Tag: Egypt
Libya and Egypt are not in the same place
It will strike some as strange to write about Libya on the day Egypt’s new president takes the oath of office, but the contrast is instructive.
Oil- and gas- rich Libya had a violent revolution that swept away Muammar Qaddafi’s one-man dictatorship and has proceeded more or less on schedule with a transition roadmap laid out almost a year ago. Virtually 100 per cent Muslim and predominantly Arab, Libya has big problems with armed militias and many local conflicts but little in the way of organized national resistance.
Egypt, a far larger, poorer and more diverse country with limited natural resources, underwent a largely peaceful revolution (violence came mainly from the regime) that forced out President Mubarak but failed to sweep away a highly institutionalized military autocracy. Egypt’s political roadmap has changed many times in the past year and a half, so much so that Marc Lynch has satirized the process as #calvinball. Experts can’t agree whether Egypt has even yet begun a democratic transition. With lots of help from the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been very much in charge, though it now faces a serious challenger in President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.
None of this means that Libya will necessarily come out all right or that Egypt won’t. But the odds are in that direction. A lot depends on Libya’s election July 7, which I’ll be observing as a Carter Center monitor. Voting for real for the first time in more than 40 years, Libyans will be choosing an assembly (called the National Public Conference in English) with two main tasks: to select a committee to write the country’s new constitution and to name a government that will replace the National Transitional Council, the oft-maligned, self-appointed body that has steered Libya’s revolution for the past year and a half. Scheduled for drafting within 120 days (recently extended from 60), the constitution will then be approved (or disapproved) in a referendum, followed by new elections. This is a sensible sequence, even if the schedule remains tight. There is some discussion of whether the draft constitution should be sent to the assembly before the referendum.
By contrast, Egyptians have already elected a president, whose powers are uncertain because the military has continued to issue obiter dicta. While many of us assume these will be decisive, a great deal depends on how the tug-of-war between democratically elected president and judicially empowered military officers comes out. Nor is it clear how the constitution will now be written. The SCAF claims to have arrogated to itself legislative authority, dissolving a parliament elected only a few months ago in more or less democratic polls but declared illegitimate by a court mouthing what the military wanted said. It is completely unclear when a new parliament will be elected, or even when the next presidential election will be held.
Libya’s big challenge is to stay on track. The militias are the greatest threat to doing that, so it is important that the new assembly and government make more progress than the NTC has on dissolving them. If they become entrenched, or aligned with political forces, a revolution that seemed to be headed in the right direction could be pulled seriously off course.
Egypt’s big challenge is to find where the right tracks that lead to serious democracy lie. It is hard to believe that either the military or Morsi acting alone will find them. But the interaction between the two, guided in part by the Egyptian courts, may have a better chance. I suspect the Americans are also playing a role in pushing the military to turn over real authority to the civilians, but Morsi’s advocacy yesterday of freedom for a terrorist convicted in a U.S. court may make them hesitate. Admittedly, Morsi is navigating in difficult waters. He’d better learn quickly where the shoals lie.
Libya is freer of external constraints, but in some sense just as fraught with its own internal difficulties, on a far smaller scale than Egypt. What can a single American election observer hope to contribute in such a situation? Not much. Local observers who know the terrain and the people, never mind the language and culture, are likely to have a far bigger impact. But having a few of us around in Carter Center shirts may provide some top cover for Libyan political parties and nongovernmental organizations to be bold in insisting on good procedures in preparation for the polling, on election day and in the subsequent counting. Most newly democratic regimes would like a seal of approval, not a Bronx cheer, from the foreigners.
This is also an opportunity for me to sniff the atmosphere in Libya nine months after my last visit, when I returned more hopeful than I had been previously that Libya was on the right track. Circumstances in post-war and revolutionary places change rapidly. The security environment is nowhere near as permissive as it was last September, when I ran along the quay in Tripoli. I am most interested in talking with ordinary Libyans: what do they think about what they’ve wrought? Are they longing for a return to a strongman, as many Iraqis seem to be doing, or are they determined to forge ahead in the democratic direction? Do they have confidence in the electoral process? Will they view the results as legitimate, even if the results aren’t what they prefer? What are their priorities, and how do they think their needs can best be met?
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Keep quiet and send money
Yesterday’s discussion of Egypt moderated by Freedom House’s Charles Dunne and sponsored by the Middle East Institute at the Carnegie Endowment was way more optimistic than many, but not convincingly so.
Hafez al Mirazi of the American University in Cairo was the most upbeat. He is pleased that the revolution’s secularists joined forces with now President-elect Morsi in a civilian front intending to oust the military from power. This alliance will continue until the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) hands over power. Morsi, two of whose children are American citizens, is intending to bring a broad spectrum of people into his government. SCAF will have little influence, beyond the power to declare war. But then a few minutes later he admitted that the SCAF and the “deep state” (not further defined) will be a corrupting influence. There is a lot to be done to ensure accountability, including investigation of the secret police and publication of archives.
Khaled Elgindy of Brookings was less upbeat. The liberal consituency that brought about the revolution is now fragmented. None of its components seems to be capable of a good “ground game” among the Egyptian people. Morsi will try to maintain good communication with Egypt’s Christians, but he needs to go beyond tokenism if he is going to win them over. There is a real need to strengthen the judiciary and rule of law, including transitional justice. But it is unclear how strong the commitment to accountability of the old regime is. There is a palpable reluctance to dig up the past. Economic development and security may take priority. The “deep state” will persist, opening up to newcomers and trying to preserve its privileged hold on economic resources.
Nathan Brown of George Washington University was somewhere in the middle. The West has gotten used to the idea of Morsi as Egypt’s president and support has been more forthcoming than anticipated. The Americans have gotten the reassurance they need on Israel; the Europeans have gotten what they need on human rights. The problem for Morsi is lack of resources. The naming of a Christian vice president will be seen as a big and controversial step by the Muslim Brotherhood, but it won’t count for a lot with the Christians if it is tokenism. Morsi’s primary concerns will be security and the economy. The stock market rose 15% on his win, but he will have to sort out priorities among the Brotherhood’s economic directions: social justice, sharia compliant finance and liberal “Washington consensus” policies. The courts, which have played a major role in the transition so far, will now have to tussle with a democratically legitimated president. SCAF influence in the courts remains substantial, with individual Supreme Constitutional and administrative judges beholden to the army.
Tellingly, the three presenters gave different answers to the question whether Egypt was really in a democratic transition, or not. Hafez al Mirazi said yes, of course. Morsi represents the revolution, which is now beyond the violent stage. Khaled Elgindy said no, it has not yet really started. Only now with Ahmed Shafiq’s concession of defeat can a real transition begin. Nathan Brown thought there had certainly been a move towards democracy after the fall of Mubarak, but the process is unclear and losing momentum.
On the U.S. role, the advice was the same as I used to give alumni when I was an undergraduate: keep quiet and send money. That’s going to be hard to sustain unless there is clearer evidence that Egypt is moving in a direction the West finds acceptable. Morsi’s vow today to seek freedom for Omar Abdel-Rahman, who is serving life in prison for conspiracy to blow up the World Trade Center eight years before 9/11, is not going to endear him to Americans.
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No laughing matter
Ilona Gerbakher reports:
Monday, as Egypt’s elections results were being broadcast to the world, Freedom House and the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies met to discuss “Revolution under siege: is there hope for Egypt’s democratic transition?” Two of the speakers were unable to say the phrase “President Morsi” with a straight face, which is perhaps a good indicator of the future of his presidency.
Anwar Sadat, Chairman of Egypt’s Reform and Development Party, believes that it doesn’t matter who is president of Egypt, but the fact that the election took place at all proves that there is hope for a democratic transition. He urges America not to worry about the Muslim Brotherhood or further unrest in Egypt: now that a president for “all Egyptians” has been declared, he believes things in Egypt will settle down. Egyptians need to look forward, not backwards–they must reconcile themselves to a united future and continue the democratic transition.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will inevitably hand over power. But even in this united, newly democratic Egypt, old economic and political challenges will prevail, particularly the Sudanese border, Libya and the “traditional” Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He warned the revolution will not bring magic. Without unity in the post-revolutionary period there will be no security, no stability and no safety.
Mohammed Elmenshawy, Director of the Languages and Regional Studies Program at the Middle East Institute, disagreed with the idea that the identity of the president does not matter: if Egypt had elected Ahmed Shafiq, torch-bearer of the ancien regime, it would have marked the end of the revolution. We are in a symbolic moment: the election of a man outside of the elite circle who have ruled Egypt for the last 60 years. He is also the first freely elected head of an Arab State. Morsi is truly a man of the people. He is a typical middle class Egyptian. His wife looks and dresses like an ordinary Egyptian woman. The fact that he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is also very important: they are the only organized people on the street. Neither the liberal/secularist Egyptians nor the military elite are “on the streets, getting their hands dirty” as effectively and consistently as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Elmenshawy cautions, however, that the majority of Egyptians did not vote for President Morsi, but rather against his opposition. Morsi does not have the solid majority political mandate that he needs in order to effectively counter the SCAF and the Egyptian “deep state.” The strong man presidency so typical of the Mubarak era is a thing of the past. Morsi will be hampered by a weakened executive role in an Egypt that is more polarized than ever before. What is the role of the United States in this new post-revolutionary Egypt? “You had better stay out, you better shut up.”
Nancy Okail, Director of Freedom House Egypt and recent guest of the Egyptian penitentiary system, asks whether this election is truly a new situation for Egypt, or merely a perpetuation of the past? She agrees with Elmenshawy’s assertion that the vote was not for Morsi but against Shafiq and the SCAF. She notes that over the sixteen months since Mubarak was forced out of office, SCAF has taken several steps to significantly curtail the power of the executive branch: it decreed that military intelligence can search and arrest civilians without due process, dissolved parliament and limited the power of the constituent assembly. An article in the new constitution gives veto power over the constitution to SCAF, allowing it to cancel any part of the constitution they see as “inappropriate.”
All of these actions limit the power of the incoming president and shore up SCAF’s power. In addition, SCAF is playing up to wide-spread populist and xenophobic sentiment in Egypt, branding Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as pro-American, splintering Morsi’s already fragile majority. The message from SCAF to Morsi is that he is not going to be sitting on a very stable seat.
In what was perhaps a symbolic moment, she asked, “How will President Morsi…,” stopped herself mid-phrase, and told the audience “I’m trying to get used to it.” She laughed, and the audience chuckled with her. Elmenshawy in a subsequent discussion was also unable to say the phrase “President Morsi” without chuckling to himself, laughter rippling through his audience.
But the weakness of newly-elected President Morsi is no laughing matter. Will Morsi be the person to bring Egypt together? Sadat’s optimism aside, the laughter in the audience suggests not.
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A smooth landing after so much turbulence?
Travel has made me late to post on the election of Mohammed Morsi as Egypt’s president, so it is unlikely I’ll say anything you haven’t heard before. But maybe it will be useful if I explain why some like me who advocated a vote for Ahmed Shafiq is happy to see the election of Morsi.
I suggested voting for Shafiq when it looked as if the election of Morsi might give the Muslim Brotherhood a monopoly on institutional power in Egypt, as it already controlled the parliament. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) used a Supreme Constitutional Court decision to close the parliament and arrogate legislative power to itself. So Morsi’s election is breaking the army’s monopoly on power, rather than Shafiq breaking the Brotherhood’s monopoly on power. The point is the same: Egypt is a deeply divided society getting ready to write a constitution. The broadest possible representation in power is what the country needs.
It would be hard to resist the joy some Egyptians are expressing at the election of Morsi, who has gone out of his way to reach out to the broadest possible spectrum of Egyptian society. He has even resigned from the Brotherhood and praised the army, underlining his intention to be the president of all Egyptians. Some will gripe that he can leave the Brotherhood but the Brotherhood doesn’t leave him. Others will doubt his sincerity in promising to treat women and Christians equally. Still others will worry that his promise to uphold international agreements won’t apply to the peace treaty with Israel, on which the Brotherhood has in the past advocated a referendum. There are enormous uncertainties surrounding Morsi.
The greatest of these is what powers he will actually exercise. Even former president Hosni Mubarak kept a parliament, which is nice to have around when you need legislation on controversial matters of no import to the army. Who would want to decide on the level of food subsidies in Egypt today? Or pension payments? Or female genital mutilation? Not the army for sure. It should be content to keep control of its own budget and economic enterprises while blocking any moves towards accountability for crimes committed under the Mubarak regime. I don’t think it will be long before we see the army unhappy with its legislative responsibilities, but it will be difficult to get rid of them. There is a strong likelihood that new legislative elections will bring another strong showing by the Islamist parties (the Brotherhood controlled 48 per cent of the seats after the last elections and the Salafists another quarter or so).
Meanwhile Morsi, has to put together a government, uncertain of its powers but confident of his own democratic legitimacy. It is not even clear where and how he will be sworn in, though I trust they’ll figure that one out. The SCAF will be overseeing the cabinet-formation process, and perhaps even vetoing particular names. One of Morsi’s lieutenants is saying
It will be a coalition government without an FJP [Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party] majority and led by an independent figure.
That sounds smart to me. An Egyptian administrative court today threw out the arrest and detention powers that the army gave itself just a few days ago. If Morsi is patient and diligent, he may well find power on many issues gravitating in his direction, with the army content to protect its more immediate interests.
If that happens, I’ll be wondering again where the counterbalancing forces can be found. But Egypt has already been through a lot of turbulence. Dare I hope that, like my flight from Vienna today, things smooth out for a good landing?
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This week’s peace picks
Lots of good events in DC this week, several of them big all-day events. I’ll be away part of the week in Vienna–that’s my excuse for not going to everything. Write-ups for peacefare.net are, as always, welcome.
1. Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA, Stimson, noon June 25
Event Details
On June 13, 2012, The Centre for International Governance Innovation released its long-awaited report, “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA.”
The report will be presented at an event on June 25 in Washington, DC, co-hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute North America (SIPRI North America). CIGI Senior Fellow Trevor Findlay, author of the report, will present the report’s findings. He will be introduced by Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, executive director, SIPRI North America.
The release of “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA” marks the culmination of a two-year research project that examined all aspects of the Agency’s mandate and operations ― from major programs on safeguards, safety, security and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to governance, management and finance. The report makes multiple recommendations, both strategic and programmatic, for strengthening and reform of the Agency. The project was a joint undertaking of CIGI’s global security program and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.
Professor Findlay holds a joint fellowship with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He also holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at NPSIA and is director of the CCTC.
When & Where
SIPRI North America, Stimson Center
1111 19th Street NW
Twelfth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
3. Iran and the West: Oil, Sanctions, and Future Scenarios, SAIS room 500 BOB, 9-12:45 June 26
Room 500
1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC
| 9:00 – 9:15 | Light Breakfast |
| 9:15 – 9:30 | Welcoming RemarksAmbassador Andras Simonyi (Managing Director, SAIS CTR) |
| 9:30 – 11:00 | PANEL I Energy and Politics: Myths and Reality of a Complex InteractionSpeakers:
Claudia Castiglioni (Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow, SAIS CTR) Sara Vakhoshouri (President of SVB Energy International and former Advisor to Director of the National Iranian Oil Company International) Guy Caruso (Senior adviser in the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, former administrator of the Energy Information Administration) Moderator: Robert J. Lieber (Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) |
| 11:00 – 11:15 | Coffee |
| 11:15 – 12:45 | PANEL II The Future of Iran-West Relations: A Transatlantic PerspectiveSpeakers:
Michael Makovsky (Foreign Policy Director at the Bipartisan Policy Center) Abbas Maleki (Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at Center for International Studies, MIT) Moderator: Suzanne Maloney (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution) |
4. Crisis Yemen: Going Where? City Club, 555 13th St NW, 10-noon June 26
June 26, 2012
Crisis Yemen: Going Where?
Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Lecturer and Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Princeton University; and former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen
Mr. Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton University; author, Waq al-waq blog and The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemeni Studies Fellow in Yemen
Dr. Charles Schmitz, Associate Professor of Geography, Towson University; President, American Institute for Yemeni Studies; and former Fulbright and American Institute for Yemen Studies Fellow in Yemen
Mr. Robert Sharp, Associate Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, U.S. Department of Defense/National Defense University
Dr. John Duke Anthony, Founding President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; former Fulbright Fellow in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen; and official observer for four of Yemen’s presidential and parliamentary elections
5. Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: International Norms, Unintended Consequences, and the Challenge of Non-Traditional Conflict, German Marshall Fund, 12:15- 2 pm June 26
| Date / Time |
Tuesday, June 26 / 12:15pm – 2:00pm Register with host
|
|---|---|
| Location |
German Marshall Fund 1744 R Street NW, Washington DC, 20009
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| Speakers | Mark R. Jacobson, Sarah Holewinski, Mark V. Vlasic |
| Description | A discussion of the dilemmas posed by the use of RPVs, or “drones to include the implications for alliances, international norms, and their use outside of traditional armed conflict. The panel will also address the unique capability this new technology presents as well as the potential for unintended consequences and “blowback.”Speakers include Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of CIVIC (Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict) who is preparing a report on drones with the Colombia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Mark Vlasic from Georgetown University and Madison Law & Strategy Group PLLC who has served at the World Bank and the Pentagon and has authored a legal analysis of Targeted Killing in the Georgetown Journal of International Law. The event will be moderated by Dr. Mark Jacobson, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Deputy NATO Representative in Afghanistan. |
6. Third Annual Conference on Turkey: Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey, National Press Club, 9-5 June 27
The Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies
in collaboration with the Institute of Turkish Studies present:
“Regional and Domestic Challenges for an Ascendant Turkey”
June 27th, 2012
9:00am-5:00pm
National Press Club
529 14th Street, NW 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
Conference Schedule:
8:45am – 9:00am: Registration
9:00am – 9:15am: Welcome
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin, Middle East Institute
Gönül Tol, MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies
Ross Wilson, Institute of Turkish Studies
9:15am – 10:00am: Opening Keynote
Senator John McCain
United States Senate
10:00am – 10:30am: Keynote
Ömer Çelik
Deputy Chairman of the Justice and Development Party
10:30am – 10:45am: Coffee Break
10:45am – 12:15pm
Panel 1: Turkey’s Domestic Calculus: The Kurds, the Constitution, and the Presidential System Debate
Yalçın Akdoğan, Member of Parliament, Justice and Development Party
Ruşen Çakır, Turkish Daily Vatan
Michael Gunter, Tennessee Technological University
Levent Köker, Atilim University
Moderator: Michael Werz, Center for American Progress
12:15pm – 1:00pm: Lunch*
1:00pm – 1:45pm: Keynote
Ibrahim Kalın
Chief Adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
1:45pm – 3:15pm
Panel 2: Turkey, the EU, and the U.S.: Evolving Partnerships Post-Arab Spring
Brice de Schietere, Delegation of the European Union to the U.S.
Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, IREX
Ambassador Ross Wilson, Atlantic Council
Yaşar Yakış, Center for Strategic Communication, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moderator: Sharon Wiener, Koç University
3:15pm – 3:30pm: Coffee Break
3:30pm – 5:00pm
Panel 3: Turkey’s Leadership Role in an Uncertain Middle East
Amr Darrag, Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt
Joost Hiltermann, International Crisis Group
Yigal Schleifer, Freelance Journalist
Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Moderator: Abderrahim Foukara, al-Jazeera
*Complimentary lunch will be available on a first come first served basis
Follow @CSIS for live updates
The CSIS Southeast Asia Program will host its second annual conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea June 27-28, 2012.
The conference is a timely policy level discussion of the complex and important issues around the South China Sea. The program will take place a week before Secretary of State Clinton departs for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell will deliver the keynote speech on Wednesday, June 27 and Senator Jim Webb (D-VA), chairman of the Senate’s Asia Pacific subcommittee, will present a keynote address on Thursday, June 28.
In addition, CSIS is pleased to have recruited a world-class group of experts from Asia and the United States to initiate the dialogue around five key themes:
- Recent developments in the South China Sea
- South China Sea in ASEAN-U.S.-China relations
- Assessment of the South China Sea in a changing regional landscape
- Role of international law in resolving and managing territorial disputes
- Policy recommendations to boost security and cooperation in the South China Sea
Continuing disputes suggest there is a great need and interest to explore security in the South China Sea. We have invited approximately 20 experts to make presentations and will invite senior officials, executives, academics, and members of the media to participate in the dialogue. The full conference agenda is available here.
Please click here to RSVP by Monday, June 25, 2012. When you RSVP you MUST include the panels you wish to attend.You must log on to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, please contact imisadmin@csis.org.
8. Libya, One Year Later, CATO, noon June 27
Noon (Luncheon to Follow)
Featuring Diederik Vandewalle, Adjunct Associate Professor of Business Administration and Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College; Jonathan Hutson, Director of Communications, Enough Project to End Genocide and Crimes against Humanity; Benjamin H. Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst, Cato Institute.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and join the conversation on Twitter with the hashtag #CatoEvents. Also follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Some political commentators have called the Obama administration’s intervention last year in the Libyan civil war an “undeniable success” and one of “the greatest triumphs and signature moments in Barack Obama’s presidency.” One year later, however, Libya remains in crisis. Reports suggest that operatives linked to al Qaeda are active in Libya. Militias are detaining thousands of former regime loyalists and engaging in widespread torture. Instability remains rampant and has spilled into neighboring states. Moreover, President Obama’s unilateral decision to intervene contravened congressional war powers.
What do these troubling developments mean for the future of the UN’s “responsibility to protect”? Did the death of Muammar Qaddafi vindicate the intervention? Will Qaddafi’s example make other so-called rogue states less willing to relinquish their nuclear programs? Were political commentators premature in declaring NATO’s intervention a success? Please join us as leading scholars examine this under-appreciated and almost forgotten topic.
Cato events, unless otherwise noted, are free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by noon, Tuesday, June 26, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
9. Sanctions on Iran: Implications for Energy Security, Brookings, 9-12:30 June 29
Next month, international economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will intensify dramatically. Although Iran has been the target of various U.S. and multilateral sanctions throughout most of the past three decades, the latest measures are the most severe in history. These actions have been credited with reviving Iran’s interest in negotiations with the world, but they have yet to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and are creating new challenges for the international coalition that has sought to constrain Iran. They also pose new uncertainties for energy markets and the international economy at a precarious period in the global recovery and the U.S. presidential campaign.
On June 29, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a discussion assessing the wide-ranging implications of the Iran sanctions regime and consider the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
After each panel, participants will take audience questions.
Details
June 29, 2012
9:00 AM – 12:30 PM EDT
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
For More Information
Brookings Office of Communications
events@brookings.edu
202.797.6105
Event Agenda
- 9:00Welcoming Remarks
- 9:15Panel One: Strategic and Energy Implications of Iran Sanctions
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Moderator
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-
-
- 10:45Break
- 11:00Panel Two: International Approaches to Iran Sanctions
-
Moderator
-
-
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Tanvi Madan
Fellow
The Brookings Institution
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Playing chess with Mike Tyson
I might wish that were the name of William Dobson‘s book about how dictators are adjusting to contemporary pro-democracy rebellions, as the original text of this post said, but really it’s Dictatorship 2.0. I haven’t read it but intend to do so, as there was a lively discussion of it yesterday at the Carnegie Endowment with Karim Sadjadpour chairing, Dobson presenting, Otpor‘s Srdja Popovic and Marc Lynch commenting.
It is hard to be an old style dictator today, Dobson avers. Really only North Korea is left, as Burma has begun to adjust. The plug can’t be pulled on communications, which means dictators need to get savvy and use more subtle forms of repression: targeted tax inspections, contested but unfree and unfair elections (preferably with the opposition fragmented), control over television and the courts, big handouts to the populace. Dictatorships today do not aim for ideological monopolies but rather to prevent and disrupt mobilization.
Oppositions have to adjust as well. Srdja outlined the basics: they need unity, planning and nonviolent discipline. They must be indigenous. Internationals can help, mainly through education and help with communications. Protesters need to avoid confronting dictatorial regimes where they are strong and attack them where they are weak. You don’t challenge Mike Tyson to box; better to play chess with him. This means avoiding military action in Syria, for example, and focusing on the regime’s economic weakness. The contest is between opposition enthusiasm and the fear the regime seeks to impose. Humor and “dispersive” tactics that do not require mass assembly in the streets (work and traffic slowdowns, boycotts, graffiti, cartoons) are increasingly important in reducing fear.
Marc emphasized the sequence of events in the Arab awakening: Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia made people elsewhere realize what was possible, Mubarak’s overthrow in Egypt made it seem inevitable, Libya and Yemen were far more difficult, a reversal that has continued in Syria, where the regime has substantial support from Alawites and Christians afraid of what will happen to them if the revolution succeeds. The tipping point comes when perception of a regime changes from its being merely bad to being immoral.
So who is next? Saudi Arabia and Jordan are in peril, Marc suggested. Bahrain is living on borrowed time. Srdja suggested Iran, which is moving backwards towards an old style dictatorship after the defeat of its Green Movement, can only be challenged successfully if the protesters learn from their mistakes. They need better leadership and a focus on the state’s inability to deliver services. China, Dobson said, has been good at pre-empting large protests. Burma may not be adjusting quickly enough to avoid an upheaval.
I didn’t hear mention of Russia, Cuba, Algeria, and lots of other places that might be candidates, but no one was trying to be comprehensive. Wherever they may be, dictatorships will adjust to what they see happening elsewhere and try to protect their monopoly on power from those who challenge it. Their opponents will also need to adjust. It is thus in both war and peace.
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