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Haste makes waste

David Makovsky in USA Today wisely councils the Egyptians to take their time in building democratic institutions and not focus excessively on elections.  The quick response: the constitutional amendments will be done in 10 days, referendum on them within two months, elections within six.

I imagine someone in the Army is saying this is the way to be responsive to the protestors, but it is also a formula for mistakes, including mistakes made with some malice aforethought.  The process is as important as the outcome.  Despite the American precedent of writing a constitution behind closed doors in Philadelphia, long experience suggests that fragile, conflicted and formerly autocratic societies–and Egypt should be considered one–need time to decide on how power is to be distributed, which is what a constitution does.  They also need the participation of a broad segment of the population, because otherwise it will look like a power grab (and may well be one).

There is in any event a need for time to develop the institutions of a free society:  most of the media, courts, political parties, trade associations, NGOs and labor unions existing today in Egypt are heavily conditioned by the former regime.  It will be some time before they are reformed, or new ones created.  Context counts.  As Makovsky says,

This means going beyond the obvious of lifting the existing emergency law and amending the Egyptian Constitution. It also requires an independent judiciary, a free press, minority rights, and a security apparatus that maintains the monopoly on the use of force. These institutions provide the opportunity for the creation of a civic culture where parties can negotiate their demands in a peaceful framework. Otherwise, the hope for democracy can be easily thwarted.

It is of course problematic to move slowly when the mainstays of the revolution are apparently pressing for fast action. But more than anything else, the quick action needed now is a new government, an early demand of the protesters that has not been fulfilled. The one currently in place, appointed in his desperate last days by then President Mubarak, will do everything it can to block accountability for the regime’s past behavior and tilt the scales of the future towards their continuation in power. It is no surprise that the military would not be replacing its friends in the government quickly, but that makes it all the more urgent.

Of course all these issues should be left up to the Egyptians to decide–I am not suggesting that the Americans or anyone else can do this for them.  But there is a lot of experience out there to suggest that haste makes waste, especially in matters of constitutional reform.

Egyptian army scraps constitution, keeps cabinet

The Armed Forces communique’ no. 5, issued today, does the following (according to Egyptian Chronicles):

1. Freezes the current constitution.
2. Dissolves both chambers of parliament.
3. Announces the army will rule the country for a 6 month transitional period until August.
4. Forms a committee to amend some constitution articles.
5. Continues Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet until a new one is named (unclear when).
6. Asserts that Mohamed Hussein Tantawy, the minister of defense, will represent the country.
7. Egypt respects its international treaties.

The main potential difficulty here is the continuation of Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet, which is the last one appointed by then President Mubarak.  It is hard to imagine that the protesters will be pleased with that, though most will welcome the freezing of the Mubarak-era constitution and dissolution of its parliament, fraudulently elected in December.  It is easy to imagine however that the Army wants to keep at least some of the ministers in place–otherwise it has to find new people to run the ministries, which would raise all sorts of difficult political and technical issues.

I had some experience with a military regime in Brazil 1982-85, where I was a U.S. diplomat.  The Brazilian armed forces had enjoyed exercising power and a privileged position for some time, but by the time I arrived they had realized that running the country was just too difficult.  They preferred to get back to playing soldier.  So they decided to turn the country back to the civilians, who have done a pretty good job since.  My sense is that the Egyptian military already knows that running the country is too hard–they need help and are prepared to get it from Mubarak’s cabinet (which of course includes quite a few of their colleagues).

The question is whether the protesters will accept this or insist, as they have said they would, on dismissal of the cabinet.  This immediate question is related to a broader one:  how much accountability will there be for crimes and corruption under the Mubarak regime?  Leaving the cabinet in place now virtually guarantees that accountability will be postponed, if not skipped altogether.  How many files will be destroyed by the Mubarak-appointed ministers?  Several of them have already been barred from leaving the country.  Can the Army really leave in power ministers who can’t be trusted to leave Egypt?  Not to mention Vice President Omar Suleiman, who appears to remain quietly in office.

One other point:  the six-month transition period.  That would be consistent with new elections in by September, when they were due for the presidency anyway.  I won’t be surprised to see this period extended.  It might even be wise to extend it, if the time is used to allow people to organize political parties that can seriously compete with Mubarak’s NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which will have a head start.  Six months are also not too long to get the electoral mechanism into shape–it is used to running fraudulent elections, not competitive ones.

Revolutions move in phases.  The first phase is over.  But there is more to come.  I’d bet on a new cabinet, which really is needed to ensure that the subsequent phases move in the right direction.  But when the Army will recognize the necessity I can’t predict.