Tag: Egypt
Arab world: positive balance, still teetering
I need a scorecard to keep track of political change in the Arab world, so here it is:
- Egypt: New Egyptian parliament led by Muslim Brotherhood met for the first time yesterday. It needs to choose a commission to write the new constitution and call elections for president in June. Other powers are uncertain. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces still running things and holding on to perks and power.
- Yemen: President Saleh has left for the U.S. for medical treatment. I still find it incredible he would come here given the risks of a court deciding to hold him accountable for crimes for which he has immunity in Yemen. A single-candidate “election” February 22 is scheduled to elevate his vice president to the presidency. It is unclear to me what good this will do. Protests continue, his relatives cling to power and dissident parts of the armed forces control parts of the capital.
- Libya: Demonstrators in Benghazi Sunday attacked National Transitional Council offices in a protest over lack of transparency in deciding the electoral law to be used in May elections and in disbursing money. That’s the good news. Occasional strife among the armed militias is the bad news.
- Syria: The Arab League, much criticized because its human rights observers have failed to stop the violence, proposed a serious transition plan, which the Syrian National Council accepted and the Assad regime rejected. The Russians are saying that their patience has run out. A strong UN Security Council resolution would be a fine way to show that they mean what they say.
- Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom is cracking down hard on demonstrations in the majority Shia, oil-producing east.
- Bahrain: Despite the Bassiouni report‘s frankness about human rights abuses during last year’s repression of protests, the monarchy shows no sign of letting up and the Americans, anxious to keep the Fifth Fleet there, aren’t complaining too loudly.
- Morocco, Algeria, Jordan: All attempting various degrees of reform to forestall revolution. Largely succeeding so far. In forestalling that is. Reforms are modest.
So what once looked like a wave of Arab spring protest has now broken into rivulets moving in many different directions as they hit harder and softer obstacles. A few regimes are gone, but most are still holding on, in some cases just barely. Tunisia is the great success story, so far.
There are quite a few shoes that haven’t dropped yet, but likely will: Egypt’s economy is devastated, shoulder launched antiaircraft missiles are circulating in and beyond Libya, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may well expand further in Yemen, sectarian war threatens in Syria. The new regimes, especially in Egypt, look likely to be tougher-minded towards Israel, even if domestic issues predominate in the short term. 2012 is likely to be even more challenging than 2011.
Still: the overall direction is clear enough. There will likely be more freedom of speech and expression in much of the Arab world once this tide goes out. There will also be more Islamists in power and fewer supposedly secular and pro-Western autocrats. There will likely be more political competition, though how long it will be permitted to last is uncertain. It is also unclear how much governance will improve, in particular whether accountability and transparency will triumph over cronyism and corruption, and whether human rights–especially minority rights–will be respected. The balance for the year is positive, but there are still a lot of things to sort out.
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This week’s peace picks
2. US-Israel and Iran: Looming Military Confrontation? Atlantic Council, January 17, 3-4:30 pm January 17, 2012
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force on January 17 for a public briefing on the rising conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran. Tensions are mounting as the United States and Europe tighten economic sanctions against Iran, and Iran responds with a ten-day naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, and threatens to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the United States and Israel are preparing for their own joint military exercise, “Austere Challenge 12.” Are the chances for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran and between the United States and Iran increasing? Would Israel consult the United States before attacking the Iranian nuclear program? What would be the consequences for the region and world economy?Panelists will discuss these issues, the impact of the domestic political climates in Israel and the United States on Iran policy, and possible diplomatic approaches to the Iranian nuclear program.
The Iran Task Force, co-chaired by Atlantic Council Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel and Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape, its role in the region and globally, and any basis for an improved relationship with the West.
A discussion with
Michael Eisenstadt
Director, Military and Security Studies Program
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow
Brookings Institution
Introduction by
Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
Moderated by
Barbara Slavin
Senior Fellow, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
To attend, RSVP with your name and affiliation (acceptances only), to southasia@acus.org.
3. “The Western Balkans and the 2012 NATO Summit,” U.S. Helsinki Commission Hearing, B318 Rayburn, January 18, 2 pm
As the United States and other NATO allies prepare for their summit in Chicago on May 20-21, this hearing will assess the current relationship with NATO of each of the countries of the Western Balkans with the goal of deeper engagement and further enlargement. While further enlargement of the European Union after Croatia’s entry next year remains a more distant goal, greater Euro-Atlantic integration has the potential to increase stability in the Western Balkans now, and strengthen the Alliance in the process. The focus of the hearing will be on what Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia need to do meet their respective Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including the building of democratic institutions and adherence to the rule of law at home. The hearing will also look at the potential contribution each could make to the NATO alliance, as well as NATO’s continuing role in deterring further violence and conflict in the Western Balkans.
Witnesses Scheduled to Testify:
Nida Gelazis, Senior Associate, European Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Daniel Serwer, Professor and Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (will particpate via Skype)
Ivan Vejvoda, Vice President for Programs, German Marshall Fund of the United States
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, is an independent agency of the Federal Government charged with monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords and advancing comprehensive security through promotion of human rights, democracy, and economic, environmental and military cooperation in 56 countries. The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. Senate, nine from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.
4. Author Event: Arsalan Iftikhar, “Islamic Pacifism” Busboys and Poets, January 18, 6 pm.
Arsalan Iftikhar will discuss and sign his book, “Islamic Pacifism: Global Muslims in the Post-Osama Era”. Arsalan Iftikhar is an international human rights lawyer, global media commentator, founder of TheMuslimGuy.com and global managing editor of The Crescent Post. Additionally, he is also a regular weekly legal affairs/political commentator for the National Public Radio (NPR) show Tell Me More with Michel Martin and a contributing writer for CNN.com and Esquire Magazine (Middle East edition). Co-sponsored by the Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). http://bbpbooks.teachingforchange.org/book/9781463553128. Free and open to everyone.
5. Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Election: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations, U.S. Policy and Domestic Politics.
Featuring FPRI Senior Fellows
Shelley Rigger Davidson College
Vincent Wang University of Richmond
Terry Cooke GC3 Strategy, Inc.
Jacques deLisle Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Register for webcast/teleconference
In the January 14, 2012, elections, Taiwanese voters faced a choice between giving a second term to Ma Ying-jeou—who has pursued a policy of closer economic ties and broader rapprochement with the Mainland and who has drawn criticism for lackluster leadership, economic inequality and drawing to close to the PRC—and Tsai Ing-wen—whom Beijing and opponents in Taiwan portray as reckless proponent of independence and a threat to the economic gains achieved or promised by Ma’s policies. In voting for a legislature—for the first time held jointly with the presidential election, the Taiwanese electorate face a similar choice between retaining a supermajority for Ma’s KMT or giving Tsai’s DPP a larger share.
FPRI Senior Fellows Shelley Rigger, Vincent Wang, Terry Cooke and Jacques deLisle assess the elections’ meaning and implications: Why did the winners win and the losers lose? What does the outcome portend for cross-Strait relations during the next four years? What is likely to be the impact on U.S. policy toward, and relations with, Taipei and Beijing? What are the implications for the future of Taiwan’s democracy and for the significant economic, social and foreign policy decisions Taiwan’s government faces in the near term?
Shelley Rigger is the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. She has a PhD in Government from Harvard University and a BA in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University. She has been a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University in Taiwan (2005) and a visiting professor at Fudan University in Shanghai (2006). Rigger is the author of two books on Taiwan’s domestic politics: Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge 1999) and From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001). She has published articles on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the national identity issue in Taiwan-China relations and related topics. Her current research studies the effects of cross-strait economic interactions on Taiwan people’s perceptions of Mainland China. Her monograph, “Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics and ‘Taiwan Nationalism’” was published by the East West Center in Washington in November 2006.
Vincent Wang is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department at the University of Richmond, specializing in international political economy and Asian studies. He has been a Visiting Professor or Fellow at National Chengchi University (Taipei), National Sun-Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung, Taiwan), El Colegio de Mexico, and Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University (Seoul, South Korea). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. His latest and forthcoming publications cover the China-India rivalry, the rise of China, and China-Taiwan relations.
Terry Cooke is a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Asia Program and the principal director of GC3 Strategy, Inc., an international consultancy specializing in sustainability-related technologies and capital linkages between Asia and the U.S. Previously, Dr. Cooke was Director of Asian Partnership Development for the Geneva-based World Economic Forum. He has advised the Lauder Institute on global business outreach as a member of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School’s Department of Management. Dr. Cooke was a career-member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service, with postings in Taipei, Berlin, Tokyo and Shanghai.
Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in US-China relations, Chinese politics and legal reform, cross-strait relations, and the international status of Taiwan.
Particpants will be able ask questions online or via the telephone. You may also submit questions via email: questions@fpri.org.
Friday, January 20
12:00 – 1:30 p.m. Eastern Time
This event is available exclusively
via webcast and teleconference.
Register for webcast/teleconference
- For more information contact 215 732 3774, ext 102 or fpri@fpri.org.
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The end is nigh, again!
I made a bunch of predictions a year ago. Here is how they turned out:
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh). I wasn’t far off on this one. No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use. It got worse, as suggested. No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right: growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul. I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right. There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces. This is pretty much on the mark.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)? I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly. The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves. Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction. Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow. Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements. Presidential election was held and things have improved. Haiti has been calmer than anticipated. Good news.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level. Happy to be wrong here too: they did not succeed, but they did try several times. And they did not recentralize.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others. Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back. Pretty much on the mark.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls. Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them. Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials. I was also right about yawning and stretching.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians. Dead wrong on both counts.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!). The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket. Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction. He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking. Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.
I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong. Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example). But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you? Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.
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OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want
I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S. As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted: “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.” That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:
1. Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.
2. North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead. Lots more prestige and very lucrative.
3. Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel. It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.
4. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.
5. The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.
6. The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.
7. Bahrain does the same. Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.
8. Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.
9. The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.
10. Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.
11. Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”
12. I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.
If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas. If he doesn’t, then…
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You won’t find any of this on Amazon
Hanukkah, an apocryphal festival if there ever was one, starts this evening. In my family, we expected gifts each night. Here’s my wish list:
1. Release of those arrested post-election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. A serious civilian government in Egypt ready to restrain the security forces and fulfill the ideals of the revolution.
3. International Criminal Court indictment of President Saleh of Yemen.
4. Turnover of power in Damascus to the Syrian National Council.
5. A transition in North Korea that opens the door to peaceful reform.
6. An end to military action in the Nuba Mountains and resolution of Sudan’s disputes with the South.
7. Quick and peaceful formation of a new government in Baghdad.
8. Success in negotiations with the Taliban that allows accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops.
If you think this is grand, just wait until you see what I ask for the twelve days of Christmas!
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Oy veh, Egypt
The facts are reasonably clear: the army is attacking demonstrators who want to remove it from power. The demonstrators, focused for the last couple of days on the cabinet office that houses the army’s recently appointed civilian but retrograde government, lack nonviolent discipline. Somehow the notion has grown that hurling stones and Molotov cocktails is consistent with nonviolence. It isn’t. It incites responses in kind (but amplified in severity) from the security forces and limits the number of people who will join in street protests. The protesters may not cause a lot of harm to the soldiers, but they are doing serious damage to their cause. A lot of Egyptians either support the army or just want the disorder to stop.
Stepping back from daily events, the main political tug of war is between the Muslim Brotherhood (now represented politically by the Freedom and Justice Party, or FJP) and the military. The FJP is doing well in Egypt’s ongoing parliamentary elections. But it will likely need allies to get over 50% of the seats and in any event won’t want to try to govern on its own. It will find coalition partners either among the more extreme Islamists (the Salafists are also doing well, though not as well as originally imagined) or among the non-Islamists. But the non-Islamists are fractious. Some will even prefer to keep the army in power–or at least use it to limit the sway of the Islamists–rather than ally with the the FJP.
The Americans are leaning on the army to transfer power to civilians as soon as possible. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is no doubt responding that they would like to do so but cannot in an atmosphere of disorder that extremists the Americans don’t like might exploit. When the complicated elections conclude in mid-January, the FJP–disciplined and well-organized–will offer itself as the logical and democratically validated alternative. But the parliament whose majority the FJP is likely to lead will have few powers–the main one is to choose a committee that will write a new constitution. Whether the army will allow it to do even that without severe constraints is not clear. Presidential elections are due by next July.
Egypt will be fortunate to get that far without further upheavals. There is no guarantee the revolution of 2011 will end in a democracy. The demonstrators made a profound errorentrusting their fate to the army, which is using its power to preserve is prerogatives and limit Islamist gains. As distasteful as it may be, the best bet for non-Islamists now is to throw in their lot with the Islamists, aiming to establish a truly democratic framework that will enable them eventually to gain power after a period of Islamist rule. But I know from the Middle East Institute conference session at which Esraa Abdel Fattah, one of the originators of the April 6 Movement that sparked Egypt’s revolution, spoke last month how deep the distrust and distaste for the Islamists is.
I don’t envy the difficult choices that Egyptians now have to make. The euphoria of deposing Hosni Mubarak has long since evaporated. They are now engaged in a long, hard slog that has no better than even odds of coming out in a truly democratic direction. Even in the best of circumstances, that will take years more to create. Meanwhile the economy is deteriorating, religious and other social divisions are exacerbating, and extremists are recruiting. The country desperately needs improved leadership, more money and a healthy dose of common sense. It is unlikely to get any of those in time.
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