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A sense of direction

Friday night’s attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo has already generated more heat than light.  The analytical question is what were its short and long term impacts?

One in the short term is the recognition by many on  both sides of the rather wide Egypt/Israel divide that the Camp David accords, however defective they may be regarded in particular details, have an enormous benefit:  they eliminate the need for either country to be constantly on a war footing, thus avoiding enormous burdens that neither country would want to take on in the current environment.  Several Egyptians I spoke to yesterday viewed Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements as far more forthcoming than he has been in the past.  Even Egyptian Salafists seemed to think the attack a bad idea, therefore possibly incited by the U.S. and helpful to Israel.

Egypt wants to renegotiate some aspects of the accords.  The recognition on both sides of their value may make renegotiation easier, though I imagine the Israelis will want provisions that make it more difficult for a future Egyptian government to renege on the accords entirely.  Politicians are now competing to see who can be more opposed to the current version of the accords and more vigorous in pursuit of renegotiation.  It is widely believed that the military will not allow the accords to be abrogated, which ironically frees the politicians to call for precisely that, knowing that it won’t happen.  Over the longer term, democratically elected politicians could find themselves trapped by their own promises.

The economic impact of Friday night’s riot is likely to be substantial.  I’ve enjoyed some of Egypt’s fine tourist attractions the last few days:  the step pyramid at Saqqara as well as the more famous pyramids and sphinx at Giza.  We were almost alone at Saqqara.  There were a few more people at Giza, mostly Egyptians enjoying a fine Saturday.  No long lines of tour buses, no wait for anything.  We also enjoyed a good lunch at Meena House, the spectacular hotel at the edge of the Giza pyramids.  It, too, was deserted.  The attack on the embassy will likely set the recovery in tourism to Egypt back another six months to a year, which means a lot to the significant percentage of the population that depends on it for their livings.

For those who thought the revolution was about making things better for the average Egyptian, the attack on the embassy is therefore not only a diversion, but also a perversion of priorities.   Friday’s demonstration was supposed to have been about “correcting the path,” but it was far too small to get the army to accelerate the handover to civilians or even to get it to fix a date for elections.  To the contrary, the embassy attack inspired a re-imposition of emergency laws, not a loosening of military controls. One keen American observer I spoke to suggested that the “scales are falling from Egyptian eyes” and they are now recognizing that their “revolution” was in fact hijacked by a military coup, one that was popular for a while but is now much less so.  But even many of those who may no longer be enthusiasts for the army do not want to see disorder and disruption, which is becoming more widespread.

What the Egyptian transition seems to lack today is a clear sense of direction.  People are doubting whether the military really intends to turn over power to civilians.  I’ve already found in my few hours in Libya a dramatically different spirit:  Benghazi at least thinks it knows where it is going and has advertised the fact repeatedly on the road from the airport:  “we have a dream,” the signs read.  Even though Qaddafi and his sons are still at large, people here are determined to push ahead to establish a more open and democcratic regime.  I have little doubt but that Egyptians also want that, but they seem less sure of how to get it.  The complexities of Egypt are far greater than those of relatively unpopulated and hydrocarbon-rich Libya.

PS:  For those who might still wonder whether the football hooligans were in fact at the Israeli embassy Friday night, I discussed the matter yesterday with an Egyptian observer who knows their leadership well and stayed on the streets until 5 am.  He assured me that the leaders of the “ultras” had not participated but that younger adherents had.  They precipitated the confrontation with the police with gusto and determination.

What I said and didn’t say

I’m not much into the duelling aspect of blogging, but there has been enough misunderstanding of what I wrote yesterday about my experience in Tahrir that it may be enlightening to respond to at least a few of the criticisms.

Let me focus on Angry Arab, whose comments have been repeated elsewhere.  He writes under the heading “dumbest comment of the day”:

Daniel Serwer, who is in Cairo, reckons last night’s violence at the Israeli embassy had more to do with discontent against Egypt’s military rulers than Israel. He also suggests (see 11.12am post) that many of those protesting could be regarded as football hooligans.

This is dumb, but it is not what I said.  I wrote:  “The predominant themes in Tahrir however had little to do with Israel.”  I then went on to outline what those themes appeared to be.  I’ve checked this point several times:  people in Tahrir were talking, chanting and singing about mainly internal Egyptian issues.

I never suggested that Egyptians were not angry with Israel.  Nor did I suggest that the attack on the Embassy had more to do with Egypt’s military than with Israel.  In fact, I wrote:

Egyptians regard the Israeli killing of several Egyptian policemen in Sinai in the aftermath of a terrorist attack inside Israel as humiliating and want a more fulsome apology for it.

I went on to conclude that peace between Egypt and Israel could not be maintained unless the people are committed to it, “society to society.”

Angry Arab also suggests I said “many of those protesting could be regarded as football hooligans.” What I actually said was “some of whom were surely what would be termed football hooligans in Europe.” I might prefer today to have said “likely” rather than “surely,” but the point here is that I never said “many of those protesting” (I added the bold face) could or should be regarded as football hooligans, which is what Angry Arab said I said.  In case there is any doubt:  I assume most of them were Egyptians angry with Israel.

Accuracy is not Angry Arab’s strong point. Let’s take this statement: “this ‘US blogger’–whoever he is–because she holds a PhD from Oxford University and is a young academic.” Yes, I am a PhD, from Princeton not Oxford, male and not young, all of which is readily ascertainable from this website.

I don’t however expect anyone to believe me because of age, education or gender. I only expect to be quoted accurately and debated honestly. That is not what Angry Arab did.  I would rate his comments dumbest of  my day.