Tag: Egypt
Revolutions require follow through
Michelle Kelemen had a good piece on NPR this morning focused in part on what shifts in U.S. assistance are required as autocrats fall in the Middle East.
This is a subject close to my heart, as I watched in Serbia when we abandoned Serbian civil society organizations as soon as Milosevic fell. Even worse, we cut off Otpor, the student movement that sparked the popular protests, because it put up billboards saying “we are watching you.” This ambiguous phrase, accompanied by a picture of a bulldozer, was meant to convey that the protesters would continue to monitor the new authorities, as well as the remnants of the old regime, to make sure that the transition was completed. The right thing to do, but too much for U.S. Embassy Belgrade.
Net result: reform in the Serbian security services never was completed. Serbia is still struggling with the consequences, which include a political spectrum unable to escape the unfortunate dictates of the ethnic nationalism that kept Milosevic in power.
I fear something like this may also happen in the Middle East, where the Obama Administration is already ambivalent about how much change it really wants. The remaining autocrats are no doubt pressing for less rather than more, and some think their influence is behind the President’s hesitation to take more decisive action in Libya. Would anyone watching recent events in Egypt be surprised if the security services managed to come out of this without thorough vetting and reform?
To Hillary Clinton’s great credit, she is quoted in the NPR piece as saying,
When I spoke with the Egyptian officials just over the last couple of weeks they kept mentioning central and eastern Europe. They kept saying that’s how we want to turn out. We don’t want to get this derailed. We want to make this work. So we want to help them make it work.
In Central and Eastern Europe there was a strong magnetic pole in Brussels that ensured the new governments would point in the right direction. That is not the case in the Middle East, where the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies as well as the Syrian and Yemeni secular autocrats (not to mention the Iranian theocrats) will weigh in heavily against fully democratic revolutions. Indigenous democrats are going to have to keep the needle pointed in the right direction.
The Secretary of State and her Egyptian interlocutors have the right approach, one that will require continuing support not only to the new post-autocratic governments but also to the civil society organizations, including some of the Islamic ones, that mobilized and steered the protests. I would shift substantial resources to them–and to support for the upcoming referenda and elections–quickly and decisively. Revolutions require follow through.
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What will Friday prayers bring?
Tomorrow is Friday again, and across the “greater” Middle East there will be prayers and restlessness. The big questions:
- Saudi Arabia: intellectuals have been signing petitions in favor of constitutional monarchy, but the experts are still betting that people will not go the street–it is illegal to demonstrate, and socially disapproved. We’ll see.
- Libya: most of the country is liberated already, but will crowds risk turning out in Tripoli?
- Egypt: Mubarak’s buddy prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, has stepped down. El Baradei at least is calling this a turning point. Will it open the way for real regime change that the military has been resisting?
- Tunisia: Ben Ali’s buddy prime minister has already stepped down, opening the way for real change, but the country is burdened with refugees from Libya. The Brits are at least trying to relieve that burden.
- Yemen: President Saleh has said he’ll step down in 2013. The political party opposition, buoyed by tribal support, is proposing he do it by the end of this year. Will that be enough to split his opponents and save his tuchas?
- Bahrain: formal opposition parties have presented reform demands in an opening bid for negotiations with the monarchy. Will that split them from the demonstrators?
- Iraq: The violent crackdown last weekend amplified what otherwise might have been relatively quiet demonstrations against corruption and for better services. Has the government learned its lesson?
- Jordan and Syria: little noise, as their king who allows demonstrations and president who doesn’t try to feed a reform half loaf to relatively weak oppositions. Will they succeed?
- Iran: crackdown in full swing with the arrest of Green Movement stars Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and their wives. Ahmedinejad is increasingly dominant and effective against both clerical and lay opponents, inside and outside the regime. Can he keep it up?
I can’t remember a time I looked forward so much to Friday, with anticipation but also with trepidation. The world could be looking very different by Sunday.
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So much to keep track of!
So I thought a quick update on the revolutions of 2011 might be in order:
- Libya: Gaddafi holding on in Tripoli, where his forces indulge in random killings, but most of the rest of the country seems to be in rebel hands. Tribes and a hodge-podge of local authorities seem to be the mainstay of law and order, insofar as it exists. The army is split. Lots of high level defections. The Americans have finally imposed unilateral sanctions freezing assets and banning travel. The UN Security Council is still debating its draft, which may have to lose the referral to the International Criminal Court in order to get past India, China and Russia (none are states parties to the ICC).
- Yemen: Protests have grown dramatically with adherence by some important tribes, President Saleh took the Gaddafi vow to fight to the last drop of blood, and the opposition seems intent on continuing despite Saleh’s vows to leave office in 2013 and not install his son.
- Egypt: Big demonstration yesterday to keep pressure on the military, force out the prime minister, who is Mubarak’s buddy, and end the state of emergency, which the military has promised to do once order is restored.
- Bahrain: Another big demo, but the monarchy clearly committed for the moment to avoiding violence. An important Bahraini Shiite leader returned to the country from exile and was allowed to speak.
- Tunisia: Protesters Friday pressed for faster change. Pro-Ben Ali youth rioted Saturday. Violence in both instances. The good guys should really wear white hats and maintain non-violent discipline, as that will help to distinguish them from the bad guys.
- Iraq: At least eight killed around the country in the first big demonstrations, mainly by undisciplined security forces. The Speaker of Parliament says he supports the demonstrators’ right to protest, Prime Minister Maliki tried to fend off both protests and criticism, and Ayatollah Sistani weighed in on the side of the improved public services and an end to corruption. Sistani is the one really worth listening to, but he hasn’t got a lot of influence in Kurdistan, where violent demonstrations continue.
- Jordan: A big, peaceful demonstration Friday, but big is much smaller (4000) than in other places. The call is still far more for reform than for regime change.
- Iran: The regime still has things “under control,” mistreating its own people even as it praises the rebellions in Arab countries. The video at that link, by the way, demonstrates a lack of discipline on both sides of the confrontation, but the text is useful for understanding why demonstrations in Iran have been less than fully successful.
Overall: lots of ups and downs this week, but it is clear that few real dictators will survive much longer. The question of what will replace them is still an open one, but it is looking more and more as if re-imposing autocracies will be nigh on impossible. The people simply won’t stand for it. More power to them!
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Haste makes waste
David Makovsky in USA Today wisely councils the Egyptians to take their time in building democratic institutions and not focus excessively on elections. The quick response: the constitutional amendments will be done in 10 days, referendum on them within two months, elections within six.
I imagine someone in the Army is saying this is the way to be responsive to the protestors, but it is also a formula for mistakes, including mistakes made with some malice aforethought. The process is as important as the outcome. Despite the American precedent of writing a constitution behind closed doors in Philadelphia, long experience suggests that fragile, conflicted and formerly autocratic societies–and Egypt should be considered one–need time to decide on how power is to be distributed, which is what a constitution does. They also need the participation of a broad segment of the population, because otherwise it will look like a power grab (and may well be one).
There is in any event a need for time to develop the institutions of a free society: most of the media, courts, political parties, trade associations, NGOs and labor unions existing today in Egypt are heavily conditioned by the former regime. It will be some time before they are reformed, or new ones created. Context counts. As Makovsky says,
This means going beyond the obvious of lifting the existing emergency law and amending the Egyptian Constitution. It also requires an independent judiciary, a free press, minority rights, and a security apparatus that maintains the monopoly on the use of force. These institutions provide the opportunity for the creation of a civic culture where parties can negotiate their demands in a peaceful framework. Otherwise, the hope for democracy can be easily thwarted.
It is of course problematic to move slowly when the mainstays of the revolution are apparently pressing for fast action. But more than anything else, the quick action needed now is a new government, an early demand of the protesters that has not been fulfilled. The one currently in place, appointed in his desperate last days by then President Mubarak, will do everything it can to block accountability for the regime’s past behavior and tilt the scales of the future towards their continuation in power. It is no surprise that the military would not be replacing its friends in the government quickly, but that makes it all the more urgent.
Of course all these issues should be left up to the Egyptians to decide–I am not suggesting that the Americans or anyone else can do this for them. But there is a lot of experience out there to suggest that haste makes waste, especially in matters of constitutional reform.
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My debut on bloggingheads
Recorded Friday with Ussama Makdisi of Rice University, discussing next steps in Egypt, but it can no longer be embedded. Watch it here.
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Egyptian army scraps constitution, keeps cabinet
The Armed Forces communique’ no. 5, issued today, does the following (according to Egyptian Chronicles):
1. Freezes the current constitution.
2. Dissolves both chambers of parliament.
3. Announces the army will rule the country for a 6 month transitional period until August.
4. Forms a committee to amend some constitution articles.
5. Continues Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet until a new one is named (unclear when).
6. Asserts that Mohamed Hussein Tantawy, the minister of defense, will represent the country.
7. Egypt respects its international treaties.
The main potential difficulty here is the continuation of Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet, which is the last one appointed by then President Mubarak. It is hard to imagine that the protesters will be pleased with that, though most will welcome the freezing of the Mubarak-era constitution and dissolution of its parliament, fraudulently elected in December. It is easy to imagine however that the Army wants to keep at least some of the ministers in place–otherwise it has to find new people to run the ministries, which would raise all sorts of difficult political and technical issues.
I had some experience with a military regime in Brazil 1982-85, where I was a U.S. diplomat. The Brazilian armed forces had enjoyed exercising power and a privileged position for some time, but by the time I arrived they had realized that running the country was just too difficult. They preferred to get back to playing soldier. So they decided to turn the country back to the civilians, who have done a pretty good job since. My sense is that the Egyptian military already knows that running the country is too hard–they need help and are prepared to get it from Mubarak’s cabinet (which of course includes quite a few of their colleagues).
The question is whether the protesters will accept this or insist, as they have said they would, on dismissal of the cabinet. This immediate question is related to a broader one: how much accountability will there be for crimes and corruption under the Mubarak regime? Leaving the cabinet in place now virtually guarantees that accountability will be postponed, if not skipped altogether. How many files will be destroyed by the Mubarak-appointed ministers? Several of them have already been barred from leaving the country. Can the Army really leave in power ministers who can’t be trusted to leave Egypt? Not to mention Vice President Omar Suleiman, who appears to remain quietly in office.
One other point: the six-month transition period. That would be consistent with new elections in by September, when they were due for the presidency anyway. I won’t be surprised to see this period extended. It might even be wise to extend it, if the time is used to allow people to organize political parties that can seriously compete with Mubarak’s NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which will have a head start. Six months are also not too long to get the electoral mechanism into shape–it is used to running fraudulent elections, not competitive ones.
Revolutions move in phases. The first phase is over. But there is more to come. I’d bet on a new cabinet, which really is needed to ensure that the subsequent phases move in the right direction. But when the Army will recognize the necessity I can’t predict.
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