Tag: European Union
We expect our friends to govern well
Margarita Kadriu, editor of the Pristina daily Kosova Sot, asked some questions. Here is what I replied. The interview should have been published in Albanian today:
Q: There are different statements in Belgrade and Prishtina about the possibility of an agreement between the parties, with the guarantee of Mrs. Ashton. Do you expect this dialogue to succeed?
A: I hope it succeeds. It is not guaranteed to succeed. There are real difficulties ahead for both Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: Serbia requested an autonomous community of the Serb municipalities, while Kosovo is agreed to have an Association of Serb Municipalities without executive powers. Is it dangerous for the stability of Kosovo such an association if it creates a new level of legislative or executive power?
A: Kosovo is well within its rights to ask three things: that whatever is agreed be consistent with the Ahtisaari agreement; whatever the Serbs get inside Kosovo should be available also inside Serbia to Albanians; that nothing should impede Kosovo’s progress towards European Union membership.
Q: Despite talks about normalizing relations, Serbia continues to have territorial claims about a part of Kosovo. Will the pressure from Brussels be sufficient to make Belgrade give up from this claim?
A: I don’t know, but I do think it important. Kosovo should not need to live with a neighbor claiming all or part of its territory. As I understand the situation today, the claim is over all of Kosovo, not just a part.
Q: It is mentioned an amnesty for the Serbs of the North who have been part of parallel structures. Is this a right thing to do?
A: I don’t see participation in the parallel structures as something people should be punished for, in and of itself. The question is whether they committed criminal acts: violence, property theft, expulsion of people from their homes and other crimes. A bit of understanding for those who cooperated with institutions that they thought legitimate is in order.
Q: Serbia’s urgent need is to get “the date,” while Kosovo has been promised the launch of negotiations for the S[tability and] A[ssociation] A[greement]. Which country has more urgent need to find a solution for the North in relation with the EU?
A: It seems to me clear that Serbia has the more urgent need. I don’t think a launch of SAA negotiations has the same significance in Kosovo that the launch of accession negotiations has in Serbia.
Q: Seeing the progress of dialogue, do you see any opportunity for creation of some sort of Republika Srpska in northern Kosovo?
A: I think it is something people in Kosovo are right to worry about. The question is whether the authority entrusted to the Pristina government will be sufficient to qualify the country for EU membership. That is not the case in Bosnia today. I would not want to see that disease infect Kosovo.
Q: A part of the opposition, “Vetevendosje,” is calling Prime Minister Thaci traitor, saying that he is trading with the North. How consistent is this accusation?
A: I don’t think it is appropriate to call anyone a traitor. The opposition has to criticize the government—that’s its role. But the Prime Minister is clearly trying to do the best he can for the country. I find it a bit surprising that an opposition that opposes clauses of the constitution and advocates a referendum on union with another country would call anyone a traitor.
Q: While continuing talks with Serbia, Kosovo has other important emergencies, especially in the development of the economy, attracting foreign investors, improving the environment for doing business. Recently, there is an increase of people’s dissatisfaction about the living standard, bills, privatization of public companies. Do you think that there is a risk from social unrest?
A: There is always a risk of social unrest, even when times are good. That Kosovo has a lot of problems is clear. I too look forward to the day it can focus on those and not on relations with Belgrade
Q: The rule of law is a strong concern in Kosovo. Judiciary suffers from political influences, various abuses, nepotism and misuse of justice. Is EULEX THE rescue mechanism, or Kosovars themselves should be able to strengthen the justice?
A: In the end, it will be courageous Kosovars who bring justice to the country. EULEX is trying hard to help, but there is no substitute for courageous police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and journalists.
Q: We hear a lot about corruption and it is a disease of all the countries in the region. How do you see the way out of this high degree of corruption affairs that have characterized the country several times?
A: The way out is good governance, which depends on transparency and accountability. You’ve seen how Croatia has moved in that direction. Serbia is moving too. Join the parade.
Q: This year there are foreseen local elections to be held, but there are voices that support the idea of holding national elections, too. Is this a good idea, or a premature one?
A: I think I’ll leave to Kosovo’s elected politicians the responsibility for deciding when to hold elections.
Q: Let’s talk a little bit now also about some developments in the region. Again, we have tensions in Macedonia. Why this country is continuing to have troubles?
A: Macedonia has well-known problems: the name issue with Greece, sometimes tense inter-ethnic relations and difficulty in meeting European political standards, even where ethnic differences are not involved. But it has done relatively well economically, has reformed its military and participates in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and has a long record of inter-ethnic collaboration in governing the country. I hope to see Macedonia sort out its problems and continue to progress.
Q: In Albania, this year is crucial election year in relation to the EU. Do you believe that Tirana will pass this test?
A: I really don’t know. I hope so. Good elections are fundamental to qualifying for EU membership.
Q: Let’s conclude this interview with a Gallup poll that shows Albania and Kosovo as the most pro-American countries. What effect has this sentiment in relation to Washington?
A: Albanian and Kosovar affection for the United States are much appreciated in Washington, including by me, but of course we expect our good friends to contribute to regional peace and security, govern well and respect the rights of all their citizens.
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Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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Doing the right thing
Belgrade daily Blic asked this afternoon:
We would like your short[ly] comment on the statement of president of Serbia Mr. Tomislav Nikolic that vicepresident of USA Mr Joseph Biden is not well informed about Serbian politics on Kosovo.
I responded:
That just means Mr. Biden said something Mr. Nikolic did not like. It would be surprising if it were otherwise: Mr. Biden knows the Balkans better than any other prominent American politician. He has been a strong supporter of Kosovo independence and a united Bosnia and Herzegovina. What could he have possibly said that would please Mr. Nikolic?
A word or two more may be in order.
Joe Biden has also been an advocate of a softer approach to Serbia, which the Obama Administration assiduously pursued for its entire first term. It got nothing, so far as I can tell, in return. That of course corresponded mainly to Boris Tadic’s presidency, when both Europeans and Americans tredded lightly so as not to weaken the relatively moderate Tadic, who was challenged only from the nationalist right (principally by Nikolic).
Now that Nikolic is in power, there really is no reason to tred lightly. Neither Europeans nor Americans are inclined to do so. The Germans have been particularly forceful in insisting on the dismantling of Serbian parallel structures in northern Kosovo. The result has been realy progress, though no final agreement yet, in the Belgrade/Pristina talks.
There is some hope in Washington that Nikolic will also prove more pliable on Bosnia. He is not tied, as Boris Tadic was, to the Republika Srpska president, Milorad Dodik. My guess is that Dodik is doing his best to remedy that. The Americans likely figure that they will get more from Nikolic on Bosnia with a tough line these days than with the failed soft line they used without success in the past.
The Balkans do not rank high on Washington’s list of priorities these days. Even Joe Biden may not be so well-informed about Serbian politics on Kosovo, as Nikolic suggested. But the Vice President is still doing the right thing to insist that Serbia accept reality in Kosovo and Bosnia.
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Delaying the inevitable
Blic Online late last night published what purports to be a draft text of a Pristina/Belgrade agreement, one supposedly agreed by the EU and Pristina. It seems to me, as one would expect, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan in many of its details, and it follows the spirit of the Ahtisaari plan in ending at least some of the Serbian campaign against Kosovo membership in “international bodies” with
economic, cultural, and social (including sporting) purposes. Serbia shall not block Kosovo’s membership in the OSCE.
But it falls short of Kosovo membership in the United Nations.
It is difficult to comment on a text that was likely prepared originally in English, translated by Blic and retranslated into English for me by a kind reader. Nor is it clear where the original came from or how close to a final agreement this text may be. Is it being published now to test Serbian and Kosovar reaction? Does it genuinely represent something Pristina can accept?
I don’t know. Nor am I likely to know, as the diplomats will not want to discuss in public the status of this text.
What it shows, however, is that the two sides, one way or the other, are dealing with key issues: how can the Serb population of northern Kosovo participate in Kosovo institutions and still avail itself of the Ahtisaari plan’s provisions for governing themselves? How can Kosovo’s interest in maintaining a single judicial and security framework be satisfied while allowing wide latitude to local governance in the other respects provided for by Ahtisaari?
The devil here is not so much in the details. It is in the broader context. While this text purports to be status neutral, it would in principle allow Kosovo to join a lot of international bodies, some of which are open to membership only to sovereign states. That is, so far as I know, the case for the 57-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Here there is a problem. The text obligates Serbia not to block (or encourage others to block) membership, but others would of course be free to continue to do so. The European Union has five non-recognizing states any one of which might block Kosovo membership. It is my hope that there is a clear and unequivocal understanding that none of the EU member states will block Kosovo membership.
That still does not solve the problem, because Russia could still be an obstacle where it is a member, including the OSCE. What this shows it seems to me is the difficulty of partial solutions that purport to be status neutral. Kosovo membership in the UN would end all discussion of its eligibility for membership elsewhere. Taking a step-by-step approach is fraught with difficulty, and inconsistent with the spirit of the original Ahtisaari plan, which foresaw universal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
The simple fact, recognized almost as much on the streets of Belgrade as on the streets of Pristina, is that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia and will never again be. Delaying the inevitable may be the best that can be done right now, but it means a continuing uphill struggle for a state that needs to focus on other things: jobs and economic development, the fight against corruption and organized crime, proper treatment of its Serb citizens and other (numerical) minorities.
It would be far preferable–and less painful in the long run–to end Serbia’s empty sovereignty claim. There may be five non-recognizing EU members that can block Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, but there are 22 EU members that can block Serbia’s eventual entry into the EU. Delaying the inevitable makes life harder not only for Pristina, but also for Belgrade.
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Do unto others…
As soon as the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo was elevated to the prime ministerial level, the process began to proceed much more smoothly, until the current round. The slowdown is understandable given the complexity of the topic: dismantlement of illegal Serb institutions in northern Kosovo.
In an attempt to prevent full integration of the Serb-dominated municipalities into the institutional framework of Kosovo, the government in Belgrade is demanding the formation of an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo. The problem is that Serbia insists that the association should have executive and legislative powers, including in the area of public security and rule of law. Priština has rejected the proposal as inconsistent with Kosovo’s Constitution. Washington also seems to oppose the idea, as the US Ambassador to Serbia, Michael Kirby, said that his country would not like to see another Republika Srpska in the Balkans.
The growing divergence between the two sides has prompted Brussels to intensify its diplomatic activity. For that reason, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton held a meeting with Serbia’s top figures – President Tomislav Nikolić, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and his deputy Aleksandar Vučić.
Prior to the meeting, President Nikolić was pessimistic about the outcome, expressing concern that Serbia could be asked to concede more than it can accept. But when the meeting was over, he appeared in a quite different mood and told media that an agreement would likely be reached by the end of the month, as Priština agreed to make some concessions. Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi denied Nikolić’s words, demanding an explanation. This week Lady Ashton will visit Kosovo to try to sort things out.
Whatever Belgrade is hoping for, it is clear that no executive or legislative powers beyond the Ahtisaari agreement should be granted to the Serb municipalities. The most Serbia should get is more clarity on the implementation of Ahtissari in northern Kosovo, so that the government can save face in the eyes of more nationalist voters. The probabilty that premature elections will be held this autumn is growing with each passing day. Fortunately for the governing coalition, two thirds of people in Serbia accept that Kosovo is independent according to the latest opinion poll. For the record, the support to European integration is also on a steady decline for two years already.
Meanwhile, Albanians from the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia have requested an association of Albanian municipalities in Serbia along the lines of the one that Belgrade wants for Kosovo Serbs. Zoran Stanković, a Serbian government official, countered that the institution of such an association would violate Serbia’s Constitution. But so too would the Serb one in Kosovo, if it extends its functionality to police and courts.
Thaçi likewise faces elections, in 2014. He will need to save face as well. Even if the appeal for the Albanian association in Serbia was made only to put pressure on Belgrade to soften its own demands, the idea is worth considering. As Daniel Serwer wrote:
Whatever the Serbs of Kosovo gain in this negotiation should also be available to the Albanian-majority community of Presevo in southern Serbia.
Stability in the long-term requires reciprocity. It may be the only feasible solution.
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Drop it now
The failure of the latest round of Belgrade/Pristina talks to reach agreement on an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo is neither surprising nor particularly discouraging. Mundane as it sounds, this is a delicate issue.
An association is clearly permitted under the Ahtisaari plan, which Belgrade has not accepted but Pristina has pledged to implement. Were it to become more than an a consultative body and acquire executive functions, such an association could come close to creating a Republika Srpska-like governing entity within Kosovo, one that would make it virtually impossible for Pristina to exercise full control over those functions it requires to qualify for EU membership. Pristina needs to make sure that it does not fall into this trap.
Tanjug (via B92 English) quotes Alexandar Vulin, Belgrade’s office chief for Kosovo, as saying Serbia:
simply supports the constitution of an association (of Serb municipalities) that would have the authorities, control and influence over the judiciary, police, education and all aspects important for the life of citizens.
This is a precise description of what no one in the international community should expect the Pristina authorities to accept. It would legitimize, not dissolve, the “parallel” (illegal) Serbian institutions in Kosovo.
To me, there is a simple, first test of what should be permissible for Belgrade within Kosovo: is it also permissible within Serbia? Whatever the Serbs of Kosovo gain in this negotiation should also be available to the Albanian-majority community of Presevo in southern Serbia. That community has nothing like the privileges in the Ahtisaari plan, never mind what Vulin is claiming. Belgrade needs to come to the negotiating table with wants that correspond to what they are willing to offer in analogous circumstances.
Of course the circumstances are not entirely analogous, because Belgrade does not accept Pristina’s authority as sovereign. This is a real problem and should not be ignored, as both the Brussels and Washington prefer. Belgrade’s bold assertion of continuing sovereignty over all of Kosovo conflicts with what Ahtisaari offered. It is wrong for Serbia to ask for the privileges contained in his plan (and then a good deal more) without paying the price of admission.
This phase of the Pristina/Belgrade talks is putting the Pristina authorities in an awkward situation. It is quite clear that no one in the Kosovo government, including its Serb participants, wants to go further than the Ahtisaari plan in accommodating Serbia. Anyone who does is likely to pay a price at the next election. Moreover, there is a real risk that Serbia will use an association of Serb municipalities to pry the southern Serbian enclaves away from their grudging acceptance of Pristina’s limited authority. That’s what Vulin is openly proposing.
No one has asked my advice on these issues, so I am free to state publicly what it would be: going any further than Ahtisaari would be a mistake. Even implementation of Ahtisaari should be conditional on Serbia’s dropping its claim of sovereignty and accepting the plan as a whole, rather than picking off the parts it likes and leaving the parts it doesn’t.
Belgrade can drop its claim of sovereignty elegantly (and silently) by allowing Kosovo to enter the United Nations. This would be a gesture to which Pristina could be expected to respond generously. Belgrade’s sovereignty claim is going to have to be dropped eventually in any event. The EU will never take in another member whose borders are uncertain, as it did to no good effect with Cyprus. Serbia would do best to drop it now. Once that is done, Vulin’s pretension will be voided and the question of the association of Serb municipalities will be far more manageable.
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