Tag: European Union
Breaking up Bosnia is not the thing to do
Ismet Fatih Čančar is an independent researcher, a former Partnership for Peace Fellow at NATO Defence College, and a former advisor to the Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He writes:
On August 30, The Spectator published an article by Swansea law professor Andrew Tettenborn in which the author exults in the break up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believes this is a natural course of events, the inevitable ending of “the pantomime horse democracy.”
He is wrong. The break up of Bosnia is not a safe roadmap to sustainable peace in the Balkans. His argument is consistent with nationalist Serb and Croat actors who claim Bosnia is an aberration with no future, due to its ethnic differences and diversity.
Ignoring the law…
The complexities of the constitutional and political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the power-sharing structure under the Dayton Agreement, and the division of the society along ethno-national groups are well-known. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against this system August 29 in Kovačević vs Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court identified a series of systemic, institutional discriminations that need to be amended if Bosnia wants to progress on the Euro-Atlantic path.
Critics oppose implementation of this verdict, stating that any implementation, or even the mere thought of reforming or upgrading the Dayton Agreement, will lead to conflict and Bosnia’s break up. Discarding such a landmark decision is a brazen attempt to undermine the significance of the verdicts of an international court, in this case the highest legal and judicial institution in Europe in charge of implementation and protection of basic human rights.
The opinion of the ECHR in the case of Kovačević vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a lethal blow to the foundations of the discriminatory, ethno-national, backward oriented, immoral social contract embodied in the Dayton Agreement, which deprives a large number of Bosnian citizens of their basic civic rights. This is the greatest strength of the verdict: it directs Bosnia and Herzegovina to reject a system that subordinates individual citizens’ rights to the priorities of the country’s three major ethnic groups.
The argument that Bosnia cannot exist if it is not strictly an ethnic electoral system is a lazy, watered down excuse of anti-Bosnian actors who receive support from Moscow and wish to keep the country trapped in the chains of ethno-national politics. The alternative, a citizen-based civic model for Bosnia and Herzegovina, requires more political will and resources, but it is the best path towards a functional constitutional democracy like those other European citizens enjoy across the continent.
…and the facts
In an attempt to make the idea of Bosnian break up more digestible, domestic actors and international observers often display ignorance towards basic historical facts. Contrary to the statement that Bosnia and Herzegovina is “an entity set up following Bill Clinton’s brokering of the Dayton Accords in 1995,” Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina derives its continuity from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted into the United Nations three years earlier, in 1992. Before that it was for centuries a stable European state with borders defined by natural geographical features and state structures. It was the Bosnian Kingdom in the Middle Ages, Bosnia during Ottoman rule, a Corpus separatum during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and one of six republics within Socialist Yugoslavia. The claim that Bosnia’s diversity has produced animosity of “historical memories” lacks substance. Its civilizational space and international subjectivity are historic constants. Diverse religions and beliefs have coexisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries in peace and harmony.
The problems come from Serbia and Croatia, not Bosnia
The constant effort to break Bosnia up comes mainly from Serbia and Croatia, which have throughout history sought to annex parts of its territory. The source of the problem in the Balkans is not the allegedly irreconcilable religious, ethnic and national differences among people, but rather the “Greater-state” ambitions of Serbia and Croatia.
A series of judgments of international courts have unequivocally established the fact that the war pillage and destruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted from the political projects of Belgrade and Zagreb to ethnically clean territories. They used both ethnic and religious factors to inflame interethnic hatred, mistrust, and instability, culminating in mass war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
These ambitions continue to serve as the political focus of Serb and Croat nationalist and secessionist actors, thus slowing nationbuilding in Bosnia. To save peace in the Balkans, the US and EU should raise their voices against the ethnonationalists, who deny genocide and glorify war crimes and their perpetrators.
Bosnia and Ukraine
The main reasons to reject the idea of breaking up Bosnia are not historical, but moral and political. Accepting Bosnia’s breakup would legitimize genocide and ethnic cleansing, posing a dangerous precedent for similar campaigns of killing and persecution. Such a precedent could also serve as a potent initiator of militant ethnocracy on European soil, which can easily consume other hotspots across the continent in pursuit of ethno-national exclusivity. The logic of blood and soil would return Europe to the 1930s.
It would be hypocritical for the democratic world to insist on defending democratic ideals under attack in Ukraine, while permitting the break up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ukrainian struggle is also the Bosnian struggle. The secessionist leader of the Bosnian Serbs has openly praised and publicly awarded Putin for the atrocities he has committed against Ukrainians. The recent visit of members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kiev conveyed the right message. The campaign of Russian “denazification” of Ukraine is a campaign that Bosnia and Herzegovina also went through in its struggle towards freedom and international affirmation.
Principles of justice and legality, inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect for human rights, and the promotion of peace and security are of crucial importance for the European continent. They need to be defended in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Make partition unacceptable to the Serbs in northern Kosovo
Yesterday I wrote about what Serbia should be doing to atone for its unsuccessful insurrection in Kosovo. Today is I am writing about what Pristina should do to ensure that such a plot will never succeed. The Kosovo police should not be the only institution committed to preventing more terrorist attacks.
The secret sauce is budget and budget execution
The key for Pristina is gaining the acceptance, if not the affection, of Kosovo Serbs. To be fair, Pristina has already done a great deal to achieve this in communities south of the Ibar river. According to the Prime Minister himself:
Ten Serb-majority municipalities in have received on average 62% more budget (as a whole) per capita, as well as 89% more in capital expenditures per capita than the other 28 municipalities, 27 of which are Albanian-majority.
This is shown by Ministry of Finance Budget Dept. data from the last 14 yrs (’08-’22). When it comes to budget utilization, the 6 relatively well-integrated Serb-majority municip. in the south of have consistently performed better than the 4 in the north.
Tweeted February 7
Serbs, mainly from south of the Ibar, participate in Kosovo’s government and benefit visibly from doing so, even if they remain unsatisfied.
Last time I was in the four northern municipalities, admittedly a few years ago, the difference was apparent. The north was decrepit. Belgrade had mercilessly exploited it while Pristina largely ignored it. That needs to change: more budget execution and less interference from Belgrade are key. The EU and US need to do much more to convince Belgrade to withdraw its security forces and end their cooperation with local crime bosses.
Money won’t be enough
But more than cash and restraints on Belgrade are needed. Pristina should “reach out” to the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But what does this mean?
First and foremost it means establishing the rule of law there. The 2013 Brussels agreement between Belgrade and Pristina ensured it would be under the authority of Pristina’s police and courts, suitably integrated with Serbs. Belgrade has withdrawn the Serb personnel. Those who meet objective criteria for professionalism should be reintegrated and new hires recruited. Intimidation of Serbs who work for the Pristina institutions needs to be prosecuted, with help from EULEX.
Second, it means enabling free and pluralistic political discourse in the north. Pristina should aim to end the Srpska Lista political monopoly. The US and EU should provide assistance to other organizations of Serbs and others in the north to organize and campaign effectively. No new elections should be held before pluralism is ensured. It will do no good if the people who organized the insurrection win. In the meanwhile, Pristina should provide the non-Serb mayors with strong financial and political support to improve living conditions in their municipalities.
Third, Pristina should welcome dissent in the Serb communities, not only in the north. Opposition Albanian parties in Pristina should reach out to Serbs in the north to form coalitions. That would introduce a refreshing change in Kosovo politics.
Serbs are essential to Kosovo’s identity and independence
Most Kosovo Serbs do not like Kosovo’s independence. But so long as they remain in Kosovo–I hope forever–they are a vital piece of it. Without the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most live and most Serb religious sites are located, Kosovo as a separate state would lose an important reason for its separate existence. The Serbs are, in addition to a distinct history of the Albanian populations, one of the important factors that distinguish Kosovo from Albania. A Kosovo patriot today will want all Serbs and other minorities protected and even cherished.
I have the sense that Kosovars increasingly appreciate that point. Belgrade does not. President Vucic shows little concern for the welfare of the Serbs in Kosovo, especially those who live south of the Ibar. He uses their falsely portrayed plight to pump up war fever in Serbia. Belgrade is committed to partition. It wants the north, de facto if not de jure. Pristina should aim to make that something the northern Serbs reject.
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Presidential clarity in video
I try hard to keep an open mind and to understand opposing perspectives. But there are moments when doing so denies reality. This is one of those moments in the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. If Pristina had done anything like what Belgrade has done, you can be sure I would be just as tough with Kosovo.
The attempted Serbian uprising in northern Kosovo weekend before last was just that. Belgrade trained and equipped 30 or so paramilitary cadres, who murdered a Kosovo policeman before losing three of their own men. Likely they intended to spark much more violence and a crackdown, with a view to justifying a Serbian military intervention. Serbia mobilized its forces and sent them to the border/boundary, which suggests an invasion was planned.
Two dozen or so perpetrators escaped to Serbia, where they still harbor. They include he ringleader, Milan Radoicic. He is a close political partner of Serbia’s President Vucic, supposedly now under house arrest. I haven’t seen anything on the whereabouts of the others.
Verbal reactions aren’t enough
So far, the US and EU public reactions have been exclusively verbal. Both Washington and Brussels know that the Serbian state was responsible for an attempted violent insurrection with political purposes, aka terrorism. Kosovo President Osmani in the above video is right to be calling for sanctions. If Serbia gets off scot free in public, it will only incentivize similar behavior, perhaps not only by Belgrade. There are lots of capitals that might like to foment rebellion in neighboring democracies.
This attempted insurrection is only the latest in a long series of Serbian efforts to destabilize the situation in Kosovo. It is high time to impose serious sanctions. What might that mean? Here are a few thoughts about items that should be on the options menu:
- Suspend Air Serbia flights to the US and EU.
- Freeze World Bank and EBRD projects in Serbia.
- Suspend EU and US official financing for economic (not democracy) projects in Serbia.
- Freeze Serbia’s negotiations for EU accession.
- Suspend military cooperation between the Serbian Army and the Ohio National Guard.
- Impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals who ordered and supervised the training of the paramilitaries.
Expectations should be clear
Just as important as sanctions are the expectations they are intended to support and what Serbia would need to do to end them. Here are a few suggestions for those:
- An official, public apology by the President of Serbia to the President of Kosovo.
- Delivery to the Kosovo authorities for trial of all of the alleged perpetrators harbored in Serbia.
- Disbanding of the Srpska List political party.
- A documented end to all arming and equipping of insurrectionary forces inside Kosovo.
- Documented withdrawal of all covert Serbian security forces from Kosovo territory.
These aren’t much more than random thoughts. There are many other things that could be done, either by way of sanctions or demands. The point is that verbal denunciations alone will not suffice. The EU and US should be aiming to permanently weaken Serbia’s hold on northern Kosovo.
Right the balance
Kosovo is currently suffering substantial EU “consequences”, for its failure to comply with Brussels demands for removal of elected mayors from municipal buildings and reduction of Kosovo police presence in the Serb communities of Kosovo’s north. I don’t know how the mayors are doing, but it was presumably the police presence that enabled a quick, effective, and professional reaction to the attempted insurrection. The EU should lift its sanctions on Kosovo. The circumstances that led to their imposition have evaporated.
The time has come to recognize that “consequences” for Serbia are far more important and entirely justified. The moment has come to right the balance in EU and US policy, which parliamentarians in both have declared unfairly weighted in favor of Serbia and against Kosovo.
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It’s not only about Kosovo
Serbia’s effort to destabilize Kosovo so that it can claim control of its Serb-majority north should today be apparent to all. The license plate brouhaha of last year, the boycott of municipal elections in the spring, the subsequent rioting against the elected non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO peacekeepers in May, the kidnapping of Kosovo police–these were all prelude to the foiled insurrection last weekend.
Hear and see no evil
But the US and EU have so far failed to draw the necessary conclusions. They continue to call for dialogue without any consequences levied against Belgrade. The American Ambassador in Belgrade has even seen fit to suggest Serbia should join NATO. The overwhelming majority of Serbs reject that prospect. Their government’s recent behavior makes it not just illogical but nonsensical.
Within the EU, holding Serbia accountable is difficult because it requires unanimity. Viktor Orban’s pro-Russian Hungary is the usual spoiler. The outcome of yesterday’s election in Slovakia will make Bratislava Moscow’s next best friend.
In the US, it is the Biden Administration’s dogged and fruitless offer of goodies to turn Serbia towards the West that blocks any serious reevaluation of Balkans policy. The officials concerned simply do not want to accept failure. They continue to pursue appeasement, blind to Belgrade’s malfeasance.
It’s not only Kosovo
This blindness will have consequences. Serbia, like Russia, sees the West as divided and weak. Belgrade may back off temporarily in Kosovo in order not to provoke a serious reaction. But Serbia will continue to pursue irredentist aims in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Montenegro, government formation is blocked. The new president there wants pro-Russian parties in the coalition. The prime minister-designate is resisting, under pressure from Washington and Brussels. But he also rejects cooperation with the Western-oriented former ruling party. The country is in a dangerous limbo. Belgrade, working with the Serbian Orthodox Church, could well create chaos there, as it has repeatedly in recent years.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community High Representative has taken a series of unwise decisions that have damaged his own standing. He can no longer freely enter the 49% of the country’s territory known as Republika Srpska (RS). Its leader has taken the entity to within a few short steps of secession. He awaits only Moscow and Belgrade approval to declare de jure independence. He has already separated the RS from the country’s judicial and executive authority.
What’s next?
The Ukraine war will be an important factor in what happens next in the Balkans. The omens are not favorable in any of the possible scenarios.
If Russia were to lose in Ukraine, Moscow might well try to get compensation in the Balkans. The method would be destabilization, not naked aggression. Serbia could be given the green light and covert assistance to create chaos in northern Kosovo, force installation of a pro-Russian government in NATO member Montenegro, and allow RS to declare full autonomy if not independence.
If Russia wins in Ukraine by holding on to Crimea and at least part of Donbas, the precedent will reinforce Serbia’s push for at least de facto if not de jure control of Serb populations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
If the war in Ukraine continues for another year, Moscow could decide to refocus on the Balkans and set a precedent there for what it wants in Ukraine.
All these scenarios would entail major losses for the the US and EU. They can be prevented. But only if current policies are reevaluated now and a much tougher approach taken to counter Serbian irredentism.
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Stiffening the approach to Serbia
Kosovo police and NATO forces in the Serb-majority north of the country over the weekend foiled an armed uprising. One Kosovo policeman and three terrorists were killed and others arrested. But most seem to have escaped. Serbia and its Srpska Lista political proxies in Kosovo have declared a day of mourning. That confirms their support for the insurrection. The little green men appear to have found safe haven inside Serbia.
Serbian President Vucic met subsequently with the Russian Ambassador. Vucic complained about “brutal ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, for which there is no evidence. We have no confirmation that Vucic ordered the armed uprising. But one of his mainstays in northern Kosovo was involved. Such things don’t happen without Belgrade’s knowledge. Vucic could have stopped it in advance or denounced it after the fact. He did not do either.
What this incident tells us
This incident is confirmation that Vucic does not intend to normalize relations with Kosovo. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue with that objective is a cover for his real goal. He wants separation of the four northern Serb-majority municipalities. He would prefer de jure partition and hopes that Russian success in annexing parts of Ukraine will validate that objective. But he would settle, for now, for de facto separate governance, in the form of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
Pristina has demonstrated that its police can handle, with NATO backing, a heavily armed group of several dozen determined militants. But it is just as clear that Serbian armor could move into Kosovo with ease. It is less than 25 miles, maybe an hour’s tank drive, from the nearest Serbian border crossing to north Mitrovica. NATO has recently beefed up its forces in Kosovo. But it is not clear whether they are equipped or trained for anti-armor warfare.
American and European diplomats think Serbia will not attempt such a move because of the political consequences. But Vucic knows better. He is trying to convince the world that Serbs are being ethnically cleansed from Kosovo. That could validate a claim his tanks protect civilians. That is why he repeatedly claims, without evidence, that such ethnic cleansing is ongoing, as he did yesterday in a meeting with the Russian Ambassador.
The American and European response
The Western response has been weak so far. Brussels and Washington have appealed to “both sides” to prevent further violence and escalation. This implicitly equates the sterling performance of the Kosovo police with an illegal armed uprising that could have caused instability throughout the Balkans. Those responsible for Balkans policy in both capitals are unwilling to admit failure of their efforts to lure Serbia westward. Instead, they are urging a quick return to “the dialogue.”
An alternative approach would denounce Belgrade’s support for the armed uprising, labeling it a terrorist act and levying sanctions against Vucic and his defense and national security officials. NATO would prepare its forces in northern Kosovo for defense against an armored invasion. The West would praise the Kosovo police and urge a fair and speedy trial for the perpetrators in Kosovo courts. Ambassadors to Belgrade would be withdrawn for consultations.
A new policy is needed
They could be sent back quickly with a single message: the era of appeasement is over. If Belgrade wants EU membership, Serbia needs to quickly:
- arrest and turn over the terrorists to the Kosovo authorities.
- drop its insistence on separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo.
- align with Ukraine sanctions on Russia.
- support Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the United Nations.
If Belgrade refuses, the EU should announce it is freezing accession talks. The US should suspend military cooperation with Serbia, including cooperation with the Ohio National Guard.
Washington and Brussels should also prepare to spur Pristina to reach out to northern Serbs to find alternatives to Srpska Lista. In addition, Pristina should seek to ensure that there are no anti-Serb incidents throughout Kosovo, in order to invalidate Vucic’s claims of ethnic cleansing. Pristina should promptly investigate any incidents that do occur. The courts should promptly try perpetrators.
It is time to reconfigure Western policy on Serbia and Kosovo. Renewal of the current approach will bring new failures. A firmer approach with Belgrade is the necessary first step.
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Stevenson’s army, September 19
– Politico’s story on the farm bill shows how lobbyists work.-
– National review shows Europe is helping Ukraine.
– NATO members have also been increasing their own defense budgets
– WSJ says Chinese Foreign Minister was fired for having an affair while ambassador to US
– NYT says US wants a security treaty with Saudi Arabia modeled after Japan treaty
– House GOP pretends they have a plan to balance the federal budget
– Meanwhile the House GOP has failed to move either its spending package or the DOD appropriations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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