Tag: European Union
Belgrade: a question of when, not if
A friend writes from Belgrade:
Vucic continues to psychologically set the conditions to prepare the population for war against Kosovo through the media and other means. These efforts have intensified recently:
–Vucic plans to invade the north of Kosovo as soon as it is politically expedient to do so;
–Timing depends on his perceptions of relative Russian strength/support, and Western weakness;
Perceptions of Western weakness
–The continued strength of Western support for Ukraine will play a large role in these perceptions. If Western support for Ukraine is seen as tepid or pushing Ukraine towards unwanted negotiations, then Vucic will feel emboldened;
–Vucic’s perceptions of Western weakness depend in part on feedback from Serbia’s recently reinvigorated lobbying effort in Washington, as well as feedback from Orban and Lajcak;
–Vucic’s perceptions of Western weakness/resolve also depend in part on US Ambassador Hill’s continued highly embarrassing and debasing public efforts to kow-tow to Serbia;
Deterrence is failing
–Vucic believes the West will not respond militarily to an incursion in the north of Kosovo and will only wag fingers and protest impotently, while calling for renewed negotiations;
–These opinions are shared by most educated Serbs and are seen as painfully obvious to all but the most sycophantic Western politicians and diplomats;
–The only Serbs who seem to disagree with this evaluation are those with a vested financial interest courting the EU and Washington, or those who support retaking Kosovo and think they can fool the West.
Thus, it is a question of when, not if, and a question of whether or not the US and EU can retain any deterrent credibility in the short to medium term.
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Failure is definitely an option
Things are coming apart in the Balkans, where a sometimes uneasy peace has prevailed for more than two decades. War in the 1990s mode is unlikely. No one can sustain a conflict like the one in Bosnia, which lasted more than three years. Nor would the NATO-led forces in Kosovo tolerate a full-scale Serbian invasion of its entire territory. But instability, armed clashes, ethnic strife, and dysfunction are more than possible. They are likely. US and EU policies and practices are not helping.
Dodik threatens Bosnia and Herzegovina with secession
Milorad Dodik is back as president of the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska, or RS) that governs on 49% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has continued to salami-slice his way towards independence, de facto if not de jure. Recent moves include two notable ones. The RS Assembly has passed legislation that purports to invalidate the jurisdiction of Bosnia’s judicial system. In addition, Dodik himself has declared that the international community High Representative, responsible for the Dayton peace agreement, will be arrested if he enters RS territory. Both moves violate both the spirit and letter of the Dayton agreements. But apart from declaring the former invalid the HiRep, Washington, and Brussels have done nothing to counter them.
Dodik has also built up the police forces of the RS, obtained ample armaments and financing from Russia, and successfully enlisted Hungary to block any EU sanctions Brussels might propose. Washington has sanctioned him both for his challenges to Dayton and for blatant corrupt practices. But the lack of a unified Western response invites further salami slices. So too does Dodik’s warming relationship with Belgrade, which is seeking a “Serbian world” that incorporates the Serb populations of neighboring countries.
Vucic threatens part of Kosovo
That is an even more serious threat in Kosovo. Serbia already controls four Serb-majority municipalities north of the Ibar River contiguous with the border Belgrade calls a “boundary.” With encouragement from Belgrade, the Serbs there have abandoned the Kosovo institutions, boycotted recent elections, and rioted against installation of the non-Serb mayors who were consequently elected. Serbia has kidnapped Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, mobilized its army along the border/boundary, intimidated Serbs into leaving the Kosovo Security Force, threatened North Macedonia and Montenegro for having recognized Kosovo, and rejected agreements reached with Pristina that the US and EU claim are legally binding. The Americans and Europeans have responded only with mild verbal reprimands.
That has not been true for Pristina, which has incurred “consequences” for its insistence on installing the non-Serb mayors in their offices and deploying paramilitary police in response to disorder. While northern Kosovo has calmed since the spring, US and EU diplomats are still insisting on their own demands for withdrawal of Kosovo police from Kosovo’s sovereign territory. Meanwhile, Serbian President Vucic has been busy trying to prevent Ukraine from recognizing Kosovo independence, in clear violation of the agreement the Europeans and Americans say is binding.
Vucic also threatens the whole of Montenegro
The situation is even less salubrious in NATO member Montenegro. It lacks a fully empowered government following June elections. The President wants Russophilic political parties in the government. The Prime Minister-designate does not, but he also resists bringing in the former ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). The result will either be a government with a thin majority in parliament or new elections. In any new election, Serbia will pull out all the stops to support the Russophiles, who are also pro-Serbian.
The obvious solution would be a coalition between the Europe Now! winners of the June election and DPS, which is also pro-European. But Belgrade will exert enormous pressure on the President and Prime Minister-designate to prevent such a combination. Serbia sees the possibility of regaining de facto, if not de jure, control of all of Montenegro. That would eliminate a potential rival for EU membership. It would also render Montenegro’s NATO membership a practical dead letter. Podgorica would continue to be a member, but serve Russian interests.
Blind to the obvious
The sources of threats in the Balkans to peace, stability, and progress towards the EU are clear. They lie in Banja Luka and Belgrade. Moscow supports both. But Brussels and Washington remain blind to the obvious. They are still trying to bend Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro in directions the majority does not want to go. Failure is an option. Now is the time to re-assess and correct course. Democracy and rule of law require it.
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The right direction for Balkans policy
Labor Day weekend is over, so everyone in the US is back at work. It’s a good moment to reflect on EU and US policy in the Balkans.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is pointing in the right direction. It has decided, subject to confirmation, that the Bosnian constitution, agreed at the Dayton peace talks in 1995, violates the individual rights of its citizens. They cannot all vote for their choice as president, due to geographic and ethnic restrictions, which also dominate in the election of other officials.
This power-sharing arrangement was essential at the end of the Bosnian war. It reassured the warring parties that they could hold on to power. Other ethnic groups would not be dominant. Twenty-eight years of peace have ensued.
That is nothing to sniff at. The Dayton scheme seemed a house of cards when it was signed in December 1995. The Americans made the constitution difficult to amend because they realized how fragile the arrangement would likely be. But the constitution they imposed was precisely what the then warring ethnic nationalists wanted. They have used its bizarre concatention of group rights to protect their own hold on power. They have also prevented citizens who don’t identify with a particular group from gaining power.
This is not the first time the ECHR has intervened in favor of individual rights regardless of ethnicity. Bosnian politicians have mostly ignored its previous decisions. This one will likely suffer the same fate, unless something is done to counter the inertia.
Kosovo
Kosovo is different, arguably more successful. Its minority communities are much smaller relative to the majority than those in Bosnia. Still, Kosovo has strong constituitonal arrangements to protect minorities, including a veto on constitional changes. There are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as the government, minority vetoes, and an advisory Council of Communities linked directly to the President. But there are no ethnic restrictions on voting rights comparable to Bosnia’s.
Belgrade, Washington, and Brussels have been pressing Pristina hard to implement a 10-year-old agreement that calls for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM). Belgrade wants it to have executive powers. That would make it a level of governance intermediary between Pristina and the country’s municipalities, which have ample powers of their own.
The ASMM could thus become analogous to Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Advocates of the ASMM say that such arrangements for minority governance exist in more than a dozen European Union member states. But in all those instances the neighoring countries recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors. That is not the case with Kosovo, as Serbia has steadfastly refused recognition and its officials now assert it will never happen.
What is to be done?
Washington and Brussels should be pressing Bosnian politicians this fall to implement the most recent as well as previous ECHR decisions. The Europeans and Americans should also back off pressing Pristina for the ASMM, explaining to Serbia that its formation will have to await Belgrade’s recognition as well as recognition by the five non-recognizing EU members. Washington and Brussels should also be prepared to guarantee that the ASMM will be consistent with the Kosovo constitution. They have said as much in op/eds. They should say it in a formal international agreement.
Along with these diplomatic moves should come a vigorous effort to upgrade the judicial systems in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Unfortunately, the Bosnian ruling parties are gutting serious reform. Bosnia needs to make its prosecutors and judges far more independent of politics. Extending the existing international OSCE judicial monitoring to prosecutors would be a major step in the right direction. In Kosovo, it is vital that Belgrade encourage the Serb judges and police to return to the country’s institutions, which they exited last spring at Belgrade’s behest. Belgrade also needs to refrain from influencing their decisions.
Group rights–including the ASMM in Kosovo as well as Bosnia’s existing constitutional provisions–are the wrong direction. The right direction for EU and US policy in the Balkans is greater support for individual rights under the rule of law. This is still at least a decade-long project, despite the many well-intentioned efforts that have preceded it. The sooner Pristina and Sarajevo start, the sooner they’ll finish.
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Appeasement without limits
This interview, which I did Tuesday for Anja Ivanović at Podgorica daily Pobjeda, has attracted some attention, so I am posting here the original English version:
Q: The Minister of Serbian defense, Miloš Vučević, stated that the recognition of Kosovo will come back to haunt Montenegro and North Macedonia, much like it has for Ukraine and to all those who promoted Kosovo as an independent state. US ambassador in Serbia Christopher Hill did not make any criticism on this statement but said that he does not see the statements of Serbian officials as an attempt to destabilize the region. What kind of policy do you think Hill is demonstrating with such an attitude toward Belgrade’s propaganda? Why do you think Hill didn’t criticize Serbia at all?
A: US policy now favors Belgrade. Washington is silent on many things: corruption at high levels in Serbia, Serbian threats of the use of force, a Belgrade-sponsored attack on NATO troops, Vucic’s refusal to commit to implementing agreements reached recently in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. You will have to ask Ambassador Hill and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar why. My impression is that they have convinced themselves they can bring Serbia towards the West, despite a good deal of clear and compelling evidence to the contrary. They also appear to be prioritizing Serbia’s allowing arms supplies to get to Ukraine.
Q: Do you believe that the absence of a critical attitude of the American ambassador is proof of a “soft policy” towards Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić? What do you believe needs to happen to change Hill’s approach?
A: Yes, US policy towards Serbia is now all about appeasement. I don’t see this changing while present personnel are in place.
Q: Is it possible that Hill, who openly supported the “Open Balkan” initiative, abstains from reacting to the disputed statements of Serbian officials because of possible privileges in the Initiative “Open Balkan”?
A: So far as I am aware, Open Balkans is a dead letter. Nor do I think it offered much to the US. American support for it was part of the appeasement policy.
Q: This month, US and EU officials sent a letter in which they called for a change of soft policy towards Serbia and Aleksandar Vučić in relation to Kosovo. Do you think that this approach by Hill confirms their request? Is Hill opposing US officials with this statement?
A: The “officials” you mention were legislators. They would like a dramatic change in the current approach. I see no sign yet that US and EU executive branch officials will give it to them. Much more pressure will be required.
Q: The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro and the first Montenegrin ambassador in Washington, Miodrag Vlahović, assessed in an Open Letter (published by Pobjeda) to the US Ambassador in Belgrade, Christopher Hill, that the “Pax Americana” policy promoted by His Excellency Hill through concessions and pandering to the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, was “deeply wrong and compromises decades of positive and effective US engagement in the Balkans.” Do you have comment about Vlahović letter?
Q: I think Ambassador Vlahovic is correct.
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Montenegro: where’s the beef?
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee. He continues his observations on his country’s current political course:
Montenegro’s parliamentary election June 11 gave the Europe Now movement 24 out of 81 seats, edging out the former ruling party and its coalition allies. But the process of creating the new Montenegrin government still goes on. After a long consultations, President Milatović has given Milojko Spajić a mandate. He now has to gain a majority in parliament.
Back to square one
That took almost two months. Now Montenegrin politicians seem to be back to square one. The reason is simple. The dilemma is whether to include pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties (New Serbian Democracy and the Democratic People’s Party) in the next government.
Their inclusion would be risky move for Spajić. The new government would lose any claim to being pro-EU. And it would have no credibility in the West. The US and German ambassadors in Podgorica have emphasized that participation of political parties opposed to NATO and to recognition of Kosovo, or failing to oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine, would block Montenegro’s progress towards the EU.
Limited options
Spajić has received this message, but whether he can comply remains uncertain. Without the pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties, he can hope for support from 44 members of parliament (41 is required for a simple majority). But a qualified majority (3/5) of 49 is required for implementation of crucial judiciary reforms.
The elephant in the room is is the former ruling party, the Democratic Party of Socialists, together with their allies. They are pro-EU. If things were normal and logical, DPS would be a natural partner for Spajić’s Europe Now movement.
Spajić, however, still clings to the notion that former President Đukanović’s party is “not reformed enough.” Translation: Đukanović is still there. Not able to do what is logical, Spajić is condemned to forming a weak government unable to pursue needed reforms. He might even find himself evicted from the prime ministry after even the smallest dispute or political crisis.
No top cover
President Milatović, his deputy in the Europe Now movement, is part of Spajić’s problem. The President is thought to be connected to a group who have announced the creation of new party. They want inclusion of anti-NATO parties in the new government.
So is this delay about formation of a new reformist government that can take Montenegro into the EU, or is it a power struggle between Spajić and Milatović? Where’s the beef?
New elections?
There is the possibility of new elections. That would mean Spajić lost the power struggle. It is an open question whether it would be good or bad for Montenegro.
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Another Belgrade view on whether Serbia is moving West
The Belgrade Media Center has kindly given me permission to republish in English this interview with Dušan Janjić, the founder of the Forum for Ethnic Relations:
The “Serbia against violence” protest will probably crystallize into a network of political parties, civil movements and interest groups with a pro-reform political offer. The inappropriate attitude of the government towards the needs of citizens and the demands of protests of various kinds, strikes and other outpourings of dissatisfaction, as well as frequent manifestations of the incompetence and irresponsibility of the government create conditions for the spread of protests.”
In his opinion, the government is one of the important generators of violence.
“Violence is one of the instruments of staying in power, but also of defending the economic and other monopolies of those who support it. In that alliance, there was a wide spread of power, money and organized crime, especially the drug business. This makes it impossible to realize the necessary deviation from violence”, Janjić states.
Janjić believes that the summer months are important for the spread of protests throughout Serbia, as well as for the preparation of wide promotion in Serbia and for the international promotion of the goals and demands of the protest.
“Apparently, in the fall, the protest mantra becomes: ‘Stop the mafia.’ This protest will be more massive and united by its political message in its stance against the government and the mantra: “Leave”! Then there will be decisive support for the transition of power,” Janjić points out.
The interlocutor of the Media Center states as the main challenge and responsibility for the “coordinators” of the protest: whether they will manage to build a flexible and effective network of associated actors, as well as to train themselves for joint action in which the key actors, in addition to common messages, by preserving their special identities, attract as wide a range as possible in the circle of supporters and future voters; whether they will manage to build and present to the public an alternative political vision, program and political propaganda and marketing communication with citizens.
He adds that this is a condition to maintain and strengthen the motivations and action of the initial protest, as well as to participate in the “Stop Mafia” movement. Otherwise, the emergence of the “Stop Mafia” movement will involve a much wider circle of opposition parties and other entities. But it would be dangerous for the transition if that movement is imposed and the widespread dissatisfaction of citizens is reduced only to a decision against,” Janjić believes.
Janjić notes that it should be borne in mind that in the fall the ruling old women, their coalitions and movements will be activated.
“Also, influential “patriotic”, “sovereigntist” movements such as the Serbian Right and parapolitical organizations and other anti-reformist, anti-NATO players linked to their “pro-Kremlin” ties and interests will be activated on the stage in the fight for voters’ votes in the upcoming elections. On this wave, there could be a repetition of the “betrayal of citizens’ expectations” as well as the real needs of society,” says our interlocutor.
By ignoring all the demands of the protesting citizens, the government has the following messages: That the government does not have the will, readiness, or ability to properly solve the problems that the protests point to; that every new incident, especially a security one, every affair or involvement of the authorities in connection with organized crime is evidence of the corruption of the authorities and increases the concern for the safety of a wide range of citizens, even members of the army and the police; that he does not respect the voice and dignity of citizens; that the ruling elite and its top itself put their own interests and survival in power first; that it has no vision of improving the situation in the country and that it is wandering in search of Serbia’s place in the world. This, in turn, encourages memories of the experiences of poverty and suffering from the era of sanctions and wars in the 90s; That behind the ignoring,
“All in all, the uncertain government and many unfulfilled promises encourage distrust in the government. And one who cannot be trusted cannot be a guarantor of security. This, in turn, further expands the fears, apprehensions, insecurities and sense of threat of the citizens”, concludes Janjić.
Anti-Western and pro-Putin propaganda and admonition of the authorities for European integration
“Since 2012, when SNS came to power, we have been swearing by “European integration” and very little work has been done on the reforms that are a prerequisite for membership.
From 2015 until today, the government is characterized by disorientation regarding the goals and means of running society. In its operation, there is a noticeable increase in the influence of interest groups that are anti-reform and anti-EU and NATO. This is expected and represents “bad news”. The “good news” is that such regimes, from Trump in the USA, Putin’s Russia and even in the EU itself, such as Orban’s, are collapsing. It shows that populist dictatorships are not a sustainable answer to the challenges of decades of economic and political crisis. Just as the EU is working on the “New Green Deal”, Serbia also needs a “New Deal”, ie a strategy and policy for sustainable reforms of the economy, institutions and society”, believes Janjić.
NATO membership is a necessary stage on the way to full EU membership
“That’s the rule. Through its unilateral internal political decision (Resolution of the National Assembly), Serbia declared itself “militarily neutral” and an exception to the rule. This neutrality has nothing in common with the military neutrality of Austria, Finland and Sweden. With the recent accession of Finland and (soon) Sweden to NATO membership, everything has come down to the exception of Austria, which is a member of the EU, but is not a member of NATO,” says the interlocutor of the Media Center.
According to his opinion, tolerance of Serbia’s self-proclaimed neutrality was the result of geostrategic security “balancing” of EU and US interests towards Russia.
“After all, in the example of Serbia, the source of the idea of ”military neutrality” is Putin’s Moscow from the phase of “Euro-Asian integration”. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, in February 2022, marked the end of this policy of Moscow, and of tolerance by the EU, USA and NATO. A new distribution of spheres of interest is underway. This exacerbates the issue of Serbia’s membership in NATO. This, on the other hand, is contrary to the current ideological and political commitment of the majority of political and economic, as well as civil society, especially the SPC,” Janjić states.
The normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is a necessary evil for the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina
“The authorities of Kosovo and Serbia have similar views and ways of dealing with crises. The opening of new crises serves them to create a “new reality”, and this one is interpreted with the leading goal of staying in power. Agreement and normalization of their societies and relations between Serbia and Kosovo is only a necessary evil for these authorities. In that kind of politics, the “final agreement” can only be the “final solution” or the elimination of the Other. This creates circumstances in which the Third Party (Quinte Group) is forced to take the initiative in reducing the damage, which gives rise to the obligation to create a framework for the actions of the authorities of Kosovo and Serbia.
Because of all this, it should be expected that the spiral of the crisis will rise to a higher level and include more and more problems and involved actors. For now, it seems that the Serbian government, with the attacks of Serbian demonstrators on KFOR – NATO soldiers, as well as with the announcement that they will return to the UN Security Council, has reached the limit where they recognize the intention of further militarizing the crisis and bringing Russia and China into the game. This would jeopardize the interests of the Quint Group and the citizens of the Western Balkans themselves in maintaining the current state of “unfinished peace”.
The likely answer will be to increase capacity and cooperation to prevent or control possible armed conflicts. In a political sense, this encourages a re-examination of the overall scope and format of the current “Brussels Dialogue”. There are more and more voices in favor of ending this phase of the “dialogue” by means of the International Conference on the Normalization of Relations (that is, on the stabilization of peace and development) between Kosovo and Serbia. The convener or “facilitator” of the conference would be the European Commission, and the guarantors of the implementation of the agreed solution would be the EU, the USA, Great Britain, NATO and Kosovo and Serbia,” explains Janjić.
A new challenge for Europe, NATO and Russia
“With the last summit held in Lithuania, NATO entered the final stage of its “rounding up” in Europe. The end of the war in Ukraine is coming, the enlargement to the Western Balkans, ie Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Moldova and Georgia. Moscow will, without a doubt, continue with various measures to prevent the unification of Europe in NATO and to “push” NATO as far as possible from the borders of Russia. Certainly, it is a challenge for Europe and NATO as well as for Russia.Although , Russia has an even bigger challenge on its territory east of the Urals, and especially on its Central Asian borders.
Also, the USA, the European Union as well as NATO, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, have to face the challenges of the growing power and influence of China and India. In other words, there is the same challenge before all countries, both for the “Great Powers” and for small countries, such as Serbia: How to adapt to globalization and at the same time ensure their own development”, concluded Janjić.
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