Tag: Egypt
This week’s peace picks
A light week in DC. The big events are elsewhere: NATO Summit continuing today in Chicago, nuclear talks with Iran in Baghdad Wednesday, and Egyptian presidential election Wednesday and Thursday.
1. Egypt’s Presidential Election and Public Opinion: What Do Egyptians Want? Brookings, May 21, 3-4:30 pm
Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
Summary
The elections of 2012 could prove to be even more consequential for Egypt than the turbulence of 2011. Various Egyptian factions have spent the last year trying to find their place in the new post-Mubarak order, and for the first time Egyptians have an opportunity to choose their president. It is a critical time to take the pulse of the population.
On May 21, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will unveil the results of a new University of Maryland poll. Conducted in the weeks leading up to Egypt’s historic presidential election, the poll gauges which candidate is most favored by the public, what issues are driving public preferences, what Egyptians want their leader and their country to look like, and what role they want religion to play in politics. In addition, the poll explores Egyptian public attitudes toward the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the Iran nuclear issue, the Syria crisis, and the American presidential election. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami, principal investigator of the poll and the Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, will present his latest research and key findings. Steven Cook, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations will provide commentary and offer his insights from his own research. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, director of research for the Saban Center, will moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
2. The Dynamics of Iran’s Domestic Policy, WWC, 9-10:30 am May 22
Bernard Hourcade
Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, and Senior Research Fellow (emeritus) CNRS
Bijan Khajehpour
Managing Partner, Atieh International
On the eve of the Baghdad meeting between Iran and the P5+1, two Iran experts will discuss the role of domestic dynamics—recent parliamentary elections, divisions among the ruling elite, economic difficulties—in Iran’s decision to return to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue.
- post-war political agreements, especially the effects of excluding or including parties to the conflict both in governance and in security institutions, such as the military and police;
- the role of international diplomats and mediators;
- economic arrangements in peace agreements;
- the role of peacekeeping missions.
An array of cases will be discussed.
Speakers
- Charles “Chuck” Call, Presenter
Associate Professor, American University, and former Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow (2008-2009) - Caroline Hartzell, Presenter
Professor of Political Science, Gettysburg College and former Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow (2010-2011) - Lise Howard, Presenter
Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University, and current Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow - Ambassador Robert Loftis
former Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at U.S. Department of State, current USIP Interagency Professional in Residence; - Pamela Aall, Moderator
Provost, USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
4. The Day After Baghdad: Assessing the Iran Nuclear Talks, National Iranian American Council, 2-3:30 pm May 24
A panel discussion featuring:
 |
 |
 |
|
|
||||
| PJ Crowley Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs |
George Perkovich |
Bijan Khajehpour |
Aaron David Miller |
Trita Parsi |
Thursday, May 24, 2012
2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
101 Constitution Ave, NW
Capitol View Conference Room, 7th Floor
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Is the Arab awakening marginalizing women?
The short answer is “yes,” judging from Monday’s discussion at the Woodrow Wilson Center. I missed the beginning but watched the rest on webcast. Since I haven’t seen any other reports of this interesting event here is what I learned:
In Tunisia and Egypt women are suffering setbacks when power is distributed or equality is at issue. They are nevertheless voting for Islamist parties that deal these setbacks, apparently because they believe the Islamists will be less corrupt.
Since 2005, women have also been suffering setbacks in Iraq, which like Egypt had an earlier history of recognition of women’s rights. Tribal forces and Islamist parties are the cause. Illegal practices like child and temporary marriages, honor killings, female genital mutilation and gender based violence are on the increase. The 25% quota for women in parliament has been important to keeping women present in the public sphere.
In Kuwait, the Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood are in power together. They are fierce on social issues and trying to separate women’s issues from other questions, in order to keep them distinct.
In Saudi Arabia, Arab spring has encouraged women to work for change and the King to make some limited moves. The Arab spring inspired the driving campaign, in which about 60 women defied the ban. Activism has increased both on line and at universities. The government is generally trying to look the other way. Religious police will not enforce face covering. The King has authorized women to participate in municipal elections in 2015 and has announced he will appoint women to the Majlis. These are symbolic steps. More important is the government push for women’s employment and campaign against child abuse and domestic violence. Nonviolent progress in Egypt and other places would encourage changes in Saudi Arabia.
Overall, not a pretty picture. When things in Saudi Arabia seem to be progressing more steadily than elsewhere, you know you are in trouble!
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Glass half full
Amr Hamzawy, now a secularist member of the Egyptian parliament, returned to the Carnegie Endowment where he once worked on democratization issues today with a more optimistic version of what is going on in Egypt than the one I reported earlier this week.
Democratic transition is always messy, but Amr suggested four facts important to judging whether things are improving or not:
1. Egypt is way behind its original timetable for transition, which called for turnover of the government from the military to civilians within six months. It will take 17 or 18 months, provided the first round of the presidential election occurs later this month, as now planned. Preparation of the constitution, which should have preceded the presidential election, will now occur afterwards, giving the new president the abundant powers the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces now exercises and influence over the constitutional outcome. In addition, the constitution-drafting body has now been blocked in court, because of its legitimacy deficit. It did not include sufficient non-Islamist or women’s representation.
2. Human rights violations continue “nonstop.” Civilians are still tried in military courts, even more than was done under Mubarak. Military crackdowns on demonstrations are deadly and brutal.
3. Egyptian politics are nevertheless dynamic and diverse, with citizens fully engaged. There is currently a spirited debate on whether the presidential election should proceed. There is also ample debate within the various political forces, with the Islamists far from unified. There is no general moderating trend. The Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice Party) is becoming more pragmatic on the constitution and rights, but more conservative on social issues. The Salafists (El Nour) are very conservative on personal freedom but good on freedom of association and also on NGOs.
4. Non-Islamist political forces are strengthening and cooperating more with Islamists, who increasingly recognize the importance of consensus to the legitimacy of what they do, including in constitution-writing. There are plans for various non-Islamist parties to merge under the umbrella of Mohammed el Baradei’s constitutional party, something they could not do before the elections because they needed to test their relative electoral strength. The Islamists will not benefit much from their current time in power, because they are not delivering on their inflated promises. Their popularity has peaked. The Americans are wrong to focus their attention so strongly on the Muslim Brotherhood. The non-Islamist forces in parliament will soon deliver a liberal draft law on nongovernmental organizations as well as legislation against torture and sexual harassment. Al Azhar, the most important religious authority in Egypt, has done papers on democracy and personal freedoms that are very good and will influence the political forces, which have generally endorsed Al Azhar’s views.
Of course there are many other shortcomings: security sector reform hasn’t begun, rule of law is weak. Christians are not well-represented in the current parliament and some are leaving Egypt, but others are engaging more in the political sphere to regain lost ground.
Having ended natural gas exports to Israel, Egypt will maintain the Camp David peace treaty but no more so long as settlement activity continues.
There are difficult years ahead, but the Egyptian transition has not yet failed.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Ingredients of success
I’m spending the day at the “The Arab Spring: Getting It Right,” the annual conference of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in lovely Crystal City. Here are a few highlights.
The first session focused on the ingredients for successful democratic transitions. Here are my quick notes:
Dan Brumberg, Georgetown, in the chair:
- Systemic problems need systemic solutions: if you get rid of torture, you need forensics.
- Need process of consensus and pact-making.
- Religion is an important dimension of identity that needs to be part of that process.
Jason Gluck, USIP: constitution-making
- People need to know why they need a new constitution. What are the core principles they want enshrined there?
- Egypt: battles over timing, constitutional committee reflect lack of answers. Exclusiveness undermines the constitution-writing body.
- Tunisia: using simple majority, not consensus, in committees writing the constitution, with little outreach to civil society beyond Tunis.
- Libya: only four months for constitution-writing, which doesn’t allow deep consideration or public participation. Inclusivity is in doubt.
- Process matters more than constitutional content. Because it makes for legitimacy. Making a constitution is a political, not a legal exercise. It incarnates core values of the state and society.
- Not a drafting exercise but a national dialogue about needs and aspirations.
- Inclusive, participatory, consensual, transparent, deliberative processes are more likely to have good results.
Alfred Stepan, Columbia: transition needs these elements:
- Legitimate constitution written by a representative group.
- A government results from popular vote.
- Powersharing (with military or religious authorities) is not necessary
- The government has to have real authority over policy.
- Civil society more important in deconstructing autocracy than in reconstructing the state, which requires political society and leadership.
- Major transitions (end of WWII, 1989) have required international support, but Arab awakening is getting much less external assistance.
- Brumberg: ironically, opposition consensus building happens more in autocratic society like Tunisia rather than in more open one like Egypt.
Tunisia has been successful because parties have been talking with each other and developing consensus (pact-making) for a long time (since 2003)
Laith Kubba, National Endowment for Democracy: getting it right means avoiding chaos or crisis. Indicators:
- Military “neutralized” and under civilian control: Tunisia OK, Egypt not and militias are the problem in Libya.
- Security apparatus has to shift from protecting regime to protecting state.
- Economic equity has to increase.
- State institutions need to emerge that allow society to be free, including at local level.
- Democratic culture, including associations, free but responsible press.
- New elites emerging in political parties, youth groups, think tanks.
- Education improving.
Big risk: those who reject democratic culture as a foreign import.
Comment from a Tunisian participant, whose name I missed:
- Traditional solidarity was important in Tunisia. Reduced likelihood of revenge.
- So too was role of women.
The second session focused on regional and global impacts:
Radwan Ziadeh, Syrian National Council and Carr Center, Harvard
- Syria is not like Tunisia, Yemen or Libya. It is now more like Bosnia: international community hesitancy, political opposition cannot deliver so Free Syria Army is taking over, regime crimes are systematic.
- Hoping for protection of civilians in a safety zone along Turkish border by an Administration that includes people who made the mistakes in Bosnia.
- Three hundred observers are insufficient.
- Need for military action without UN Security Council approval, but UNGA (137 countries) and Friends of Syria provide cover.
- Everyone looking for U.S. leadership, but Washington is inhibited by domestic considerations, lack of oil interest.
- Arabs lack resources and legitimacy to act.
Brian Grim, Pew Research Center: Religion and the Arab Spring
- Government restrictions on religion are increasing in more countries and those with greater population before Arab spring.
- Problem is especially strong in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where constitutional guarantees for religious freedom are not strong and apostasy laws are prevalent, enforced both by governments and social hostilities.
- Restrictions on conversion 80% in MENA, where both government violence and social hostilities are prevalent.
Caryle Murphy, Woodrow Wilson Center: A View from the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia)
- Arab Spring affects Saudi Arabia externally: Egypt, Bahrain, Iraq.
- Saudi effort is to manage and keep it away from the Gulf.
- Foreign policy activism: GCC confederation? First step with Bahrain?
- Riyadh is disappointed in the U.S., lack of confidence in U.S. willingness to intervene.
- Arab Spring also affects Saudi Arabia internally: TV, internet and Twitter have made young Saudis more aware of the rest of the world and want to be more like it. Ditto those studying abroad.
- But impulse is still evolutionary, not revolutionary. Unemployment is the big youth problem. Government is aware but will it move fast enough to accommodate youth demands for jobs and more freedom?
- Society still very conservative, political consciousness very limited, including both secularists and Islamists.
- Petitions for constitutional monarchy, Umma party formation led to government clampdown.
- Eastern Province: Shia very unhappy.
- Religion is a focus of debate, which is important because it is the foundation of legitimacy.
Aylin Unver Noi, Gedik University (Turkey): Regional Alignments
- Ankara has shifted foreign policy towards Middle East.
- Sunni resistance camp emerging, pro-Palestinian, Islamist-led, democratic governments.
- Revolution in Syria would cause it to join this camp, as Jordan might.
- Turkey concerned with Kurdish aspirations, especially PKK activities in Syria.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Danger, anxiety, fear
Mona Makram-Ebeid, a determined human and women’s rights advocate and Egyptian politician, returned to the Middle East Institute today, just a few days more than a year since her last appearance there. A year ago she was upbeat about the Egyptian revolution, sure that the arc of history might be long but in the end bends towards justice. To be fair, she also noted the weakness of Egypt’s institutions, the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the need to keep the army in line with the demands of the revolution.
This year, she is much less confident about where the arc bends. The atmosphere in Cairo is one of “danger, anxiety, fear.” She has resigned from the parliament, along with many of the other “liberals.” Egypt is in constitutional limbo, with the work of its constitution-drafting body frozen by a court judgment and elections still scheduled for May 23-24. Far from being “de-mystified,” as she anticipated last year, the Muslim Brotherhood won decisively in elections against fragmented liberals and is seeking a monopoly of power. She seemed uncertain that their current candidate would remain in the presidential race; he might withdraw still in favor of Adel Abol Fotouh, who already has gained Salafist and more moderate Islamist backing.
Hope lies in several odd directions. It may be possible, she thought, to restore at least part of the 1971 Egyptian constitution before the election, so that the new president will have limited powers rather than those that existed under the Mubarak regime. Al Azhar, the Egyptian mosque/university that is authoritative in much of the Islamic world, has issued good statements on human rights and is working on another on women’s rights. Amr Moussa, the veteran Egyptian politician and former Arab League leader, offers the best hope in the elections, building on a base Makram-Ebeid described as the tourist industry, Coptic Christians, women, liberals, leftists and Sufis.
Still, counter-revolution looms and stability is threatened. Military support is vital to keep things moving in the right direction and avoid internal strife. The choice Egypt faces is between a civil and a theocratic state, which is what the Muslim Brotherhood really wants.
The U.S. should not let Egypt’s mistreatment of American nongovernmental organizations and their democracy-promoting staffs determine its reaction to the situation in Egypt. It needs to take a more hands-off approach, letting things evolve in accordance with Egypt’s own internal dynamics. American support for free trade and investment would make a big difference in a country facing a severe economic crisis.
Presentations of this sort from Egypt’s liberal democrats elicit in me two contradictory emotions: sympathy for their unenviable plight and disdain for their all too obvious inability to set things right without resorting to military intervention. The notion that Amr Moussa, a fossil of the Mubarak era, Al Azhar and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are going to be the saviors of democracy strikes me as less than likely. But in a bleak landscape, Makram-Ebeid is saying they represent the best hope for countering a sharp turn in the theocratic direction. Egypt needs saving, from itself.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Let your people go!
Tonight is the Jewish festival of Passover, when we celebrate liberation. Last year, I called this season the Passover of Arab liberation, but noted the difficulties Syria was facing.
This year we seem to be somewhere in the middle of the ten plagues, with Bashar al Assad not even beginning to think about letting his people go (and in fact inflicting the plagues, which is not something pharaoh did). The mutual ceasefire deadline is set for April 12, provided Damascus pulls back from populated areas and ceases artillery fire on April 10. In the meanwhile, Bashar seems to have intensified the military attacks in an effort to do as much deadly damage as possible to his opposition. While I hope Kofi Annan’s effort is successful, you’d have to be Moses-like in inspiration to bet on it.
We should nevertheless consider the possibilities. If by some fluke the Syrian army really does withdraw from some places, I hope the revolution will tuck away its guns and somehow demonstrate its overwhelming superiority in numbers. It is particularly important that April 12/13 see a massive demonstration of opposition in Damascus and Aleppo, even if that means everyone just staying home in a general strike. It will also be vital that the UN deploy observers quickly, and in far greater numbers than the couple of hundred currently contemplated.
It seems far more likely that Bashar will not withdraw or cease fire. What then? There is really no sign of international will to intervene. Despite ample documentation of artillery attacks on civilian targets as well as helicopter operations, neither the Turks nor the Arab League are preparing serious military action to enforce a no-fly zone or create humanitarian corridors or safe zones. The Syrian security forces are busy mining the borders so that civilians can’t escape. While it seems unlikely that Bashar can prevail 100%, he is well on his way to reducing the opposition to a low-intensity insurgency, with the bulk of the population sullenly resenting but accepting restoration of the dictatorship. At least for a while, it is likely to be significantly more draconian than before the rebellion started.
This is a bad outcome, but I am afraid not the worst. If the fighting continues to escalate and Bashar still survives, the consequences could be catastrophic for the region. The violence might then overflow Syria’s borders and pose serious problems for Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and maybe even Turkey. If Bashar manages to stay in place, it is vital that the Friends of Syria, that unwieldy conglomeration of more than 80 countries, maintain and tighten its efforts, in particular the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We see in Burma how strategic patience can win the day.
Many of my friends and colleagues are appalled that nothing more is being done. I can’t describe myself as comfortable with this state of affairs. But it is important to recognize that there are other priorities on earth. The Administration’s first concern has to be Iran. There is no way to get a negotiated solution to its nuclear challenge, or prevent the Israelis from using military means, unless the United States maintains a credible military threat. Entering a war with an uncertain outcome in Syria would not be a smart prelude to dealing with Iran. American resources, though large, are not infinite–we wouldn’t want to run out of cruise missiles or suffer serious aircraft losses in a second priority fight.
There is also a diplomatic factor. The best way to mount a credible threat against Iran is with UN Security Council backing. What are the odds of the Russians conceding that if we go to war with Syria without their cooperation? The odds may not be good in any event, but we need at least a small chance for success.
So I am afraid our Syrian heroes will need to continue their efforts. I still prefer they be nonviolent ones. Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks of violent attacks convinces me that the Free Syria Army will shorten the reign of Bashar al Assad by as much as a single day. It is far more likely that their attacks will frighten large numbers of people who might otherwise have joined nonviolent protests.
I’ll pray for the Syrians at Seder tonight, as I trust many Jews around the world will do. Not because I think praying will do the Syrians any good, but because the parallel between today’s Syrians and our own liberation narrative should inform our sensibilities. The people of Syria are seeking the freedom that Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis have all started to enjoy, even if they are still at the beginning of their journeys through the wilderness. I hope the Syrians catch up soon.
The most frequent injunction in the Old Testament is to treat a stranger like ourselves:
…you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt… {Leviticus 19:33-34}
Bashar: let your people go!
PS: I missed this Monday, but you shouldn’t:
RSS - Posts
