Tag: Egypt
Why riot?
You don’t have to be a foreign affairs expert to see that there are political reasons for the Innocence of Muslims-inspired protests around the Muslim world in what has been termed “the video incident.” America’s recent wars in predominantly Muslim countries have heightened tensions. U.S. support for Israel also contributes.
But this can’t be just about politics. The video offended Muslim sentiments. If these protests were really about politics, why were they not more widespread and why did they not take on a more explicitly political guise?
Americans find it difficult to understand the religious justification for these protests. Either they are reduced to cultural relativism (“things are different in the Muslim world”) 0r they wonder if Muslims are so weak in their faith that any offense to their prophet pushes them to mass violence. Neither produces interesting answers.
What Westerners fail to appreciate is the cultural milieu in which Islam originated and propagated. Islam emerged from a pre-existing oral tradition of poetry. The influence is apparent in the Holy Qur’an, which often reads like poetry:
Say, “I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind,
The Sovereign of mankind,
The God of mankind,
From the evil of the retreating whisperer –
Who whispers [evil] into the breasts of mankind –
From among the jinn [spirits] and mankind.” (Surat an-Nas 114)
Recitation of the Qur’an is art, and those with the Qur’an memorized are respected. In early Islam, that was the only way to experience the Qur’an. It is believed Muhammad was illiterate, so when he received the Qur’an from the Angel Gabriel he memorized it and taught it to his followers. The sunnah, or the large body that encompasses the words and actions of the Prophet and some of his close followers, was also initially memorized and passed along orally.
Memorization and oral transmission were the privileged modes of gaining and disseminating knowledge. How was it to be determined whose oral transmission was legitimate? What would be done if two people remembered something differently? In the case of the sunnah an incredibly complex system developed for evaluating the legitimacy of different ahadith (pieces of the sunnah, particular stories about things the Prophet said or did). Was it possible that a certain transmitter could have had contact with another in order to pass along a hadith? Did both transmitters live in the same era and were they known to have traveled in the same region?
The issue of legitimacy also brought into question each transmitter’s character. Ignoring other variables, one might trust what one transmitter said the Prophet did over another if the first had a reputation for honesty while the second was known to lie. The legitimacy of the information a transmitter passed along was intimately connected to the transmitter’s reputation: how honest he was, how often he prayed, whether his teachings were consistent. Character is vital to legitimacy in the Islamic tradition.
The connection between the legitimacy of the content and the character of the content’s originator or transmitter implies that criticism of the latter calls the former into question. If a transmitter is not of high moral standing, there are implications for whether the ahadith he transmitted are considered legitimate. Insulting the Prophet, the original transmitter, calls into question his message, or all of Islam.
In the Shi’i tradition a religious leader’s character is very important, especially in a Muslim’s choice of Ayatollah. Because of the occultation of the last imam, Ayatollahs are selected to demonstrate how a Muslim should live her life until the last imam returns. The importance of an Ayatollah modeling good character is captured in the title given to a well-respected Ayatollah, marja-e-taqlid, which translates as “source of emulation.”
This is strange from the Judeo-Christian perspective, which privileges text. Jews are exigent about error-free copying of the Torah. Western culture worries about plagiarism. Improperly expropriating text undermines an author’s credibility and may call into question everything she has written. We have little need to worry about an author’s character to decide whether a text is valid or not.
It is therefore not surprising that the Judeo-Christian tradition includes insulting, teasing, or at least recognizing the faults of religious leaders without it negatively reflecting on their mission. In the Jewish tradition, many of the prophets are far from moral perfection, but their character flaws do not affect the sanctity of their purpose. Most Christians had a good laugh at the late-night TV jokes about Jesus’ possible wife. The ancient Greeks often mocked the gods.
There is of course no justification for the killings associated with the recent demonstrations. But the importance of transmitters in preserving the Islamic tradition provides some insight into the anger a number of Muslims are feeling around the world, an anger that so many in the West cannot begin to understand.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
George W. Bush’s playbook
I can do no better in summing up Mitt Romney’s foreign policy speech today than he does himself in the penultimate sentence:
The 21st century can and must be an American century. It began with terror, war, and economic calamity. It is our duty to steer it onto the path of freedom, peace, and prosperity.
Here’s the problem: the terror, war and economic calamity Romney refers to occurred not on Barack Obama’s watch, but on George W. Bush’s. And Governor Romney’s foreign policy prescriptions, like many of his domestic policy prescriptions, are drawn from George W. Bush’s playbook.
The few innovations in Romney’s speech at Virginia Military Institute today are hardly worth mentioning. He wants to see the Syrian revolutionaries get more arms, in particular anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, but he fails to say how he will prevent these from being used against us, except to say that those who receive them will have to share our values. That should fix everything in the arms bazaars of the Middle East.
He says he will support a two-state solution for peace between Palestine and Israel. Nice to see him return to the mainstream from the extremist wings of Israeli and American politics, which is where he was during the “47%” fund-raising dinner in Florida when he suggested we would kick the can down the road and maybe skip the two-state solution altogether. Trouble is, the people he pitched that line to are supporting his campaign with fat checks. He says there will be no daylight between America and Israel, which is code for saying that the Jewish settlements will continue to expand, since that is what Netanyahu’s Israel wants. I fail to understand an American presidential candidate who outsources U.S. policy on the Palestinians to Israel.
In Libya he’ll track down the killers of our personnel, which is exactly what Obama promises to do. I’d just be curious how those 15 Navy ships he plans to build each year will help in the effort.
He pledges to condition aid to Egypt but makes the conditions both vague and easy to meet: build democratic institutions and maintain the peace treaty with Israel. There are lots of problems with President Morsy’s Egypt, but you won’t be able to hang him for either of those offenses, yet.
In Afghanistan, he calls the withdrawal the president has pledged a retreat but makes it clear he is not proposing anything very different.
Then there is this on foreign assistance:
I will make further reforms to our foreign assistance to create incentives for good governance, free enterprise, and greater trade, in the Middle East and beyond. I will organize all assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official with responsibility and accountability to prioritize efforts and produce results. I will rally our friends and allies to match our generosity with theirs.
The trouble here is that the Ryan budget guts the foreign affairs budget, including foreign assistance. There won’t be any American generosity to be matched with theirs if Romney is elected. This is where Romney departs definitively from Obama and shows his reliance on George W.’s playbook.
I hasten to add that I’d be all for organizing our assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official. That would be a good idea.
One last issue: with all this overload of American values as the basis for our foreign policy, I’m curious what Romney plans to do about Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and other less than fully democratic friends in the region? They get no mention in this speech, but of course they really can’t be mentioned in a speech that gives unequivocal backing to both our friends and our values. What would Romney do when there is a choice between the two? Keep silent would be a good guess.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Constitutions count. What does tech do?
Constitutions count. In a democratic society ruled by law, they distribute power among institutions and determine how it is gained and how it is lost. The process of preparing one after civil war or dictatorship is particularly fraught, as we are seeing in the recent Arab Spring revolutions. Society is divided, who truly represents “the people” is unclear, how those who draft the constitution are chosen is problematic, and power still grows out of the barrel of a gun. How does a constitution avoid capture by armed elites and gain popular legitimacy in these difficult situations? What role can and should the public play? How can technology best contribute?
A group of experts on constitution-making and on technology met last week in DC to discuss these issues at a roundtable co-hosted by Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Google Ideas. Some conclusions on constitution-making were clear: the process should be seen to be transparent, it has to fit the particular context in which it is occurring, and it has to create or demonstrate a broad, inclusive consensus around main issues. The ways in which technology can contribute are still the subject of experimentation. It can facilitate public participation by enabling substantive citizen inputs to the text of a constitution, improving transparency, enhancing civic education and expanding inclusiveness. The drafting of a constitution can also benefit from technology that makes the body of all past constitutions discoverable and searchable.
The constitution-making experts see the process as a complex one that includes not only public participation but also judicial engagement and external assistance in deliberating, drafting, adopting, promulgating and implementing a new constitutional order. The South African process is often viewed as the best example and imitated elsewhere, because public participation ensured the post-apartheid constitution’s legitimacy, even though there was little apparent impact on the constitutional text, which remained virtually unchanged. Even where public participation has had an impact on the text, it is rarely extensive. Historically, relatively few provisions have attracted intense public scrutiny.
Legitimacy also depends to an important extent on the transparency of the constitution-making process as well as public understanding of the outcome. A good constitutional process lays the foundation for good implementation and the creation of a culture of constitutionalism. This is particularly difficult to achieve if the constitution is the product of an international intervention, as in post-war Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq. There international officials actually wrote the initial constitutions, with little consultation with local citizens. What the internationals consider “universal” principles do not necessarily translate well. It might have been better to adopt a transitional or provisional constitution, (as in Tunisia and Libya) that can be used until the local population is in a position to conduct its own constitution-making process.
When the time comes for a locally prepared constitution, the process needs to be transparent but still allow for elite deal-making and technical drafting behind closed doors. Not everything can be done in public, as some compromises will embarrass participants with their own constituencies. Expectations need to be managed. The public should not be led to believe it will have an impact on the drafting if in fact it will not, which happened in Iraq. Over-promising in post-conflict situations creates big difficulties. So too does drafting that is piecemeal or uncoordinated. The pieces of a constitution need to fit together, without leaving gaps and overlaps that will create problems later. It is also important to provide a suitable mechanism and threshold for amendments, which are difficult decisions in post-war situations.
Technology-based experiments conducted so far in connection with public participation in constitution-making processes include those in Iceland, Tunisia, Egypt and Somalia.
The recent Icelandic constitution-making process included weekly publication of drafts and an extensive dialogue on Facebook, Twitter and Youtube conducted by members of the drafting committee. This enabled direct interaction with interested members of the public, who were able to comment on a website as the draft evolved. Out of a national population of 300,000, there were 40,000 visitors to the site, 12,000 views on the YouTube channel and 3,600 comments.
In Egypt and Tunisia, Google supported the creation of web platforms that provided YouTube videos for voter education and enabled the general public to comment on all the individual articles of the constitutions. On the Egyptian site, articles could be sorted by how happy users were with them and how hotly debated they were (using Face book ‘likes’ and ‘comments’, respectively). This gave the drafters clear input and enabled the public to verify that their views were taken into account, but it allowed for little nuance. Egyptians have made upwards of 150,000 “inputs” to the constitutional process.
In Somalia, Voice of America (VOA) and Google Ideas partnered in a telephone survey conducted by professional Somali journalists skilled in asking questions and getting answers. Each survey’s results were discussed on daily political talk radio, with call-in listeners and even directly on-air with the Somali Prime Minister. This allowed people living in a precarious security environment to give their opinions while remaining anonymous. The polling reached over 3,000 people.
None of these experiments is definitive but some have already been transplanted from one context to another. All illustrate the potential of technology to open the constitution-making process and build legitimacy and trust in the public eye. But they tend to favor the technology-enabled part of the society, which may amplify the influence of some parts of society at the expense of others. They also favor individual contributions and may disadvantage some technology-poor civil society organizations. Direct democracy is not necessarily good democracy. Especially in post-conflict societies, there is the real possibility of illiberal results. We need to be careful not to harm the democratic process. Technology should enable constitution-making, not drive it.
There is also an important role for technology in supporting the drafting process. More than anything else, drafters want examples of how to deal with their problems. They often turn to the constitutions of countries that share their geography, culture or language, to find possible models and appropriate solutions, even sometimes copying typographical errors. No easily retrievable central repository of these documents currently exists. The Constitution Explorer project, run out of Stanford University and the University of Texas, aims to change that, by collecting and coding the world’s constitutions for the past two hundred years. This kind of toolbox is what those charged with drafting most need to avoid pitfalls and improve their own product.
This applies more broadly as well. There is no definitive solution to the problem of how technology can contribute to public participation in constitution-making. There is a growing variety of tools that may be appropriate—or not—in particular contexts. Where they work well, they can improve not only substantive input but also transparency, accountability and civic education, leading eventually to a democratic and constitutional culture.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Arab women agree on problems, not solutions
Women have played important roles in the Arab awakening but they now face an uphill struggle to consolidate their gains.
During the first panel of this week’s Woodrow Wilson Center about “Women after the Arab Awakening,” participants discussed the problems facing women on the Middle East. Heads nodded and the audience, mostly women, groaned and laughed together. All cringed when speakers presented alarming legal and cultural setbacks for women and smiled or applauded for stories of courage or insightful comments about the status of women.
In the second panel, when the speakers were asked to identify a path forward, tensions flared. The audience tittered at provocative statements and the question and answer period turned into a heated argument. Underlying the tension, were important issues: the appropriate role of religion in government, the tension between Islam and feminism and the appropriate representation of minorities in democracies.
Dalia Ziada, one of Newsweek’s most influential women and CNN’s eight agents of change in the Arab World, sees politicians and political systems as only part of the problem. Culture is also responsible. Suzanne Mubarak advanced the status of women with the “khula” law giving women the right to divorce and other legislation allowing women to pass down their nationality. President Mubarak allocated 64 seats in the lower house of parliament to women. These legal successes did not result in meaningful improvement in status for women in Egypt because of culture. Most women who ran for office had connections to Suzanne Mubarak or other leaders and were often not considered competent.
Rihab Elhaj, co-founder of the New Libya Foundation, made a similar point. Eighty of the 200 seats in the Libyan parliament are allotted for political parties, which are required to include women alternately with men on their party lists. This helped women get 33 seats, but they have not yet taken on leadership roles because they are unconnected to leading male politicians.
In Tunisia, culture and social norms have also interfered with women achieving the status laws allow. Tunisia has a unique history of legislation promoting women’s rights. But when Omezzine Khelifa, a political party leader in Tunisia and adviser to the Minister of Tourism, proposed parity, many disagreed. Some thought it was not the time to deal with women’s issues. Others opposed a parity law because it suggests that women are incapable of getting into public office any other way. Parity in Tunisia passed, but as in Egypt it did not allow women to win 50% of the seats. Most political parties chose men to head their lists, so women won seats only if a party received enough votes to win multiple seats.
Fahmia Al Fotih, Yemeni journalist, also described cultural barriers. Several key women leaders during the revolution were subjected to harassment and even violence as a result of their participation in the protests. A barrier was erected to keep women and men separate, but some women chose to ignore the barrier in protest and were often beaten as a result. The National Consensus Government is composed of 35 members, of whom only three are women.
Not all problems in the Middle East can be attributed to patriarchal culture. There are real legal, physical and social barriers preventing women from reaching high positions. In Yemen, a humanitarian crisis has pushed political participation from many women’s minds as they struggle to feed their families. According to an Oxfam report this year, four out of five Yemeni women report that their lives have gotten worse in the past twelve months. Saudi blogger Hala Al Dosari recounted harassment by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a woman jailed for driving and a youth conference on the empowerment of civil society shut down at the last moment. Ziada expressed concern about possible Egyptian legislation allowing marriage at 14 and female genital mutilation. In Tunisia, Khelifa reported on the recent debate about whether women should be described as “complementary” or “equal” to men in the constitution. Al-Nahda’s draft of Article 28 to the constitution, which used the “complementary” wording, was defeated, but the debate will not be over until the constitution is finalized.
The second panel was intended to address what should be done to solve these problems. Syrian Honey Al-Sayed of Souriali Radio called for an effort to define equal roles for Syrian women now, before the revolution is over. Heads nodded in response, given that so many of the speakers had noted how optimistic they were about women’s rights during their revolutions and how things changed afterwards. Elhaj said that the change in Libya was not because of some Islamist scheme to remove women from the public sphere, but because of a natural reversion to the status of women prior to the revolution. Al-Sayed argued that Syria might be able to avoid this if there is a large-scale education campaign and civil society organizations are developed now.
Gabool Al-Mutawakel, Youth Leadership Development Foundation co-founder, made a similar argument for working to keep the spirit of the Yemeni revolution going, but she offered new insight: the problem facing women is the notion of “women’s issues.” She cited a female politician who preferred to talk about being a woman in politics rather than her policy ideas. Women will not succeed in Yemeni politics if the only areas about which they can speak with credibility are women’s issues. Women must not just represent women, but all of Yemen. Al-Mutawakel suggested we teach women about leadership, not just empowerment. We should also foster a culture of competition where women learn how to win and lose. Quotas can have the effect of killing a woman’s motivation to fight for a seat.
It was in this panel that tensions flared. Hanin Ghaddar, a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and editor of NOW News, saw an inherent contradiction between feminism and Islam and argued for separation of religion and state in Lebanon. The revolution taught her that small changes are no longer acceptable and that we need drastic, radical changes, which an Islamic government cannot offer. Yassmine ElSayed Hani, Wilson Center Visiting Arab Journalist, argued on the contrary that separation of religion and state is not realistic in Egypt. Sharia is a way of life that should not be reduced to the troubling laws in the Middle East that are supposedly based on it. About 80% of the Egyptian population is Muslim, so the government should reflect the majority of the population. Ghaddar argued in response that a democracy should protect the minority. Ziada suggested that Egypt may not need a religious government exactly because its population is so religious.
There is agreement about the problems women in the Middle East face, but disagreement on what to do about them.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This week’s peace picks
There are good choices this week including the kickoff presidential debate.
1. How Should the Next American President Engage the World?, Monday October 1, 6:30 PM – 8:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: David Rothkopf, Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Thomas Friedman, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan
Foreign Policy’s David Rothkopf will moderate a debate with Thomas Friedman, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan, and Jessica T. Mathews. This debate, the second in a three-part series sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment, will focus on one of the key issues in this year’s election—How should the next American president engage the world?
Register for this event here.
2. Building Inclusive Societies: Transatlantic Perspectives on Multiculturalism and Integration, Tuesday October 2, 8:30 AM – 12:30 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: Francois Rivasseau, Rokhaya Diallo, Kubra Gumusay, Nasar Meer, Michael Privot, Emmanuel Kattan, Sonya Aziz, Eduardo Lopez Busquets, Justin Gest
Emerging European and American experts from the spheres of academia, policy making and the media will discuss their experiences and perspectives on this critical issue, including what Europe and the U.S. can learn from each other’s models of multiculturalism and integration. They will consider the challenges that both sides face in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment and improving levels of civic engagement among youth, particularly within emerging demographic groups.
RSVP for this event to Delegation-USA-EU-Events@eeas.europa.eu.
3. Women After the Arab Awakening, Tuesday October 2, 8:45 AM – 1:00 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Fifth Floor
Speakers: Dalia Ziada, Omezzine Khélifa, Rihab Elhaj, Fahmia Al Fotih, Hala Al Dosari, Honey Al Sayed, Gabool Almutawakel, Hanin Ghaddar, Yassmine ElSayed Hani, Haleh Esfandiari, Rangita de Silva de Alwis
9:00 – 11:00am PANEL 1: Today’s View from the Ground; Dalia Ziada – Egypt, Executive Director, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies; Omezzine Khélifa – Tunisia, Politician and Advisor, Ministry of Tourism; Rihab Elhaj – Libya, Co-founder and Executive Director, New Libya Foundation; Fahmia Al Fotih – Yemen, Communication analyst and youth focal point analyst, United Nations Population Fund; Hala Al Dosari – Saudi Arabia, Ph.D. candidate in health services research; Moderator: Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center
11:15 – 1:00pm PANEL 2: Tomorrow’s Prospects for Women in the Region; Honey Al Sayed – Syria, Director, Syria Program, Nonviolence International; Gabool Almutawakel – Yemen, Co-Founder, Youth Leadership Development Foundation; Hanin Ghaddar – Lebanon, Managing Editor, NOW News; Yassmine ElSayed Hani – Egypt, Independent Journalist, Foreign Desk, Al Akhbar daily newspaper; Moderator: Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Director, Global Women’s Leadership Initiative, Woodrow Wilson Center
4. The Missing Link: How Can the Pakistani Diaspora Improve U.S.-Pakistan Ties?, Tuesday October 2, 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Sixth Floor
Speaker: Irfan Malik, Aakif Ahmad
According to research produced by the Asian American Center for Advancing Justice, Pakistani-Americans are the second-fastest-growing Asian-American ethnic group. They are represented in a variety of professional fields, from medicine and accounting to construction and transport, and are known for their affluence and philanthropy. How can they help improve U.S.-Pakistan relations? What can they offer, and how can their resources and expertise be better tapped? This briefing marks the release of a series of recommendations, formulated by a working group of diaspora members convened by the Wilson Center.
5. Iraq Energy Outlook, Wednesday October 3, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Fatih Birol
The CSIS Energy and National Security Program is pleased to host Dr. Fatih Birol, Chief Economist and Director of Global Energy Economics at the IEA, to present highlights from the IEA’s recent World Energy Outlook Special Report, the Iraq Energy Outlook.
Iraq is already the world’s third-largest oil exporter. It has the resources and intention to increase its oil production vastly. Contracts are already in place.Will Iraq’s ambitions be realised? And what would the implications be for Iraq’s economy and for world oil markets? The obstacles are formidable: political, logistical, legal, regulatory, financial, lack of security and sufficient skilled labour. One example: in 2011, grid electricity could meet only 55% of demand.
The International Energy Agency has studied these issues with the support and close co-operation of the government of Iraq and many other leading officials, commentators, industry representatives and international experts. The report examines the role of the energy sector in the Iraqi economy today and in the future, assesses oil and gas revenues and investment needs, provides a detailed analysis of oil, gas and electricity supply through to 2035, highlighting the challenges of infrastructure development and water availability, and spells out the associated opportunities and risks, both for world oil markets and for Iraq’s economy and energy sector.
RSVP for this event to energy@csis.org.
6. Iran: Economic Troubles and International Sanctions, Wednesday October 3, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Fifth Floor
Speakers: Bijan Khajehpour, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Suzanne Maloney
By talking about such complexities (existence of a large grey economy, regional interdependencies, deep-rooted merchant tradition, existence of semi-state economic institution etc.), the speakers will address the issue why sanctions do not have the intended result in Iran. Lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
7. Post-Referendum South Sudan: Political Violence, New Sudan and Democratic Nation-Building, Wednesday October 3, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC, 20036, Room 736
Speaker: Christopher Zambakari
Christopher Zambakari, doctoral student in the Law and Policy Program at Northeastern University, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to itolber1@jhu.edu.
8. Breeding the Phoenix: An Analysis of the Military’s Role in Peacebuilding, Wednesday October 3, 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, Truland Building, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Room 555
Speaker: George F. Oliver, Ho Won Jeong, Solon Simmons, Dennis Sandole
There are numerous professional groups and individuals working for world peace. The reality is, however, that wars between nations or within nations still cause untold human deaths and casualties. World peace, a condition where war no longer affects human societies, is a long way off. This research focuses on how to end wars and restore a sustainable, positive peace to those who have experienced the horrors of war.
More specifically, this study focuses on the military’s role in peacebuilding. In the last twenty years, post-war peacebuilding has emerged as a powerful method that helps nations recover from war. Soldiers, whether they are part of an international intervention attempting to end the war or a member of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, have an important role to play. Today, soldiers do more than win their nation’s wars; they also help other nations and their citizens recover from war. In the last few decades, civilians from organizations like the United Nations, other intergovernmental organizations, other governments and nongovernmental organizations have responded to help nations recover from war or a violent conflict. There is no argument that civilians are better at peacebuilding than the military, yet the military is moving into this realm more and more.
So what are the roles of the military and civilians? This research project answers these questions. The critical factor in determining what the military does and what civilians do is based on security. If security is good, civilians can perform all the aspects of peacebuilding. Conversely, if security is lacking, then the military must step in and take on the various parts of peacebuilding. Security, however, is not like a light switch, on or off, good or bad. It is more like a rheostat with varying degrees of security. This research defines five levels of security and then seeks to find the fine lines where civilians can replace the military in peacebuilding functions.
Current peacebuilding ideas have evolved from practice, but behind that practice are some relevant conflict and conflict resolution theories. These theories are explored and ideas for future peacebuilders are identified. Analysis of real world peacebuilding has led to the creation of various functions that help peacebuilders restore a society after a war. These functional areas are: security, humanitarian assistance, governance, rule of law, infrastructure restoration, economic development and reconciliation. Who performs each of these functional areas is directly related to the security conditions.
This research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how security impacts the role of the military in peacebuilding. Qualitatively, two case studies are explored, post-World War II Germany and Kosovo. Quantitatively, this research explored the issue through a questionnaire that was taken by 579 soldiers, civilians and experts in peacebuilding. In the end, the hypothesis was proven that the military’s role in peacebuilding is inversely linked to the level of security. If security is sufficient, civilians do the work; and if security is deficient, then the military’s role is larger.
9. Aiding the Arab Transitions: US Economic Engagement with Egypt, Wednesday October 3, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Stimson Center
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Twelfth Floor
Speakers: Caroline Atkinson, Amb. William Taylor, James Harmon, Mona Yacoubian
With the Middle East still reeling from a spate of anti-American violence, US relations with Egypt, perhaps the most important Arab country in transition, hang in the balance. Just prior to the outbreak of unrest in Cairo, the largest American trade delegation ever to the Middle East completed its historic visit to Egypt. The trade group’s trip came on the heels of a senior US delegation to Cairo to negotiate a $1 billion debt relief deal. In addition, the US government has assembled a package of financing and loan guarantees for American investors and recently established a $60 million US-Egypt Enterprise Fund. With persistent unemployment, low economic growth and anemic foreign investment, the Egyptian economy is struggling as Egypt attempts to meet the challenges of its historic transition. Meanwhile, the recent unrest has spurred calls inside the United States to withdraw its economic support from countries such as Egypt.
A distinguished panel will discuss the role of US economic engagement with Egypt, how this engagement fits into a broader US strategy on the Arab transitions, and the role US economic engagement can play in ensuring a more positive future for Egypt.
Register for this event here.
10. Afghanistan and the Politics of Regional Economic Integration in Central and South Asia, Wednesday October 3, 5:30 PM – 7:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium
Speakers: Jawed Ludin
Jawed Ludin, deputy foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, will discuss this topic. A reception will precede the event at 5:00 PM.
RSVP for this event to saiscaciforums@jhu.edu.
11. Syria After Assad: Managing the Challenges of Transition, Thursday October 4, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Jim Marshall, Amr al-Azm, Afra Jalabi, Murhaf Jouejati, Rafif Jouejati, Rami Nakhla
The Syrian revolution has taken a terrible toll. Tens of thousands of Syrians have been killed and hundreds of thousands wounded. Millions have been forced from their homes. Urban centers have been destroyed, villages bombed, and communities subjected to horrific brutality at the hands of regime forces and Assad’s loyalist militias. The fabric of Syrian society is fraying under the pressure of escalating sectarian tensions. The militarization of the revolution and the proliferation of armed opposition units pose long term challenges for rule of law and security. Damage to infrastructure and to the Syrian economy will require tens of billions of dollars to repair.
How much longer the Assad regime will survive is uncertain. When it falls, a new government will face daunting challenges. How will the Syrian opposition respond? Will a new government be able to address the urgent needs of Syrians for humanitarian relief, economic and social reconstruction, and provide basic rule of law and security? Even today, in liberated areas of Syria where a post-Assad transition is already underway, the opposition must demonstrate its capacity to address these challenges.
Over the past year, a group of opposition activists collaborated to develop recommendations and strategies for managing the challenges of a post-Assad transition. Join us for the first presentation in the United States of the document they produced: “The Day After: Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria.”
Register for this event here.
12. U.S.-Egyptian Relations: Where is the Bilateral Relationship Headed?, Thursday October 4, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Center for National Policy, One Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, Suite 333
Speakers: Perry Cammack, Stephen McInerney, Shibley Telhami, Gregory Aftandilian
The slow and initial tepid response of the new Egyptian leadership to the attack on the U.S. embassy in Cairo has led many observers to question the efficacy of the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship and caused some members of Congress to advocate for a cut in U.S. assistance. On the other hand, both Egyptian and U.S. officials have indicated that they want the bilateral relationship to be maintained, as each side has equities it wants to protect. Please join CNP Senior Fellow for the Middle East, Gregory Aftandilian, and a panel of experts to analyze this situation and give their assessments on where the bilateral relationship is headed. A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
13. Systematic Approaches to Conflict Mapping, Friday October 5, 10:00 AM – 1:00 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, Truland Building, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Rome 555
Speakers: Sara Cobb, Alison Castel
Conflict-affected societies are complex adaptive environments that often present peacebuilders and policy makers with difficult or “wicked problems.” One movement in the field is to take more holistic or integrated approaches to working with societal conflict.
Systems mapping of conflicts is one tool that is being used to enable peacebuilders to grapple effectively with the complexity these environments present. Dr. Robert Ricigliano will introduce participants to the technique of systems mapping of conflicts as a tool for assessment and planning for peacebuilding operations.
14. Paul Collier – “Making Natural Resources Work for Development,” Friday October 5, 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, The Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: Paul Collier
Professor Collier has been the Director of the Research Development Department of the World Bank for 5 years from 1998 to 2003. His research covers fragile states, democratization, and the management of natural-resources in low-income societies. Professor Collier is the author of The Bottom Billion, which in 2008 won the Lionel Gelber, Arthur Ross and Corine Prizes and in May 2009 was the joint winner of the Estoril Global Issues Distinguished Book Prize. His second book, Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places was published in March 2009; and his latest book, The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature, in May 2010. He is currently advisor to the Strategy and Policy Department of the International Monetary Fund, and advisor to the Africa Region of the World Bank. In 2008, he was appointed Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) ‘for services to scholarship and development’. In 2011 he was elected to the Council of the Royal Economic Society.
Register for this event here.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It’s not only Libya
A lot of people seem to be surprised that Libyans have taken up the cudgels against the Benghazi militias thought to have attacked the U.S. consulate there, killing the American ambassador and three of his colleagues. Readers of peacefare.net will not be so surprised, as I’ve repeatedly described the situation there as evolving in a positive direction, with a lot of appreciation for what the United States and NATO did to defeat Muammar Qaddafi. I wrote to friends Thursday just before the news of the uprising against the militias broke:
I’ve been there (in both Benghazi and Tripoli) twice in the last year. I certainly have never had a warmer reception as an American in an Arab country. Most Libyans, especially Benghazis, understand perfectly well that the U.S. and NATO saved them from Qaddafi. And they appreciate it. I drove repeatedly through demonstrations in Benghazi during the election period–there was zero hostility to Westerners. Ditto at the polling places. And ditto last September right after Qaddafi fled Tripoli, when I enjoyed a great Friday evening celebration in Martyr’s (Green) Square.
The Libyan transition has been going reasonably well, on a time schedule they themselves have set, with resources that are overwhelmingly their own. Yes, the militias are a problem, but they are also part of a temporary solution. There would be no order in Libya today without them. They guarded all the polling stations during the elections and eventually reestablished control over the consulate compound after the attack.
We’ll have to wait for the incident report to know, but I would bet on the attack having been a planned one (contra Susan Rice) by armed extremists associated with opposition to the elections and possibly with secession of Barqa (Cyrenaica)….The Libyan [political science professor] Chris Stevens met with the morning he was killed gave me an account of these small extremist groups, mainly headquartered in Derna, the evening after the elections [in July 7]. The state has, however, lacked the organization and force necessary to mop them up, which might in fact be a difficult operation. They are wise not to try until they know they can succeed.
They will now have to do it. We should be helping them where they need help.
It would be a mistake to take the uprising against the extremist militias as the final word. There is likely to be retaliation. What has happened so far is not law and order. It is more lynch mob, though no one seems to have been killed. We should not take much satisfaction from retribution. What is needed is justice, which requires a serious investigation, a fair trial and an appropriate punishment.
Also needed are reliable, unified and disciplined security forces: police, army, intelligence services. This is one of the most difficult tasks in any post-war, post-dictatorship society. Demobilization of the militias really is not possible until the new security institutions are able to start absorbing at least some of their cadres. Reform of security services and reintegration of former fighters are two sides of the same coin: establishing the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
It is astounding that the United States, after 20 years of demand from weak and failing states in the Balkans, Middle East and South Asia, still lacks adequate institutional means to assist in establishing foreign security forces that behave properly towards their citizens. We are especially weak on police, whose training and equipping is largely contracted to private companies that hire individuals who have never previously worked together and may have dramatically different ideas about what a proper police force does. The Americans are also weak in assisting interior ministries, since we don’t use them ourselves. I have little idea what we do assisting foreign intelligence services, since the effort is classified and has attracted little journalistic or academic attention. We have some significant experience and capacity to help with military services and defense ministries, but we could use a good deal more.
Police of course are not much use unless you’ve got courts and prisons to process the accused, along with judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and prison guards. Not to mention laws, implementing regulations, legal education, bar associations and the ineffable but important “culture of law.” Installing a modern system for rule of law is a 10 or 20 year project.
The Libyans are facing a challenge similar to what we have seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Haiti, South Sudan and likely several more places I’ve omitted. There are pressing rule of law challenges in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen as well as obvious needs in Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan, Pakistan, Nepal, and Burma (Myanmar). When will we recognize that we need a permanent capacity to respond comprehensively and appropriately?
RSS - Posts
