Tag: Egypt
Are Islamist victories avoidable?
“If democracy is to triumph in the Middle East, then Islamist victories are unavoidable and essential.” This was the resolution debated in the opening panel of last Thursday’s event on “Dictators and Dissidents: Should the West choose sides?” hosted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Reuel Marc Gerecht of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress affirmed the resolution and Rob Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal opposed it. Though there were two teams, four different positions emerged.
Gerecht argued that democracy takes time and we should have faith in the democratic process. We may not know what the ultimate outcome of a democratic process, but we do know what will happen with the alternative. Dictators in the Middle East did not move their countries any closer to democracy. They created an environment that gave rise to al Qaeda.
Stephens responded arguing that the democratic process will not be successful when those participating, Islamists in his example, are opposed to democracy. Democratic process cannot be conflated with democracy. Stephens added that sometimes we have to make difficult choices, like supporting a dictator if we think the outcome will be more democratic than a democratic process in the same area would yield. Gerecht equated this with Kemalism, which he called “enlightened despotism.”
Satloff denied the inevitability of Islamist victories. In reality, Islamists rarely win – they almost never get more than 1/3 of the popular vote. What really happens is that non-Islamists lose because of in-fighting and lack of coherent vision. Ahmed Shafiq won 48% of the popular vote even though he was associated with Mubarak suggesting desire for non-Islamist leadership. A capable non-Islamist candidate from an organized party would have had a good shot. To believe that people in the Middle East will often elect Islamists is to fall victim to what Satloff calls the “bigotry of low expectations.” We should believe that people in the Middle East are capable of making reasonable decisions and as such, will not elect Islamists every time.
Katulis argued the opposite point. He said debating this resolution is like debating gravity. Islamists are winning. When they do win, he believes they will have to moderate their ideals and policies, which might be the best antidote to extremism.
It was unclear who won the debate. It seems like the root question is about how much faith one has in the democratic process. Election outcomes don’t matter if your faith is strong.
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This week’s peace picks
Our suggested events begin and end with Egypt, but on Tuesday there are four overlapping discussions of Afghanistan. Thoughtless think tanks?
1. Revolution in Progress: Will There be a Democratic Egypt?, Monday December 10, 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center
Venue: U.S. Capital, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Congressional Meeting Room North, Washington, DC 20510
Speakers: Nancy Okail, Steven Cook, Charles Dunne
With President Mohammad Morsi claiming widespread new powers leading to massive public protests the future of Egyptian democracy remains in the balance. Bitter fights continue over the distribution of authority. NGO workers, including those of Freedom House, continue to face prosecution for their work. The role of human rights, women, and religion in the new Egypt remain unclear. And these defining struggles are taking place in a near-institutional vacuum, in which the law, the constitution, and the relations between branches of government are all up for grabs. How these issues are settled will determine Egypt’s future— and its relationship with the United States.
Register for this event here.
2. Muslim-Majority Constitutions and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Monday December 10, 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM, Karamah
Venue: Karamah, 1420 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Elizabeth Cassidy, Mohamed Abdel Aziz Ibrahim, Knox Thames
A representative from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and an expert on Muslim constitutions will present and discuss USCIRF’s recent report entitled, “The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Majority Muslim Countries and Other OIC Members.” At this time when many nations are rewriting their foundational documents, the report provides a comparative analysis of religious freedom provisions in the constitutions of majority Muslim countries and other members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Register for this event here.
3. Is America Still Exceptional? Foreign Policy over the Next Four Years, Monday December 10, 8:00 PM – 9:30 PM, Marvin Center Ampitheater
Venue: Marvin Center Ampitheater, 800 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Henrey Nau, Daniel Deudney, James Goldgeier
This event features a debate between Henry Nau (GWU) and Daniel Deudney (JHU) on the future of American foreign policy. Moderated by James Goldgeier, Dean of AU’s School of International Studies.
Register for this event here.
4. Syria in Transition: An Insider’s View, Tuesday December 11, 12:15 PM – 1:30 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: Mohammed Ghanem, Ilhan Tanir, Leila Hilal
While fears of chemical weapons and of an impending “failed state” dominate discussions on Syria, a narrative is being largely lost: civil leaders inside Syria who are taking matters into their own hands.
Civilian administrative councils have emerged throughout Syria in so-called “liberated zones.” Civilians are organizing for purposes of administering basic municipal services and law and order as they prepare for a post-Assad future.
What do these pockets of self-governed territory look like and how can they be sustained? What is the relationship between the civilian councils and the military brigades? How can the United States most effectively help civilian units prepare for a post-Assad future?
Please join the New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force for a conversation with Ilhan Tanir, Washington correspondent for Vatan, and Mohammed A. Ghanem, senior political advisor at the Syrian American Council, who has just returned from Syria. Ghanem and Tanir will discuss how Syrian civilians are creating a government of their own and how this movement may impact the country’s future.
Register for this event here.
5. Elections, Reconciliation, and the Final Two Years of Afghanistan’s Transition: Perspectives from the International Community, Tuesday December 11, 1:00 PM – 4:30 PM, USIP
Venue: United States Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steve Coll, Jim DeHart, Thomas Lynch, Clare Lockhart, Thomas Ruttig, Francesc Vendrell, Scott Warden, Scott Smith, Andrew Wilder
As the clock winds down on the final two years of Afghanistan’s security transition, where does the accompanying political transition stand?
The main elements of the political transition are the 2014 presidential elections and the attempt to forge a political reconciliation with the Taliban. These issues are interrelated. Some say that there can be no effective elections unless a reconciliation process can first ensure adequate security conditions. Others say that reconciliation is impossible until there is a newly elected government in Kabul.
Both processes are affected by Afghanistan’s many uncertainties. Yet some recent developments have settled some questions and opened new opportunities. The re-election of President Obama has settled the question of who is responsible for US policy. The recent release of Taliban leaders by Pakistan could indicate a willingness on the part of Islamabad to play a more active role in supporting a negotiation. The consolidation Salahuddin Rabbani as the Chairman of the High Peace Council may yield greater progress in talks with the armed opposition. The setting of the election date by the Independent Election Commission fulfilled a longstanding demand by the political opposition, but also raised questions about the feasibility of holding elections.
The press of time will force the international community to take a number of positions on a number of complex issues in Afghanistan. Please join USIP for two panel that will look at both processes of the political transition.
Register for this event here.
6. Afghanistan: Endgame or Persisting Challenge with Continuing Stakes?, Tuesday December 11, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Martin Indyk, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ronald E. Neumann
After more than a decade of great effort and sacrifice by the United States and its allies, the Taliban still has not been defeated, and many Afghans believe that a civil war is coming. In 2014, foreign forces will complete the handover of security responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, international financial flows will radically decrease, and Afghanistan’s presidential elections will intensify political uncertainties. These challenges are mounting at a time when Afghanistan is dealing with rising insecurity, dysfunctional governance, rampant corruption and ethnic factionalization, while the regional environment is not easily conducive to stability in the country. With the U.S. and international publics tired of the war, fundamental questions about any remaining stakes in Afghanistan and the efficacy of any persisting stabilization efforts are increasing.
On December 11, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host the launch of a new book, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan (Brookings, 2012), by Brookings Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown. Aspiration and Ambivalence analyzes the past decade of U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan and offers detailed recommendations for dealing with the precarious situation leading up to the 2014 transition and after. In her book, Felbab-Brown argues that allied efforts in Afghanistan have put far too little emphasis on good governance, concentrating too much on short-term military goals to the detriment of long-term peace and stability. Felbab-Brown will be joined by Ronald E. Neumann, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-07). Vice President Martin S. Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
Register for this event here.
7. The United States and South Asia After Afghanistan, Tuesday December 11, 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Root Room A/B/C
Speakers: Alexander Evans, Husain Haqqani, Karl F. Inderfurth, Cameron Munter, Wendy Chamberlin
U.S. interests in South Asia are evolving. An intense focus on counterterrorism and Afghanistan since 9/11 is giving way to a broader range of interests. Washington takes India’s global status seriously and is working closely with New Delhi on a range of regional and global issues. China’s rise, often neglected as a factor in South Asia policy, is encouraging a more strategic U.S. approach to Asia policy as a whole. As a result, a significant opportunity now exists to rethink U.S. South Asia strategy.
An upcoming report by Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Fellow Alexander Evans draws on over 90 interviews with a range of current and former U.S. policy practitioners from the State Department, National Security Council, Congress, and the intelligence community to consider how the United States can achieve an integrated South Asia policy following the 2014 military drawdown in Afghanistan. The report, which benefits from the expertise of the Asia Society Advisory Group on U.S. Policy toward South Asia, includes recommendations for better incorporating expertise into policy planning.
In conjunction with the report’s release, please join us for a discussion on the prospects for achieving a strategic U.S. approach to South Asia and the hard choices an incoming Administration will need to make to get there. An event will also take place in New York on December 12, Islamabad, Pakistan on December 18, and New Delhi, India on December 20.
RSVP for this event to AsiaDC@AsiaSociety.org.
8. Prescriptions for Peaceful Transitions: Is Democracy Mandatory?, Tuesday December 11, 4:00 PM – 5:30 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speakers: Carl Gershman, Cynthia Irmer, Marina Ottaway, William Zartman
Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Cynthia Irmer, special assistant in the Office of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Humans Rights at the U.S. Department of State; Marina Ottaway, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and I. William Zartman, SAIS professor emeritus, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to RSVP@ipsinstitute.org.
9. Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy – A Handbook of Projects, Tuesday December 11, 5:30 PM – 7:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: S. Fredrick Starr, Adib Faradi, Geoffrey Pyatt,
S. Fredrick Starr, CACI chairman; Adib Faradi, CACI visiting scholar and former deputy minister of Commerce for Afghanistan; and Geoffrey Pyatt, principal deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State’s South and Central Asia Affairs Bureau, will discuss CACI’s new report, “Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy.” Note: A reception will precede the event at 5 p.m. Members of the media who want to cover this event should contact Felisa Neuringer Klubes in the SAIS Communications Office at 202.663.5626 or fklubes@jhu.edu.
RSVP for this event to saiscaciforums@jhu.edu.
10. Egypt on the Brink (Again), Friday December 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050
Speakers: Steven Cook, Shalom Cohen, Eric Trager
Nearly two years after throngs filled downtown Cairo to demand the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, tens of thousands are back demanding the ouster of his elected successor, Muhammad Morsi. For the ruling Islamists, winning the planned December 15 national referendum on a new constitution would be the turning point that ends the current crisis; for their opponents, the hastily scheduled referendum only stokes more fury at a democratic transition gone terribly awry.
To discuss the fast-moving events in Egypt and their implications for U.S. policy and regional security, The Washington Institute invited Steven Cook, Shalom Cohen, and Eric Trager to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Friday, December 14, 2012, from 12:30-2:00 p.m. EST.
Register for this event here.
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Referendum above all
Yesterday’s confusing moves by Egyptian President Morsi amount to this: he values the approval next Saturday of the illiberal draft constitution he ramrodded through the constituent assembly above all else. He was willing to surrender some of the powers he arrogated to himself last month, as they were no longer needed to protect the constituent assembly (which has completed its work) from a possible court decision on its validity. He is contemplating martial law to ensure the security of the referendum. He is claiming to be open to amendments to the constitution, by procedures that at this point are completely unclear.
What Morsi wants is the democratic validation of the constitution approval in the referendum can provide. This will ensure both an enhanced role for religion in the Egyptian state and preservation of military privileges. It will marginalize women and minorities, for whom the new constitution fails to guarantee equal rights. It will make secularist politics difficult. It will consolidate Morsi’s own hold on power and, he hopes, enable the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party to do well in parliamentary elections.
Morsi’s opposition is apoplectic. It is hoping that street demonstrations will cause him to postpone the referendum and reopen the constitutional draft to debate and reconsideration, not just amendment. Some even ask that Morsi resign, something he shows no sign of contemplating. We can expect the next week to be tumultuous, with Morsi and the military trying to keep the referendum on track and the opposition desperately trying to derail it.*
What happens if the referendum on the new constitution is defeated? This is the one real concession in Morsi’s decree yesterday:
If the people vote against the draft constitution in the referendum on Saturday, 15 December 2012, the president is to call for the direct election of a new Constituent Assembly of 100 members within three months.
This means Morsi, who now holds legislative power (and it was the parliament that chose the last constituent assembly), will not appoint a new constituent assembly if one is needed but instead allow it to be elected.
I am still betting Morsi comes out on top. There is precious little time to organize a “no” vote and no reason for him to give in to demands that the referendum be postponed, unless it proves logistically difficult to get it done by Saturday. Many Egyptians are fed up with the street demonstrations. International factors–in particular the United States–are not interested in prolonging the disorder. Egyptian arrest yesterday of an alleged leader of the Benghazi attack on the U.S. consulate will weigh heavily in Morsi’s favor in Washington.
Morsi wants his referendum and his new constitution. He is likely to get them, sooner rather than later.
*The boycott is on.
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Illiberal Egypt
My Twitterfeed is full of people bemoaning Egyptian President Morsi’s crackdown on protests against his ramrodding of the new constitution first through the constituent assembly and now through the December 15 referendum. My sympathies are with them on process, which was rushed and excluded important parts of Egyptian society, and substance, because the constitution is both excessively Islamist and excessively protective of military prerogatives. While Morsi’s Justice Minister has indicated the President might delay the referendum if the opposition engages in a dialogue, he shows no signs of backing off either the draft constitution or the decree in which he gave himself dictatorial powers. There are also reports that Morsi is preparing a decree to impose martial law.
Morsi is a democratically elected president with strong and organized support from the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest political force in the country, and equivocal support from the more conservative Salafists, who did well in parliamentary elections. He is likely to prevail. My friends in the street protests, who have rejected the call for dialogue, are likely to lose, not because they are wrong but because they are poorly organized, undisciplined and unappealing to many Egyptians. My guess is that some of them will boycott the referendum, hoping that will invalidate it. Others will vote “no,” ensuring that turn-out is not so low as to cause reasonable people to question its validity.
The street protests themselves are a problem. Many Egyptians are tired of them. They want to get back to making a living. Cairo–and other Egyptian cities–are chaotic even without street demonstrations. With them, life quickly becomes a struggle.
The lack of nonviolent discipline is a big problem. Street demonstrators almost everywhere have to be extraordinarily disciplined to avoid being blamed for violence. Egyptian demonstrators throw rocks and bang with sticks on cars. These are minor malfeasances, but enough to give Morsi what he needs to accuse them of violence, which he naturally claims was unprovoked.
Don’t get me wrong here: I have no doubt which side is more likely to initiate violence and to use it with abandon. The police and their thuggish friends in the Muslim Brotherhood really don’t have any other method of dealing with crowds. The protesters need to make sure that responsibility lies clearly and unequivocally where it belongs. They have not done so.
We are headed for an illiberal Egypt, one that holds elections, convenes a parliament, passes laws and even tolerates a wide range of discussion. But it will also limit effective political opposition, disrupt it when it occurs, and use the police and courts as instruments of repression. Islam will play a much stronger political role than in the past, even if lots of Egyptians remain uncovered and unwilling to attend mosque regularly. Women and minorities will have to fight uphill for their rights, not that that is anything new. The military’s prerogatives will remain protected, at least until they become a serious constraint on the economy. Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood organizations will find comfort, if not sustenance, in Cairo.
On foreign policy, I doubt Morsi’s Egypt will renounce the peace treaty with Israel, but it will be more exacting in its interpretation of it and expect continuation of the loosened restrictions on its army’s presence in the Sinai. Those who want Egypt to reemerge as a leader in the Arab world will likely have to wait a while. An occasional initiative from Cairo will not change the facts of life: Egypt is too weak economically and militarily to do much heavy lifting on, for example, the Syria civil war or the Iranian nuclear program. Morsi will cozy up to Washington when it suits him, rightly expecting (as Mubarak did) that the Americans will soften their criticism of his illiberalism in exchange for cooperation on terrorism and Israel.
Were I Egyptian, I would be disappointed in an illiberal outcome. Much better than that seemed possible when Mubarak fell almost two years ago. The important thing is to make it just the first stage in a longer-term transition towards a more worthy democratic outcome. Only more disciplined, united and organized liberal forces can make that happen.
PS: This is a good presentation of the anti-Morsi perspective.
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Hanging tough
Egyptian President Morsi’s speech this afternoon was profoundly uncompromising. He denounced what he sees as opposition-inspired violence, suggested it was bought and paid for (possibly by foreign sources) and underlined the need for law and order, sine qua non.
This is an appeal a lot of Egyptians will like, even if it will infuriate the demonstrators at the presidential palace. His only concession was a call for a “national dialogue” meeting on Saturday. But he did not, as some hoped, postpone the constitutional referendum scheduled for December 15. Nor did he offer any changes to its profoundly ambiguous contents, which protect the military’s prerogatives better than the citizens’ rights.
His television address sounded to me more like Bashar al Assad than like Hosni Mubarak. Morsi claims he expresses the will of the Egyptian people, something Mubarak did not care much about. What’s more, Morsi may be right. There are lots of Egyptians fed up with disorder. His opposition will be hard put to mount a successful “no” vote at the polls.
But even if they do, Morsi made it clear he intends to proceed by appointing another constituent assembly. He is in no mood to compromise with those who want to limit his power or his stay in office. Those who thought he might be pushed aside or resign–or even allow reconsideration of the draft constitution–were badly mistaken. Morsi is holding on to power with both hands.
The secular opposition now has a difficult choice: go to the polls, despite the likelihood that the new constitution will be approved, or boycott, which will ensure that it is approved. My bet is some will do the former and others the latter, ensuring not only passage of the referendum but also a small measure of democratic legitimacy.
It is unlikely much will come of Saturday’s national dialogue meeting. It is too close to the date of the referendum to initiate any changes in the current draft. And the opposition is too fragmented to come into the meeting united behind a small but significant set of requested changes. Only if they do so will they have any significant impact.
Morsi is trying to impose his own order on what has been a chaotic revolution governed by Calvinball (a game never played with the same rules twice, as Marc Lynch has taught us). My guess is that he has the support of the “party of couch,” the Egyptians who want law and order and don’t want to join the demonstrations. He will likely also get the judiciary back on side, as he has promised that the extraordinary powers to block judicial decisions he arrogated to himself will expire once the referendum is held.
The net result is unlikely to look like a democracy two years from now, even if it allows more freedom of speech and association than Mubarak permitted. The opaque, forced-march process that Morsi imposed to get the new constitution completed is not the kind of transparent, participatory process that makes for stable democracy, even if it is approved in a referendum. The most important of the Arab uprisings looks as if it will end considerably short of the ideals that inspired it. Many revolutions do.
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Ramrod
Yesterday’s forced-march approval of Egypt’s draft constitution by its rump constituent assembly bodes ill.
If there is anything constitution-making experts agree on, it is the need for a consensual and inclusive process in drafting and approving a new constitution. This is often far more important than the specific language and provisions. Usually a fairly small portion of any given constitutional draft is contested. But when it comes to those provisions that raise the hackles of one group or another in the society, it is vital that they be involved and that there be a search for consensus, which can only be obtained by broad participation in a deliberative and transparent process.
Egyptian President Morsi decided instead to ramrod the draft through, before the Egyptian constitutional court could intervene to dissolve the constituent assembly as it had the lower house of parliament. Most of the secularists and minorities who were in the constituent assembly have already left in protest earlier in the process. Morsi claims he is accelerating approval by the mostly Islamist rump in order to end any need for him to retain the dictatorial powers he gave himself last week.
This is bizarre and circular logic. It amounts to saying:
I gave myself dictatorial powers. Now to prevent me from using them you have to accelerate approval of the constitution and accept the draft that I want. Then I can give up the dictatorial powers, because the constitution gives me what I really need.
Morsi plays this game because he fears two things: the “remnants” of the Mubarak dictatorship, especially in the judiciary, and the liberal secularists, who are uniting with minorities and others for what I imagine will be massive demonstrations today. Rather than bringing them into the tent, Morsi has chosen to keep them out. Their massive demonstrations won’t count for much if Morsi wins his bet by putting the new constitution to a quick referendum and getting it approved.
The merits and demerits of the new constitution are not really the issue. It will take time to evaluate them. Early reports suggest it does not protect women’s or minority rights as fully as the secularists would like. The role of Sharia as the main source of law is the nominally the same as it was under the little applied Mubarak constitution, but with some indication that it will be applied more vigorously. Presidential and military powers are greater than many would like.
But Egypt is not going back to Mubarak-style dictatorship. That would be an optimistic view. The real risk is continuing chaos, economic breakdown, social division and eventual theocracy aimed at establishing law and order. Morsi has opened a door to hell, but it is also the door to Muslim Brotherhood heaven. Those who thought Egypt was back because it brokered what is likely to be a short-lived ceasefire between Hamas and Israel are likely to be disappointed. The transition ahead for Egypt is still a long and difficult one. And where it ends up–democracy or theocracy–is still uncertain.
PS: For a knowledgeable view of the human rights provisions of the constitution, see Egypt: New Constitution Mixed on Support of Rights.
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