Tag: European Union
An exclusive club, not the movies
Danijela Milinkovic at Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti asked me some questions. I responded a week ago. I gather they published the interview yesterday. Here is the interview in English:
Q: Wanting to achieve its strategic goal – joining the EU – Serbia faces numerous demands on Kosovo, which, it seems, getting bigger and bigger as we progress in integration. Is our path towards the EU charged masochism and do you believe that giving up on Kosovo for Serbs will be the ticket for entry into the European track?
A: As I understand it, normalizing relations with Pristina is the EU’s current requirement in order to give Serbia a date to begin accession negotiations. It has been understood from the first that this “normalization” includes reaching mutually satisfactory agreements with Pristina on northern Kosovo.
But Serbia will not become an EU member without going further. It will have to establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo and exchange ambassadors, because becoming a member will require agreement of the 28 existing members. More than one will insist on diplomatic relations between Pristina and Belgrade, even if the EU as a whole does not. Nor is that the only thing Serbia will have to do: it will have to meet the many other criteria for membership. There is no single “ticket” for entry into the EU. There are many tickets.
Accession to the EU is a long and complicated process of conforming Serbia’s laws and practices to European norms. It will take at least a decade. Once you get finished with one chapter, there will be another one. There are currently 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire, which form the basis of the accession process. There may be more by the time Serbia completes the process.
I would not regard preparation for EU accession as “masochism.” Countries do these things because they want rule of law, security, prosperity and social well-being. There are enormous rewards. If you enter the process feeling nothing but pain, maybe you are in the wrong process. You are not going to the cinema; you are joining a privileged and highly selective club that will enable all of Serbia’s citizens to enjoy far better and freer lives.
Q: Whatever Serbia does, it seems that is not enough to change the attitude of the great powers towards our country us? Where are we wrong?
A: While I often hear this complaint, it seems to me that both Europe and America are today respectful and friendly towards Serbia. Once Milosevic was gone, sanctions were lifted, Serbian leaders were welcomed in Washington, Brussels and European capitals, and substantial resources were made available, mainly through the IMF and private channels. There is ample cooperation on many issues: drugs, organized crime, nuclear technology. There are really only two issues that give people in Washington pause about Serbia: Kosovo and Bosnia. On those, I would describe the pressure from Washington as firm but relatively light-handed. The two governments disagree on Kosovo and on Milorad Dodik, but this is not affecting their basically friendly relations on many other issues.
The EU is taking a tougher attitude right now on Kosovo, largely due to German initiative. From my perspective, that is a good thing: if the issues in the north can be resolved, Kosovo will certainly benefit but so too will Serbia.
Q: Would you say that Serbia is today at a turning point?
A: No. It seems to me Serbia is still clinging to romantic notions about its ties to Russia, the Non-aligned Movement and the claim to sovereignty over Kosovo that have nothing to do with its future in the European Union. Serbia will not be at a turning point until it makes a decision to turn. Even then, it will have a long process of negotiation and adjustment of its laws and practices before entering the EU. Even once fully prepared, it may have to wait for the 28 members to arrive at a convenient political moment.
Q: Do you think that decomposition of the Balkans is over or we will see new changes of borders in the future?
A: The changes that have occurred so far have been in the status of borders (from internal boundaries to international borders), not where the borders are drawn. I would describe this not as “decomposition” but as dissolution of former Yugoslavia. I see no possibility of additional changes of borders, which won’t be acceptable to either Europe or the U.S.
Q: The European Council has decided to grant Serbia a “conditional date”, in other words, to determine the beginning of the pre-accession negotiations with the EU for March. What does Serbia need to do until then, in order to make the next step in the integrations?
A: This is a question for the EU, not for me. But my understanding is that the EU wants to see normalization of relations with Kosovo, including a settlement of the main issues in the north, before it starts accession negotiations.
Q: Is Serbia going to face with the new conditions regarding Kosovo in the coming months?
A: Yes, in coming months and years. Kosovo will be an issue in many of the 35 chapters of the negotiations, unless there is a comprehensive solution early in the process.
Q: How do you comment on the platform and Kosovo resolution, adopted by the Government and the Parliament? Will this document contribute to the solution of the Kosovo issue or contrary?
A: I don’t believe the platform is a step forward: it reiterates Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo while proposing separate governance of the Albanians, who would become second class citizens inside Serbia. They won’t accept that, and no one in Europe or the United States will ask them to do so. But let’s see what happens in the talks between Dacic and Thaci. That is more important than what it says in the platform.
Q: You said that this platform is “Milosevic`s dream”. Could you, please, explain that?
A: I don’t think I need to say more: my previous answer explains fully. Milosevic would have been delighted with sovereignty over all of Kosovo and second class citizenship for Albanians.
Q: What is, in your opinion, the most disputing in the platform for the international community and Kosovo Albanians?
A: For the moment, northern Kosovo is the big issue, but in the future it will be something else: protection of monasteries and religious sites, military forces or who can go where for Christmas. Underlying all the issues are questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. When you reach agreement with Pristina on those issues, the story will be over.
Q: Serbia is required to withdraw from the institutions in northern Kosovo, and our government has consistently refused this request as inadmissible. Will the proposal for broad autonomy of the Serbian community in Kosovo be acceptable to the West and Pristina?
A: I see no problem if Serbia will accept the autonomy provided for in the Ahtisaari plan. That is already accepted in Pristina, Washington and Brussels, all of which will be prepared to see additional agreements reached to implement the Ahtisaari arrangements.
Q: What do you expect to happen in the next few months in the Balkan region and can we expect new instabilities and conflicts?
A: Troublemakers can always make trouble. But I hope to see the leaderships in Belgrade and Pristina make a real effort to come to terms with each other, for mutual benefit. I see some indication that Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci are headed in the direction of a comprehensive resolution of issues. That would be a good thing.
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Another step forward
On January 17, the fourth round of talks on normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo was held in Brussels. Maja Kocijančić, the spokesperson for EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, who mediates in the dialogue, told media that the meeting lasted about five hours and was constructive.
The main focus was on how to distribute the customs revenue collected at recently established border checkpoints. The sides agreed that the money should be used for development projects in majority-Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo. Kosovo Prime minister Hashim Thaci said it would be done through a fund managed jointly by Priština, a Serb representative from the north and the EU.
The issue of parallel Serb institutions in northern Kosovo also was discussed for the first time as an official topic. While no conclusive agreement has been made, there are some grounds for optimism. Ivica Dačić, Serbian prime minister, said that whatever solution will be found in the end, it must be acceptable both to the Serbs and Priština. His Kosovo colleague, Hashim Thaci, announced that once the illegal institutions in the north are dissolved, local Serbs will choose their legitimate representatives in elections organized by Priština.
Perhaps more interesting is what the two prime ministers told media before the meeting. Thaci stated that the dialogue should result in Kosovo getting a seat in the UN. Dačić replied that everything can be discussed, provided that Priština is willing to make certain concessions in return. The response enraged hard-line nationalists in Serbia, and the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), the only openly anti-EU force in Parliament, immediately demanded that Dačić resign because of „treason“.
Similar was the reaction of Kosovo „Self-determination“ movement to Thaci’s announcement that customs revenue would be invested in development of Serb-dominated northern Kosovo municipalities, as they accused the prime minister of unconstitutionally giving „special autonomy“ to the north.
But something more worrying took place in Priština just a few hours after the meeting in Brussels was concluded. Three explosions burst almost concurrently at different locations, destroying three government-owned vehicles. A heretofore unheard-of organization called „Dissatisfield“ has claimed responsibility for the incident. In a message to newspaper „Express“, the group said it was a warning to the government, which they believe is „giving northern Kosovo over“.
So, what can be inferred from this available information? That the two prime misters have made another step forward in negotiations, as they did in each of the previous rounds. After Serbia’s – or, rather, President Nikolić’s – much criticized platform for Kosovo, it may be regarded as a somewhat unexpected achievement. At the same time, negative – at times even excessive – reactions from radical elements on both sides, who seek to thwart any effort at normalization between the countries, are indicative of how big the pressure is that the negotiators have to withstand. That is something that both western partners and domestic observers should be aware of when evaluating the results.
The next round of the dialogue is planned for the second half of February. There is a lot of speculation, mostly in the yellow press, that premature elections could be held in Serbia this year. The speculators believe Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić will try to capitalize on his growing popularity as the leader of anti-corruption campaign to win a larger share of power for him and his Serbian Progressive Party. I hope Vučić will wait at least until Dačić and Thaci accomplish what they have begun.
P.S: I’ve learned that Sunday, in the early morning, Serbian Gendarmerie removed the monument in the south Serbian town of Preševo, which the local Albanian-majority government recently put up in honor of fallen combatants from the former Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa (LAPBM). The action was swift and went without incidents. The Kosovo government has condemned the move, but also called on the local Albanians not to react to the provocation, warning that such behavior by Belgrade is putting the dialogue at risk.
I don’t know what in Serbia’s legislation might have served as the legal foundation for the government to remove the monument, but I do know that Serbia has formally amnestied members of LAPBM as far back as 2002, recognizing them as a legitimate party in the peace negotiations at the time. But although this could affect the further course of the negotiations to some degree, it is very unlikely to terminate the process completely.
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Patience is a virtue
I’m in Pristina, so friends and colleagues are assuming I know something about the talks Thursday between Serbian Prime Minister Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci. The truth is I know nothing I wouldn’t know in Washington DC, except that the few people I’ve talked with here are skeptical of any agreement on the northern bit of Kosovo not under Pristina’s control and concerned that the young Kosovo state may get snookered. I imagine that mirror-image concerns exist in Serbia.
Complicating the situation here are three more or less simultaneous bombs that went off Thursday evening targeted at parked government cars. “Dissatisfied” claimed the bombings, which appear not intended to kill anyone but rather to warn the government not to give in on the north.
Vetëvendosje! (Self-determination), a Kosovo opposition political party that opposes the dialogue, has accused Thaci of violating the constitution by offering “special” autonomy to the north. That’s rich, since Vetëvendosje! itself has an anti-constitutional platform calling for a referendum on union with Albania (which is prohibited in the Kosovo constitution). If Thaci were to give away the north, it would benefit Vetëvendosje! more than the government.
The simple fact is that we don’t have enough data on either what was agreed in Brussels or who was behind the bombings to even begin to speculate on the implications. Patience is a virtue. We should give both Dacic and Thaci the benefit of the doubt. They are risking their political careers trying to resolve one of the last remaining war and peace problems in the Balkans, with a lot of help and pressure from their European and American colleagues. Dacic is getting flak in Serbia for suggesting that Kosovo might get UN membership if a satisfactory agreement can be reached on the north. Thaci is getting flak in Pristina for supposedly agreeing that customs revenue collected in the north will go at least temporarily to development projects in the north, in a scheme jointly administered by the Kosovo government, a Serb from the north and an EU representative. Neither of these alleged offenses sounds capital to me, but I’m suspending judgment until we know more.
Let’s wait and see what has really been agreed and how it will be implemented. In the meanwhile, is it too much to ask that all political parties in Kosovo renounce violence and wait for the Prime Ministers to report to their respecctive parliaments on what happened in Brussels?
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The Iran nuclear cliff
It isn’t often that Washington reaches a consensus on Iran, but that seems to be what is happening. Patrick Clawson urges a generous offer to Iran, to test definitively whether a deal stopping it short of nuclear weapons can be reached. Suzanne Maloney sees 2013 as the make or break year:
Dennis Ross, Trita Parsi, and Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett had long ago come to the conclusion a big package was needed to woo Tehran from its nuclear ambitions, from widely varying premises.
2013 is the make or break year for the same reason we faced a “fiscal cliff” crisis at the end of the last Congress: Washington has set itself up for a big decision. Either we get a deal that prevents Iran from getting nuclear weapons, or the Administration (with ample Congressional support) has committed the United States to go to war. Suzanne is surely correct that the American people are not “there” yet, but I see that as a good thing: it gives the Administration maximum negotiating leeway. Maximum but not infinite: Congress (Democrats and Republicans) will have to lift sanctions if a deal is reached. It won’t happen unless the majority is satisfied that the deal blocks Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.
International Atomic Energy Agency officials are in Tehran today trying to gain access to an Iranian site thought to have been used in the past for nuclear weapons research. The Americans regard Iran coming clean on those activities as vital to any deal that lets Iran off the sanctions hook. It is unlikely we’ll have a quick answer to the many questions about Iran’s past activities, but the talks today are important to opening the door.
At the same time, the P5+1 (5 permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) are haggling with Tehran over a date to continue the political-level nuclear talks, which are supposed to convene this month. The main issue seems to be whether sanctions relief will be on the agenda. The Americans in particular have wanted to reserve all but the smallest sanctions relief (parts for aircraft) for later on, after seeing real progress on nuclear questions. The Iranians want sanctions relief up front.
The emerging consensus in Washington in favor of a big package to test Iran’s intentions and reach a definitive conclusion could end years of uncertainty and haggling. But it also raises the very real possibility of going over the Iran nuclear cliff to war.
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The EU is still a powerful magnet
My friends at tacno.net, where Milan Marinkovic has landed, have published this interview today in Serbian:
In a recent interview for „Anadolia“ (AA) news agency, you said that even „armed conflict cannot be ruled out“ following Belgrade’s platform for „normalizaion of relations with Kosovo“. If such a conflict really occurred, on what scale and of what intensity would you expect it to be, and what implications could it have for the rest of the region?
– It is difficult to talk about the possibility of armed conflict without readers thinking you are advocating it. I am not. But when a country claims territory it does not rightfully control, and refuses to recognize the authorities who do have a right to control it, that is a situation that can obviously lead to armed conflict. As KFOR is drawn down, Pristina and Belgrade need to make diplomatic arrangements that give both confidence no armed incursion will occur. Otherwise, they need to both make defensive military preparations, which would be excessively expensive and potentially destabilizing.
I don’t think a big war is possible in the Balkans any longer: no one has the force and sustainment capability any longer. Nor would it benefit any country in the Balkans to initiate hostilities. But bad things do happen, and war in the Balkans has always been more about violence against civilians than against other armed forces. We should not forget the 1990s.
Serbian Prime minister Ivica Dačić has warned on several occasions in the past couple of weeks that the police will remove, using force if necessary, a monument built in the south Serbian town of Preševo by the municipal Albanian-majority government in honor of fallen combatants from the former LAPBM, should the Albanians fail to remove it themselves by January 17. Local Albanians have so far rejected Dačić’s ultimatum, ignoring at the same time a compromising proposal by Western ambassadors to Serbia that the monument be moved from the town centre to another location. If the monument remains in its place after the deadline set by Dačić, he will find himself under considerable pressure from Serbian nationalists, including his own supporters, to fulfill the promise and remove the monument. Do you see any possibility that a middle groung could be found between Belgrade and local Albanians within these few days, which would help to relieve the tension?
– It is clearly preferable that this issue be resolved by compromise. I don’t know the situation well enough to judge whether the Western ambassadors’ proposal is one that will work. But it would make no sense for Serbia to destroy a monument to people whose comrades in arms were amnestied 10 years ago, thus reigniting a conflict that has largely died down. At the same time, Albanians have to appreciate that Serb lives were lost as well. I would note that in Sarajevo recently the government has decided to put up a monument to Serbs killed by Bosniak forces during the war. These problems are not insoluble.
Last November, during the celebration of the Albanian national holiday, the Day of Flag, Albanian and Kosovo prime ministers, Sali Berisha and Hashim Thaci respectively, hinted at the desire of Albanians who live across the region to unify into a single nation state. This raised some eyebrows in neighbor countries, especially Serbia. Although this type of rhetoric is not unusual in the Balkans on such occasions, Ilir Deda, a prominent expert from Kosovo, said that it should be taken seriously. Mr Deda warned that the idea is likely to gain ground over the coming years if Kosovo remains in limbo in terms of European integration and UN membership. There is a palpable fear that Serbian nationalists would use it as a perfect excuse in their attempts to revive the project of greater Serbia, primarily through secession of RS from Bosnia. If the idea of pan-Albanian unification became part of Albanian leaders’ official agenda at some point, what position would Washington be likely to take on the issue?
– Washington will oppose pan-Albanian unification, just as it opposed pan-Serbian unification. It regards the current borders in the Balkans as fixed. The next phase is EU membership. Once the Balkans states join the EU, borders won’t matter much. I’d be surprised if Albanians from Albania preferred pan-Albanian unification to EU accession. I doubt Serbs from Serbia would prefer pan-Serbian unification to EU accession. And let’s be clear: changing borders in the Balkans would lead to violence.
Let’s now move to Bosnia. In addition to enduring divisions along ethnic lines, the overall socio-economic situation is steadily deteriorating, not to mention people’s growing dissatisfaction with high levels of corruption, street crime and violence of various sorts. The EU, for its part, has managed to preserve the status quo in the sense that the country has not broken apart, but will it be enough to prevent destablization internally, given domestic politicians’ obvious inability to carry out meaningful reforms that would improve people’s lives in the foreseeable future?
– Bosnia and Herzegovina has a democratic system. It is up to its citizens to vote to fix what ails it. The EU and the U.S. have been extraordinarily generous. The incentives are there. And the EU will keep its door ajar for when the Bosnians decide to do the right things. Until then, they will have to live with the governments they elect.
A general assumption is that most important for stability of the Western Balkans is that Serbia and Croatia, as two major regional players, maintain good relationship. Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić has given a few undiplomatic statements since he assumed the office, provoking a negative reaction on the part of Zagreb. Meanwhile, Prime minister Dačić has been looking to arrange a meeting with his Croatian counterpart Zoran Milanović in order to sort things out, but some analysts are warning that Croatia’s looming accession to the EU might make the country become less interested in its future relationship with Belgrade. What is your view? How will Croatia’s EU membership affect Zagreb’s policy toward neighbors, especially Serbia?
– My general impression is that EU membership has improved relations between new member states and their neighbors. Certainly Slovenia has played a very positive role in the Balkans generally over the past 20 years or so. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have also been more part of the solution than part of the problem. There are historical problems between Croatia and Serbia, but so far as I know relatively few big current issues. Croatia’s economic benefits from the EU will echo throughout the Balkans.
All former communist states of eastern and southern Europe are either already members of or aspirants to membership in NATO. The only exception is Serbia, and the reason is well known: most Serbs refuse to even consider joining NATO, largely because of the air campaign against Serbia in 1999. While some analysts believe that NATO membership would have no particular effect on Serbia’s EU prospects, arguing that these are two completely separate processes, others claim that it could be of great importance, helping Belgrade look more credible among its Western partners. Which argument is closer to your line of reasoning and why?
– I’m not sure Serbia’s hesitation about NATO is caused only by the 1999 bombing. Some in Serbia are attached to its friendship with Russia and nostalgic for its non-aligned status during the Cold War. It also knows it cannot become a member of NATO without changing its attitude on Kosovo.
Partly for these reasons, no one in NATO is campaigning for Serbian membership. Belgrade has a good deal of credibility in the West, but if it wants to become a full-fledged Western state it will need to adjust its foreign policy. This is not just a matter of “good neighborly relations” or “normalizing relations.” NATO is not going to bring the Kosovo issue into its membership. It has to be solved, completely, first. There is no use in pretending otherwise.
Contrary to a widespread belief of local conspiracy theorists, the Balkans are nowhere among U.S. foreign policy priorities. The ongoing economic crisis, which is becoming increasingly political, has caused EU membership to lose some of its attractiveness in the eyes of people both in EU member states and aspiring countries, which could make it more difficult for Brussels to keep us dedicated to the eurointegration process. If the crisis in Europe continues to deepen, leading eventually to resurgence of aggressive nationalism in the Balkans as a serious threat to already fragile peace, what is the breaking point at which Washington would begin to consider a stronger engagement in our troubled region?
– There are triggers that would motivate stronger engagement: widespread violence against minorities or interstate conflict, for example. But it is very difficult to picture anything that would precipitate the kind of heavy military intervention we saw in the 1990s.
Even in its current weakened state, the EU is a powerful magnet. And the financial crisis in Europe will not last forever. Anyone who doubts the attractiveness EU membership should just visit one of the nearby members and compare the standard of living. Skip Greece, as its crisis is profound, but self-induced.
After all, should we hope that ex-Yugoslavian countries could begin to view one another as major strategic partners rather than rivals any time soon, apart from mere rhetoric aimed at satisfying Brussels’ demand for good neighborly relations?
– I think you already see Slovenia taking that attitude, and I sometimes hear it also from Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. It will be hard for some of those who are lagging in the EU regatta to see the advantages of improved relations with their neighbors, but with time I think it will happen.
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Damsel in distress
France has answered a call from Bamako to stop an Islamist insurgent move southward. Their quick march towards the capital of Mali against an army led by American-trained officers has
left observers struggling to distinguish between fact, spin, and falsehood.
I won’t be surprised if we discover that the story is more complicated than the narrative so far, which is more or less “damsel in distress” and runs along these lines: Northern Mali is already in the hands of Sunni extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda and responsible for destroying Sufi shrines and documents. They were intending to move south to take over the capital, which appealed to France for help. The Brits and Americans are said to be in supporting military roles.
Just who made the appeal, and who is really in power in Bamako, is not clear to me, and no one seems to be asking. Instead they are rushing to do something. The UN Security Council will reportedly meet today. It had already in December approved an ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) military mission of doubtful capabilities to retake the north, but assembling that and deploying it was going to take months. ECOWAS is said to be accelerating its effort.
These military moves may be absolutely necessary. Damsels do sometimes have to be rescued, even if they are not without blemish in precipitating their distress. Mali’s military has played a dubious role in bringing on this crisis. Still, stopping an extremist takeover of Mali sounds like a pretty good idea to me. It is certainly preferable to fighting entrenched extremists for years, as in Yemen.
But I have no confidence that the north can be retaken by purely military means or that Bamako can be held without dealing with whatever brought on this crisis. Mali has had a pretty good reputation for sustaining democratic processes, but clearly something went awry. A few French bombs are not going to set things straight, even if they do discourage the Islamists from moving south.
For those interested in the deeper issues, this event at USIP in December is a good place to start. Those who imagine that civilian instruments of foreign policy can be jettisoned with the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, or that military means alone will solve the challenges we face, had better think again. These damsels will keep turning up where we least expect to find them. We don’t need to rescue them for their sake. What difference does it make if Malians elect their leaders or not?
We rescue governments, democratic or not, for our own sakes: fragile or collapsed states in the hands of extremists have a way of generating explosive packages on international flights, capturing tourists for ransom and investing heavily in the drug trade and human trafficking. These evils in Mali are far more likely to affect Europe in the near term than the United States, so it is a good thing that Europeans are taking the lead. But if they lead only with military means and ignore civilian requirements, whatever they do won’t last long or work well.
PS: @joshuafoust points out that @tweetsintheME (Andrew Lebovich) has elucidated at least some of the ethnic, religious and other background to the conflict. For some of the musical context, click here.
PPS: Jennifer Welsh reviews the legal basis for the French military intervention.
PPPS: The counter-narrative of enemy-producing Western intervention hasn’t taken long to emerge.
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