Tag: European Union
Montenegro will need to do more
This is an interview I did for Samir Kajošević of the Montenegrin daily Vijesti more than two weeks ago. My English version may be a bit out of sync with the Montenegrin version, but I am hoping the content is identical. They published it Thursday under the headline “Brussels will expect more and more from Montenegro”:
The Montenegrin government must show willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption, because Brussels will insist on that issue more and more during the negotiations, said professor Daniel Serwer from Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School.
“It will have to show willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption if it wants to make progress in the EU negotiations. Brussels has become much more exigent in insisting on rule of law as one of the first chapters to be opened,” says Serwer.
Q: How could Brussels affect Montenegro’s willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption? Is it possible that the EU can stop the process of negotiations if there are no “big trials”?
A: I don’t think Brussels has in mind a particular size or number of trials. The question is whether there is a concerted and effective effort against organized crime and corruption. Brussels will know it when it sees it, whether the trials are few or many, big or small. You will know it too, because there will be a lot to report on.
Q: How could internal problems in EU affect Montenegro’s integration process? Can Brussels afford to slow that process, because Montenegro is the only country in region which is in negotiations?
A: The EU is clearly suffering many fatigues: enlargement fatigue, euro fatigue, unemployment fatigue , immigration fatigue … But Montenegro is not a big pill for Europe to swallow. The important thing is to qualify for membership in every way and be ready when the political door opens. That won’t happen right away, but I do think it will happen. You would not want to miss the opportunity when it arises.
Q: How do you comment the fact that the Milo Đukanović party is constantly ruling in Montenegro for two decades? Such situations are not characteristic of democratic regimes.
A: It is unusual but not unheard of. There are other democratic regimes in which a single party has ruled for longer: Japan is one. Djukanovic is in power because he has the votes. I don’t really see anything wrong with that. The problem is with the opposition: why has it been unable to gain significant ground?
Q: After retiring in 2010, Đukanović again returned as a prime minister. What do you think are the main reasons of his return: fear of loosing power or stopping of reforms?
A: I haven’t seen him in recent years, so I really can’t say. There are precious few politicians who want to leave power, and even fewer who do it for two years, then return. If he came back to stop reforms, he did it at the wrong time: both NATO and the EU will insist on reforms.
Q: Soon as Đukanovic came back as prime minister this November, higher US officials sent a message that he is one of the main political figures in the Balkans. Why is Đukanovic so important to Washington despite charges of his criminal history and lack of democracy?
A: As prime minister of a Balkans country that helped in the fight against Milosevic and has embarked on what are taken here as serious efforts to join the EU and NATO, he will get some respect in Washington. As for criminality, I would be the first to denounce corruption or organized crime.
But I don’t accuse people who have not been formally charged, much less tried and convicted. The assumption of innocence needs to apply. If you have evidence to the contrary, best to publish it or provide it to the courts. More than one Balkans prime minister has landed in difficulty because of courageous journalists and courts , but you have to get the facts straight and provide evidence to support them.
Q: Part of the Montenegrin public claims that he is back to make Montenegro a part of a NATO. What do you think?
A: I hope it is true. Montenegro belongs in NATO, which will welcome it and benefit from its membership, as will Montenegro.
Q: Is he capable to do that, after his businesses connections with Russian tycoons such as Oleg Deripaska?
A: NATO is mainly concerned with the institutions of the state, not the business connections of its leaders. And Russia is no longer the enemy it once was. You may know much more than I do about his business connections. If you have evidence of wrong doing , publish it or give it to the courts. Innuendo is not what I would regard as good journalism.
Q: In Montenegro there are still fears of Serbian influence in domestic politics. Regarding their problems with Kosovo and internal affairs, is Belgrade capable to influence in the neighborhood countries or is it just a “ghost from the past”?
A: Serbia is still an important country in the region: geographically central, in population and economy relatively big, well-connected in the world, cosmopolitan and culturally important. Not everyone in the region wins so many tennis games. It does not dominate the region as it once did, but its neighbors, especially Kosovo, can’t ignore it. Nor can Montenegro.
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Sugar-coated Kosovostan
The European parliament rapporteur expects a “flexible” resolution on Kosovo from the Serbian parliament. What he’ll get is a sugar-coated resolution intended for European and American consumption and a hard-core “rationale” (OBRAZLOŽENJE) that betrays the inflexible core of Serbian policy.
The resolution itself rules out recognition of the “unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo.” That is Belgrade’s traditional position. In my view, it doesn’t mean much. As the International Court of Justice advised, the declaration of independence is an expression of political will that breached no international law. Sovereign states recognize other states as sovereign. So far as I know, Britain never “recognized” America’s July 4, 1776 declaration of independence (please correct that if I am wrong). The resolution also, quite properly, declares Belgrade’s intention to
discuss the creation of conditions that the Serbian community and other ethnic communities throughout Kosovo and Metohija are able to strengthen, grow and live in peace and security.
Declaring itself willing to implement agreements already reached (no great concession, but necessary since there is a new government in place), Belgrade then makes it clear it expects the EU to make any further progress worthwhile:
any agreement that is reached should contribute to Serbia’s EU integration.
Of course for this to happen Belgrade has to show flexibility:
The Republic of Serbia is willing to make further concessions in order to overcome the current state of relations between the Serbian and Albanian people.
But not too much:
At the same time, the Republic of Serbia is unwilling to make further concessions that could jeopardize its state and national interests.
The justification that follows continues the uncompromising approach of the initial draft, which we published here three weeks ago. Kosovo is treated as a province of Serbia. Belgrade will grant it autonomy, keeping the governance of all the Serbs (north and south of the Ibar river) under Serbia’s control to a very large degree. This formula would deny both sovereignty and territorial integrity to Kosovostan. If there are important differences between the current version and the previous draft, I haven’t found them yet and will be grateful to readers if they point them out.
Bad ideas of the Kosovostan sort are having a minor resurgence in today’s world: some in Israel would like the West Bank to have this sort of status. It isn’t going to work as a solution in Palestine, and its analogy won’t work as a solution in Kosovo.
Both the Palestinians and Kosovars have limited means to respond to propositions that would essentially make them non-citizens of a country that doesn’t want them (and in particular does not want them to vote). The authorities in Pristina will (and should) go to the next meeting with Belgrade (I understand scheduled for January 17). There they will presumably say a loud “no” to the proposition that their status be decided by Belgrade. More or less half the UN General Assembly has already recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state. But unless they are able to begin to bring something home that looks better than Kosovostan, they are going to face increasing radicalization of their domestic politics, where a substantial opposition party (Vetvendosje) would like to hold a referendum on union with Albania. Radicalization of Albanian nationalist sentiment within Serbia and Macedonia is also a likely outcome with potentially disastrous consequences.
Washington and Brussels would do well to realize that their pressure on Belgrade to ante up has not yet had the desired effect. They’ve been offered a sugar-coated but still bitter pill. They should make it clear this medicine will not cure what ails Belgrade’s European ambitions. Their other problems will make American and European diplomats try to low-key the Balkans portfolio, but they need to do better than Kosovostan.
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My Fantasyland
I gather the Serbian parliament will not actually approve the Fantasyland platform for Kosovo but will instead pass a resolution containing some basic principles to which its negotiators will adhere in the future political-level talks. This inspires me to suggest a few basic points that, if adopted, would go a long way to ensuring that peace and stability are maintained in the Balkans and that Serbia gets an early date to start negotiations on EU accession. This is my Fantasyland. No, I don’t expect Belgrade to listen to me, but here it is anyway:
Serbia hereby acknowledges the evil that was done in its name during the Milosevic regime. We have prosecuted criminals involved and delivered all the international indictees to the Hague Tribunal. Our current government is a democratic one that understands sovereignty cannot be maintained over a province in which human rights were so grossly violated. Milosevic lost sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999. Democratic Serbia cannot regain it.
Nor would we want to: governing a young and rapidly growing population of more than 1.6 million Albanians, many of whom no longer speak Serbian, is simply not what we want to be doing. They can and should govern themselves.
But we expect proper treatment of Serbs and other minorities there. This is Serbia’s primary concern: to ensure the safety, security and prosperity of its citizens who live in Kosovo, as well as the protection of Serbian monuments, churches, monasteries and other property, both religious and secular. For these purposes, Serbia accepts the Ahtisaari plan, whose letter and spirit were intended to provide real protection. We cannot accept pro forma implementation but will insist on substantial guarantees of the rights and privileges provided therein, which we negotiated for in good faith. This will be the main subject of discussion in our talks with the Pristina authorities.
The Pristina institutions are distasteful to us because they include people who have done deadly harm to Serbs in Kosovo. But we understand that they are the product of an internationally sponsored state-building process and represent the will of the majority population of Kosovo. We will respect and cooperate with these institutions as we do others legitimately elected and empowered, so long as they respect the human rights of the Serb population.
Despite our pleas, the International Court of Justice has advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not breach international law. Once the Ahtisaari plan has been fully and faithfully implemented to our satisfaction, we will reconsider whether we can recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Pristina government.
In the meanwhile, we will seek for Serbs in Kosovo governing arrangements comparable to what we are willing to provide Albanians and other minorities within Serbia, particularly in the south. We understand that these contiguous populations will one day, like the Serbs in northern Kosovo, enjoy the privileges of citizens of the European Union, including the disappearance of the borders that now temporarily divide them from their co-nationals. We look forward to, and seek to hasten, that day.
We have sought a status-neutral approach to international community relations with Pristina. We will continue to be status-neutral ourselves, meaning that we will no longer claim Kosovo is a province of Serbia. But we understand that about half the members of the UN have now recognized the Pristina institutions as sovereign and independent. We will no longer oppose such recognitions and will ask that Russia allow Kosovo to enter the General Assembly. This will help ensure that the Pristina institutions feel the full weight of responsibility for maintaining peace and stability as well as the security and welfare of all their citizens.
What a fine day that would be, eh? This is not entirely fantasy. I know lots of Serbs in Belgrade who would sign up to something like this. The issue is not whether this is beyond imagination, but rather whether Serbia’s current leadership can bring itself to break with an approach that is causing both Serbia and Kosovo unnecessary pain. Unfortunately, it cannot.
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Serbia’s new year
Publication of my reflections on Kosovo’s new year made me wonder why I hadn’t done a comparable piece on Serbia. So here it is.
Serbia struggled through 2012, which saw the fall from power after more than 10 years of its Democratic Party and the defeat in the May election of its incumbent president, a tougher line from the European Union and the United States on dismantling Belgrade’s governing structures in Kosovo and continued weak economic growth. Belgrade’s success in slowing recognition of Kosovo has not translated into anything positive for Serbia, which seems to be running a foreign policy based on inat (spite), or at least on delaying the inevitable. This has driven it in showy but unproductive directions: the Non Aligned Movement and Russia are far from the European aspirations of most of Serbia’s citizens. Former Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic’s presidency of the General Assembly keeps Serbia’s profile high but has produced few concrete results. His announced intention to hold a debate on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which has acquitted several high-level indictees of alleged crimes committed against Serbs, promises more of the same.
Relations with Kosovo have nevertheless improved, with implementation of some of technical agreements progressing and political-level talks begun. Serbia’s platform for the talks was prepared late. I welcomed it with my version of a Bronx cheer. It may be revised, but more likely ignored.
According to the platform, Belgrade continues to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo and aims at separate governance of the Serbs there, including those south of the Ibar river who have already integrated to a significant degree in Pristina’s institutions while enjoying the autonomy the Ahtisaari plan provides. Serbia’s campaign against recognition of Kosovo by other states has been moderately successful, but recognitions continue (13 in 2012). Belgrade failed in its concerted effort to prevent Kosovo from joining the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Serbia faces two big problems on the domestic front: its slow economic growth since 2009 and its rapidly aging population. Combined, they are straining the country’s finances, causing the dinar to depreciate and inflation to rise, while unemployment remains high. Per capita income is now at about the same level as Kosovo’s, which used to be much lower. The global economic environment is not positive, in particular in Europe. “Doing business” conditions have improved and foreign direct investment has been a big plus.
Serbs are already enjoying visa-free travel to the Schengen area of Europe and Serbia has achieved the status of candidate for European Union membership. It does not, however, yet have a date to begin negotiations. Brussels, reluctant to open the door to further enlargement, will be exacting not only in the eventual negotiations but also in agreeing to a date for their start.
The still fairly new president and government in Belgrade have yet to solve the equation that stumped their predecessors. Serbia’s European ambitions require modernization and reform. But Serbia is still attached to ideas about state legitimacy, the role of religion in the state and the relationship of Serbs to non-Serbs that are backward-looking. It is not surprising that President Nikolic and Prime Minister Dacic think it natural that they visit Banja Luka before Sarajevo, a move that presumably foreshadows their intention to continue their predecessors’ habit of favoring relations with Republika Srpska over relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the hastily arranged visit of the foreign minister to Sarajevo notwithstanding.
The American role vis-a-vis Serbia has declined significantly. The Europeans have most of the leverage. Berlin has the biggest say in how they use it, though London, The Hague, Ljubljana and eventually Zagreb will also insist on reform and modernization while Paris, Rome, Stockholm and others try to win Belgrade’s affections with softer approaches. In the end, though, it takes consensus of all the EU members to decide on membership. Serbia will get there, but the road is going to be long and difficult.
In 2013, the key issue will be a date to begin negotiations. That depends on improving relations with Pristina. A solution for the Serb-controlled north seems far off, but I hope it will be found. Serbia needs to declare independence from Kosovo.
PS: There is a translation (thank you Milan Marinkovic!) into English of the picture here.
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Hussein Saleh, you are not alone
My journalist (McClatchy) friend and fellow Haverford graduate Roy Gutman tweeted this moving short video about a Yemeni International Committee of the Red Cross worker, Hussein Saleh:
I Know Where I’m Going from Intercross on Vimeo.
It reminded me of what I know: most of the people who work for humanitarian and other organizations, nongovernmental and governmental, in conflict zones are host country nationals. They take enormous risks and get killed at an accelerating rate: they are most of the more than 300 humanitarian workers killed last year worldwide.
My first encounter with what the State Department now calls “Foreign Service nationals,” that is citizens of the country in which a U.S. government facility is located, was with Danilo Bracchetti, who worked in U.S. embassy in Rome from the late 1940s until retirement sometime after I left in 1993. When he started, Rome had no garbage collection, because no one threw anything out. He was the only Italian I ever met who admitted to having been in a fascist youth organization (virtually everyone was of course). By the time I came along in the late 1970s, Italy was still in the throes of the Red Brigades, so working for the Americans was not without risk. He never betrayed the slightest hesitation. So far as Danilo was concerned, working for the Americans was an honor and a privilege, one I’m sure he was proud of to his premature dying day.
I’ve met other “host country” nationals in more dangerous situations. Iraq was particularly challenging. The U.S. Institute of Peace employees there did not always tell their families for whom they were working. In 2006/7 especially, they lived in risky conditions. One of our security contractors–an Iraqi Kurd–was killed then in a militia hit. A number of our employees and collaborators later applied for and got visas to come to the U.S., on grounds that they were in danger if they remained. Others fled to Kurdistan, which is still relatively safe from the sectarian violence that plagues other parts of Iraq.
A number of the key players in Afghanistan’s bureaucratic upper crust these days spent the Taliban years working for international relief organizations, some of which were active even then. It is amazing how well acclimated they are to Western habits, even though they conserve their Afghan roots. It was no small thing to deliver international aid during the years in which the Taliban ruled.
In Syria today virtually all the people distributing substantial amounts of international humanitarian assistance during the civil war are Syrians. The risks they face every day are unimaginable. Or, depending on how you look at it, all too imaginable.
Despite the very real risks they run on behalf of Western governments and organizations, these host country nationals are largely invisible in today’s world. But talk to any journalist, aid worker or diplomat. They will recount tales of their heroism and devotion. The host country (and third country) nationals run risks every day. As the year comes to a close, I hasten to express what so many of us have felt: deep appreciation and respect for the commitment they demonstrate and the sacrifices they make. Hussein Saleh, you are not alone.
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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