Tag: European Union
Another Belgrade view on whether Serbia is moving West
The Belgrade Media Center has kindly given me permission to republish in English this interview with Dušan Janjić, the founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations:
The “Serbia against violence” protest will probably crystallize into a network of political parties, civil movements and interest groups with a pro-reform political offer. The inappropriate attitude of the government towards the needs of citizens and the demands of protests of various kinds, strikes and other outpourings of dissatisfaction, as well as frequent manifestations of the incompetence and irresponsibility of the government create conditions for the spread of protests.”
In his opinion, the government is one of the important generators of violence.
“Violence is one of the instruments of staying in power, but also of defending the economic and other monopolies of those who support it. In that alliance, there was a wide spread of power, money and organized crime, especially the drug business. This makes it impossible to realize the necessary deviation from violence”, Janjić states.
Janjić believes that the summer months are important for the spread of protests throughout Serbia, as well as for the preparation of wide promotion in Serbia and for the international promotion of the goals and demands of the protest.
“Apparently, in the fall, the protest mantra becomes: ‘Stop the mafia.’ This protest will be more massive and united by its political message in its stance against the government and the mantra: “Leave”! Then there will be decisive support for the transition of power,” Janjić points out.
The interlocutor of the Media Center states as the main challenge and responsibility for the “coordinators” of the protest: whether they will manage to build a flexible and effective network of associated actors, as well as to train themselves for joint action in which the key actors, in addition to common messages, by preserving their special identities, attract as wide a range as possible in the circle of supporters and future voters; whether they will manage to build and present to the public an alternative political vision, program and political propaganda and marketing communication with citizens.
He adds that this is a condition to maintain and strengthen the motivations and action of the initial protest, as well as to participate in the “Stop Mafia” movement. Otherwise, the emergence of the “Stop Mafia” movement will involve a much wider circle of opposition parties and other entities. But it would be dangerous for the transition if that movement is imposed and the widespread dissatisfaction of citizens is reduced only to a decision against,” Janjić believes.
Janjić notes that it should be borne in mind that in the fall the ruling old women, their coalitions and movements will be activated.
“Also, influential “patriotic”, “sovereigntist” movements such as the Serbian Right and parapolitical organizations and other anti-reformist, anti-NATO players linked to their “pro-Kremlin” ties and interests will be activated on the stage in the fight for voters’ votes in the upcoming elections. On this wave, there could be a repetition of the “betrayal of citizens’ expectations” as well as the real needs of society,” says our interlocutor.
By ignoring all the demands of the protesting citizens, the government has the following messages: That the government does not have the will, readiness, or ability to properly solve the problems that the protests point to; that every new incident, especially a security one, every affair or involvement of the authorities in connection with organized crime is evidence of the corruption of the authorities and increases the concern for the safety of a wide range of citizens, even members of the army and the police; that he does not respect the voice and dignity of citizens; that the ruling elite and its top itself put their own interests and survival in power first; that it has no vision of improving the situation in the country and that it is wandering in search of Serbia’s place in the world. This, in turn, encourages memories of the experiences of poverty and suffering from the era of sanctions and wars in the 90s; That behind the ignoring,
“All in all, the uncertain government and many unfulfilled promises encourage distrust in the government. And one who cannot be trusted cannot be a guarantor of security. This, in turn, further expands the fears, apprehensions, insecurities and sense of threat of the citizens”, concludes Janjić.
Anti-Western and pro-Putin propaganda and admonition of the authorities for European integration
“Since 2012, when SNS came to power, we have been swearing by “European integration” and very little work has been done on the reforms that are a prerequisite for membership.
From 2015 until today, the government is characterized by disorientation regarding the goals and means of running society. In its operation, there is a noticeable increase in the influence of interest groups that are anti-reform and anti-EU and NATO. This is expected and represents “bad news”. The “good news” is that such regimes, from Trump in the USA, Putin’s Russia and even in the EU itself, such as Orban’s, are collapsing. It shows that populist dictatorships are not a sustainable answer to the challenges of decades of economic and political crisis. Just as the EU is working on the “New Green Deal”, Serbia also needs a “New Deal”, ie a strategy and policy for sustainable reforms of the economy, institutions and society”, believes Janjić.
NATO membership is a necessary stage on the way to full EU membership
“That’s the rule. Through its unilateral internal political decision (Resolution of the National Assembly), Serbia declared itself “militarily neutral” and an exception to the rule. This neutrality has nothing in common with the military neutrality of Austria, Finland and Sweden. With the recent accession of Finland and (soon) Sweden to NATO membership, everything has come down to the exception of Austria, which is a member of the EU, but is not a member of NATO,” says the interlocutor of the Media Center.
According to his opinion, tolerance of Serbia’s self-proclaimed neutrality was the result of geostrategic security “balancing” of EU and US interests towards Russia.
“After all, in the example of Serbia, the source of the idea of ”military neutrality” is Putin’s Moscow from the phase of “Euro-Asian integration”. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, in February 2022, marked the end of this policy of Moscow, and of tolerance by the EU, USA and NATO. A new distribution of spheres of interest is underway. This exacerbates the issue of Serbia’s membership in NATO. This, on the other hand, is contrary to the current ideological and political commitment of the majority of political and economic, as well as civil society, especially the SPC,” Janjić states.
The normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is a necessary evil for the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina
“The authorities of Kosovo and Serbia have similar views and ways of dealing with crises. The opening of new crises serves them to create a “new reality”, and this one is interpreted with the leading goal of staying in power. Agreement and normalization of their societies and relations between Serbia and Kosovo is only a necessary evil for these authorities. In that kind of politics, the “final agreement” can only be the “final solution” or the elimination of the Other. This creates circumstances in which the Third Party (Quinte Group) is forced to take the initiative in reducing the damage, which gives rise to the obligation to create a framework for the actions of the authorities of Kosovo and Serbia.
Because of all this, it should be expected that the spiral of the crisis will rise to a higher level and include more and more problems and involved actors. For now, it seems that the Serbian government, with the attacks of Serbian demonstrators on KFOR – NATO soldiers, as well as with the announcement that they will return to the UN Security Council, has reached the limit where they recognize the intention of further militarizing the crisis and bringing Russia and China into the game. This would jeopardize the interests of the Quint Group and the citizens of the Western Balkans themselves in maintaining the current state of “unfinished peace”.
The likely answer will be to increase capacity and cooperation to prevent or control possible armed conflicts. In a political sense, this encourages a re-examination of the overall scope and format of the current “Brussels Dialogue”. There are more and more voices in favor of ending this phase of the “dialogue” by means of the International Conference on the Normalization of Relations (that is, on the stabilization of peace and development) between Kosovo and Serbia. The convener or “facilitator” of the conference would be the European Commission, and the guarantors of the implementation of the agreed solution would be the EU, the USA, Great Britain, NATO and Kosovo and Serbia,” explains Janjić.
A new challenge for Europe, NATO and Russia
“With the last summit held in Lithuania, NATO entered the final stage of its “rounding up” in Europe. The end of the war in Ukraine is coming, the enlargement to the Western Balkans, ie Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Moldova and Georgia. Moscow will, without a doubt, continue with various measures to prevent the unification of Europe in NATO and to “push” NATO as far as possible from the borders of Russia. Certainly, it is a challenge for Europe and NATO as well as for Russia.Although , Russia has an even bigger challenge on its territory east of the Urals, and especially on its Central Asian borders.
Also, the USA, the European Union as well as NATO, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, have to face the challenges of the growing power and influence of China and India. In other words, there is the same challenge before all countries, both for the “Great Powers” and for small countries, such as Serbia: How to adapt to globalization and at the same time ensure their own development”, concluded Janjić.
US sanctions are failing to prevent Bosnian Serb peace violations
I am pleased to publish this piece by Ajdin Muratovic, a Washington, D.C.-based Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project. He has extensive experience working, studying, and living across Eastern Europe.
Targeted sanctions—an increasingly popular item in Washington’s Western Balkans toolkit—are supposed to change behavior and deter future malign conduct. Yet the sanctions the US has leveled against Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik for violating the peace agreement that ended the Bosnian war are failing to achieve either objective. The results could be catastrophic. Failure to maintain peace and stability in Bosnia risks triggering another war in Europe. That could lead to untold human suffering, while sapping resources and bandwidth from strategic priorities such as the war in Ukraine. Such an outcome is easily preventable. US policymakers should modify a sanctions regime that is insufficiently tough, poorly targeted, and lacks multilateral support.
How we got here
In late 1995, the US-led Dayton Agreement ended nearly four years of extreme violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian war introduced the term “ethnic cleansing” to the world. It featured genocide, concentration camps, mass rape, and hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded for the first time in Europe since the Second World War––all less than an hour’s flight from Germany. The Dayton Agreement succeeded in reconciling warring parties and preserving Bosnia’s territorial integrity, but at a price. Postwar Bosnia became a highly decentralized state with two powerful subnational “entities” – the Bosniak-Croat dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS), the latter currently led by Dodik.
Dodik has led Bosnian Serb politics for most of the almost three decades since the end of the war. He was initially seen as a moderate with whom the West could work rather than a hardline Serb nationalist. He started his political career as a State Department darling. But he eventually came to undermine the Dayton peace agreement by creating illegal parallel government institutions, seizing Bosnian central government property, ignoring Bosnian constitutional court orders, and obstructing policies that would improve the Sarajevo government’s ability to function, all while promising unification with Serbia.
Sanctions and the reaction
In response, the US sanctioned Dodik, twice: in 2017 for “actively obstructing the Dayton Agreement” after he defied constitutional court rulings; and again in 2022 for numerous “corrupt and destabilizing activities,” including accumulating “personal wealth through graft, bribery and other forms of corruption.”
Yet Dodik has only become bolder and more extreme since being sanctioned. A recent report to the UN Security Council stated that “secessionist rhetoric and action” has “intensified” during the past six months. The report cites as evidence Dodik’s March 2023 proclamation that “our goal is unification, meaning leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina and joining Serbia.” He added that he and his allies “are just waiting for the moment to do that.”
Rather than idly waiting, Dodik and legislators from his party are acting, implementing a stealth secession. In June, they voted to suspend all rulings of Bosnia’s constitutional court, effectively removing Republika Srpska from the court’s jurisdiction. This and similar moves by Republika Srpska officials violate the Dayton Agreement and threaten to ignite a war. If history is any guide, it will quickly become a regional conflict.
Unrivalled American influence
This is happening in a country where, unlike in Iran or Russia, the US has unrivaled influence. American officials designed Bosnia’s contemporary political system during the Dayton negotiations at an Ohio military base. The agreement, part of which also serves as Bosnia’s constitution, renders it a non-sovereign state with ample opportunity for American intervention.
The most powerful official in the country is not its elected head of government, but a foreign diplomat appointed by internationals known as the High Representative (HR). He oversees civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The HR has immense powers to ensure treaty compliance, including vetoing legislation and firing Bosnian officials. US support is vital for the appointment of a HR, and the Deputy HR is always an American.
An EU-led military force, currently over 1,000 troops, supplements the HR’s treaty enforcement. Additionally, the Dayton Agreement, and a subsequent UN Security Council resolution, permit NATO deployments, including US troops, without consent from Bosnian officials. Although Europeans occupy key civilian and military roles in Bosnia, they only do so with American blessing. Perhaps no example better illustrates American centrality in Bosnia than the fact that key decisions, such as new election laws, are frequently negotiated in the U.S. Ambassador’s residence, rather than in Bosnian institutions.
Strategic irrelevance and tactical errors
Yet Bosnia is not a strategic priority for the United States government. The US Trade Representative’s website, which lists over 110 trading partners, does not include Bosnia. Neither the US National Defense Strategy, nor the National Security Strategy, mentions the country. In fact, the two documents only refer to the Western Balkans region only once. Washington’s assessment that Bosnia is not a priority has led to a concomitant lack of consistent US engagement and high-level policy attention when it comes to the region. This includes insufficient US pressure on problematic actors such as Dodik.
Tactically, sanctions against Dodik have failed in three primary ways.
No isolation
First, they have not isolated him politically or economically. Dodik and his political party continue to win elections. Internationally, he punches above the weight of a sub-national leader. He has allied himself with fellow European right-wing and pro-Russian politicians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban to avoid potential EU sanctions, attended Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s recent presidential inauguration, and is a frequent guest of Putin.
Still, American officials regularly meet with Dodik and behave as if he is a good-faith actor. Dodik has replied to such American attention by doubling down on pro-Russian and secessionist policies. Such meetings only served to highlight the irrelevance of existing sanctions – a point that both Dodik and the opposition make. The sanctions have also been financially inconsequential. Bosnian politicians mostly confine their assets and dealings to the EU and neighboring Balkan countries.
No multilateral complement
This highlights a second tactical shortcoming. There are no multilateral sanctions to complement American ones. So far, only the United Kingdom has joined the sanctions against Dodik. EU sanctions would impose serious economic and lifestyle costs on destabilizing individuals. But the Union refuses to activate a more than decade-old framework to sanction individuals that “undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order” of BiH.
Hungarian and Croatian officials have signaled that they would not provide the necessary unanimous support, despite abundant evidence of sanctionable offenses. Reports also indicate that the EU’s envoy to Bosnia advised against joining the US sanctions for fear of making Dodik a “martyr.” The response to Saudi Arabia’s murder of Jamal Khashoggi demonstrated that individual member states, such as Germany, can levy sanctions independent of the Union. No individual EU member, however, has been willing to join the US in sanctioning Dodik.
Inadequate targeting
In addition to not bringing allies along in support of sanctions, Washington has done an inadequate job of targeting Dodik’s network of political and economic accomplices and proxies. In 2022, the US Treasury, acting on a new executive order that includes corruption as a targetable offensive, sanctioned a Dodik-linked construction firm and a TV station. This well-intentioned attempt has yet to bear fruit.
The construction firm, Integral Inženjering, continues to profit from EU-funded projects, such as a newly-constructed bridge to Croatia. It participates in European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) projects, despite the US being a founding member of the bank and its biggest capital contributor. Alternativna Televizija, formerly a USAID-supported outlet that Dodik’s proxies took over in 2017, has continued with the same pro-Dodik coverage as before the sanctions.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While the US failure to dedicate significant attention to Bosnia has placed the region’s security at risk, it is not too late to make tactical adjustments to sanctions policy. The limited goal should be stopping Dodik’s attacks on the peace agreement.
Get real
Policymakers first need to be honest about the present failure. State Department officials regularly claim, without concrete evidence, that sanctions are having an impact. American lawmakers, rather than serving as an accountability mechanism, are reinforcing the State Department’s narrative. Senator Shaheen, usually an astute foreign policy observer, stated that Dodik, “is upset about the U.S. sanctions, so clearly they are having an impact.”
But merely upsetting a targeted individual is an unserious metric. The US must hold itself to a higher standard. The American-led Dayton Agreement provides ample political and military leverage to maintain regional stability.
Stop the useless meetings
Second, U.S. officials should stop meeting with Dodik and other sanctioned individuals until they start reversing their destabilizing policies. Six years of meetings have not achieved anything other than making US officials appear feckless and incompetent. In a symbolic example of his approach to the US, Dodik humiliated the American ambassador to Bosnia in 2017 by refusing to shake her extended hand. Despite his clear contempt for Washington, every US Ambassador and visiting State Department official since then has continued to meet with him.
Dodik uses these meetings as a spectacle to demonstrate to local audiences his strength relative to the superpower’s emissaries. Frequently he will insult U.S. officials, or even walk out of meetings. None of these meetings have resulted in substantive policy changes on his part. If Washington wants to effect change, its officials need to stop serving as props in this humiliating charade. He is not a good faith actor. Dodik is an aspiring strongman who respects strength, not goodwill gestures.
Target the enablers
Third, the US needs to target Dodik’s economic and political enablers. Earlier rounds of sanctions against Dodik-affiliated entities demonstrated that a business doesn’t need to be registered in Dodik’s name to be considered under his control. While sanctioning Dodik-affiliated television station ATV was a good first step, Washington should go further and lead sanctions against the crown jewel in Dodik’s collection of businesses. That is ATV’s sole owner at the time of sanctioning, a tech services firm named Prointer.
Institutions controlled by Dodik’s political party have awarded Prointer tens of millions of dollars in no-bid IT contracts. The bulk of Prointer’s offering is American software services – 15 of the 22 companies it lists as “technology partners” are US-based. Dodik has confirmed that his son works for the firm. That gives credence to allegations that he was secretly managing the firm on behalf of his father. Prointer is one part of a vast business empire – stretching from real estate to fruit exports – that provides Dodik with unrivaled financial resources to maintain power and pursue his destabilizing agenda.
Avoid contradictions
The US should also sanction the political enablers of Dodik’s secessionist agenda. Treasury’s recent sanctioning of Dodik’s right-hand woman, Zeljka Cvijanovic, is an important step after six years of misguided and contradictory policies. Both Cvijanovic and Dodik celebrate convicted war criminals, engage in genocide denial, defy constitutional court rulings, and call for secession.
The US also appropriately sanctioned Dragan Stankovic for expropriating central government property, but it was Cvijanovic who signed into law the unconstitutional framework for him to do so. The UK sanctioned Cvijanovic in 2021 for violating the Dayton Agreement, but American officials continued to host her in Washington. This accommodating behavior, despite her secessionists policies, only served to embolden separatists by implying that the US was not willing to reinforce its rhetoric of upholding the Dayton Agreement.
Washington should not put itself in such a contradictory and counterproductive situation again. It must demonstrate the same decisiveness that it did in 2004 when it sanctioned every single member of the Serbian Democratic Party for obstructing war crimes prosecutions. Additionally, it banned from US entry every coalition partner of the SDS. These moves sent a clear message about US values, policies, and commitment to upholding the Dayton Agreement. They also contributed to SDS’ political collapse by effectively isolating a whole network of destabilizing individuals.
Secondary sanctions
Fourth, the US should impose so-called secondary sanctions on Dodik himself and his family, forcing non-US firms and individuals to choose between doing business with the U.S. or with Dodik. This type of sanctions leverages US dollar dominance in global trade and American market power to effectively compel non-US entities into implementing American policies. Such sanctions, for example, would apply to any bank dealing in US dollars – practically every legitimate bank on the planet – and conducting business with Dodik.
Secondary sanctions can be controversial for many reasons, including for imposing opportunity costs on non-U.S. businesses for the sake of American interests. While there is rising pushback against them – from China to Russia and plenty of countries in between – there are no American allies that engage in significant business relations with Dodik, meaning that secondary sanctions would be less of a burden than other examples. Additionally, secondary sanctions would partially compensate for the current absence of multilateral sanctions.
Multilateral sanctions
Fifth, irrespective of whether the U.S. implements secondary sanctions, it should ensure that sanctions against Dodik and his allies are multilateral, rather than easily evadable unilateral ones. The US should, at a minimum, coordinate its targeting with the UK to avoid an inconsistent approach, as was the case with Cvijanovic. While getting agreement from all 27 EU member states to sanction Dodik may be unlikely, Washington can still convince individual member states to levy their own.
Germany, for example, has already suspended development projects in the RS, but it should also employ a more targeted approach by punishing destabilizing individuals instead of the whole citizenry.
WHY THIS MATTERS
History demonstrates that seemingly isolated Balkan tensions can quickly escalate to regionally destabilizing events. Yet Europe lacks the willpower, coordination, and capacity to address continental security challenges without American support. To avert humanitarian catastrophe and distraction from strategic priorities, the US should refine its existing sanctions regime.
Dodik’s current trajectory makes peace unsustainable. Future actions to uphold the Dayton Agreement will inevitably require more funds and bandwidth at a time when there is already one war in Europe. The current US sanctions policy undermines its earlier investments in the region and squanders its influence. US taxpayers contributed over $15 billion from 1992 to 2002 on military operations to stabilize BiH and implement the Dayton Peace Agreement.
A National Defense University report assessed that Bosnia was the “exception” to otherwise “poorly coordinated and executed foreign interventions.” This US investment created unprecedented leverage to ensure stability in a volatile region. The current sanctions policy, however, is undermining this investment and making it likely that Dodik will collapse a US-sponsored peace agreement.
The better answer to the Dayton question is bankruptcy now
Thank you for the map, Gerard Toal!
Last week I engaged in the following exchange with Marko Atila Hoare (@markoah). He knows much more about Bosnia and Herzegovina than I ever will:
Marko: But do you think additional EUFOR troops would be a good thing ? I am concerned that if and when R[epublika S[rspska] finally secedes, EUFOR troops would protect it from pro-state BiH forces (in the name of ‘peace’). Even if they just reinforced the Dayton order, that would not be good.
Me: Dayton>secession, at least for now
Marko: Yes; maintenance of Dayton, potentially indefinitely, is a worse danger than an RS secession bid, which could at least be resisted and would allow BiH to repudiate the Dayton straitjacket. Better that RS becomes Transnistria than that it remains a pillar of an apartheid BiH.
We are now in the third decade since then of efforts to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina through dysfunctional powersharing arrangements. It is reasonable for people to ask whether continuing is better than the alternative.
The Dayton question
That is the Dayton question. Is it better to maintain the peaceful but unsatisfying status quo? Or would it be better to let Dayton go and see what will happen? The RS has already salami-sliced its way more than halfway there. It recently passed a law negating the authority of Bosnian Constitutional Court.
Of course the RS might not become a new Transnistria. It might instead become independent or the westernmost province of Serbia. Its secession might also precipitate a series of ethnic rebellions in Kosovo, Macedonia, and even in Serbia. That could be disastrous.
But the more immediate question is what would happen inside Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Brcko
The northeastern town of Brcko was the center of gravity of the last Bosnian war. The reason there was a Dayton negotiation was that the US forced a ceasefire to prevent the Bosnian Federation (Bosniak and Croat) forces from taking it in the fall of 1995. Banja Luka was about to fall. Ten days more would have decided the fate of Brcko.
Answering the Dayton question requires imagining what would happen with RS secession. My guess is that the RS sooner rather than later will try to take over Brcko, because it can’t survive intact without the northeast Bosnian town that links its two wings.
The EUFOR troops responsible for preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity lack the capability to prevent an RS takeover. It is not clear whether forces loyal to the Sarajevo government would be able to do so. That is a vital factor. If they can, then the RS will suffer a terminal defeat and a new negotiation for a more functional constitution would become feasible.
If Sarajevo can’t prevent an RS takeover of Brcko, the RS could secede but the World Bank, IMF, Western governments and investors would cut it off, forcing it into bankruptcy and further into the arms of Russia and Serbia. That would be a source of Schadenfreude for some, but it is not what I would call a winning wicket.
Win win
Far better would be an outcome that blocks secession but still forces a renegotiation of the Dayton agreements. The West should bankrupt the RS before it secedes rather than after. All Western assistance to the RS should come to a halt until all RS moves towards secession, including its law negating the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, are reversed. That would open an opportunity for a rescue effort, executed through Sarajevo, on condition that the constitution be renegotiated.
The EU and US would need to insist on a new constitution that eliminates the elaborate powersharing arrangements in the Dayton version. One person one vote and strong protection for individual political and economic rights are the ideal. But a new constitution should also provide strong protection for group rights when it comes to education, language, religion, and culture. I might prefer a constitution that eliminates the two entities and cantons in the Federation, but that is for Bosnians to decide.
Montenegro’s long day’s journey into night
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee. He continues his observations on his country’s current political course:
Post-election political chaos in Montenegro continues.
A winning “Europe Now!” Movement – which controls 24 out of 81 seats in Parliament – has announced the start of negotiations with the pro-Russian/pro-Serbian coalition “For the Future of Montenegro. ” These are the parties of the former “Democratic Front.” Their leaders are still faced with a pending second trial for their alleged participation in failed 2016 coup d’etat, backed by Russia.
That is no surprise. Europe Now! has repeatedly stated that no negotiations with the former ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) would be possible. That pledge was an important element of their election campaign. That is the first contradiction of the current Montenegrin political constellation: the DPS, which is clearly pro-European, i.e. in favor of EU integrations, cannot be the partner of Europe Now! whose public political program is focused on EU membership.
Three consequences
The option to invite pro-Russian parties to join the new government has provoked three immediate negative consequences.
The first problem already exists. In two governments since the fall from power of DPS there have been no ethnic Montenegrins, a detriment largely ignored by the US and EU. The Serb nationalist narrative prevails.
The second concerns the Albanian, Bosniak, and Croat minority parties, which have 10 seats in parliament.* It is not yet clear whether they will lend their support to a government that denies the Srebrenica genocide, negates Montenegrin identity, and supports Russian aggression in Ukraine. But it is highly unlikely they would participate in a government which (re)confirms the political platform that the Serbian Orthodox Church, backed by Aleksandar Vučić regime, has promoted since 2020.
The third consequence concerns the international community’s Quint (US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy) diplomatic representatives in Montenegro. They continue to hesitate to voice public opposition to participation of pro-Russian parties in the next Montenegrin government. The Ambassadors remain attached to the formula “stable government with clear EU orientation.” Their inertia gives encouragement to pro-Serbian/Russian nationalists.
A serious and present danger
The statements of the Quint do not disturb “Europe Now!” because they fit well with its lip service to EU integration and allow room to include in the government those who have for decades obstructed Euro-Atlantic integration. Still, the unofficial prime minister-designate Milojko Spajić, President of Europe Now!, has been unable to say how many MPs or even parties will support his government, nevermind name a cabinet.
Because of loopholes in the Montegrin constitution, this hiatus allows the “technical” Prime Minister Abazović, to continue in office. His “out-going” mandate has lasted almost a year, despite the lack of accountability for dubious deeds. One of the rare points of consensus (minus Serbia and Russia) is that Abazović should go as soon as possible.
Wrong direction
But that would not suffice to calm the situation. Instability and uncertainty loom over the smallest country in the Western Balkans. Without a clearer and more precise position of the Quint, Montenegro will continue to face enormous problems. It will likely revert to negative and destructive political developments, with implications for the economy and security.
Montenegro continues its long journey in wrong direction. Where and when it may arrive to the point of no return is not only a rhetorical question, but a serious and clear danger.
* This sentence has been corrected from the original, which had omitted the Croats and cited 11 rather than 10 minority seats.
The West needs to rebalance Balkans policy towards tough love
The US Congress has now conducted hearings on the Balkans in both the Senate and House. Members from both sides of the aisle evinced discomfort with Biden Administration policy. It has leaned heavily towards appeasement of Belgrade and has failed to react strongly to secessionist moves in Bosnia. What is the alternative?
The US is oblivious to the obvious
Administration officials are fond of reiterating the laudable 1990s strategic objective: Europe “whole and free.” They are oblivious to the obvious. It is not happening anytime soon. President Putin has forced the drawing of a new line in Europe. The Russian-dominated parts Europe will remain for now on the Eastern side of the line. This includes Russia and Belarus as well as parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria). The remaining questions are about Ukraine and the Balkans. Will the line go through them, or will they join the West?
In Ukraine, conventional warfare will answer the question. In the Balkans, it is already decided. For the foreseeable future, there is no serious prospect that Serbia or Republika Srpska (the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will join the West.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the RS, that is obvious. Its president, Milorad Dodik, is a wholly-owned Russian proxy. He is doing his best to end any accountability to the Sarajevo “state” government. The RS parliament has already passed legislation denying the validity of Constitution Court decisions. It is only a matter of time before it passes legislation claiming state property, which the RS needs as collateral for its international loans. The international community’s High Representative will presumably annul all secessionist legislation from now on, but how he will enforce his decisions is not clear.
Dodik may not proceed all the way to declaring independence, as even Serbia would be reluctant to recognize the RS. But whether he does or not, RS will remain attached to the East so long as he is in power. The only hope for getting rid of him is to bankrupt the entity and bail it out with Western financing, conditional on his resignation and an end to secessionist ambitions. It is not yet clear whether Washington and Brussels have the stomach for that.
Serbia
Serbia is different. President Vucic is hedging between East and West. He plays Washington and Brussels off against Moscow and Beijing, hoping to get all he can from all four. Belgrade has a policy of military neutrality, for example, and conducts exercises with both NATO and Russia. Serbia buys weapons from both East and West. It ships weaponry to both Russia and Ukraine. Belgrade has refused to align with EU sanctions against Russia, but it votes against Russia on some General Assembly resolutions denouncing Russian aggression.
This Yugoslav-style “non-aligned” foreign policy is linked with ethnic nationalist domestic politics and ambitions for regional hegemony. Judging from ongoing anti-Vucic demonstrations, there are a lot of Serbs who aren’t happy with the current regime, which they view as violent, corrupt, and repressive. But the only viable electoral opposition to Vucic stems from his Serbian nationalist right. He has all but obliterated the liberal democratic opposition, which was weak to begin with. He controls most of the popular media and judicial system in addition to the executive. The Serbian security services and their allies in the Serbian Orthodox Church are wedded to Moscow.
In the region, Vucic aims to create the “Serbian world,” analogous to Putin’s “Russian world,” an idea that supported the invasion of Ukraine. In its weakest form, the goal is Belgrade political control over the Serb populations in neighboring states. Belgrade has already achieved that in Montenegro and Kosovo. In Bosnia, only Dodik, whose interests are not congruent, stands in the way. In its stronger form, the Serbian world entails annexation of territory Serbs occupy in neighboring countries and creation of Greater Serbia.
Rebalance the policy
Belgrade has not moved one inch closer to the West in the six years of Vucic’s presidency, despite consuming a truckload of diplomatic carrots. Strengthening of his links to Beijing has more than compensated for any weakening of his links to Moscow. The RS has spent 17 years moving towards secession. It is not going to reverse course without vigorous pushback. This situation requires a more realistic Western policy in the Balkans.
We need to lower expectations and raise incentives. Dodik’s RS and Vucic’s Serbia are not going to voluntarily embrace the West. The US, UK, and EU will need to starve the RS of all Western funds in order to end Dodik’s secessionist ambitions. They will also need to end Serbia’s immunity from Washington and Brussels criticism. Washington recently sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, Director of Belgrade’s Security Intelligence Agency, for corruption, drug and arms trafficking, and supporting Russia’s malign influence. That was a step in the right direction. The EU should do likewise. A public demand for Vulin’s removal as well as for the arrest and extradition to Kosovo of the thugs who attacked NATO peacekeepers in May would be another.
Possible benefits
Rebalancing toward Serbia and the RS would have the great virtue of testing not only their intentions, but also Moscow’s and Beijing’s. Moscow under current conditions is not going to want to increase funding to the RS. China hopes to use Serbia as an entry point to Europe. Beijing might think twice about investing in a Serbia that is on the outs with the EU. We could well be happily surprised if China and Russia decide to cut their losses and leave Serbia and the RS on the Western side of the new division of Europe. If they don’t, we will at least have saddled them with significant burdens.
Rebalancing could also help to revive the moribund dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Washington and Brussels have focused their pressure on Pristina, which has no hedging option and has traditionally bandwagoned with the West. There is a long history of Pristina responding better to carrots than sticks. Even longer is the history of Belgrade responding better to sticks than carrots. If Vucic saw Washington and Brussels coming after him with a stick rather than carrots, he would be inclined to hedge more in their direction. Tough love would bring better results than appeasement.
A good hearing, if the Administration were listening
The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised the alarm in a hearing yesterday about the situation in the Balkans. Member after member cited concerns. They worried about escalating ethnic tensions and instability, Russian malfeasance, Chinese inroads, failure of Serbia and Kosovo to implement agreements, failure to implement court decisions and secessionist moves in Bosnia and Herzegovina, endemic corruption, and flagging economies. They might also have cited substantial migrant outflows from the region.
There was a single witness: Gabe Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary. Despite the availability of many credible people who hold contrasting views, the Congress has unfortunately chosen in this and the previous recent Senate hearing on the Balkans to hear only from the Administration. Congressman Issa (R-CA) was at pains to lament this.
Say it fast and confidently
Gabe quickly cited EU accession as the US objective, without noting the diminished credibility of that prospect and unlikelihood that would happen any time in the foreseeable future. He averred that the “breakthrough” normalization (Ohrid) agreement reached in February and the annex added in March are critical. But he failed to note that Serbia refused to sign both and quickly violated them.
He insisted on the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM) to coordinate culture, education, and public services as the keystone. But he failed to explain why the US has not insisted on the quid pro quo also agreed in 2013. That was the extension of the Kosovo constitution to the Serb majority municipalities of the north. Belgrade has repeatedly blocked that in many different ways.
Gabe noted the supposed agreement of Kosovo and Serbia to recognize each other’s documents and national symbols. But he neglected to note that this is a problem principally in Serbia. He repeated the canard that Serbia would no longer lobby against Kosovo’s international integration. Serbian President Vucic has pledged not to fulfill that provision. Belgrade failed to observe it at the Council of Europe days after signing the agreement.
In Bosnia, Gabe cited Milorad Dodik’s anti-Dayton activities. But he was at a loss to explain how the US would get Europe to join in the sanctions against him. He cited excessive reliance in the region on Russian energy. However, he failed to note that Serbia is the prime culprit in that respect.
The questioning was good
Chair Kean (R-NJ) wanted to know whether the US will bring strong pressure to bear on President Vucic if Kosovo Prime Minister proceeds with the ASMM. Gabe said a quick and confident “absolutely” and went on to claim that the agreement requires Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This it clearly does not do. He added that Serbia has agreed to remove the protesters and participate in new elections for mayors in northern Kosovo.
I suppose that might be true in diplomatic channels, but where is the evidence in public? Would you believe it just a few months after elections held because Belgrade agreed the Serbs would participate but that they then boycotted? Gabe went on to say that those demonstrators who attacked journalists Kosovo police and NATO should be punished. Where is the public US demand that Belgrade, which ordered the rioting, turn them over to the Kosovo justice system?
Ranking Member Keating (D-MA) focused on China. Gabe rightly emphasized Beijing’s political conditions but placed his hope entirely in the EU to institute (some day) contracting procedures that would counter Beijing and keep projects open to US competitors.
Sanctions
Representative Wagner (R-MO) underlined her bipartisan “Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreements Through Sanctions” Act. Gabe pledged to support it and to prevent financing from reaching those who are trying to dismantle Bosnia (in addition to support for EUFOR and the HiRep). That sounded serious. Maybe State has finally realized that staying silent on Dodik is not a winning strategy. The Congressman made it clear she wanted Hungary bent into allowing EU sanctions on Dodik.
Congressman Titus (D-NV) focused on Russian disinformation and the free press. Gabe skipped the opportunity to focus criticism on Serbia, which has seen a long decline in press freedom and a dramatic rise of Russian disinformation.
Congressman Huizenga (R-MI) asked about Serbia buying Chinese and Russian arms. Gabe claimed Serbia had curtailed its purchases from Russia “significantly” in response to the threat of sanctions but has increased procurement from China (which is not covered by the “CAATSA” sanctions in question). Huizenga also asked about the five EU nonrecognizers. Gabe took the opportunity to claim vaguely that action on the ASMM would be helpful.
Congressman Self (R-TX) focused on President Vucic’s incitement of the election boycott and import of heavy weapons from Russia. Why don’t we have sanctions on Serbia now? Gabe squirmed out by claiming that he didn’t control CAATSA sanctions and that other sanctions had been used in the Balkans, neglecting to mention they have not been used against Serbia. Self made it clear he regards Serbia as a Russian proxy in the Balkans.
Congressman Moran (R-TX) asked about Montenegro. Sadly, Gabe was unaware of the newly contracted coastal road there that the Chinese will build and mistakenly thought it was the already built north/south highway. He also took the opportunity to emphasize that Montenegro’s new government will make Podgorica a fast-achieving candidate for EU membership and that its new president as “pro-American.” I don’t yet see any guarantee of those two propositions.
A well-briefed committee, but the Administration isn’t listening
Well-briefed, the members of Congress asked good questions. The Administration responses were less convincing. They consistently avoided any serious criticism of Serbia and continued to hold Kosovo principally, if not exclusively, responsible for the current train wreck. There was no sign that Gabe was listening to the repeated indications that a tougher approach with Serbia is needed.
Two notable omissions. Gabe did not mention Open Balkans, a Belgrade initiative that appears to have died a merited death. But bad ideas never die in the Balkans. They return like zombies to haunt the region. Just wait a few years, or maybe months. It will be back, along with partition.
Unless I missed it, Gabe also failed to mention the recently sanctioned Serbian Director of the Security Intelligence Agency. No one asked what we are going to do about Aleksandar Vulin. That was an unfortunate omission.