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Is Obama selling out the protesters?

Ross Douthat in the NY Times is full of praise for President Obama’s caution and realpolitik with respect to Egypt:

Obama’s response to the Egyptian crisis has crystallized his entire foreign policy vision…it’s clear that the administration’s real goal has been to dispense with Mubarak while keeping the dictator’s military subordinates very much in charge. If the Obama White House has its way, any opening to democracy will be carefully stage-managed by an insider like Omar Suleiman, the former general and Egyptian intelligence chief who’s best known in Washington for his cooperation with the C.I.A.’s rendition program. This isn’t softheaded peacenik dithering. It’s cold-blooded realpolitik.

Or is it just a mistake?

The president has been remarkably unclear in the last day or two about where Egypt should be going. Democracy talk is out again.  I am with him all the way if he wants to suggest that Egyptians should decide their own fate, but when he says Cairo can’t go back where it came from he is suggesting something else: that as long as it doesn’t go all the way back to a Mubarak-style autocracy, the U.S. may be prepared to accept or help stabilize the outcome.

That is a message Omar Suleiman no doubt enjoys hearing, as he clearly has no intention of taking Egypt much more than a meter or two down the path of “reform.”  And it may be a message welcome to some in Congress.  But do we really think that Egyptians will accept a revolution that gives power to the man President Mubarak might have given power to even in the absence of the street protests?  It may be realist, but is it realistic?

Of course behind this “realism” lies fear:  in particular of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Reuel Gerecht, also in the NY Times today, clarifies why fear of the Brotherhood coming to power is overblown, even if the organization itself continues to be odious.  In fact, he argues that bringing it into a broad democratic tent might be the best thing that could happen to defuse and even reverse radicalization among Sunnis. An analogous experiment is underway with Moqtada al Sadr’s Shia political forces in Iraq, so far without any great detriment to the U.S.

My hope is that President Obama is somewhat less realist than Douthat thinks, and somewhat more pragmatic about the need to ensure that he is not seen as selling out the protesters.  If Omar Suleiman is able to restore autocratic “stability” to Egypt, and if President Obama is perceived as having helped him do it, the next protests will not be as benign towards the United States as those of the last ten days.

PS: This is a lot better than the Black-eyed Peas half-time show:

Cairo starts down a constitutional path to we know not where

In the bright light of the first day of the work week here in DC things are even clearer than they were yesterday: the Egyptian regime and the Obama Administration are sticking with a constitutional route to a still ill-defined but “representative” end-state, while the protesters are prepared to go the extra-constitutional route to full-fledged parliamentary democracy. As Mohamed El Baradei put it yesterday on CNN:

We need to abolish the present Constitution. We need to dissolve the current Parliament. These are all elements of the dictatorship regime, and we should not be — I don’t think we will go to democracy through the dictatorial Constitution.

This is no small matter, but the protesters are not likely to get their way unless the army comes over to their side more definitively than seems likely at present.  In the meanwhile, they will need to keep up the pressure through a continuing presence in Tahrir square and other efforts to mobilize supporters, who seem tired but not quite exhausted.

Failing that, Vice President Omar Suleiman will go all the way for a game-winning touchdown.  It is clear today that, despite the regime’s claims to the contrary, his statement yesterday was not agreed with the protesters, but it more than likely represents the maximum intent of the regime, which is to pre-empt and co-opt the protests rather than change the Egyptian political system in any fundamental way.  It falls short of promising anything like representative parliamentary democracy, and it implicitly leaves President Mubarak in office until the end of his term.  President Obama likewise could not be vaguer about where things are headed:  Egypt he said yesterday cannot go “back to what it was.”

For both Obama and Suleiman, keeping President Mubarak in place is important not only for the sake of “stability” but also because his leaving office would trigger–under the current constitution–elections in 60 days.  The Muslim Brotherhood, even if illegal, is the most organized of Egypt’s opposition parties and might do very well in elections held that soon.  While President Obama is trying to sound nonchalant about the Brothers, he definitely does not want them winning Egypt’s first really competitive elections.

Many secular protesters would not want that either, even if for the moment they find themselves in the anti-regime camp with the Brotherhood.  But their solution is for President Mubarak to resign and Egypt to be governed extra-constitutionally while it prepares for elections, presumably not within the 60 day time limit.  They might want to see something like what is going on right now in Tunisia, where a new Interior Minister has prohibited the former ruling party from operating. Mr. Suleiman is not interested in that idea being imported into Egypt.

Bottom line is the same as yesterday:

• stick with the constitution, which despite its faults offers a clearly marked path that leads we know not where; or
• abandon the constitution and try to hack a new path through the regime’s many brambles towards democracy.

For the moment, Cairo seems headed for the constitutional path to we know not where.

As I got some grief yesterday for not publishing all of Omar Suleiman’s statement, I include below the whole thing:

“The Vice-President held a series of meetings with representatives of the full spectrum of political parties and forces, as a well as a number of youths from the 25 January movement. The meetings arrived at the following consensus:

All participants of the dialogue arrived at a consensus to express their appreciation and respect for the 25 January movement and on the need to deal seriously, expeditiously and honestly with the current crisis that the nation is facing, the legitimate demands of the youth of 25 January and society’s political forces, with full consideration and a commitment to constitutional legitimacy in confronting the challenges and dangers faced by Egypt as result of this crisis, including: The lack of security for the populace; disturbances to daily life; the paralysis of by public services; the suspension of education at universities and schools; the logistical delays in the delivery of essential goods to the population; the damages to and losses of the Egyptian economy; the attempts at foreign intervention into purely Egyptian affairs and breaches of security by foreign elements working to undermine stability in implementation of their plots, while recognizing that the 25 January movement is a honorable and patriotic movement.

The participants in the national dialogue agreed on a number of political arrangements, and constitutional and legislative measures, which the participants agreed by consensus would be of a temporary nature until the election of new president at the end of the current presidential term, including:

First: Implementing the commitments announced by the President in speech to the nation on 1 February 2011:

1. No nomination for a new presidential term will take place;

2. A peaceful transition of authority within the constitutional framework;

3. The introduction of constitutional amendments to articles 76 & 77, and related constitutional amendments needed for the peaceful transition of authority;

4. Legislative amendments related to the amendments of the constitution;

5. Implementation of the rulings of the Court of Cassation, regarding challenges to the People’s Assembly election

6. Pursuit of corruption, and an investigation into those behind the breakdown of security in line with the law

7. Restoring the security and stability of the nation, and tasking the police forces to resume their role in serving and protecting the people.

Second: In implementation of these commitments the following measures will be taken:

1. A committee will be formed from members of the judicial authority and a number of political figures to study and recommend constitutional amendments, and legislative amendments of laws complimentary to the constitution to be completed by the first week of March.

2. The Government announces the establishment of a bureau to receive complaints regarding, and commits to immediately release, prisoners of conscience of all persuasions. The Government commits itself to not pursuing them or limiting their ability to engage in political activity.

3. Media and communications will be liberalized and no extra-legal constraints will be imposed on them.

4. Supervisory and judiciary agencies will be tasked with continuing to pursue persons implicated in corruption, as well as pursuing and holding accountable persons responsible for the recent breakdown in security.

5. The state of emergency will be lifted based on the security situation and an end to the threats to the security of society

6. All participants expressed their absolute rejection of any and all forms of foreign intervention in internal Egyptian affairs.

Third: A national follow-up committee will be established and composed of public and independent figures from among experts, specialists and representatives of youth movements, and will monitor the implementation of all consensual agreements, and issues reports and recommendations to the Vice-President.

In addition, all participants in the dialogue saluted the patriotic and loyal role played by our Armed Forces at this sensitive time, and affirmed their aspirations for a continuation of that role to restore of calm, security and stability, and to guarantee the implementation and of the consensus and understandings that result from the meetings of the national dialogue.

The super bowl of Egyptian politics

I know most of the American public is more interested in the Packers and Steelers today, where the outcome will be clear and unequivocal.  But Egypt is still in play, and it is far harder to tell in which direction Cairo is headed than to choose the Super Bowl winner.

It is certainly tempting to sympathize with the demonstrators who say President Mubarak has to go first, and only then will negotiations be meaningful.  But the sad fact is that would leave Egypt, according to its Mubarak-designed constitution, either in the hands of Vice President Omar Suleiman (in case of temporary unavailability of the President), torturer in chief of the Egyptian secret services, or Speaker of the People’s Assembly (in case of the President’s resignation), Ahmad Fathi Sorour, a party hack who has presided for more than 20 years over a puppet parliament and is said to have designed much of the repressive legislation of the Mubarak regime.

Moreover, no free and fair election can be held in Egypt without amendments to the constitution, which in its present form requires that the elections be held in 60 days from the removal of the president and that candidates pass muster in the People’s Assembly, whose members are overwhelmingly Mubarak cronies chosen in fraudulent elections in December. Can either Suleiman or Sorour be trusted to steer the ship of state towards free and fair elections that would replace that parliament as well as the president and almost certainly sink the regime and all that holds fast to it?

There is another path:  treat the constitution as the scrap of paper it is written on and try to hack a new path towards democracy.  Some would have this done by an army takeover; others might prefer the army to install a civilian caretaker government that might even leave Mubarak in place, force him to allow a new parliament to be elected freely and fairly, amend the constitution, then proceed with presidential elections.  This would necessarily be a government that could not command a majority in the current People’s Assembly, so it would depend for its effectiveness on the army force-marching the parliament to the desired results.

So there is a fork in the road:

• stick with the constitution, which despite its faults offers a clearly marked path that leads we know not where;
• abandon the constitution and try to hack a new path through the regime’s many brambles towards democracy.

The Americans, who have a good deal of clout in the matter, seem to be opting for the former, because they know and like Omar Suleiman and hope he will maintain stability but lead eventually in the right direction, which of course for them means not only democracy but also protection of their interest in seeing the Israel/Egypt peace treaty maintained.  At least some of the opposition political parties also seem inclined to stick with the constitution, but others might prefer the extra-constitutional route.

The people in Tahrir square want to be sure their sacrifices will be honored with a result that meets their expectations.  They seem devoted to the proposition that Mubarak must step down, but far less interested in the constitutional route than in an army-led transition.  Most Egyptians seem to trust the army’s guarantee more than Suleiman’s.  But if Suleiman can keep army backing, that will give him a great advantage.

Whether Mubarak resigns or not is becoming less relevant to the outcome, as his power is waning.  It seems to me that replacement of the current government with one that includes many people clearly and unequivocally devoted to democracy is in order.  Until that or Mubarak’s removal happens, the demonstrators had better hold on to Tahrir square and be prepared to fill it quickly, as they did on Friday, with peaceful and good-humored people.

A statement just issued by Suleiman’s office, supposedly on the basis of discussions today with representatives of the protesters and the political opposition, tries to steer the outcome in the constitutional direction (but there is no sign the protesters have subscribed yet).  While offering unspecified constitutional amendments, the guarantees are far from robust:

“In implementation of these commitments the following measures will be taken:

1. A committee will be formed from members of the judicial authority and a number of political figures to study and recommend constitutional amendments, and legislative amendments of laws complimentary to the constitution to be completed by the first week of March.

2. The Government announces the establishment of a bureau to receive complaints regarding, and commits to immediately release, prisoners of conscience of all persuasions. The Government commits itself to not pursuing them or limiting their ability to engage in political activity.

3. Media and communications will be liberalized and no extra-legal constraints will be imposed on them.

4. Supervisory and judiciary agencies will be tasked with continuing to pursue persons implicated in corruption, as well as pursuing and holding accountable persons responsible for the recent breakdown in security.

5. The state of emergency will be lifted based on the security situation and an end to the threats to the security of society

6. All participants expressed their absolute rejection of any and all forms of foreign intervention in internal Egyptian affairs.

Third: A national follow-up committee will be established and composed of public and independent figures from among experts, specialists and representatives of youth movements, and will monitor the implementation of all consensual agreements, and issues reports and recommendations to the Vice-President.

In addition, all participants in the dialogue saluted the patriotic and loyal role played by our Armed Forces at this sensitive time, and affirmed their aspirations for a continuation of that role to restore of calm, security and stability, and to guarantee the implementation and of the consensus and understandings that result from the meetings of the national dialogue.”

From the midst of uncertainty

Rashad Mahmood, back in touch now that the internet is functioning, writes from Cairo:

It seems the regime is still divorced from reality, but now at least realizes that some superficial changes need to be made. The new Secretary-General of the NDP, Hossam Badrawy is more respectable than the recognized crooks such as Safwat El-Sherif and Ahmed Ezz, but these changes are basically a tangent to the substance of what the demonstrators want. One friend with knowledge of the NDP sees this as a move to preserve the respectability of the NDP post-Mubarak, and turning it into a normal center-right party that would look after the interests of the business elites, while other parties would move in to fill the gap to its left.

However, the state and the NDP are so inseparable at this point that it is hard to envision how this transition would happen. Can the institutions captured by the party such as the electoral commission, large swaths of the judiciary, the entire security services, and others really let the party become one among many? That’s the question going forward. It is also unknown to what extent Suleiman is integrated into the NDP apparatus, if at all, which raises interesting questions for a potential Suleiman presidency.

This is all distinct from the substantive demands of the protesters for the removal of Mubarak, lifting the emergency law, new elections, and constitutional reform. All they have right now is the word of Suleiman and Shafiq, which no one seems inclined to take at face value.

There is no clear leadership of the demonstrators. There seems to be a network of organizers who are keeping things running, and in time some of them may come to have a greater voice, but I have not heard of anyone really stepping up to the plate. This may be to the advantage of the protesters, since there is no one the regime can target to decapitate the movement. El Baradei still seems somewhat marginal, despite the Brotherhood’s backing, although it’s hard to tell from my living room.  Who knows what backroom negotiations are going on?

The only other potential leadership on the horizon is the group of “wise men” that issued the statement that Carnegie translated. There are some very well-respected names on the list from both the business and liberal intellectual worlds. Allegedly there have been talks between the regime and representatives of the group, but will the protesters feel cut out of the process? One tweeter said, something like, “beware of billionaires claiming to side with a revolution.”

Last few thoughts. Some are saying that the regime has successfully fought off the protesters and that it is going to survive with a more liberal, but fundamentally authoritarian system. While I think this is a possibility, I would say that there are still too many moving pieces to say definitively, and too many opportunities for the regime to screw things up (from their perspective).

The lost international legitimacy is going to be hard to make up without some substantive reforms. If it does relapse into a mostly authoritarian system with Suleiman at the helm, it will be interesting to see how the US reacts. After all the publicity, and the high-profile calls for substantive change and reform, it will be hard to defend Suleiman when he cracks down on protesters or tries to rig elections.

Leaderless is good, but it can’t negotiate

One of the great virtues of the demonstrations in Egypt is that they have been leaderless, or more accurately they have multiple leaders, none of whom are clearly dominant in the sense that they command and control the mass of demonstrators.  It is a virtue because it means the movement can’t be decapitated, and unity is easier to maintain without egos in the way.  Arrest a few “instigators” and others pop up.  While Mohammed El Baradei, Ayman Nour and others may have visibility in the West that others lack, there is no evidence yet that they could call off the demonstrations, or turn them back on.

The problem with this is that the process has reached the point at which negotiators are needed to work out the transition to a more democratic regime.  This is particularly difficult in Egypt’s case because the constitution gives President Mubarak powers that are needed in the transition.  As two of the demonstrators(Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty) explain in the Washington Post this morning, an interim president (either Vice President Omar Suleiman in the case of a temporary delegation of power or the Mubarak crony who is the Speaker of parliament if he resigns) cannot propose constitutional amendments, dissolve parliament or even dismiss the cabinet.

The result:  elections would have to be held within 60 days under the present constitution, which requires a parliament now more than 90% controlled by Mubarak cronies to approve candidates for president.

Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty claim that this difficulty can be overcome with an explicit delegation of authority by President Mubarak before he resigns or absents himself temporarily:

So before Mubarak resigns he must sign a presidential decree delegating all of his authorities to his vice president until their current terms end in September. Mubarak issued similar decrees, transferring his powers to the prime minister, when he was hospitalized in 2004 and 2009. In addition, Mubarak must issue decrees lifting the “state of emergency” that has allowed him to suppress Egyptians’ civil liberties since 1981 and ordering the release or trial of those held in administrative detention without charge – estimated to be in the thousands.

And they want more:

Also before Mubarak resigns, an independent commission of respected judges, constitutional law experts, civil society representatives and all political movements should draft language to amend the constitution to ensure that presidential elections are open to all credible candidates; that Egyptians abroad are allowed – for the first time – to vote; that any elected president is allowed to serve only two terms; and that the elections are supervised by judicial and civil monitors.

Tarek Masoud, in yesterday’s New York Times, even asks that Mubarak stay on through dissolution of parliament and new elections.

All of this clearly requires negotiations–this is not a simple matter like the demand that Slobodan Milosevic recognize the results of an election he had in fact lost. And for negotiations there is going to have to be credible leadership, and a solid mass of demonstrators behind it.

In its absence, the regime is already exploiting the situation by “negotiating” piecemeal with opposition political parties that are as much a part of the regime as Mubarak. If they can co-opt a few well-known oppositionists while the numbers in Tahrir square decline, Mubarak and Omar Suleiman can still hope to nickel and dime the tired demonstrators and set up a transition to something that may replace regime personnel at the top but will not require accountability or change the deep state, in particular the army’s outsized role in Egyptian politics, economics and society and the extensive internal security apparatus that keeps people in line.

So the time has come for some convincing leadership to tell Omar Suleiman (and the Americans, who have become de facto mediators) what the terms of Mubarak’s surrender will be. You would have to know more about what is going on in Cairo than I do to predict how that leadership will emerge and who will be in it, but if it doesn’t appear soon there is a real risk of losing ground in a war now almost won.