Tag: Egypt
This week’s peace picks
1. Front Burner: Al Qaeda’s Attack on the USS Cole, Heritage Foundation, 12-1 pm July 10
Event Details
- DATE Tuesday, Jul 10, 2012
- VENUE Lehrman Auditorium
More About the Speakers
Author
Hosted By
On October 12, 2000, eleven months before the 9/11 attacks, the USS Cole – with Commander Kirk Lippold at the helm – docked in the port of Aden in Yemen for a routine fueling stop. At 1118, the 8,400-ton destroyer was rocked by an enormous explosion. This bombing marked al Qaeda’s first direct assault against the United States and expanded their brazen and deadly string of terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East. In this first-person narrative, Lippold reveals the details of this harrowing experience in which seventeen sailors died and thirty-seven were wounded. Thanks to the valor of the crew in the perilous days that followed, the ship was saved.
Yet, even with al Qaeda’s intentions made clear in an unmistakable act of war, the United States government delayed retaliating. Bureaucrats and politicians sought to shift and pin blame as they ignored the danger signaled by the attack, shirking responsibility until the event was ultimately overshadowed by 9/11. In Front Burner, Lippold captures this critical moment in America’s battle against al Qaeda, telling a vital story that – until now – has been lost in the fog of the war on terror.
Commander Lippold retired from the Navy in 2007 and remains active in current events and national security affairs. His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon, among others.
2. Chronic Kleptocracy: Corruption within the Palestinian Political Establishment, 2172 Rayburn HOB, 2 pm July 10
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Oversight Hearing
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Date
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
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Time
2:00 PM
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Location
Washington, DC
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Room
2172 Rayburn HOB
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Subcommittee
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Chaired by Steve Chabot (R-OH) |
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Witnesses
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3. Reform, Revolt and Revolution in Egypt and the Arab World, Embassy of Slovenia, 2410 California Street NW, 6-8 pm July 10
Egypt and the Arab World
Lisa Anderson
President, The American University in Cairo
H.E. Roman Kirn
Ambassador of Slovenia to the US
Reception and Program
Embassy of Slovenia
2410 California Street, NW
Washington, DC
Space is limited. Advance registration is required.
4. Libya’s First Elections: A Preliminary Look at Results and Outlook, Atlantic Council, 12-2 pm, July 11
| Date / Time | Wednesday, July 11 / 12:00pm – 2:00pm |
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| Location |
Atlantic Council of the United States 1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
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| Speakers | Gregory Kehailia, Fadel Lamen, Esam Omeish, Karim Mezran |
| Description | After four decades of dictatorship under the rule of Moammar Qaddafi, Libyans will go to the polls on July 7 to elect the nation’s first constituent assembly. With more than 4,000 candidates for the assembly’s 200 seats and nearly 2.7 million voters, all eyes are on the National Transitional Council to fulfill this final step in handing power over to the elected body. After delays due to security and technical reasons, how did the first election proceed? What do the results say about the desires of Libyans to move forward in their transition to democracy? Who are the major players that emerged through this election and how will government formation proceed? |
5. After the Summit: Assessing Iraq’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors, Middle East Institute, 12-1:30 pm July 12
Location:
The Middle East Institute is proud to host John Desrocher, Gregory Gause, Ken Pollack and Amb. Samir Sumaida’ie for a discussion about Baghdad’s complex relations with its Arab neighbors during a time of regional transition. As Iraq seeks to reclaim its role as a powerful player in the Arab world, what obstacles does it face as it attempts to project power and influence in a region still largely suspicious of Iraq’s motivations and alliances? What’s the view of Baghdad from the Arab Gulf and what influence does Iraq have on the unfolding crisis in Syria?
Bios:
John Desrocher took up his position as the director of the Office of Iraq Affairs in September 2010. He spent the preceding year at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad as minister counselor for Economic Coordination, responsible for U.S.-Iraq economic policy issues. He has extensive experience in international trade and in Middle East issues and has served as counselor for Economic and Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. He participated in Palestinian-Israeli economic negotiations while serving at the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem in the late 1990s and served as State Department desk officer for Iraq in the mid-1990s.
Gregory Gause is professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and was director of the University’s Middle East Studies Program from 1998 to 2008. In 2009-2010, he was the Kuwait Foundation Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University (1987-1995) and was a Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1993-1994). He has published three books, among them The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Kenneth Pollack is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is an expert on national security, military affairs, and the Persian Gulf. He was drector for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. He also spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. He is the author of A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House, 2008)
Amb. Samir Sumaida’ie was appointed Iraq’s ambassador to the United States in April 2006. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Sumaida’ie served as a member of Governing Council (GC) in Iraq. In the GC, he was chairman of the media committee, helped found the Iraqi Telecoms and Media Commission and the Public Broadcasting Institution, and held positions on the security, finance, and foreign relations committees. He then served as the minister of interior in Baghdad. In this capacity he managed a domestic security force of over 120,000. Prior to his appointment as ambassador to the U.S., Sumaida’ie served as permanent representative to the United Nations from July 2004 to April 2006.
Moderator: Phebe Marr is a prominent historian of modern Iraq. She was research professor at the National Defense University and a professor of history at the University of Tennessee and at Stanislaus State University in California. She is the author of The Modern History of Iraq (Third Edition, Westview Press, 2011). She is a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of The Middle East Journal.
6. Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Between Authoritarianism and Islamism, National Endowment for Democracy, 12-2 pm July 12
featuring
Mokhtar Benabdallaoui, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
with comments by
Samer Shehata, Georgetown University
Thursday, July 12, 2012
12 noon–2:00 p.m.
(Lunch served 12:00–12:30 p.m.)
1025 F. Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: 202-378-9675
RSVP (acceptances only) with name and affiliation by Tuesday, July 10
About the Event
The outcomes of the recent Arab uprisings have confirmed the organizational superiority and widespread appeal of Islamist political parties in a number of countries in the Middle East. The new form of Islamism appears to be compatible with democracy, a free society, and a modern economy, and its ascendancy may foreshadow the political future of the region and the roles of domestic, regional, and international actors.
In his presentation, Mokhtar Benabdallaoui will explain why Islamists have embraced democracy instead of fundamentalism and why the appeal of Islamists exceeds that of leftists and liberals in the Arab world. He will assess the challenges of shaping Islamist political thought in a democratic direction, the prospects of Islamist governments accepting diversity and differences of opinion, and the ways in which Islamists may reconcile conflicting religious and political ideas from across the Arab world. Drawing upon the example of Islamist political parties in four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon—Mr. Benabdallaoui will consider how ascendant Islamists have influenced societies across the Middle East and conclude with an assessment of the main stakeholders in the Arab Spring, their propensity for reform, and the prospects for further change in the region. Samer Shehata will provide comments.
About the Speakers
Mokhtar Benabdallaoui is a professor of Islamic studies and director of the Doctoral Center for Studies in Politics and Religion at Hassan II University in Casablanca, Morocco. He is also founding director of the Center for Humanities Studies and Research, a Casablanca-based nongovernmental organization that carries out a broad range of activities under the auspices of the Civic Forum, including civic education workshops, publication of the quarterly journal Rihanat, and conferences on democratic reform. During his fellowship, Dr. Benabdallaoui is studying the evolution, activities, and impact of Islamist parties in the Arab world and intends to publish his findings in the form of a book. Samer Shehata is an assistant professor of Arab politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University.
7. The Role of Central Asia in Afghanistan, Carnegie, 12:15-1:45 pm July 12
Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Martha Brill Olcott Thursday, July 12, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 1:45 PM EST
As Central Asia plays a fundamental role in efforts to develop a peaceful and stable Afghanistan as well as a secure and prosperous region, the United States must continue to actively engage with Central Asian countries.
Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake will discuss the prospects for developing Central Asia into a region of economic opportunity, which could help lead to regional integration.
Please note that the event will take place in the Saul/Zikha Room of the Brookings Institution.
8. View from the Ground in Syria, CSIS, 10:30-11:30 am, July 13
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Friday, Jul 13, 2012 | 10:30 am – 11:30 am
The Center for Strategic and International Studies invites you to a discussion on
View From the Ground in Syria
With Donatella Rovera Senior Crisis Response Adviser, Syria Amnesty International
With commentary by Aram Nerguizian
Visiting Fellow, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderated by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies
Friday, July 13, 2012 10:30 a.m. – 11:30 a.m.
B1 Conference Room
1800 K Street, NW, Washington DC 20006
Seating is limited.
RSVP is required. Please RSVP (acceptances only) with your name and affiliation to externalrelations@csis.org
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Libyan bellwether
From Tripoli:
It is hard not to share Libyans’ affection for their revolution. They are thrilled with themselves. Qaddafi seemed forever, especially after the United States normalized relations with Libya in 2004. But somehow in a relatively few months last year they found the courage and the means to evict him from power and establish what they hope will be a free society and a democratic state.
The odds are long. Libya has no democratic tradition. Elections were not held at all during Qaddafi’s 42 years in power. The violence of the Libyan revolution, supported by NATO air power, has left thousands of armed youths and dozens of militias scattered throughout the country. This week a mob claiming to object to the geographic distribution of parliamentary seats attacked the elections commission office in Benghazi. Their looting of the computers and other equipment suggests other motives, as did the green shirts some of the youths wore (green was Qaddafi’s favored color). There are also threats of an election boycott in the south, where clashes have occurred recently. Disorder lurks not far below the apparently peaceful and relatively orderly surface.
It is not however hard to find a hopeful Libyan. Things were so bad under Qaddafi that improvement will not be difficult. Libyans believe themselves moderate people who will not reward the Muslim Brotherhood or the more radical Salifists the way Egypt did, a woman with hair covered by a hijab says to me. It has taken time for Libyans to begin to understand that the election on July 7 is important. Some thought they had fulfilled their civic obligation when they registered to vote. No one knows how many will turn out or how they will vote, but there is ample choice and a real possibility of new faces emerging.
Women in Libya will run both as individuals for 120 seats in the assembly as well as on party lists for the remaining 80. The party lists are required to alternate male and female names. An Italian businessman who has been coming to Libya for decades was surprised they were even being allowed to vote. There is palpable distrust in political parties, which have emerged only in the past year. Individual reputation and standing is expected to count for a lot.
I enjoyed dinner this evening with activists from Egypt and Morocco. The contrast with Libya could not be stronger. Egypt has elected a Muslim Brotherhood president who will now engage in a complicated tug of war with the country’s still powerful Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has dissolved the elected parliament. The Moroccan king has nominally begun a reform process with a new constitution and elections that returned an Islamist-led government, but things there remain as always: absolute monarchy rules.
Libya, a country many in the region view as backward, has a grand opportunity with the elections this week. If they go well, it will mark an important step forward in a democratic direction for the Arab awakening, which has lost a lot of its shine in recent months due to profound confusion in Egypt, extreme violence in Syria and a half-baked outcome in Yemen. If the elections in Libya go poorly, with violence or boycott undermining their legitimacy, it will be a giant step backwards. Libya is not the largest or most important country in the Arab world, but right now it is a bellwether that counts.
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Libya and Egypt are not in the same place
It will strike some as strange to write about Libya on the day Egypt’s new president takes the oath of office, but the contrast is instructive.
Oil- and gas- rich Libya had a violent revolution that swept away Muammar Qaddafi’s one-man dictatorship and has proceeded more or less on schedule with a transition roadmap laid out almost a year ago. Virtually 100 per cent Muslim and predominantly Arab, Libya has big problems with armed militias and many local conflicts but little in the way of organized national resistance.
Egypt, a far larger, poorer and more diverse country with limited natural resources, underwent a largely peaceful revolution (violence came mainly from the regime) that forced out President Mubarak but failed to sweep away a highly institutionalized military autocracy. Egypt’s political roadmap has changed many times in the past year and a half, so much so that Marc Lynch has satirized the process as #calvinball. Experts can’t agree whether Egypt has even yet begun a democratic transition. With lots of help from the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been very much in charge, though it now faces a serious challenger in President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.
None of this means that Libya will necessarily come out all right or that Egypt won’t. But the odds are in that direction. A lot depends on Libya’s election July 7, which I’ll be observing as a Carter Center monitor. Voting for real for the first time in more than 40 years, Libyans will be choosing an assembly (called the National Public Conference in English) with two main tasks: to select a committee to write the country’s new constitution and to name a government that will replace the National Transitional Council, the oft-maligned, self-appointed body that has steered Libya’s revolution for the past year and a half. Scheduled for drafting within 120 days (recently extended from 60), the constitution will then be approved (or disapproved) in a referendum, followed by new elections. This is a sensible sequence, even if the schedule remains tight. There is some discussion of whether the draft constitution should be sent to the assembly before the referendum.
By contrast, Egyptians have already elected a president, whose powers are uncertain because the military has continued to issue obiter dicta. While many of us assume these will be decisive, a great deal depends on how the tug-of-war between democratically elected president and judicially empowered military officers comes out. Nor is it clear how the constitution will now be written. The SCAF claims to have arrogated to itself legislative authority, dissolving a parliament elected only a few months ago in more or less democratic polls but declared illegitimate by a court mouthing what the military wanted said. It is completely unclear when a new parliament will be elected, or even when the next presidential election will be held.
Libya’s big challenge is to stay on track. The militias are the greatest threat to doing that, so it is important that the new assembly and government make more progress than the NTC has on dissolving them. If they become entrenched, or aligned with political forces, a revolution that seemed to be headed in the right direction could be pulled seriously off course.
Egypt’s big challenge is to find where the right tracks that lead to serious democracy lie. It is hard to believe that either the military or Morsi acting alone will find them. But the interaction between the two, guided in part by the Egyptian courts, may have a better chance. I suspect the Americans are also playing a role in pushing the military to turn over real authority to the civilians, but Morsi’s advocacy yesterday of freedom for a terrorist convicted in a U.S. court may make them hesitate. Admittedly, Morsi is navigating in difficult waters. He’d better learn quickly where the shoals lie.
Libya is freer of external constraints, but in some sense just as fraught with its own internal difficulties, on a far smaller scale than Egypt. What can a single American election observer hope to contribute in such a situation? Not much. Local observers who know the terrain and the people, never mind the language and culture, are likely to have a far bigger impact. But having a few of us around in Carter Center shirts may provide some top cover for Libyan political parties and nongovernmental organizations to be bold in insisting on good procedures in preparation for the polling, on election day and in the subsequent counting. Most newly democratic regimes would like a seal of approval, not a Bronx cheer, from the foreigners.
This is also an opportunity for me to sniff the atmosphere in Libya nine months after my last visit, when I returned more hopeful than I had been previously that Libya was on the right track. Circumstances in post-war and revolutionary places change rapidly. The security environment is nowhere near as permissive as it was last September, when I ran along the quay in Tripoli. I am most interested in talking with ordinary Libyans: what do they think about what they’ve wrought? Are they longing for a return to a strongman, as many Iraqis seem to be doing, or are they determined to forge ahead in the democratic direction? Do they have confidence in the electoral process? Will they view the results as legitimate, even if the results aren’t what they prefer? What are their priorities, and how do they think their needs can best be met?
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Keep quiet and send money
Yesterday’s discussion of Egypt moderated by Freedom House’s Charles Dunne and sponsored by the Middle East Institute at the Carnegie Endowment was way more optimistic than many, but not convincingly so.
Hafez al Mirazi of the American University in Cairo was the most upbeat. He is pleased that the revolution’s secularists joined forces with now President-elect Morsi in a civilian front intending to oust the military from power. This alliance will continue until the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) hands over power. Morsi, two of whose children are American citizens, is intending to bring a broad spectrum of people into his government. SCAF will have little influence, beyond the power to declare war. But then a few minutes later he admitted that the SCAF and the “deep state” (not further defined) will be a corrupting influence. There is a lot to be done to ensure accountability, including investigation of the secret police and publication of archives.
Khaled Elgindy of Brookings was less upbeat. The liberal consituency that brought about the revolution is now fragmented. None of its components seems to be capable of a good “ground game” among the Egyptian people. Morsi will try to maintain good communication with Egypt’s Christians, but he needs to go beyond tokenism if he is going to win them over. There is a real need to strengthen the judiciary and rule of law, including transitional justice. But it is unclear how strong the commitment to accountability of the old regime is. There is a palpable reluctance to dig up the past. Economic development and security may take priority. The “deep state” will persist, opening up to newcomers and trying to preserve its privileged hold on economic resources.
Nathan Brown of George Washington University was somewhere in the middle. The West has gotten used to the idea of Morsi as Egypt’s president and support has been more forthcoming than anticipated. The Americans have gotten the reassurance they need on Israel; the Europeans have gotten what they need on human rights. The problem for Morsi is lack of resources. The naming of a Christian vice president will be seen as a big and controversial step by the Muslim Brotherhood, but it won’t count for a lot with the Christians if it is tokenism. Morsi’s primary concerns will be security and the economy. The stock market rose 15% on his win, but he will have to sort out priorities among the Brotherhood’s economic directions: social justice, sharia compliant finance and liberal “Washington consensus” policies. The courts, which have played a major role in the transition so far, will now have to tussle with a democratically legitimated president. SCAF influence in the courts remains substantial, with individual Supreme Constitutional and administrative judges beholden to the army.
Tellingly, the three presenters gave different answers to the question whether Egypt was really in a democratic transition, or not. Hafez al Mirazi said yes, of course. Morsi represents the revolution, which is now beyond the violent stage. Khaled Elgindy said no, it has not yet really started. Only now with Ahmed Shafiq’s concession of defeat can a real transition begin. Nathan Brown thought there had certainly been a move towards democracy after the fall of Mubarak, but the process is unclear and losing momentum.
On the U.S. role, the advice was the same as I used to give alumni when I was an undergraduate: keep quiet and send money. That’s going to be hard to sustain unless there is clearer evidence that Egypt is moving in a direction the West finds acceptable. Morsi’s vow today to seek freedom for Omar Abdel-Rahman, who is serving life in prison for conspiracy to blow up the World Trade Center eight years before 9/11, is not going to endear him to Americans.
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No laughing matter
Ilona Gerbakher reports:
Monday, as Egypt’s elections results were being broadcast to the world, Freedom House and the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies met to discuss “Revolution under siege: is there hope for Egypt’s democratic transition?” Two of the speakers were unable to say the phrase “President Morsi” with a straight face, which is perhaps a good indicator of the future of his presidency.
Anwar Sadat, Chairman of Egypt’s Reform and Development Party, believes that it doesn’t matter who is president of Egypt, but the fact that the election took place at all proves that there is hope for a democratic transition. He urges America not to worry about the Muslim Brotherhood or further unrest in Egypt: now that a president for “all Egyptians” has been declared, he believes things in Egypt will settle down. Egyptians need to look forward, not backwards–they must reconcile themselves to a united future and continue the democratic transition.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will inevitably hand over power. But even in this united, newly democratic Egypt, old economic and political challenges will prevail, particularly the Sudanese border, Libya and the “traditional” Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He warned the revolution will not bring magic. Without unity in the post-revolutionary period there will be no security, no stability and no safety.
Mohammed Elmenshawy, Director of the Languages and Regional Studies Program at the Middle East Institute, disagreed with the idea that the identity of the president does not matter: if Egypt had elected Ahmed Shafiq, torch-bearer of the ancien regime, it would have marked the end of the revolution. We are in a symbolic moment: the election of a man outside of the elite circle who have ruled Egypt for the last 60 years. He is also the first freely elected head of an Arab State. Morsi is truly a man of the people. He is a typical middle class Egyptian. His wife looks and dresses like an ordinary Egyptian woman. The fact that he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is also very important: they are the only organized people on the street. Neither the liberal/secularist Egyptians nor the military elite are “on the streets, getting their hands dirty” as effectively and consistently as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Elmenshawy cautions, however, that the majority of Egyptians did not vote for President Morsi, but rather against his opposition. Morsi does not have the solid majority political mandate that he needs in order to effectively counter the SCAF and the Egyptian “deep state.” The strong man presidency so typical of the Mubarak era is a thing of the past. Morsi will be hampered by a weakened executive role in an Egypt that is more polarized than ever before. What is the role of the United States in this new post-revolutionary Egypt? “You had better stay out, you better shut up.”
Nancy Okail, Director of Freedom House Egypt and recent guest of the Egyptian penitentiary system, asks whether this election is truly a new situation for Egypt, or merely a perpetuation of the past? She agrees with Elmenshawy’s assertion that the vote was not for Morsi but against Shafiq and the SCAF. She notes that over the sixteen months since Mubarak was forced out of office, SCAF has taken several steps to significantly curtail the power of the executive branch: it decreed that military intelligence can search and arrest civilians without due process, dissolved parliament and limited the power of the constituent assembly. An article in the new constitution gives veto power over the constitution to SCAF, allowing it to cancel any part of the constitution they see as “inappropriate.”
All of these actions limit the power of the incoming president and shore up SCAF’s power. In addition, SCAF is playing up to wide-spread populist and xenophobic sentiment in Egypt, branding Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as pro-American, splintering Morsi’s already fragile majority. The message from SCAF to Morsi is that he is not going to be sitting on a very stable seat.
In what was perhaps a symbolic moment, she asked, “How will President Morsi…,” stopped herself mid-phrase, and told the audience “I’m trying to get used to it.” She laughed, and the audience chuckled with her. Elmenshawy in a subsequent discussion was also unable to say the phrase “President Morsi” without chuckling to himself, laughter rippling through his audience.
But the weakness of newly-elected President Morsi is no laughing matter. Will Morsi be the person to bring Egypt together? Sadat’s optimism aside, the laughter in the audience suggests not.
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A smooth landing after so much turbulence?
Travel has made me late to post on the election of Mohammed Morsi as Egypt’s president, so it is unlikely I’ll say anything you haven’t heard before. But maybe it will be useful if I explain why some like me who advocated a vote for Ahmed Shafiq is happy to see the election of Morsi.
I suggested voting for Shafiq when it looked as if the election of Morsi might give the Muslim Brotherhood a monopoly on institutional power in Egypt, as it already controlled the parliament. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) used a Supreme Constitutional Court decision to close the parliament and arrogate legislative power to itself. So Morsi’s election is breaking the army’s monopoly on power, rather than Shafiq breaking the Brotherhood’s monopoly on power. The point is the same: Egypt is a deeply divided society getting ready to write a constitution. The broadest possible representation in power is what the country needs.
It would be hard to resist the joy some Egyptians are expressing at the election of Morsi, who has gone out of his way to reach out to the broadest possible spectrum of Egyptian society. He has even resigned from the Brotherhood and praised the army, underlining his intention to be the president of all Egyptians. Some will gripe that he can leave the Brotherhood but the Brotherhood doesn’t leave him. Others will doubt his sincerity in promising to treat women and Christians equally. Still others will worry that his promise to uphold international agreements won’t apply to the peace treaty with Israel, on which the Brotherhood has in the past advocated a referendum. There are enormous uncertainties surrounding Morsi.
The greatest of these is what powers he will actually exercise. Even former president Hosni Mubarak kept a parliament, which is nice to have around when you need legislation on controversial matters of no import to the army. Who would want to decide on the level of food subsidies in Egypt today? Or pension payments? Or female genital mutilation? Not the army for sure. It should be content to keep control of its own budget and economic enterprises while blocking any moves towards accountability for crimes committed under the Mubarak regime. I don’t think it will be long before we see the army unhappy with its legislative responsibilities, but it will be difficult to get rid of them. There is a strong likelihood that new legislative elections will bring another strong showing by the Islamist parties (the Brotherhood controlled 48 per cent of the seats after the last elections and the Salafists another quarter or so).
Meanwhile Morsi, has to put together a government, uncertain of its powers but confident of his own democratic legitimacy. It is not even clear where and how he will be sworn in, though I trust they’ll figure that one out. The SCAF will be overseeing the cabinet-formation process, and perhaps even vetoing particular names. One of Morsi’s lieutenants is saying
It will be a coalition government without an FJP [Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party] majority and led by an independent figure.
That sounds smart to me. An Egyptian administrative court today threw out the arrest and detention powers that the army gave itself just a few days ago. If Morsi is patient and diligent, he may well find power on many issues gravitating in his direction, with the army content to protect its more immediate interests.
If that happens, I’ll be wondering again where the counterbalancing forces can be found. But Egypt has already been through a lot of turbulence. Dare I hope that, like my flight from Vienna today, things smooth out for a good landing?
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