projects International, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and President of the Middle East Policy Council, said the two main U.S. policies in the Middle East, unconditional support to Israel and strategic partnership with pre-revolutionary Egypt and the rentier Gulf states, were contradictory and therefore precluded any grand strategy. Freeman underscored the costs associated with U.S. support and protection of Israel; he said that U.S. support for irresponsible and immoral policies of Israel has undermined U.S. strategic interests in the region and potential cooperation with the region’s other powers:
America may have Israel’s back, but no one has America’s back.
Continuation post-revolution of an American-Egyptian partnership is in doubt. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Afghanistan, and “abandonment” of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has weakened and become more “transactional.” It should no longer be taken for granted. In Freeman’s view, U.S. policies preclude formulation of grand strategies and leave room for only limited cooperation.
William Quandt, Professor at the University of Virginia and former staff member of the National Security Council, started by expressing suspicion of grand strategies. The Bush 41/Clinton dual containment of Iraq and Iran failed, as did the Bush 43 strategy of replacing certain Arab regimes, starting with Iraq, with pro-Western ones. Quandt, like the other three fellow panelists, thought the U.S. needs to revise its policies, starting with the realization that “we are not all-powerful.” A revised strategy should include:
- an end to U.S.-Iran animosity, which would avoid a dangerous war and benefit Iraq, Syria and Lebanon;
- maintenance of positive relations with NATO ally Turkey, which will also benefit Iraq and Syria;
- friendly relations with Egypt because of its geo-strategic importance and influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- greater attention to Saudi Arabia, which faces a difficult generational transition;
- a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict;
- a renewed effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
John Duke Anthony, Founding President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, discussed mainly the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, highlighting the vital strategic importance of the GCC for the region’s security and U.S. energy supplies.
Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at Carnegie Endowment and former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ambassador to the United States, highlighted how the U.S. must change its approach by assessing the new governments and players in the region not based on their ideology but rather on their performance. U.S. influence will not be decisive in the process of transition. Events on the ground and competition for power among local actors will determine the outcomes. It is crucial that the US start differentiating between different Islamist actors and parties and realize that serious differences exist among them. The clock is ticking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unless the U.S. chooses to sponsor it now, peace may never be an option again.
All four panelists agreed that U.S. policies toward the vital region must undergo serious reassessment if the U.S. wants to secure its strategic interests. The U.S. should exert extraordinary effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, re-engage with Iran and work quickly to ensure a negotiated settlement in Syria.
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