Tag: Eritrea
Stevenson’s army, November 13
– NYT’s Max Fisher explains the migrant issues exploited by Belarus.
– Biden sanctions Eritrean forces.
– NYT sees rise of menacing behaviors in GOP.
And learn from WSJ tracking of just one airplane how hard it is to meet schedules.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, August 24
– WaPo says CIA Director Burns met with de facto Taliban leader in Kabul on Monday.
– Former CJCS ADM. Mullen now say Afghanistan war was mistake.
– WSJ describes faltering Afghan economy.
In other news –
– Merkel reassures Ukraine over NS2.
– CFR has good backgrounder on global water stress.
I don’t know how much of this is accessible right now, but Foreign Affairs displays its new issue online.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
A big potential success at risk
The International Crisis Group, the Organization of the African Unity, and others are rightly focused on preventing a humanitarian disaster in Tigray, where Ethiopian forces are threatening to take the regional capital Mekelle from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Tens of thousands have already fled the Tigray Region into Sudan and many other civilians may suffer horribly if the regional capital is assaulted. Reports of atrocities by both sides are rife.
My students and I met last January with TPLF officials and party members during our 12-day study trip to Ethiopia, when we were focused on the full range of ethnic conflicts brewing not only in the far north but also in the Oromo and Amhara regions as well as in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region. Ethiopia, a country of more than 80 different and often intermingled ethnic groups, has enormous potential for internal ethnic conflict:
But the current conflict, severe as it is and could become in Tigray, is not really about Tigray. It is about Addis Ababa and who holds power there. The TPLFers we met with made it absolutely clear that they did not regard Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s Nobel-Prize winning Prime Minister, as legitimate. In the Tigrayan view, he had usurped power by taking control of the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and then moving its resources to his own Progress Party without the required consultation with the Tigrayans, who had in the past dominated the leadership not only of the EPRDF but also the army and other key institutions.
In September the TPLF insisted on holding elections in the Tigray region despite Abiy Ahmed’s postponement of national elections due to the Covid-19 epidemic. Ninety-eight per cent voted for the TPLF. Then, according to the Prime Minister, the TPLF attacked Ethiopian government forces stationed in the region. The message was clear: the TPLF wanted to control its own region without interference or presence from the Addis Ababa government. It is not surprising Abiy Ahmed reacted to the challenge to his authority.
It is going to take more than a ceasefire and accommodation of some sort in the Tigray region to settle things down, though that is the vital first step. The Ethiopian government, which frames the whole matter as a law enforcement issue, wants to arrest and try the TPLF leadership. The TPLF, with overwhelming support in its own region, wants at least autonomy if not (constitutionally guaranteed) secession, though some Tigrayans might be bought off with power-sharing of some sort in Addis Ababa. Certainly the Tigrayan loss of power there is strongly felt, not least because Abiy Ahmed’s much-vaunted agreement to end Ethiopia’s hostilities with Eritrea requires Tigrayan forces to withdraw from territory they have occupied for more than 20 years.
Even if the Tigray conflict is resolved, Ethiopia faces half a dozen other internal conflicts that might and do lead to so far localized violence. And its dispute with Egypt over control of the Blue Nile remains unresolved. Ethiopia is filling the lake behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, but at a rate that for now will not drastically affect the flow of the Nile downstream. With more than 100 million people, Ethiopia is the second largest in Africa. Its success would be a big contribution to stability in the Horn and prosperity in much of the continent. But the risks are real.