Tag: Egypt

Leaderless is good, but it can’t negotiate

One of the great virtues of the demonstrations in Egypt is that they have been leaderless, or more accurately they have multiple leaders, none of whom are clearly dominant in the sense that they command and control the mass of demonstrators.  It is a virtue because it means the movement can’t be decapitated, and unity is easier to maintain without egos in the way.  Arrest a few “instigators” and others pop up.  While Mohammed El Baradei, Ayman Nour and others may have visibility in the West that others lack, there is no evidence yet that they could call off the demonstrations, or turn them back on.

The problem with this is that the process has reached the point at which negotiators are needed to work out the transition to a more democratic regime.  This is particularly difficult in Egypt’s case because the constitution gives President Mubarak powers that are needed in the transition.  As two of the demonstrators(Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty) explain in the Washington Post this morning, an interim president (either Vice President Omar Suleiman in the case of a temporary delegation of power or the Mubarak crony who is the Speaker of parliament if he resigns) cannot propose constitutional amendments, dissolve parliament or even dismiss the cabinet.

The result:  elections would have to be held within 60 days under the present constitution, which requires a parliament now more than 90% controlled by Mubarak cronies to approve candidates for president.

Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty claim that this difficulty can be overcome with an explicit delegation of authority by President Mubarak before he resigns or absents himself temporarily:

So before Mubarak resigns he must sign a presidential decree delegating all of his authorities to his vice president until their current terms end in September. Mubarak issued similar decrees, transferring his powers to the prime minister, when he was hospitalized in 2004 and 2009. In addition, Mubarak must issue decrees lifting the “state of emergency” that has allowed him to suppress Egyptians’ civil liberties since 1981 and ordering the release or trial of those held in administrative detention without charge – estimated to be in the thousands.

And they want more:

Also before Mubarak resigns, an independent commission of respected judges, constitutional law experts, civil society representatives and all political movements should draft language to amend the constitution to ensure that presidential elections are open to all credible candidates; that Egyptians abroad are allowed – for the first time – to vote; that any elected president is allowed to serve only two terms; and that the elections are supervised by judicial and civil monitors.

Tarek Masoud, in yesterday’s New York Times, even asks that Mubarak stay on through dissolution of parliament and new elections.

All of this clearly requires negotiations–this is not a simple matter like the demand that Slobodan Milosevic recognize the results of an election he had in fact lost. And for negotiations there is going to have to be credible leadership, and a solid mass of demonstrators behind it.

In its absence, the regime is already exploiting the situation by “negotiating” piecemeal with opposition political parties that are as much a part of the regime as Mubarak. If they can co-opt a few well-known oppositionists while the numbers in Tahrir square decline, Mubarak and Omar Suleiman can still hope to nickel and dime the tired demonstrators and set up a transition to something that may replace regime personnel at the top but will not require accountability or change the deep state, in particular the army’s outsized role in Egyptian politics, economics and society and the extensive internal security apparatus that keeps people in line.

So the time has come for some convincing leadership to tell Omar Suleiman (and the Americans, who have become de facto mediators) what the terms of Mubarak’s surrender will be. You would have to know more about what is going on in Cairo than I do to predict how that leadership will emerge and who will be in it, but if it doesn’t appear soon there is a real risk of losing ground in a war now almost won.

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Mabruk Egypt!

So far, so good.  This has been Egypt’s proud day! Huge crowds, peaceful, clear messages. 

Have a look, courtesy of the Russians, who don’t resist the anti-American spin (but of course I agree that this revolution should be made in Egypt):

Now the hard part begins, for both Egyptians and Americans:

  • Brian Katulis focuses on U.S. diplomatic strategy to continue to press the case for early and quick transition.
  • Rob Satloff outlines what an ideal transition to democracy would look like from the U.S. perspective (http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3297)–sorry for that, I can’t make their links work!
  • Larry Diamond emphasizes the difficulties of the transition.
  • Tarek Masoud proposes ways of getting past those difficulties.
  • Marina Ottaway offers two translated statements from Egyptian pro-democracy advocates involved in negotiations with the authorities.  This was published in the Egyptian newspaper Ash-Shorouk February 3 and merits quotation in full, with the names of the signatories:

Full text of statement (translated from Arabic by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

The current regime, represented by the president of the republic, has agreed to a limited number of the popular demands that have been clearly expressed. The people who have come out in the millions in Cairo and all Egyptian cities still insist on the following legitimate demands:

  1. The President must delegate to his Vice President the responsibilities of managing the transitional period that began yesterday and will be completed by the end of the president’s current term.
  2. The Vice President must agree to the following: dissolve the Shura Council and People’s Assembly and form a legislative committee consisting of constitutional experts and independent judges who will prepare for the necessary constitutional amendments.
  3. Form a government of experts and independent figures that are accepted by the public to administer executive operations during this transitional period.
  4. End the rule by Emergency Law and create specific mechanisms to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on the people as well as public and private property and for unprecedented intimidation of the public. Those in the various state institutions who contributed to exposing the nation and the public to the effects of this absence of security must also be held responsible.
  5. Ensure the safety of the youth that have congregated in Tahrir Square and other streets in Cairo and various Egyptian cities during this transitional period, and protect them from prosecution, persecution and violation of their rights. Their rights, including freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and their legitimate means of expression, must be protected. We note our full solidarity with the youth and call on all signatories of this statement to protect the protesters and their personal safety.
  6. We assert on record our appreciation and praise of the responsible, patriotic role of the military.

The signatories released a second statement stating:

The group, which addressed its message to the President, his deputy and the military proposed a way out of the grave crisis that has plagued the country and its citizens. The group reiterates its call for the military to ensure the security and safety of the Egyptian youth that is protesting peacefully in Tahrir Square and other streets in Egyptian cities, and to protect them from the risk of prosecution, persecution, and violation of their rights. The violence occurring on Egyptian streets will only contribute to more political tensions and create obstacles to mitigating the current crisis. We are hoping once again that the Egyptian military will help the nation and the people to emerge from this crisis and save the lives of the Egyptian youth.

Signatories:
Ahmed Kamal Aboul Magd
Naguib Sawiris
Nabil al-Arabi
Salama Ahmed Salama
Ibrahim El Moallem
Waheed Abd El-Majeed
Abdel Aziz El-Shafei
Amr Hamzawy
Amr El Shobaki
Gamil Matar
Safwat Thabet
Ambassador Nabil Fahmy
Former Minister Mervat el-Talawi
Ali Mosharrafa
Adel el-Moalem
Yahya al-Jamal
Anis Aclimandos
Amin Mahdy
Ahmed Fouad
Justice Sami Mahmoud Zein el-Din
Amani Al Khayat
Nasser Amin
Fathi al-Shawadfi

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Transition begins today

The night was quieter than most of us expected, and the day so far as well.  Massive crowds in Tahrir square, big enough to scare off the thugs, who likely have been reined in a bit. They embarrassed the regime a good deal on Wednesday.  The army also did a bit more yesterday to keep pro- and anti-Mubarak demonstrators apart:

Regime focus yesterday was on detaining journalists and human rights activists, in an apparent effort to prevent the word from getting out about what Mubarak was up to.  Dumb move that one:  it guaranteed a lot of media attention in the U.S.–the press likes nothing better than covering themselves, and the human rights advocates will no doubt want to write about their treatment in custody.  Nothing done yesterday seems to have restricted the flow of information, and the regime did nothing as dramatically bad as what it did on Wednesday. Go figure.

Al Jazeera English in particular is doing a great job, focusing mainly on people actually involved in the demonstrations.  I turned on CNN for a comparison:  they were interviewing luminaries like Rudy Giuliani and Barbara Walters.  My how the mighty (CNN as well as Giuliani and Walters, who had nothing to say) have fallen!

President Mubarak is saying he is ready to go but fears chaos if he does.  I am starting to believe him, and the New York Times is reporting that negotiations are under way for Vice President Suleiman and the army to take over.  No one seems to have convinced Mubarak to sign on yet, but I’m not sure I’ll be surprised if he does. If he wants to die in Egypt, it may be the only way.

Even if he signs today on the dotted line, there is a long way to go yet.  The current parliament was elected in fraudulent, unfair and unfree elections in December.  The constitution not only gives the president extraordinary powers but also requires that a new one pass muster in parliament.

Someone has to figure out a way to give Egypt a new parliament, one elected freely and fairly (with substantially fewer than the 96% of seats said to be controlled by Mubarak’s party).  That new parliament would then fix the constitution and proceed with election of a new president, and maybe of still another parliament.

This is a tall order to get done by September, when presidential elections were scheduled.  But there is no limit to what can be done if there is good will.  So far, there isn’t.  Mubarak and Suleiman are still both blaming foreign agitators for Egypt’s troubles, and abuses by the security forces are still rampant, even if they are not actually beating Egyptians up quite as much as earlier in the week.

Today is supposed to be “departure” day. Whether Mubarak leaves the presidency today or not, February 4 is likely to be seen as marking the departure from an autocratic regime and the beginning of a difficult, and lengthy, transition to democracy.

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Mubarak’s order

Tuesday was the peoples’ day, yesterday was the regime’s day. What will today and Friday be?

Let there be no doubt.  Wednesday afternoon’s rioting against the demonstrators was organized and paid for by the Mubarak regime, which at the very least could have stopped it.  I imagine Mubarak hesitated to use his uniformed police for the crackdown, presumably fearing Washington’s wrath, so he had it done in civilian clothes, but many of the rioters carried Interior Ministry identification.  They targeted especially the news media, in an apparent attempt to intimidate them from covering the malfeasance.  If these are the forces of law and order, why not try chaos?

The demonstrators have done well to hold Tahrir Square, but physical contests with their antagonists are not a good idea.  Sometime in the middle of the night the number of demonstrators declines, making another Interior Ministry attack all the more likely.  Last night it was sporadic gunfire aimed mainly at legs and feet.  Officially five killed.  Tonight it may get worse.  Mubarak will try to intimidate as many as possible from joining the demonstrations Friday.  There is no substitute for a massive presence in Tahrir.

Washington naturally turns to the question, “what should Barack Obama do?”  White House spokesman  Gibbs was seen today in the twittersphere as less than forceful in condemning the regime violence, but at the same time he was pretty good in insisting that change had to start right away.  My sense is that the White House needs to play hard ball with Mubarak in private, but not get  too far out in front in public.  This shouldn’t be about the United States.  The Egyptian Foreign Ministry, in a statement that will be the shame of every professional Egyptian diplomat I know, was only too happy yesterday to reject foreign calls to incitement.

I’m not keen on recalling ambassadors, especially the American one, because it hurts communication with both protesters and the army, not to mention with the regime.  Nor do I like blanket aid cuts, though if we can find juicy items the regime is particularly interested in I would be happy to see them cut.  I trust Admiral Mullen is making it clear to the Egyptian army that we won’t be able to be as helpful as in the past unless the rioting against the demonstrators stops.  This revolution still has to be made, or unmade, in Egypt, not inside the beltway.

It will however have effects within the beltway, and throughout America.  The implications are admirably outlined in a piece by Steve Clemons. The big worry is the impact on Egypt’s peace with Israel.  While I would not be surprised if Egypt adopted a more pro-Palestinian voice, it seems highly unlikely that a democratic government in Cairo would prefer to pick a serious fight with Israel rather than tend to its own citizens’ needs.  But that is precisely what Tehran did after its nondemocratic revolution, so who can predict?

The Egyptians seem remarkably willing to keep up their efforts.  If they can hold Tahrir square today, we’ll know Friday whether they can defeat autocratic thuggery with democratic commitment.

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Saleh channels Mubarak

Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of Yemen, announced to parliament today that he will not run again in 2013. He was at least more eloquent than his mentor:  “No extension, no inheritance, no resetting the clock,” he said (this from someone who has made and broken the promise not to run previously).  This blatant copying of Egyptian President Mubarak’s approach to deflating protests is intended to fend off protests scheduled for tomorrow (why don’t Yemenis prefer Friday for protests?).  Saleh is also reported to be helping pro-regime elements get to the capital for the occasion.

There had been contradictory reports from Yemen on whether demonstrations there were serious or not. The Washington Post reported that democracy activists are divided from political opposition, and the regime handles both with skill and occasional brutality.  The demands of the political opposition have been relatively mild:  electoral and other reforms rather than the immediate departure of the president.

But if objective indicators mean anything, Yemen is still ripe for trouble, more likely of the state collapse than the revolutionary sort.  Here’s the short list of what ails it:

  • Water:  lacking and declining rapidly.
  • Oil:  also declining rapidly.
  • Rebellion:  in the north and the south.
  • Poverty:  big time.
  • Drugs:  qat, every day.
  • Autocrat:  Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power longer than Mubarak.
  • Role in the war on terror:  front line against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
  • Dependence on the U.S.:  increasing.

I can’t think of any countries that come close to this litany of ailments, apart from Somalia (an instructive analogue, and just across the Bab el Mandeb).  Yemen may not have enough of a middle class to generate the kind of revolution of rising expectations that chased Ben Ali from Tunisia, and the population’s addiction to qat may make any revolution (or state collapse) more psychedelic than monochrome.  President Saleh has been trying hard to ease tensions by raising salaries, lowering taxes, promising not to steal another term, and asserting boldly that Yemen is not Tunisia.

It has been more than a year since a real expert on Yemen predicted:

If left unaddressed, Yemen’s problems could potentially destabilize Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. The inability of the Yemeni central government to fully control its territory will create space for violent extremists to regroup and launch attacks against domestic and international targets. The international community must be realistic about the limitations of intervention in Yemen. In the near term, however, inaction is not an option.

It may not be an option in the think-tank world, but it is pretty much what we’ve done. I certainly don’t think Christopher Boucek’s recommendations have been fully implemented, though U.S. assistance is increasing rapidly:

* Yemen must build local capacity in law enforcement and its legal and judicial systems by enacting counterterrorism legislation, passing terror finance laws, improving police training, and professionalizing the prison service.

* The Gulf states should make Yemen’s membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council contingent on tough steps, including progress on curbing government subsidies, addressing corruption, and enacting measures to curtail security concerns.

* U.S. aid to Yemen is disproportionately small given its importance to U.S. national security. Development assistance, education and technical cooperation, capacity building, institution strengthening, and direct financial assistance can better address the interconnected challenges facing Yemen than military and security aid.

So are we living on borrowed time in Yemen, or can President Saleh succeed using Mubarak’s tricks?

PS:  See also Unhappy Yemen: a White House view.

PPS:  See also from the February 4 New York Times. The headline is misleading.  She thinks he is safe for six months, maybe not more.

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Mubarak tries another kind of crackdown

The demonstrators remaining in Tahrir square this morning after yesterday’s massive protest calling for President Mubarak to step down immediately are now facing attack from pro-regime thugs.  This is a crackdown of another kind, a kind that will allow the regime to tell the Americans they didn’t use the security forces (and avoid the use of a conscript army, which might not like to crack heads).  Mubarak, having announced yesterday that he will not stand for election again in September, is hoping the violence will discourage any more protests and get Egyptians to choose stability over prolonged uncertainty.

The protesters are in a bind.  Yesterday was a tremendous show of their support in Egyptian society.  But Mubarak’s refusal to step down means they have to turn out a big crowd Friday to trump his recalcitrance.  The army, which had expressed sympathy with the protests, has now called for an end to demonstrations, and a lot of ordinary Egyptians will be getting impatient with the disruption of their lives.  Violent clashes today and tomorrow could scare off a lot of people and leave only a few, hard core protesters.  That would spell triumph for Mubarak.

So the right course of action, which in any event should be nonviolent, is whatever will ensure a big crowd on Friday.  I wouldn’t pretend to know what that is from Washington, DC.  That is a decision for those behind the protests, who have done really well so far and should be relied on to lead again. Made in Egypt is still the best way.

One thing the protesters will have to consider is the complex constitutional situation. Free and fair elections to choose a successor to Mubarak will not be possible under the present constitution. How do you get the constitution revised in a parliament that is 90% National Democratic Party (Mubarak guys) by September? What alternative is there?

I should note that the interpretation I offer above of the pro-regime thug attacks is open to debate.  Here is quite a different view, just in from the newly reopened internet in Cairo:

…[a] sort of a thinking man’s NDP member says he thinks the latest attacks on the demonstrators mean that Mubarak is done, if not today, by Friday. Just yesterday, he thought the gradual return to stability, and creation of a sort of free protest zone in Tahrir was going to eventually calm things down, and let Mubarak finish out his term. Then he could shepherd in new parliamentary elections, and possibly modify the constitution to allow Omar Suleiman to run outright.

However, the chaos of today is clearly a result of some sort of rift within the regime. The internet was turned on literally just a couple hours before the pro-mubarak thugs attacked the protesters. If this was planned, one would think that they would have waited to turn the internet on after all this was over. My friend thinks that elements in the NDP that normally control these thugs felt things slipping away from them, and saw the only solution as trying to clear Tahrir with their protesters, hoping once things got chaotic the army would intervene to just clear things out. Instead, there is talk of the military intervening against the pro-mubarak forces to protect the protesters, although it is unclear if this has happened yet.

Of course this interpretation is not entirely inconsistent with the one I offer above–but it underlines splits in the regime and suggests that it would have been better not to allow the thugs to do their handiwork. Only time will tell whether it might have been wiser to leave some room for the protesters. The military for the moment is standing by, not intervening.

PS:  For those who prefer the video version, here courtesy of AP and The Lede you can watch a minute or so of what a regime is willing to try to stay in power (and it may well get worse before it gets better):

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