Tag: European Union
A bad election trifecta
There were three elections today conducted in the shadow of Europe’s austerity measures and impending recession: France, Greece and Serbia. All three saw good showings by anti-austerity, less pro-European forces. The outcomes of the first two will reduce further the role Europe plays in world affairs, at least for the next few years. The third suggested that Serbia will continue in its current policies, which are nominally pro-European but still export insecurity, in particular to Bosnia and Kosovo.
In France and Greece, opponents of German-style austerity had a good day. Francois Hollande’s victory over Nicolas Sarkozy guarantees a tug of war between Paris and Berlin. The parliamentary election outcome in Greece is not so clear yet–it will be several days before it is decided who will head the governing coalition and which parties will participate. But the good showing of smaller, anti-austerity parties of the left and right in the Greek parliamentary elections guarantees continuing uncertainty about whether Greece will implement the tough austerity required to obtain International Monetary Fund money. The bankers are worried.
The anti-austerity advocates in both Greece and France may well be correct that growth is Europe’s real need, rather than fiscal retrenchment. But Germany remains adamant about austerity, so the election results ensure continuing quarrels and painful adjustments inside the euro zone, which is already headed into recession.
So long as Europe remains focused on its own internal problems, it can play only a limited role in the rest of the world. The Americans will be fortunate if the Europeans manage to maintain any significant number of troops in Afghanistan into 2014. The prospects for enlargement beyond Croatia, which is supposed to gain membership in the European Union next year, are dim. Europe’s role in the Arab awakenings is already minimal. In Asia and the Middle East, it has condemned itself to a predominantly commercial role, though it leads the nuclear talks with Iran.
In Serbia, ethnically nationalist parties performed well. The presidential outcome will be decided in a run off two weeks hence. Moderate nationalist President Tadic did not do particularly well but seems have edged out his rival Tomislav Nikolic, who in the past has bested Tadic in the first round. Whoever wins, Belgrade seems determined to continue its quixotic effort to prepare for membership in the European Union even while laying claim to Kosovo, whose independence is recognized by 22 EU members, and supporting Serb separatism in Bosnia. The leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, campaigned openly for Tadic. These policies are incompatible, but only a few marginal figures in Serbian politics are willing to say what is obvious: Kosovo is lost and a united (but decentralized) Bosnia is in Serbia’s interest. Partition would mean the creation of a rump, radicalized Islamic state on Serbia’s border.
So what we can look forward to is a weaker Europe less willing to enlarge or play an expanded role in world affairs generally. The Balkans will be left increasingly to their own devices, which have repeatedly proved not only inadequate but also dangerous. Washington, preoccupied with other matters, will occasionally weigh in to restrain its friends–especially the Kosovars and the Bosniaks–from making big mistakes, but otherwise it will try to leave matters to a Europe that doesn’t really care if the Balkan road to the EU is a slow one.
Maybe we’ll muddle through. Maybe not. But the election trifecta means that the European Union and its attractiveness to non-members is weak and growing weaker. That’s not good.
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Glass empty
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute discussion of Hamas’s shifting political calculations, moderated by Phil Wilcox of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, was one of the more depressing events I’ve attended lately. And I attend a lot of them.
Bottom line: the shifts, though potentially real, will make no difference to the peace process with Israel. Or even to reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
Rob Malley of the International Crisis Group suggested the Arab awakening has certainly sharpened questions for Hamas about its relationship with Syria and Iran and about whether it should moderate its views, as other Muslim Brotherhood organizations have done. Hamas refused to support Bashar al Assad, but somehow that is now a byegone. Iran has renewed its financing, though at what level is unclear.
Gaith al Omari of the American Task Force on Palestine said Hamas needs Iranian financing less than in the past because it has Gaza’s revenue, which makes the Gaza leadership more independent. There is really no progress on reconciliation with Fatah, which would require more than naming a new unity government. It would require agreement on holding elections and unifying the security forces. So far, all we’ve seen is reconciliation theater, nothing more.
Mark Perry of the Jersalem Media and Communications Center anticipates generational change will be important inside Hamas. The outside (of Gaza) leadership may be ready for acceptance of the 1967 borders for a Palestinian state and for reconciliation, but the inside Gaza leadership is not. The division is not really ideological, Malley said, but based on where you happen to sit. There is a real debate happening, but the outcome is unclear.
The U.S. is a problem. The “quartet” (U.S., EU, UN and Russia) conditions (recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of violence and acceptance of past agreements) are unconditional. But Hamas sees no likelihood that Washington can really bring Israel to the negotiating table with anything interesting to offer on settlements, Jerusalem or other important issues. Hamas’ great fear is that it will get trapped like Fatah, having compromised without getting anything substantial in return. They want to know if they accept the conditions what would happen next. The U.S. has no serious response.
There is nevertheless no alternative to a U.S.-led mediation process. The Europeans and the UN have nothing substantial to offer.
This left me wondering whether George W. Bush was right when he shunned the Middle East peace process. The prospects for anything interesting happening sounded minimal to me. Then again, when the experts all agree the glass is empty, that’s when something interesting happens.
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Think twice
With U.S. officials saying–malgre’ moi–that the Annan plan is already failing, the White House is pledging to ramp up pressure on Syria. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has also held hearings looking for policy options.
They aren’t finding many, other than the now tired safe areas, humanitarian corridors, no fly zones and other euphemisms whose only real utility is to initiate what would no doubt be a lengthy and frustrating international military intervention with an uncertain outcome. Arming the opposition is another standby, but the perils of doing that have become more obvious with the continued fragmenting of the Syrian National Council, which was supposed to serve as the opposition “umbrella” and conduit for money. It just isn’t clear who might eventually benefit from the arms. Giving weapons to Sunni-dominated insurgents in Syria could have repurcussions in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and beyond that would not be in the U.S. interest.
The one point of consensus in the testimony is provision of greater support to the in-country opposition, including intelligence about the movement of the Syrian security forces. This is eminently reasonable, but even those who say
The regime has had a far harder time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance
still advocate support to the armed resistance, presumably to gain influence over it. That’s too bad, since armed resistance tends to discourage the more effective nonviolent resistance.
We can always tighten sanctions, or get someone else to tighten them, but it is in their nature that the easy and more obvious restrictions get done first. The extension of financial and travel sanctions to more and more marginal regime figures may net a few bad guys, but the marginal utility is likely to be low, unless we happen to hit a regime fixer more important than he appeared to be in the first round. A look at who is still buying Syrian oil might turn up something interesting we could accomplish, and it would likely be useful to extend some of the sanctions on Iran’s banking system to Syria. But let’s be clear: doing that will unquestionably make life even harder than it has been for ordinary Syrians.
The sad fact is that there is not much else we can do to raise the costs to Bashar al Assad, unless we are prepared to take military action. Despite White House mumbling about ramping up pressure, my sense is that we are nowhere near that decision. There are good reasons for this. Apart from all the tactical difficulties of attacking Syrian forces that are inside major population centers, the Administration’s top priority has to be mounting a credible military threat against Iran’s nuclear program.
An attack on Syria without UN Security Council approval could end Russia’s support for the P5+1 negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program, and any prospect for UNSC approval of action against Iran. We also run the risk that an attack on Syria would not go well, or that it would chew up U.S. assets like cruise missiles, or that it would provide Iran with intelligence on our capabilities that would make an attack there less effective. You don’t want to get into a scrap in Syria if your top priority is Iran (that’s true even though I would oppose an attack on Iran).
This leaves the main U.S. focus in Syria on diplomacy, in two directions: Moscow and the Syrian opposition. The renewal of the UN observer mission in Syria comes up in July. We need Moscow to bring Bashar al Assad into full compliance with the Annan plan by then. At the same time, we need to get the Syrian opposition in compliance, by ending its counter-productive use of violence. This is what none of those testifying at the House have been willing to say.
If we get to July without the Annan plan implemented, then we will need to consider withdrawal of the observers as well as the use of military force. I understand perfectly well the arguments in favor–there is no doubt in my mind that Bashar al Assad is capable of continuing the crackdown and committing much greater atrocities than he has so far. And I understand why some U.S. government officials (and President Sarkozy) are trying to create the impression that military action is likely, even though it isn’t.
But President Obama is unlikely in the middle of an election campaign focused on the economy to take us to war, yet again, in an Arab country Americans don’t care much about. Withdrawal of the observers without the subsequent use of force would leave Bashar al Assad to crack down even harder, which is what he did after the departure of the Arab League observers. That would not be a good outcome.
We need to be thinking twice about Syria at every stage.
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A deal not to make a deal?
Eric Shu, jack of all trades around peacefare.net, offers another write-up, this time of Monday’s Carnegie Endowment event on Negotiating with Iran: Istanbul and Its Aftermath. Eric becomes available next month when his Middle East Institute internship expires. Anyone out there need a fine Mandarin-speaking assistant with an excellent Brown education?
Over the weekend of April 14-15, Istanbul hosted negotiations between the P5+1 (United States, China, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany) and Iran, the first official meeting since the talks broke down in January 2011. Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief and lead representative of the P5+1, stated afterwards that the talks were “constructive and useful.” No concrete agreements were reached other than to schedule another meeting on May 23 in Baghdad.
What does this mean for the players involved? Is this a success or another ploy by Iran to drag out the negotiations, giving itself more time to enrich uranium?
At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Monday, April 16, Karim Sadjadpour, associate at Carnegie and author of Reading Khamenei, moderated a discussion that focused on the nuclear negotiations with Iran and the political ramifications of the meeting.
Vali Nasr, newly appointed Dean of JHU-SAIS and former senior advisor in the State Department, began the discussion with an argument for “maintaining the status quo.” He viewed negotiations with Iran as an issue that the Obama Administration should not deal with until after the November elections. Obama’s supposedly off-mic comment to Medvedev last month regarding missiles is also relevant here: “This is my last election. After my election, I have more flexibility.” Nasr then pointed out that it would be difficult to justify a war with Iran, especially during this election season. He closed his opening remarks with a question: can they make a deal about not making a deal?
Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and former State Department official, provided a similar evaluation of the recent negotiations. Takeyh argued that inconclusive diplomacy is beneficial as it provides space for diplomatic conversations to continue. In this case, the talks led to a scheduled meeting at the end of May for more serious negotiations. Takeyh also pointed to the difficulty Iran has in giving up its nuclear weapons aspirations. As a country with multiple adversaries in the region, it is in its own strategic interests to acquire these nuclear weapons capabilities.
As the director of the Nuclear Policy Program at Carnegie, George Perkovich focused his statements on Iran’s nuclear program. He opened with a description of how Iran pursued multiple pathways to developing the capacities needed for a nuclear program, rather than committing at the start for a weapons program. Perkovich also pointed out that Ayatollah Khamenei recently stated that “the Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons” and considers it a “big sin.” Regardless of how much truth is in the statement, it provides space for a negotiated compromise.
At the end of the discussion, the panelists were asked for historical templates that might be applicable to Iran. The speakers all mentioned North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, but agreed that historical frameworks were unlikely to work. The context, leaders, and factors of each situation are different. Deals and negotiations are “living organisms.”
The Istanbul meeting was essentially a talk about talks. The speakers expect the status quo to hold through November, but the Baghdad meeting in May provides some possibility for positive developments.
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Low expectations met
The P5+1 (permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) finally met in Istanbul today with Iran and brought forth the squeak of a mouse. According to EU High Representative Katherine Ashton:
We have agreed that the non-proliferation treaty forms a key basis for what must be serious engagement to ensure all the obligations under the treaty are met by Iran while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Saeed Jalili, the chief Iranian negotiator, put it this way:
We expect that we should enjoy our rights in parallel with our obligations (toward the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty).
At least there is overlap in those two statements about what little happened. They also agreed to meet again in Baghdad May 23, with some expert meetings likely in the meanwhile.
For those with low expectations, consider them met. But if you are feeling urgency for a clear and unequivocal Iranian commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, or to come clean on their past activities, or to end uranium enrichment, or stop enrichment at 5% (or at 20%), or to dismantle the underground enrichment facility at Fordo, you’ll need to wait longer. None of those things seem to have been discussed, despite their salience in Washington.
If the Europeans think that proceeding in this ambiguous way at an excruciatingly slow pace will somehow keep the dogs of war at bay, I’ve got bad news for them. Delay is surely one of Tehran’s objectives. Unless there is a good deal more agreed than the parties have acknowledged in public, the Iranians will likely get their delay, but have to suffer the consequences of impending sanctions as well. If they also continue to enrich, in defiance of the UN Security Council, it seems to me likely that someone will try to stop them.
The Europeans prefer to call these meetings “E3+3” rather than P5+1. I guess that’s three Europeans plus three unidentified also-rans (U.S., China and Russia). I’d be the first to claim that the Europeans have in the past played a useful moderating role vis-a-vis Iran. But I expect it won’t be long before the Americans or the Iranians, or both, decide that they need to try to settle the matter without three European countries that are supposed to have a common foreign policy and whose instincts call for misty generality rather than solid specificity. It was reported and denied that the Americans sought a bilateral meeting in Istanbul that the Iranians refused.
Yes, the Istanbul meeting has to be counted a “constructive” step forward, but the Europeans are kidding themselves if they think they can “manage” this conflict as they do their own disputes or those in the Balkans. They need to pick up the pace and meet far higher expectations if they are going to succeed in avoiding a sad end to this worthy initiative.
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Luck needs a policy
We got lucky Friday: the ceasefire in Syria mostly held. But luck is not a policy. Today things are falling apart. Belligerents adhere to ceasefires for many reasons, including to give themselves a break and to reorganize and rearm. When they see their antagonists doing likewise, they may figure they are losing relative advantage and go back to fighting. Certainly it is unwise to rely on good intentions, especially when one of the antagonists is Bashar al Assad.
What is to be done? The monitors the UN Security Council approved today are part of the answer. Inserting them will give the international community eyes and ears that it today lacks. That will tamp down violence and provide a means of holding one or the other side accountable when it happens. Some may doubt whether the Arab League observers did much good, but certainly the situation in many places deteriorated badly after their withdrawal. No ceasefire is going to last long in Syria without a means of policing it.
The Annan plan has important elements other than the ceasefire, which still need to be implemented. Hillary Clinton is precisely correct to be arguing for withdrawal of heavy weapons from Syrian population centers, freedom of expression, humanitarian access and freedom of movement for international journalists. But don’t expect Bashar al Assad to comply with these additional provisions of the Annan plan unless a lot of pressure is brought to bear and Moscow puts its foot down.
It is vital that Free Syria Army–the not so organized armed wing of the rebellion–hold its fire, giving the diplomatic machinery a chance to start up. If the opposition turns to violence–even in response to regime violence–the prospects for a negotiated solution will dim quickly.
What the opposition needs to do now is show its strength nonviolently–yesterday’s widespread demonstrations were a great start–and prepare for negotiations. Its lack of clear leadership and structure are an advantage while protesting, but fragmentation will turn to disadvantage once negotiations start. It is also important that the opposition make as many friendly contacts with the security forces as possible while the ceasefire holds, hoping to prevent them from returning to repression once it breaks down. If the opposition can make Bashar al Assad doubt the reliability of his security forces, good things can happen.
The critical wording of the provisional Security Council resolution was this (I haven’t yet been able to verify where this wording is in the resolution that passed within the hour):
…a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
This is obviously, and importantly, intended to signal to Syria’s many minorities that they will be treated correctly in the transition. Reference to the “whole spectrum” of the Syrian opposition opens the door to inclusion of groups not part of the Syrian National Council, which does not have adequate representation of on-the-ground protest groups. But it will also open the door to what could be interminable arguing over who should be at the table.
Uniting the opposition behind a single set of negotiating positions and a broadly representative delegation is the next critical step, if the six-point plan has even partial success. The responsibility is more for Syrians than foreigners, but I can at least hope that the U.S. and Europe are trying hard to insist on a single platform, carried to the negotiations by people representing the full spectrum of diversity in Syria. Luck needs a policy if is to last.
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