Tag: European Union
The zombie that haunts the Balkans
I promised yesterday a solution to Macedonia’s problems today, but to get there I am going to have to detour. The Macedonia “name” issue is unique. I can’t think of another situation, current or historical, in which a country wants a neighbor to change its name. It is also a zero sum problem: if Athens gains, Skopje loses, and vice versa.
It would be really nice if Athens came to the conclusion that rule of law requires it to give in on NATO membership for The FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), even if it believes the December 2011 International Court of Justice decision finding it in violation of a 1995 agreement is wrong. A few potential investors might even be favorably impressed and open their wallets.
But I am not holding my breath for that. Zero sum problems without solutions require reframing. Why is the “name” issue important? Because it prevents Macedonia from entering NATO and getting a date to begin its EU negotiations. Why is that important? Because those are the paths on which Macedonia has to make progress to avoid aggravating its inter-ethnic tensions, which in their most extreme form might lead to claims of exclusive territorial control over parts of the country or calls for Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo.
Ah! That is a problem I recognize from elsewhere in the Balkans. It exists almost everywhere: Serbs and Croats in Bosnia want to govern themselves on their own territory, Albanians in Kosovo feel the same way (as do Serbs in the north), some Macedonians would like to establish exclusive control over a homeland. We’ve had analogous problems in Croatia in the past (Serbs in the krajina, or borderlands) and there are latent problems inside Serbia (Bosniaks in Sandjak and Albanians in Presevo, not to mention Hungarians, Slovaks and Croats in Vojvodina).
Many of the ethnic problems of the Balkans boil down to this: why should I live as a minority in your territory, when you can live as a minority in mine?
This question could lead to an unending series of partitions along ethnic lines, something some of my colleagues in Washington do not fear. I do. Ethnic partition is a proven formula for precipitating violence, death and destruction on a grand scale. All those folks who agree on governing themselves find it difficult to decide where to draw the territorial lines, which is what leads to ethnic cleansing and war. The question is how to stop it, because once it starts it will spread from Kosovo and Macedonia at least as far as Bosnia and even Cyprus, with de jure division of the northern Turkish Republic from the rest of the island.
That is what Greeks should be worrying about, not the name of its northern neighbor.
The international community has been wise to use existing boundaries in the Balkans and try to avoid drawing new ones. While some would like to portray the independence of Kosovo as an ethnic partition of Serbia, it was not. No ethnic adjustment of Kosovo’s boundary was made when it was upgraded to a border. The same is true throughout the Balkans: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro all gained independence within well-established lines. There is no reason to depart from this course.
We’ve reached the point that a concerted and explicit international campaign to stop ethno-territorial division of the Balkans is in order. Rather than each country fighting these battles on its own, I’d like to see Europeans and Americans joining with partners in the Balkans to declare unequivocally that no territorial adjustments in the Balkans will be made on an ethnic basis, that the widely known and accepted borders are permanent and will be demarcated bilaterally, and that all concerned will join in an effort to take the measures necessary to prevent any changes.
These measures should be explicit and far-reaching, including:
- implementation of the Ahtisaari plan in northern Kosovo, with additional details required worked out in talks between Pristina and Belgrade
- admission of Macedonia into NATO as “The FYROM” in accordance with the 1995 interim accord, with explicit guarantees to Greece on its border if Athens wants them
- negotiation of EU membership only within a framework determined by central governments (in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo),
- a fixed time frame for a negotiated end to the de facto division of Cyprus,
- a region-wide agreement that each state will ensure the highest human rights standards for its minorities, with periodic verification by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
It is time that Macedonia and Bosnia as well as their friends in Albania, Montenegro and Croatia (that group is known in diplomatic parlance as the Adriatic 5) as well as Kosovo make common cause against ethnic partition in the Balkans, instead of struggling against it each country on its own.
The A5 and Kosovo will need some strong European allies against ethnic partition. The best bets are Germany, whose chancellor has been vigorous in her opposition to Serbian state structures in northern Kosovo, and the United Kingdom, where the idea of ethnic partition of Bosnia is rightly despised. If Greece joins the effort, to inoculate itself against irredentist claims from Macedonia, so much the better. A vigorous diplomatic initiative that engages the United States in addition would stand a chance of driving a wooden stake through the ethnic partition zombie that still haunts too much of the Balkans.
They taught me in school that if I didn’t know the answer to a question, I should ask a better one and answer that. Killing the ethnic partition zombie that haunts the Balkans seems to me far more important than finding a name Athens and Skopje can agree on.
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Whose glory?
I took a quick jaunt to Skopje from Pristina this morning. It was an easy hour and a quarter on the way down before 8 am. Considerably longer on the way back, with interminable lines of less than 50 kph traffic crawling past equally interminable stores selling construction materials, bathroom fixtures, appliances and ceramic tile. Not to mention the ubiquitous (but all too obviously futile) auto larje, car wash.
I hadn’t seen Skopje since its still incomplete facelift, which installed a grand pedestrian plaza along the Vardar River, where ruined asphalt and weeds used to preside. It’s a dramatic improvement, marred by the grotesquely outsized equestrian statue of we guess Alexander the Great (as well as several other grand luminaries), not to mention a triumphal arch.
It is hard not laugh at the pretention. I imagine the Brits giggled when they captured (and burned down) Washington in 1812. What were the colonists thinking when they built such a grand Capitol and President’s House in the midst of a swamp? Pretencious dolts like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington thought they were building “New Rome.”
The Greeks aren’t laughing. They view Macedonia as expropriating their cultural heritage and have hardened their opposition to their northern neighbor calling itself “the Republic Macedonia,” the name by which most countries (including the United States) recognize it.
The political entity that boasts Skopje as its capital (but was not independent until 1991) has had that name in one form or another since before the end of World War II, which is longer than the living memory of most of its residents. The Greek objection is more or less the equivalent of the United States of America contesting Mexico’s right to call itself the United Mexican States, which happens to be the country’s formal name in English, or vice versa.
No one would, or should, take this issue seriously, were it not for the fact that Greece is blocking Skopje’s entry into NATO and the formal start of its negotiations for EU membership.
That’s no laughing matter, not least because of Macedonia’s ethnic composition. The one quarter of the population that is ethnic Albanian is a lot less attached to claims of ancient glory than many of their ethnic Macedonian fellow citizens. While they are not above claiming to be the descendants of the ancient Dardanians, Albanians have little use for the grand statues of the new downtown Skopje and wonder out loud how much they cost. They are far more interested in the small, relatively new, museum and chapel dedicated to Gonxha Agnes Bojaxhiu, aka Mother Therese (who was born nearby):
Many Albanians in Macedonia regard NATO membership as vital: it is the ultimate guarantee of Macedonia’s territorial integrity and their own security. It is something their politicians have promised, and are now finding it impossible to deliver. They would gladly compromise on the “name” issue if it gave them entry into the Alliance, whose headquarters in Kabul are, ironically, guarded by the Macedonian army.
Macedonia’s name has been an issue under negotiation for the past 20 years. A settlement is nowhere in sight. The new Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, built his career by opening the issue in the early 1990s, when he was foreign minister. The current Macedonian prime minister, Nikola Gruevski, has likewise built his career on claiming Macedonian glory for Skopje.
So what can be done to resolve the issue?
Skopje has wisely offered Athens a broad cooperative arrangement, with the Greeks entitled to pick and choose among many menu items. This is intended to enlarge the pie, always a good idea when faced with a zero sum negotiation. But Macedonia is far from being able to offer what Greeks might really want: many billions to bail them out of their debit.
Tomorrow I’ll consider a more realistic way forward.
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The proof is in the pudding
Belgrade finally has a new government, formed more than two and a half months after the May 6 election. It is an unabashedly nationalist government, with Interior Minister Ivica Dačić at the helm. The governing coalition will include his “socialists,” President Nikolic’s “progressives” as well as Mlađan Dinkić’s United Regions of Serbia.
Initial signals are that this will be a “Serbia first” government that aims for economic revival above all else. Dačić, who will hold on to the Interior Ministry, told parliament:
The new government’s priority is the economic recovery of the country. All other key goals of this government, such as Serbia’s European future, the solving of the Kosovo issue, regional cooperation, combating crime and corruption, heath care, education, and others, will depend on whether or not we will be able to secure our country’s economic survival.
This is strikingly sensible and responsive to the views of Serbia’s voters. Dinkić will play the key role as economy and finance minister. Suzana Grubješić, whom I guess I know as Suzana Mrgic, will be in charge of EU integration and a deputy prime minister.
Kosovo has been demoted from ministerial rank to a mere office. The new government is pledging to implement agreements already reached with Pristina, which is a good thing and if carried out a big change. Aleksandar Vučić is a deputy prime minister in charge of defense, security, combat against corruption and crime, and defense minister. This will make him, in addition to the prime minister, an important player in dealing with the thorny issues arising in northern Kosovo, where Serbian security structures, passionate rejection of Pristina’s authority and illegal trafficking of many different sorts make a combustible mix.
The new Foreign Minister, Ivan Mrkić, is a professional foreign service officer (formerly state secretary) who served the Milosevic regime in the 1990s as ambassador to Cyprus. Whatever his role in serving Milosevic’s requirements, this should give him a very good idea of why partition of Kosovo is a really bad idea.
So what do I think about all this? I think it is about as good as could be expected: a newish government that reflects the election results, which defeated a somewhat less nationalist and more liberal government that also had good economic intentions but found it difficult to deliver.
The proof is in the pudding, which the American way of saying that we have to wait to see the results. Serbs will be most interested in the economic results. Internationals like me will be interested in what all this means for peace and stability in the Balkans. A quick move to establish the integrated boundary/border management foreseen in one of the agreements with Pristina would be a good step in the right direction. If they don’t like that one, there are several other agreements whose implementation awaits a willing Belgrade government.
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A letter to Bill Burns
People sometimes ask what I say to my colleagues in the State Department about Balkans issues. It’s often difficult to answer, since I usually talk with them, though a lot less often than some people may imagine. But a queasy feeling of things coming apart moved me last week to write a note to Bill Burns, the deputy secretary. Here is what I said:
While I realize the Balkans are not anywhere near the top of your “do” list, even within Europe, I fear things could come apart there. Washington needs to ensure that does not happen. With the likely formation of a new, more nationalist governing coalition in Belgrade, forceful steps are needed that only Washington can inspire. At stake are achievements that have protected the lives and well being of people who regard the United States as their friend and ally.
There are three places action is needed:
- Bosnia: I won’t urge you to get involved in Bosnia’s constitutional issues, as there have already been three U.S.-sponsored failures. Only the Bosnians working together are going to be able to modify the Dayton state so that it can qualify for European Union membership. But we need to ensure in the meanwhile that Bosnia does not come apart. The EU should end its growing inclination to negotiate membership separately with Republika Srpska and move its remaining troops in the country to Brcko, which is the linchpin that holds Bosnia together.
- Kosovo: The de facto partition of Kosovo at the Ibar River is a threat to stability not only inside Kosovo but also in Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia and Cyprus. A small spark could set off a region-wide conflagration and a series of ethnic partitions. Key agreements reached in the talks on practical issues remain unimplemented. We need a concerted US and EU effort to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty in the north in accordance with the Ahtisaari peace plan. This will require a serious U.S. effort to convince the five remaining EU members who have not yet done so to recognize Kosovo.
- Serbia: The end of the Tadic presidency frees Brussels and Washington to press Belgrade for more definitive resolution of issues in Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time, both the EU and the US should try to preserve in Serbia a vigorous pro-EU political opposition and civil society committed to maintaining Serbia’s Western ties and blocking Russia’s already outsized influence in Belgrade.
Washington has too many other problems on its plate to do a lot of heavy lifting in the Balkans, where the Europeans should carry most of the burden. I am not asking much:
- Get the Europeans to deal more with the government in Sarajevo on accession and move their troops to where they will signal serious intent of holding Bosnia together,
- Convince five EU members to recognize Pristina’s sovereignty and implement the Ahtisaari plan in northern Kosovo,
- Maintain a vigorous democratic opposition in Belgrade.
These are steps well within the capability of your able diplomats without major new resources.
With respect and appreciation for your many efforts,
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A milestone, again
Today is Vidovdan, Saint Vitus’ Day for Serbs. It is the 623rd anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje, commemorated as a religio-national holiday by Serbs worldwide. It is also the date on which Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, precipitating World War I, as well as other major events in Serbian history.
Today there is one more: newly elected nationalist Tomislav Nikolic asked nationalist Ivica Dacic, leader of Slobodan Milosevic’s Socialist party, to form a new government, with the support of Nikolic’s own Progressive party as well as several smaller parties in the governing coalition.
There is nothing socialist about Dacic or progressive about Nikolic. Both are nationalists and pragmatists who draw support from an electorate disappointed in the performance of the more moderate nationalist Boris Tadic, who lost this month’s presidential election after more than seven years at the helm. All claim to be pro-European, but Tadic more loudly, definitively and effectively than Nikolic and Dacic.
Alternation in power is a vital part of democratic governance. Dacic participated as Interior Minister in Tadic’s last government, but Nikolic and his “progressives” are new to governing responsibility. It is a sign of the maturity of Serb’s still young democracy that the international community is taking Nikolic’s accession to power in stride, even if many might have preferred that Tadic win.
Both Nikolic and Dacic have already gone out of their way to consult with Moscow during the government formation process. That gives more than a hint of where they plan to steer Serbia, which even under Tadic has flirted with Russia and vaunted itself as non-aligned (whatever that means in the post-Cold War world).
What does this augur for Washington and Brussels? For Brussels, it likely means a deceleration in Serbia’s technical preparations for European Union membership, which proceeded apace under Tadic. A slow-down won’t cause any handwringing in Brussels, where the prospect of any new members before 2020 is unwelcome. The EU will want to keep Serbia on track for eventual membership, but it likely will feel far less pressure to offer a date to begin accession negotiations with a Dacic-led government.
That’s a good thing from Washington’s perspective. Serbia continued under Tadic to monkey in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo in unhelpful ways. Washington was hesitant to ask too much of Tadic, who argued that would strengthen his more nationalist competitors. A tougher EU stance is vital to moderating Serbia’s efforts to maintain strictly separate governing structures in both Bosnia’s Republika Srpska and northern Kosovo.
The day also saw the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia throw out one charge of genocide against Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic. I hope this is seen in Bosnia and Serbia as evidence that he is getting a fair trial.
More important was the decision on Tuesday in a Serbian court finding 14 people guilty of killing civilians in late 1991, during Serb efforts to seize parts of Croatian territory and cleanse it of Croats. As I argued at the OSCE earlier this week, acknowledgement of responsibility for wrongdoing is a key step in reconciliation. If the new nationalist leadership in Belgrade plays it right, the Serbian courts have given them an opening to acknowledge the past and by doing so improve relations between Serbia and its neighbors in the future.
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Albania’s role in the neighborhood
I spoke this morning at CSIS on this topic. Here are the notes I prepared for myself:
- In an important sense, Albania is the new guy on the Balkans block. It was thoroughly isolated from 1945 through the Cold War.
- The collapse of the Communist regime was cataclysmic for Albanians. I was in charge of the U.S. Embassy in Rome in August 1991 when the Vlora, a ship carrying 10,000 refugees, reached the port of Bari.
- Twice in the 1990s Italian troops were sent to Albania on what we would now call stabilization missions.
- When I went to observe the 1997 elections, I found myself in the midst of far more gunfire at night than in Sarajevo during the war.
- Less than 15 years later, Albania is a NATO member and sends peacekeepers abroad. It is an exporter of stability rather than an importer.
- Still the poorest country in Europe, Albania has suffered a slowdown in growth since the 2008 but weathered the financial crisis relatively well. Severe poverty is down sharply.
- Its role in the neighborhood is a positive one: Albania’s relations with neighbors Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece are generally very good.
- This is a remarkable achievement, one that merits a gold star no matter what I say farther on.
- There are problems. Albania’s problems are above all internal: its politics are contentious and sometimes violent, its public administration is weak, its economy is burdened with corruption and organized crime, rule of law is unreliable.
- These are all well-known and longstanding problems that will need to be addressed in the EU accession process, which has begun in recent years with the application for membership, the visa waiver and the Stabilization and Association Agreement, even if Brussels has not given Tirana candidate status or a date for negotiations to begin.
- I really see only one thing that could derail Albania’s progress towards European Union membership, if not in this decade then in the next one.
- That is its relationship with other Albanian populations in the Balkans. Fundamentally, it boils down to this: will the Albanians of the Balkans accept living in six different countries, or will they challenge the existing territorial arrangements?
- If I were in their shoes, I would not for a moment put at risk my hopes to be inside the European Union by unsettling borders in the Balkans or fooling with irredentist ambitions.
- Washington and Brussels will be unequivocal in rejecting Greater Albania ambitions, which could lead to catastrophic population movements and widespread instability.
- The wise course for Albania is to cure its internal ills, maintain good relations with all its neighbors, including Italy as well as those in the Balkans, and maintain close cultural ties with Albanians who live in other countries, including the United States.
- That Albania will continue to export stability, enjoy improving prosperity and enter the European Union with its double-headed eagle held high.
PS: A lot of people in the room, including the Albanian ambassador, thought Greater Albania was getting too much attention in the discussion. I trust they are right. The attention clearly reflects how strongly Americans feel the idea is a bad one, not how strongly Albanians are attached to it.
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