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Brčko needs EU forces, not vowels

Last week saw a lot of journalists in Sarajevo for the 20th anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war.  They tended to emphasize the downside:  persistent ethnic division and tension.  Tim Judah, who has never stopped going to Bosnia, sees the glass as half full, or better.

This is especially true for the northeastern Bosnian town of Brčko and the surrounding “district” (population about 80,000), the object of many bad wartime jokes about the need for a humanitarian shipment of vowels.  It was the site of terrible atrocities at the beginning of the war and much skirmishing nearby during it, due to its strategic position in the narrow corridor linking the two wings of what is now Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.

Brčko was the hard nut that could not be cracked at Dayton, so it became the subject of a post-war arbitration process and American-led “supervision,” which provided decisions on issues the local politicians found too difficult and ensured more inclusive power-sharing arrangements than they would have concluded on their own.  A U.S.-led arbitral tribunal decided in 1999 that Brčko would belong to both the RS and the Federation, which controls the other 51% of Bosnia’s territory.  This really meant it belonged to neither.  International supervision has gradually eased off, and later this spring the assembled powers that still guide the Dayton peace process (the Peace Implementation Council) will consider whether to end it.  They likely will keep in place the arbitral tribunal, which decides the larger strategic questions concerning Brčko’s status (now formalized in the Bosnian constitution).

Things are far from perfect in Brčko–I am told it is still governed under an ethnic “key” that gets down to the level of interns and even its hotels sport ethnic identity–but its children go to more integrated schools than in the rest of Bosnia and power is shared in a way that each of the three ethnic groups seems to accept.  The place has gone from the nut that couldn’t be cracked to the glue that holds Bosnia together.  The RS cannot hope to leave Bosnia unless it controls Brčko.  Federation control would spell the end of RS.  Brčko District has to remain distinct.

This makes the end of supervision a more delicate moment than would otherwise be the case.  The European Union, some of whose more powerful members are anxious to get rid not only of Brčko supervision but also the High Representative who oversees Dayton implementation, would be wise to take notice.  The EU still has troops stationed in Bosnia but spread around the country in militarily insignificant contingents.  Better to concentrate them in Brčko, thus signaling to both Bosniaks (Bosnia’s Muslims) and Serbs that no effort to “take” Brčko will be tolerated.  Such a move might also satisfy Turkey, which supplies a good number of the troops and has hesitated to end Brčko supervision.

Some will argue that no one is prepared to start a war, so why is EUFOR (the European force) needed at all?  Certainly neither Croatia nor Serbia, the neighbors most inclined towards war in the 1990s, is interested in blotting their EU copybook by trying to gain territory in Bosnia.  Milorad Dodik, the RS president, wants independence and says so repeatedly, but Serbia won’t back him.  He can gain more by cooperation with the EU on membership than he can by going to war.  Zagreb is disinclined to support Bosnian Croat pretensions, since Croatia is scheduled for EU membership next year.

The Bosniaks, so unprepared for war in 1992, are another question.  It should not be assumed that they will be as passive as they were 20 years ago.  A serious Dodik move toward de jure independence would provoke some Bosniaks to violence.  Taking and holding Brčko would be vital to prevent RS from leaving Bosnia.

If the EU wants the Americans and the Bosnians to take it seriously, it will concentrate its remaining forces in Brčko District, signaling to all concerned that Bosnia will not be allowed to fall apart, or fall into conflict.  The move would also help convince the Americans that the Europeans know what they are doing.  We’ve all learned to do without the vowels.  Brčko needs EU forces.

Serbia*

Yesterday’s shoot out over the Kosovo asterisk surprised me.  David Kanin conceded the merits of my argument that legally UN Security Council resolution 1244 does not guarantee Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but rather provides the basis for a decision on Kosovo’s final status.  Nevertheless, he said, the asterisk was still a defeat for Kosovo because Pristina resisted it.  Serbia, which has argued long and hard that 1244 preserves its sovereignty, somehow won the political match.

This is a bit like deciding who won a soccer game by listening to which team’s fans cheer louder rather than by the score.  That’s not my way.   I admit that I’d have liked to see reciprocity in the asterisk requirement:  Serbia* with reference to both 1244 and the International Court of Justice opinion, which condition Belgrade’s sovereignty more than Pristina’s.  But the score is at least 2-zip (1244 and ICJ), no matter how loud Belgrade cheers.

There is one aspect of 1244 that is negative for Kosovo:  the continuing presence on its territory of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which has now been reduced to uselessness or worse.  Pristina has been trying to get it out of there.  Washington should help.

David also made two other points with which I can wholeheartedly agree:  that the five EU states that have not yet recognized Kosovo should do so, and that the EU should make explicit that neither Kosovo nor Serbia will get membership until they have settled the outstanding issues between them.

But I disagree with David’s reasoning on the first point.  On the second, it is already clear, to anyone whose eyes are open.

Contrary to David’s claim, the five nonrecognizing EU states (Cyprus, Romania, Greece, Spain and Slovakia) are no longer a serious obstacle to Kosovo’s relationship with the EU.  So long as the asterisk is used, they cannot block Kosovo’s progress towards a visa waiver or a Stabilization and Association Agreement, unless there is good substantive reason to do so.  They have in essence given up their vetoes now that there is a clear basis for Kosovo’s “contractual relationship” with the EU.  The main reason now for the five to recognize Kosovo is that it makes no sense not to do so.  This they will realize gradually and one by one will succumb, Cyprus last.

Several EU states have already publicly stated that Kosovo and Serbia will not enter as members until they’ve settled the issues between them.  More say it privately.  Just one (of the current 27) is really required to make this threat real.  My guess is that more than 20 current members (plus Croatia, which will join next year) will insist on this point, which is consonant with the EU requirement for “good neighborly relations.”  Presumably the reason the EU does not state this as policy is reluctance to pull the rug out from under Serbian President Boris Tadic, who has promised his country both EU membership and sovereignty over Kosovo.

Tadic is not blind and knows full well that he is making a promise he cannot fulfill.  He may still to be hoping for partition of Kosovo, a proposition neither the Americans nor the Europeans will permit because of its broader regional consequences.  But membership is a long way off still.  As long as the EU doesn’t threaten too explicitly to keep Serbia out until it gives up Kosovo, Tadic can continue his charade.  If I were a European diplomat, I would want that game to end as soon as the May elections are over.

One more thing:  I understand that Belgrade is still holding Hasan Abazi, a Kosovo trade unionist it arrested in retaliation for Pristina’s arrest of several Serbs, now released.  Abazi is being processed in a Serbian court whose jurisdiction is nominally in Kosovo.  The very existence of this court is a violation of UNSC resolution 1244.  This is an outrage.  I trust the Kosovo authorities (prime minister and foreign minister) will mention this issue to the Americans during their current visit to Washington.  I certainly encourage them to do so.

I promise:  this is my last post mentioning the asterisk, which is an issue that has lost its charm.  But I am tempted to have badges made up with a big * on them.  Maybe I should parade with one in Mother Theresa Street on my next visit to Pristina?

Time to clean under the rug

Milan Marinković writes again from Niš, about 100 miles from the Serbia/Macedonia border:

For years Macedonia has seemed a forgotten country, even to someone who lives not far away.  After the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement put an end to an almost year-long armed conflict between Macedonian security forces and local ethnic Albanian militants , the name dispute with Greece appeared to be the only major issue Skopje had to deal with.

Up until recently, when a series of inter-ethnic clashes called to mind the events from more than a decade ago. Violence seemed to erupt out of thin air. But tensions were bubbling under the surface all the while.

As in most ethnically motivated attacks in the Balkans, the perpetrators were mainly members of football hooligan gangs and ultra-nationalist movements.  The same individuals often belong to both.  This time they were attacking innocent civilians, rather than fighting one another. The worst incident occurred when a group of some thirty thugs stormed into a bus and brutally beat ethnic Albanian passengers, including women, elderly people and minors.

The mixture of football hooliganism and aggressive ethno-nationalism is a commonplace in the Balkans.  Macedonia is no exception.  The issue is not sports rivalry.  There is a political dimension.  Politicians are lenient with extreme nationalist hooligans whom they view as a useful political – and, potentially even paramilitary – tool.

The good news is that the situation in Macedonia has, more or less, been put under control. The bad news is that this has happened only after the number of policemen patrolling the streets has been significantly increased. The extraordinarily high police presence might be a temporary measure, but hardly a permanent solution.

Nationalism is more consequence than cause.  The fundamental issue is mutual mistrust, rooted in the history of this region and its all-to-common inter-ethnic violence.

The Macedonian government is bi-ethnic, including an ethnic Macedonian (VMRO) as well as an ethnic Albanian party (DUI). While the two parties are largely focused on nominally satisfying EU criteria, they have done little, if anything, to relieve growing inter-ethnic tensions at home. Rather, both –VMRO in particular – have been using every opportunity to boost, implicitly or explicitly, nationalist sentiment among their respective voters.

This is no surprise. Nationalism is still the most lucrative commodity in all domestic political markets of the Western Balkans. To make their case, nationalists on each side selectively cite historical events, overemphasizing instances where people from their ethnic group were victims, while minimizing instances when they committed atrocities against others.  The still fresh memories of the Yugoslav wars in 1990s make it easy to convince people that they should fear their neighbors of a different ethnicity.  It is harder to promote constructive dialogue and cooperation – especially when there is a language barrier like the one between Albanians and Slavs.

In Macedonia, this latest ethnic violence poses the additional risk of spilling over the national border.  Albanians constitute about a quarter of the population of Macedonia. The leader of the main Albanian opposition party reportedly supported the idea of pan-Albanian unification in a single nation-state when he commented on the current crisis in Macedonia. In Kosovo, Albin Kurti’s “Self-determination” movement has been publicly advocating the creation of “greater Albania.”

Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci also recently said:

It would be the best for Albanians to live in one state, if there were any border changes in the Balkans.

Even if Thaci offered this hypothesis for his own domestic political purposes, such statements can have a detrimental effect on Kosovo’s international position.  Serb nationalists are already using it as “yet another proof” that the West’s support of Kosovo’s independence was motivated by anti-Serbian rather than humanitarian or moral reasons.

If the recent past has taught us anything, it is that any problem swept under the rug will inevitably reappear. Growing far right extremism and a steady increase in violent forms of crime – facilitated by ever-present institutional corruption and deteriorating socio-economic conditions – have contributed to a serious deterioration of public safety in Macedonia. An apparent lack of capacity on the part of domestic political elites to conclusively tackle these pressing issues through systemic reforms indicates that active Western interference might once again prove necessary to keep the region calm.

Macedonians and Albanians still have a real desire to get into Euroatlantic institutions.  While preoccupied with other problems, the Americans and Europeans could and should use this favorable circumstance to get them to clean under the rug.  The opportunity may not last forever.