Tag: European Union
Imbalance is not good for negotiations
Naile Ejupe of Pristina daily Bota sot asked questions last Saturday. I answered:
Bota sot: On Thursday, the meeting between the prime minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, and the Serbian president, Aleksandër Vucic, was held, the meeting had no result and there is disagreement between what kind of internationals and what Kosovo accepts, what is your comment about the meeting?
A: The internationals are insisting on a single priority: the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities. That offers nothing to Pristina. It is not surprising that this dialogue is not going anywhere.
The Association has become an absolute priority for Brussels, Washington, and Belgrade
Bota sot: Is Serbia conditioning the dialogue through the association and why is such a thing allowed
A: I’m not sure it is only Serbia making the Association an absolute condition. Washington and Brussels seem to be doing it as well.
Bota sot: How should Kosovo act when the pressures for the establishment of the Association have already started to increase?
A: I’ll leave up to Kosovo’s authorities how they want to react. But I hope they do so in a way that seeks to improve relations with Washington and Brussels. Kosovo needs its friends.
The US and EU need to guarantee
Bota sot: We are witnesses that Serbia has not respected the agreements with Kosovo, who should guarantee that Serbia takes any steps after Kosovo accepts the association?
A: The EU and US need to be the guarantors. I see no sign they are serious about taking on that responsibility. That is part of the problem.
Bota sot: The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, says that if he had said what Kurti declared “he would have been hanged in Berlin.” Here he refers to Prime Minister Kurti’s statement after the September 14 meeting, what Vučić is trying to do and how long will it continue to be tolerated?
A: You’ll have to ask the European and American diplomats how long they will tolerate it. I don’t see anything wrong with the refusal to accept the Association as a precondition, without any quid pro quo. Clearly the Association presents a threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity so long as Serbia has not recognized Kosovo. I advised Lajcak years ago that if the Association is necessary it can only come at the end of the process, along with recognition, not at the beginning.
Kosovo was better prepared than Serbia
Bota sot: Let’s stick to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his statement after the September 14 meeting, which he described as a difficult meeting, while the American ambassador to Serbia, Christopher Hill, then added that Serbia had “done its homework” and that “it was well prepared,” what difficulties can Vučić be talking about and what tasks has Serbia performed?
A: I saw no Serbian preparation for any serious concession to Kosovo. Belgrade’s preparation did however guarantee support for its perspective on the Association by Brussels and Washington. I am not a cheerleader for that accomplishment. That is what Pristina has to counter. I thought the Kosovo schedule for the talks a serious step in the right direction. I do not understand why it was not regarded as such.
Bota sot: Serbia is not stopping the inciting and threatening statements, a month ago the Serbian Minister of Defense said that Montenegro and North Macedonia offended Serbia by recognizing Kosovo’s independence, while Vučić on Friday (September 15) asked the Serbs of Montenegro demand the same rights as the Albanians in North Macedonia, is Serbia trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the region and thus destabilize the Balkans?
Serbia’s aim
A: Yes. Serbia’s aim is the Serbian world, which means at least de facto Belgrade control over the Serbs who live in neighboring countries. Serbia should not be asking for anything from its neighbors that it is not ready to offer to its neighbors.
Bota sot: While Serbia makes threatening statements, Kosovo is already under the punitive measures of the European Union due to the tense situation created in the north of the country after the elections and the placement of Albanian mayors in the municipalities, these measures are called unfair by Kosovo, while after the meeting on September 14 , the EU does not exclude other punitive measures, what is your comment about this?
A: Clearly Pristina needs to improved its relations with Brussels and Washington.
What endangers Kosovo
Bota sot: The representative of the EU for dialogue, Miroslav Lajçak, has given an ultimatum that the Kosovo-Serbia agreement be implemented by the end of the year, or there may be conflicts, how endangered is Kosovo and what conflicts could he be talking about?
A: You need to ask Miroslav what he is talking about. For me, the risk arises from any action, including a “false flag,” against Serbs in Kosovo that gives Belgrade an opportunity to claim it needs to move its army to the Ibar to protect Serbs. Protection of Serbs and other minorities is vital to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
There is of course also a risk of rioting by Serbs in the north against the non-Serb mayors or whatever police presence remains. But that went entirely unpunished last time it happened. I have no reason to believe it would be punished if it happened again. Washington’s tolerance for Serbian malfeasance appears unlimited.
Bota sot: Can visas for Kosovo citizens be suspended if the agreement is not implemented and if the association is not formed and how fair is this?
A: It would be completely unfair to suspend visas for Kosovo citizens. But that doesn’t mean it won’t happen.
Better balance is needed
Bota sot: Finally, what after the fruitless talks in Brussels?
I don’t know. But if I were one of the mediators I would be looking for a balanced package at every step, not one that requires one side to move while the other does nothing.
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Belgrade: a question of when, not if
A friend writes from Belgrade:
Vucic continues to psychologically set the conditions to prepare the population for war against Kosovo through the media and other means. These efforts have intensified recently:
–Vucic plans to invade the north of Kosovo as soon as it is politically expedient to do so;
–Timing depends on his perceptions of relative Russian strength/support, and Western weakness;
Perceptions of Western weakness
–The continued strength of Western support for Ukraine will play a large role in these perceptions. If Western support for Ukraine is seen as tepid or pushing Ukraine towards unwanted negotiations, then Vucic will feel emboldened;
–Vucic’s perceptions of Western weakness depend in part on feedback from Serbia’s recently reinvigorated lobbying effort in Washington, as well as feedback from Orban and Lajcak;
–Vucic’s perceptions of Western weakness/resolve also depend in part on US Ambassador Hill’s continued highly embarrassing and debasing public efforts to kow-tow to Serbia;
Deterrence is failing
–Vucic believes the West will not respond militarily to an incursion in the north of Kosovo and will only wag fingers and protest impotently, while calling for renewed negotiations;
–These opinions are shared by most educated Serbs and are seen as painfully obvious to all but the most sycophantic Western politicians and diplomats;
–The only Serbs who seem to disagree with this evaluation are those with a vested financial interest courting the EU and Washington, or those who support retaking Kosovo and think they can fool the West.
Thus, it is a question of when, not if, and a question of whether or not the US and EU can retain any deterrent credibility in the short to medium term.
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Failure is definitely an option
Things are coming apart in the Balkans, where a sometimes uneasy peace has prevailed for more than two decades. War in the 1990s mode is unlikely. No one can sustain a conflict like the one in Bosnia, which lasted more than three years. Nor would the NATO-led forces in Kosovo tolerate a full-scale Serbian invasion of its entire territory. But instability, armed clashes, ethnic strife, and dysfunction are more than possible. They are likely. US and EU policies and practices are not helping.
Dodik threatens Bosnia and Herzegovina with secession
Milorad Dodik is back as president of the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska, or RS) that governs on 49% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has continued to salami-slice his way towards independence, de facto if not de jure. Recent moves include two notable ones. The RS Assembly has passed legislation that purports to invalidate the jurisdiction of Bosnia’s judicial system. In addition, Dodik himself has declared that the international community High Representative, responsible for the Dayton peace agreement, will be arrested if he enters RS territory. Both moves violate both the spirit and letter of the Dayton agreements. But apart from declaring the former invalid the HiRep, Washington, and Brussels have done nothing to counter them.
Dodik has also built up the police forces of the RS, obtained ample armaments and financing from Russia, and successfully enlisted Hungary to block any EU sanctions Brussels might propose. Washington has sanctioned him both for his challenges to Dayton and for blatant corrupt practices. But the lack of a unified Western response invites further salami slices. So too does Dodik’s warming relationship with Belgrade, which is seeking a “Serbian world” that incorporates the Serb populations of neighboring countries.
Vucic threatens part of Kosovo
That is an even more serious threat in Kosovo. Serbia already controls four Serb-majority municipalities north of the Ibar River contiguous with the border Belgrade calls a “boundary.” With encouragement from Belgrade, the Serbs there have abandoned the Kosovo institutions, boycotted recent elections, and rioted against installation of the non-Serb mayors who were consequently elected. Serbia has kidnapped Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, mobilized its army along the border/boundary, intimidated Serbs into leaving the Kosovo Security Force, threatened North Macedonia and Montenegro for having recognized Kosovo, and rejected agreements reached with Pristina that the US and EU claim are legally binding. The Americans and Europeans have responded only with mild verbal reprimands.
That has not been true for Pristina, which has incurred “consequences” for its insistence on installing the non-Serb mayors in their offices and deploying paramilitary police in response to disorder. While northern Kosovo has calmed since the spring, US and EU diplomats are still insisting on their own demands for withdrawal of Kosovo police from Kosovo’s sovereign territory. Meanwhile, Serbian President Vucic has been busy trying to prevent Ukraine from recognizing Kosovo independence, in clear violation of the agreement the Europeans and Americans say is binding.
Vucic also threatens the whole of Montenegro
The situation is even less salubrious in NATO member Montenegro. It lacks a fully empowered government following June elections. The President wants Russophilic political parties in the government. The Prime Minister-designate does not, but he also resists bringing in the former ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). The result will either be a government with a thin majority in parliament or new elections. In any new election, Serbia will pull out all the stops to support the Russophiles, who are also pro-Serbian.
The obvious solution would be a coalition between the Europe Now! winners of the June election and DPS, which is also pro-European. But Belgrade will exert enormous pressure on the President and Prime Minister-designate to prevent such a combination. Serbia sees the possibility of regaining de facto, if not de jure, control of all of Montenegro. That would eliminate a potential rival for EU membership. It would also render Montenegro’s NATO membership a practical dead letter. Podgorica would continue to be a member, but serve Russian interests.
Blind to the obvious
The sources of threats in the Balkans to peace, stability, and progress towards the EU are clear. They lie in Banja Luka and Belgrade. Moscow supports both. But Brussels and Washington remain blind to the obvious. They are still trying to bend Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro in directions the majority does not want to go. Failure is an option. Now is the time to re-assess and correct course. Democracy and rule of law require it.
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The right direction for Balkans policy
Labor Day weekend is over, so everyone in the US is back at work. It’s a good moment to reflect on EU and US policy in the Balkans.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is pointing in the right direction. It has decided, subject to confirmation, that the Bosnian constitution, agreed at the Dayton peace talks in 1995, violates the individual rights of its citizens. They cannot all vote for their choice as president, due to geographic and ethnic restrictions, which also dominate in the election of other officials.
This power-sharing arrangement was essential at the end of the Bosnian war. It reassured the warring parties that they could hold on to power. Other ethnic groups would not be dominant. Twenty-eight years of peace have ensued.
That is nothing to sniff at. The Dayton scheme seemed a house of cards when it was signed in December 1995. The Americans made the constitution difficult to amend because they realized how fragile the arrangement would likely be. But the constitution they imposed was precisely what the then warring ethnic nationalists wanted. They have used its bizarre concatention of group rights to protect their own hold on power. They have also prevented citizens who don’t identify with a particular group from gaining power.
This is not the first time the ECHR has intervened in favor of individual rights regardless of ethnicity. Bosnian politicians have mostly ignored its previous decisions. This one will likely suffer the same fate, unless something is done to counter the inertia.
Kosovo
Kosovo is different, arguably more successful. Its minority communities are much smaller relative to the majority than those in Bosnia. Still, Kosovo has strong constituitonal arrangements to protect minorities, including a veto on constitional changes. There are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as the government, minority vetoes, and an advisory Council of Communities linked directly to the President. But there are no ethnic restrictions on voting rights comparable to Bosnia’s.
Belgrade, Washington, and Brussels have been pressing Pristina hard to implement a 10-year-old agreement that calls for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM). Belgrade wants it to have executive powers. That would make it a level of governance intermediary between Pristina and the country’s municipalities, which have ample powers of their own.
The ASMM could thus become analogous to Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Advocates of the ASMM say that such arrangements for minority governance exist in more than a dozen European Union member states. But in all those instances the neighoring countries recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors. That is not the case with Kosovo, as Serbia has steadfastly refused recognition and its officials now assert it will never happen.
What is to be done?
Washington and Brussels should be pressing Bosnian politicians this fall to implement the most recent as well as previous ECHR decisions. The Europeans and Americans should also back off pressing Pristina for the ASMM, explaining to Serbia that its formation will have to await Belgrade’s recognition as well as recognition by the five non-recognizing EU members. Washington and Brussels should also be prepared to guarantee that the ASMM will be consistent with the Kosovo constitution. They have said as much in op/eds. They should say it in a formal international agreement.
Along with these diplomatic moves should come a vigorous effort to upgrade the judicial systems in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Unfortunately, the Bosnian ruling parties are gutting serious reform. Bosnia needs to make its prosecutors and judges far more independent of politics. Extending the existing international OSCE judicial monitoring to prosecutors would be a major step in the right direction. In Kosovo, it is vital that Belgrade encourage the Serb judges and police to return to the country’s institutions, which they exited last spring at Belgrade’s behest. Belgrade also needs to refrain from influencing their decisions.
Group rights–including the ASMM in Kosovo as well as Bosnia’s existing constitutional provisions–are the wrong direction. The right direction for EU and US policy in the Balkans is greater support for individual rights under the rule of law. This is still at least a decade-long project, despite the many well-intentioned efforts that have preceded it. The sooner Pristina and Sarajevo start, the sooner they’ll finish.
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Appeasement without limits
This interview, which I did Tuesday for Anja Ivanović at Podgorica daily Pobjeda, has attracted some attention, so I am posting here the original English version:
Q: The Minister of Serbian defense, Miloš Vučević, stated that the recognition of Kosovo will come back to haunt Montenegro and North Macedonia, much like it has for Ukraine and to all those who promoted Kosovo as an independent state. US ambassador in Serbia Christopher Hill did not make any criticism on this statement but said that he does not see the statements of Serbian officials as an attempt to destabilize the region. What kind of policy do you think Hill is demonstrating with such an attitude toward Belgrade’s propaganda? Why do you think Hill didn’t criticize Serbia at all?
A: US policy now favors Belgrade. Washington is silent on many things: corruption at high levels in Serbia, Serbian threats of the use of force, a Belgrade-sponsored attack on NATO troops, Vucic’s refusal to commit to implementing agreements reached recently in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. You will have to ask Ambassador Hill and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar why. My impression is that they have convinced themselves they can bring Serbia towards the West, despite a good deal of clear and compelling evidence to the contrary. They also appear to be prioritizing Serbia’s allowing arms supplies to get to Ukraine.
Q: Do you believe that the absence of a critical attitude of the American ambassador is proof of a “soft policy” towards Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić? What do you believe needs to happen to change Hill’s approach?
A: Yes, US policy towards Serbia is now all about appeasement. I don’t see this changing while present personnel are in place.
Q: Is it possible that Hill, who openly supported the “Open Balkan” initiative, abstains from reacting to the disputed statements of Serbian officials because of possible privileges in the Initiative “Open Balkan”?
A: So far as I am aware, Open Balkans is a dead letter. Nor do I think it offered much to the US. American support for it was part of the appeasement policy.
Q: This month, US and EU officials sent a letter in which they called for a change of soft policy towards Serbia and Aleksandar Vučić in relation to Kosovo. Do you think that this approach by Hill confirms their request? Is Hill opposing US officials with this statement?
A: The “officials” you mention were legislators. They would like a dramatic change in the current approach. I see no sign yet that US and EU executive branch officials will give it to them. Much more pressure will be required.
Q: The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro and the first Montenegrin ambassador in Washington, Miodrag Vlahović, assessed in an Open Letter (published by Pobjeda) to the US Ambassador in Belgrade, Christopher Hill, that the “Pax Americana” policy promoted by His Excellency Hill through concessions and pandering to the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, was “deeply wrong and compromises decades of positive and effective US engagement in the Balkans.” Do you have comment about Vlahović letter?
Q: I think Ambassador Vlahovic is correct.
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Montenegro: where’s the beef?
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee. He continues his observations on his country’s current political course:
Montenegro’s parliamentary election June 11 gave the Europe Now movement 24 out of 81 seats, edging out the former ruling party and its coalition allies. But the process of creating the new Montenegrin government still goes on. After a long consultations, President Milatović has given Milojko Spajić a mandate. He now has to gain a majority in parliament.
Back to square one
That took almost two months. Now Montenegrin politicians seem to be back to square one. The reason is simple. The dilemma is whether to include pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties (New Serbian Democracy and the Democratic People’s Party) in the next government.
Their inclusion would be risky move for Spajić. The new government would lose any claim to being pro-EU. And it would have no credibility in the West. The US and German ambassadors in Podgorica have emphasized that participation of political parties opposed to NATO and to recognition of Kosovo, or failing to oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine, would block Montenegro’s progress towards the EU.
Limited options
Spajić has received this message, but whether he can comply remains uncertain. Without the pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties, he can hope for support from 44 members of parliament (41 is required for a simple majority). But a qualified majority (3/5) of 49 is required for implementation of crucial judiciary reforms.
The elephant in the room is is the former ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists, together with their allies. They are pro-EU. If things were normal and logical, DPS would be a natural partner for Spajić’s Europe Now movement.
Spajić, however, still clings to the notion that former President Đukanović’s party is “not reformed enough.” Translation: Đukanović is still there. Not able to do what is logical, Spajić is condemned to forming a weak government unable to pursue needed reforms. He might even find himself evicted from the prime ministry after even the smallest dispute or political crisis.
No top cover
President Milatović, his deputy in the Europe Now movement, is part of Spajić’s problem. The President is thought to be connected to a group who have announced the creation of new party. They want inclusion of anti-NATO parties in the new government.
So is this delay about formation of a new reformist government that can take Montenegro into the EU, or is it a power struggle between Spajić and Milatović? Where’s the beef?
New elections?
There is the possibility of new elections. That would mean Spajić lost the power struggle. It is an open question whether it would be good or bad for Montenegro.
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