Tag: European Union

Peace picks this week

The big event is Carnegie’s with Islamists on Thursday, but the week somehow starts on Wednesday with an event of my very own, he said unashamedly:

1.  Does an Asterisk Make a Difference? SAIS Rome auditorium, 10-11:30 April 4

Belgrade and Pristina–after sustained U.S. and EU pressure–have agreed that Kosovo will be identified with an asterisk in European regional meetings.  The asterisk will make reference to both UN Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

The asterisk deal is causing second guessing on both sides.  What does it tell us, or not, about Kosovo’s status?  How does it affect the relationship between Pristina and Belgrade?  What implications does it have for U.S. and EU approaches to conflict management?

Wednesday, April 4, 2012
10:00-11:30 a.m.

Rome Auditorium
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Moderator:
Michael Haltzel
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations

Speakers:
David Kanin
Adjunct Professor of European Studies

Daniel Serwer
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Professor of Conflict Management

2. Delegation of Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party, Georgetown University, 12:30 April 4

Event Details

**Please note venue: Lohrfink Auditorium**

 

A Discussion with

Official Delegation of Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party (FJP)

Wednesday, April 4 -12:30pm

Lohrfink Auditorium
Rafik B. Hariri Building (2nd floor)

Georgetown University


Panelists:

AbdulMawgoud Dardery 
Member of Parliament, Freedom and Justice Party – Luxor
Member, 
Foreign Relations Committee, Freedom and Justice Party  
Hussein El-Kazzaz
Businessman
Advisor, Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party
Sondos Asem 
Senior Editor, Ikhwanweb.com
Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Freedom and Justice Party  

Khaled Al-Qazzaz
Foreign Relations Coordinator, Freedom and Justice Party

Chair:

John L. Esposito 
University Professor & Founding Director, Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding


For a map showing the location of the Rafik B. Hariri Building, please visit:
http://maps.georgetown.edu/rafikbhariribuilding/

For more information, please visit:
http://acmcu.georgetown.edu

3. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty CATO 4 pm April 4

Wednesday, April 4, 2012
4:00 PM (Reception To Follow)

Featuring the coauthor Daron Acemoglu, Killian Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; with comments by Karla Hoff, Senior Research Economist, Development Economics Group, World Bank; moderated by Ian Vasquez, Director, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute.

The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001

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If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org.


Purchase Book

Institutions — not geography, culture, or other factors — explain why some nations succeed and others fail. So says Daron Acemoglu in an ambitious new book drawing evidence from thousands of years of human history and from societies as diverse as those of the Inca Empire, 17th century England, and contemporary Botswana. Inclusive political and economic institutions, influenced by critical junctures in history, produce virtuous cycles that reinforce pluralism in the market and in politics. Acemoglu will contrast that pattern of development with that experienced under extractive institutions. He will also describe the conditions under which institutions favorable or inimical to development tend to arise. Karla Hoff will provide critical comments.

4. Islamists in Power: Views from Within, Carnegie but at the Grand Hyatt

Thursday, April 5, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
8:45 AM – 4:45 PM EST

Islamist parties have emerged as the strongest contenders in recent elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, and are likely continue to do well in future elections in other countries. It is clear that Islamist parties will have a dominant impact on the outcome of Arab transitions, but there is little understanding in Washington of what that will mean for governing.

On April 5, high-level representatives of Islamist parties from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Libya will participate in a one-day event convened by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Agenda

8:45-9:00 a.m. Opening RemarksJessica Mathews, President
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
9:00-10:45 a.m. Building New Regimes after the UprisingsModerator
Marwan MuasherPanelists
Mustapha Elkhalfi (Morocco)
Abdul Mawgoud Rageh Dardery (Egypt)
Nabil Alkofahi (Jordan)
Sahbi Atig (Tunisia)
11:15 a.m.-1:00 p.m. Writing a New ConstitutionModerator
Nathan BrownPanelists
Khaled Al-Qazzaz (Egypt)
Osama Al Saghir (Tunisia)
Mohamed Gaair (Libya)
1:00-2:30 p.m. Recess
2:30-4:30 p.m. Economic Challenges of the TransitionModerator
Masood AhmedPanelists
Hussein Elkazzaz (Egypt)
Mondher Ben Ayed (Tunisia)
Nael Al-Masalha (Jordan)
Abdelhadi Falahat (Jordan)—not yet confirmed
4:30-4:45 p.m. Closing Remarks

5.  What is in and what is not in the much-disputed newest constitution in Europe:  the Fundamental Law of Hungary, National Press club, 4 pm April 5

Jozsef Szajer

April 5, 2012 4:00 PM

Location: Zenger Room

National Press Club “AFTERNOON NEWSMAKER”
News Conference
Thursday, April 5, 2012, 4 p.m.
National Press Club (Zenger Room)

Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and Author of the new Hungarian Constitution,
JOZSEF SZAJER

Contacts: National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN, 301/530-1210 (H&O/T&F), 301/367-7711 (C), 202/662-7540 (NPC, pjhickman@hotmail.com
Mr. Szajer: Andras Szorenyi (Embassy of Hungary), 202/415-3653 (t), Andras.Szorenyi@mfa.gov.hu

For More Information On This Event,
Please Contact:

Peter Hickman

301-530-1210

pjhickman@hotmail.com

6. The Afghanistan Security Transition: the Role and Importance of Afghanistan’s Neighbors, USIP, 10-12 April 6

Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am on April 6, 2012 at www.usip.org/webcast.

As the 2014 security transition in Afghanistan approaches, multiple tracks need to be pursued to ensure sustainable peace in the country. A regional solution is often touted as a critical element in achieving such a peace. Without collaborative buy-in for such a solution, however, the potential increases that Afghanistan’s neighbors will play a destabilizing role in the country given their own domestic and international objectives. Despite much debate on this issue, the core interests policies, and views of Afghanistan’s neighboring states are still not well understood.

Join USIP to discuss how Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors – Pakistan, Iran, and the bordering Central Asian Republics – view the present situation and impending transition in Afghanistan, and what their role and policies are likely to be between now and 2014, and beyond. What measures can the U.S. and other allies take to incentivize policies of cooperation and collaboration from these neighbors with the ultimate objective of promoting stability in Afghanistan? USIP works on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote the nonviolent resolution of conflicts and build local capacity to prevent and address disputes through nonviolent means.

This event will feature the following speakers:

  • Abubakar Siddique, panelist
    Senior News Correspondent
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
  • Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, panelist
    Associate Researcher, Peace Research Institute Oslo
    Professor MPA/Sciences Po (Paris)
  • Alireza Nader, panelist
    Senior International Policy Analyst
    RAND Corporation
  • Moeed Yusuf, moderator
    South Asia Adviser
    United States Institute of Peace

7.  Global Nuclear Security and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, National Press Club, 10 am April 6

Location: Zenger Room

Panel to Discuss Global Nuclear Security and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Date and Time: April 6 at 10 a.m.
Place: Zenger Room, National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th floor

With the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran a concern of many world leaders, particularly those in the United States and Israel, a panel of foreign policy practitioners will speak at a Press Club Newsmaker on global nuclear security and ways to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Panel participants will be:

• Robert Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and former chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994
• Sharon Squassoni, director and senior fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Joseph Cirincione, president, Ploughshares Fund
• Alexander Glaser, assistant professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Contact Info: Keith Hill (khill@bna.com)

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Dumb and dumber

Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić yesterday announced the arrest of two Kosovo Albanians in retaliation for the arrest of four Serbs by Kosovo authorities:

The reciprocal measures are not in Serbia’s interests and the Serbian police does not wish to do this….[but] this type of situation (arrests of Serbs) can obviously no longer happen without reciprocal measures.

I hardly need mention that “reciprocal” or retaliatory arrests have no place in a rule of law lexicon. Nor need I mention that doing things not in your country’s interest is dumb.  With this singular act of hubris, Dačić has likely done more to tarnish Serbia’s European credentials than anyone else in recent months.

The problem goes deeper.  The arrests were made under a warrant issued by a Serbian court, one that is no longer resident in Kosovo.  This illustrates how little Belgrade respects UN Security Council resolution 1244, to which it appeals regularly and mistakenly as the basis for claims to Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.  That resolution, if it did nothing else, put Kosovo–including its judicial system–under temporary UN administration, pending a decision on final status.  Serbia does not accept the proposition that the decision has been made, which is its right.  But under 1244 it has no right to be administering law in Kosovo.

The law under which the arrest was made includes, according to Balkan Insight, the following:

Whoever attempts to unconstitutionally bring Serbia or SaM[Serbia and Montenegro] into a position of subjugation or dependence in respect of another state, shall be punished by imprisonment of three to fifteen years.

So we are not talking small beans here.  And the impact of the arrests will be much broader than on the two people arrested.  It will curtail travel by Kosovo Albanians in Serbia, which the recent EU-brokered agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on travel documents and border regime was supposed to encourage.

Dačić is no fool.  He knows full well that his move will bring him nationalist votes and embarrass President Tadić, who has sought to burnish Serbia’s European credentials as he tries to convince Brussels to give Serbia a date on which to start accession talks.  Tadić is going to have a hard time explaining to Brussels why it should bend over backwards for Serbia when Belgrade is busy undoing an agreement the EU brokered.

What about the arrest of the four Serbs by the Pristina authorities?  According to the press, they were carrying election materials for the May 6 Serbian elections, which Belgrade wants to conduct in Serb communities in Kosovo and Pristina wants to prevent.

I am sympathetic with those Kosovars who want to establish full sovereignty on the entire territory of Kosovo, but I still need to ask why it was necessary to arrest the four Serbs.   Surely there are more nefarious activities going on than carrying election materials.  I suspect the answer is that it will be a politically popular move for Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, who faces strong pressure from more nationalist Albanians to stop Serbia’s many activities inside Kosovo. But he also expects to visit Washington next week, where a provocative move like the arrests is unlikely to be welcome.

I’d call this dumb and dumber.  I’ll let you decide which is which.

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U.S. policy on the Western Balkans

The Johns Hopkins/SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations today published Unfinished Business – The Western Balkans and the International CommunityEditors Dan Hamilton and Vedran Džihić and selected authors (I’ll be among them) will unveil the book, based in part on a conference last summer in Sarajevo, this afternoon at 4:45 pm at SAIS (BOB, 1717 Massachusetts, room 500) on the occasion of the Southeast European Economic Forum. 

I submitted my chapter on “U.S. policy on the Western Balkans” a month ago, so a few items may be dated, but here it is:

More than twenty years ago Secretary of State James Baker said after a failed mission to preserve Yugoslavia as a single country:  “We got no dog in this fight.” Half a dozen wars and about $30 billion later, the Americans are too discreet to repeat the Secretary’s judgment, but they are anxious to avoid further American commitments and want to turn the Western Balkans over to the Europeans.

Baker was correct.  There were no vital American interests at stake in the Balkans in 1991.  No one there was threatening the safety and security of Americans at home or abroad.  We expected the Europeans to manage the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.  Jacques Poos had declared:  “The hour of Europe has dawned.”  Fresh from signing the Maastricht Treaty that claimed to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Europeans followed the German lead in recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia over U.S. objections. The U.S. trailed after.

The Americans eventually took the lead in the Balkans, intervening repeatedly.  This started with the NATO-enforced no-fly zone over Bosnia in 1993 and continued through the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, the deployment of IFOR in Bosnia in 1995/6 and the NATO war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999.  American peacekeeping troops stayed in Bosnia until the end of 2004 and they remain in Kosovo today.

These military interventions in the Balkans happened not because of a single over-riding vital or strategic interest but because of an accumulation of secondary interests in a relatively benign international environment.  American goals included:

  • Preventing atrocities and refugee flows that risked radicalizing Muslim populations and destabilizing neighboring countries,
  • calming the consequent domestic U.S. political reaction,
  • maintaining U.S., European and NATO credibility, and
  • reducing tensions within the Alliance.

Starting soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Balkans interventions faced relatively little opposition from a Russia distracted by its own transition problems and a China still emerging as a major economic power.  America was in its “unipolar” moment and faced few direct challenges around the world.  It sought, and still seeks, a Europe whole, free, democratic and at peace.

But the global situation today is dramatically changed.  The Council on Foreign Relations list of prevention priorities for 2012 includes 30 risks to U.S. national security, none of which is in the Balkans.  Lengthy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exhausted the American military.  A financial crisis and severe recession have depleted its economic resources.  It still faces serious challenges from nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Iran as well as the global challenge of violent Muslim extremism.  China and Russia are no longer quiescent.  Though its economy and military are still the largest on earth, America needs to reduce its lower-priority commitments, contain its budget deficit and regain its economic vitality.

As a consequence, Washington is trying to extract itself from the Balkans gradually and prudently, turning over management of the relatively few remaining problems there to the Europeans, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The European Union took over the military role in Bosnia in 2004.  The Europeans also provide most of the troops in Kosovo, where only 13% are Americans.  The United Nations continues to try to resolve the Greece/Macedonia dispute.  The OSCE maintains democracy support missions in Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia.

American diplomatic goals in the Balkans focus today on four objectives:

  • Maintaining stability and preventing any return to armed conflict;
  • Preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Building the Kosovo state and establishing it as sovereign on its entire territory.
  • Enabling all Western Balkan countries to qualify for and, if they wish, enter NATO and the EU.

The Americans are also seeking to pass off as much responsibility for the Balkans as possible to the EU, without compromising these objectives.

Maintaining stability and preventing any return to armed conflict

Only Bosnia and Kosovo present any serious visible threat to stability in the Balkans today.  The threat comes from those who would like to change borders to accommodate ethnic differences.  The fundamental Balkans quandary is this:  “why should I be a minority in your country, when you can be a minority in mine?”  The United States has gone along with changing the status of existing internal boundaries in the Balkans to international borders (all six of the former Yugoslav republics became independent in this way, as well as Kosovo), but it has staunchly resisted moving borders to separate ethnic groups, convinced that this would lead to instability and a return to armed conflict.

Republika Srpska (RS), an entity established on 49% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has undertaken a concerted effort to weaken the “state” (the central government in Sarajevo) and maximize its own autonomy.  Its current effort is directed mainly at detaching the RS courts from the state judicial system.  RS President Milorad Dodik has made no secret of his desire for eventual independence, but he is constrained from achieving that goal:  even Serbia would not risk its relationship with the European Union by recognizing RS as independent, and the international community would block overt moves in that direction.

If there is any risk of serious violence in Bosnia, it comes mainly from frustrated ambitions on the Federation side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line.  Some Bosnian Croats would like their own “entity,” and some Bosnian Muslims would like to see the end of the RS and its pretensions to independence.  Croatia, which sometimes flirts with supporting the idea of a “third entity,” can be expected to restrain the Bosnian Croats from violence.  The Americans are vital to restraining the Bosnian Muslims, who could conceivably react to Dodik’s provocations by trying  to seize Brcko, the northeastern Bosnian town that links the RS’s eastern wing (contiguous with Serbia) and its more populated Western wing (including its capital Banja Luka).

In Kosovo, the principal remaining threats of instability come from the north:  Belgrade continues to control “north Kosovo,” the area north and west of the Ibar river populated mostly by Serbs and contiguous with Serbia; Albanian militants are challenging the transit of goods from Serbia at eastern border posts.  Maintenance of stability in north Kosovo depends on NATO’s KFOR troops and the European Union’s rule of law mission (EULEX).  The Kosovo Police Service has primary responsibility for law and order in the rest of Kosovo.  It was accused of using excessive force in January 2012 to clear roads and disperse Albanian demonstrators organized by Albin Kurti, a firebrand who advocates “self-determination,” including the right of Kosovo to join Albania.

The only other problem posing a remote risk to stability in the Balkans arises from the “Macedonia name dispute.”  Since Macedonia’s independence in 1991, Greece has contested the use of the name Macedonia by its neighbor to the north, claiming that it represents an infringement on Greece’s heritage and even sovereignty.  Athens and Skopje agreed in 1995 that Greece would not block membership in international organizations of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” or The FYROM, the name by which the country became a UN member.  Athens’ refusal to implement this bilateral agreement at the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 kept Skopje out of NATO and has blocked Macedonia from receiving a date to begin EU membership negotiations.

Despite many years of UN talks (mediated by an American) and a December 2011 International Court of Justice opinion in favor of Skopje on use of The FYROM to enter international organizations, this issue has resisted resolution.  Ethnic Macedonians have become ever more nationalist as a result, a reaction that tends to aggravate tensions with ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, who constitute about one-quarter of the population.  Most Macedonian Albanians seek NATO and EU membership as quickly as possible, demur from nationalist Macedonian moves, and regard the dispute as a serious hindrance to their ambitions and welfare.  Albanian/Macedonian ethnic tensions boiled over into a near civil war in Macedonia in 2001.  That conflict ended in the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation over the past 11 years has redressed many Albanian grievances.  A repetition of violence appears unlikely, but the name issue should not be allowed to fester.

Preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton agreements that ended the Bosnian war in 1995 left Bosnia with a weak state that the international community worked hard to strengthen for the subsequent decade.  It is now generally recognized that the problem is a constitutional one.  The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has outlined more than 20 ways in which the Dayton constitution needs to be amended in order for Bosnia to become a European Union member.

The Americans tried hard in 2005/6 to encourage the Bosnians to revise the Dayton constitution with EU membership negotiations and responsibility in mind.  This effort (the April package) failed.  Two more attempts (Butmir I and II) were made in 2009, with the Swedish European Union presidency and a Deputy Secretary of State acting in tandem.  These also failed.

At this point, it seems unlikely that Washington will undertake another effort in the foreseeable future.  It appears to be focusing now on improving the functionality of the Federation, on the theory that doing so will eventually make it possible to strengthen the state government in the process of qualifying for European Union membership.

Little is being done at this point to push the RS into a closer relationship with the Federation or to strengthen the state-level government.  The international community “High Representative,” who at times in the past has used his powers to enforce the Dayton agreements and to strengthen the Sarajevo government, has lost the ability to intervene except in the most direct and obvious challenges to Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  EUFOR, the weak military presence that is now responsible for Bosnia, has little military capability to ensure that the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected. 

Building the Kosovo state and establishing it as sovereign on its entire territory

Kosovo, whose Albanian population in large part governed itself separately from the official Serbian institutions for ten years before 1999, found itself at the end of the NATO/Yugoslav war the subject of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.  This set up a UN administration to prepare the former province of Serbia for self-government and an eventual political decision on its status.  The UN proceeded gradually to turn over governing authority to the “Provisional Institutions of Self-Government,” seeking along the way to require that they meet elaborately defined standards (“standards before status”).

Subsequently, the EU led and the U.S. supported an extensive negotiation between Belgrade and Pristina on Kosovo’s “final status.”  This negotiation concluded with the “Ahtisaari plan,” which includes strong protection of minority rights and self-government for Serbian and other minority communities in Kosovo.  Pristina accepted the Ahtisaari plan, which it anticipated would resolve the final status question and lead to UN membership for Kosovo and recognition by Belgrade.  Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari plan, saying it will never recognize Kosovo.

This process ended in February 2008 with Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which had been coordinated with the United States, major European powers and others.  Eighty-five countries now recognize the Republic of Kosovo.  The International Court of Justice, in response to a Serbian government request, has advised that the declaration was not inconsistent with international law, including UNSCR 1244, which treats Kosovo as a single, undivided territory whose boundaries/borders are well established. Kosovo is a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank but not of most other international organizations.

Kosovo is still developing its state institutions.  It has implemented virtually all aspects of the Ahtisaari plan in the territory it controls.  The plan however allows it to form an armed security force only in 2013, which it will no doubt want to do.  The courts and police in Kosovo remain under EU supervision.  International prosecutors and judges try inter-ethnic criminal and property cases in Kosovo courts.  International advisors remain in many ministries.  Air traffic control and some other functions remain international responsibilities.

A key issue for Kosovo will be formation of its new security force, which is expected to evolve from the existing unarmed civil defense corps into a small land army.  The Americans will no doubt play an important role in conceiving, equipping and training the new forces, with a view to ensuring their professionalism and limiting their offensive capabilities.

Serbia has refused to recognize Kosovo as sovereign and independent but has agreed to discuss “practical” issues with the Pristina authorities, in talks led by the EU and supported by the U.S.  These talks have produced agreement on a limited number of issues, including mutual recognition of documents and enforcement of customs and tax laws at the Serbia/Kosovo border posts.  Serbia’s current constitution (adopted in 2006, post-Milosevic) defines Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.  Despite the ICJ advisory opinion, Serbia claims sovereignty over all of Kosovo, but at present it physically controls only three and a half north Kosovo municipalities contiguous with Serbia proper.

The three municipalities were majority Serb before the 1999 war, but the half of Mitrovica municipality lying north of the Ibar river was not.  In July 2011 the Pristina-controlled Kosovo Police Service briefly seized the border posts in the north, seeking to collect customs duties and enforce Kosovo law at the border with Serbia.

The international community, including the Americans and especially the Germans, has tried to squelch all talk of “border adjustments” or partition.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made it clear that resolution of northern Kosovo issues without partition is required before Serbia can qualify for EU candidacy, a position the Americans have supported.

Enabling all Western Balkan countries to qualify for and enter NATO and the EU

Several Western Balkans countries have made rapid progress in meeting NATO and EU standards.  Slovenia entered the EU in 2004.  Croatia has completed its membership qualifications and negotiations and approved a referendum on membership in January 2012.  It is expected to accede to the Union in 2013.  Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are already NATO members.  Montenegro has achieved candidacy for the EU and is approaching the last phase of its NATO Membership Action Plan.  Macedonia, while fully qualified for NATO membership, has been blocked by Greece from both NATO membership and receiving a date for start of its negotiations for EU membership.

Others are moving more slowly, and EU membership is generally a tougher and longer road than NATO membership.  A dispute over defense property has blocked Bosnia from receiving a Membership Action Plan from NATO.  It has not yet qualified for EU candidacy.  Albania and Serbia are likewise not yet candidates for EU membership.  Serbia has not expressed an interest in NATO membership, due mainly to bitter memories of the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 1999, but it participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.  Kosovo is far from both NATO and EU membership.

The EU’s current financial crisis has diminished the credibility of EU membership as an incentive for reform in the Western Balkans.  In Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo few believe that EU membership is in the foreseeable future.  They also fear that membership criteria are being tightened.  Under these conditions, NATO membership has taken on new importance, as it is the only credible nearer-term incentive.  Keeping the door to NATO open—in particular at the Chicago Summit in May 2012—is important to maintaining momentum for reform.  An invitation to Macedonia, and a strong statement of readiness to invite Montenegro when it completes its Membership Action Plan, would help to convince other Western Balkans countries that NATO membership is a realistic prospect while the EU puts its financial house in order.

Passing responsibility to the EU

The Americans have succeeded in passing off the bulk of the military responsibility for Bosnia and Kosovo to the Europeans and others, who constitute all but a small fraction of the international forces still on the ground in the Balkans.  Major civilian responsibilities are also in European hands.  The High Representative in Bosnia has been a European continuously since the signing of the Dayton agreements.  The EU has recently separated and beefed up the role of EU Special Representative, responsible for helping prepare Bosnia for EU membership.  In Kosovo, the Americans maintain a minimal military presence of fewer than 800 mainly National Guard troops but the UN, EULEX and OSCE missions are manned principally by non-Americans.

Where American commitment is still required is in the diplomatic effort to ensure that the goals cited above are not lost sight of.  The EU, because it requires unanimity for many important decisions, can be maddeningly slow and clumsy as a diplomatic actor, even after the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty.  In Bosnia, the EU lacks the clarity of purpose that the Americans bring to the table.  To the dismay of the Americans, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton in May 2011 cut a deal directly with then Prime Minister Dodik (without discussion with the state government in Sarajevo) to allow the RS to discuss its own courts and those of the state government with the European Commission.  The five non-recognizing members of the EU that do not recognize Kosovo (Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece) have prevented rationalization of the EU presence there and limited its effectiveness.  Greece has single-handedly blocked resolution of the Macedonia name dispute.

Thus the EU has the leverage, but it sometimes lacks the clarity and unity of purpose so important to getting things done in the Balkans.  The United States in principle has the clarity of purpose, but it lacks the leverage and sometimes compromises its principles as a result.  Only a tandem U.S./EU effort succeeds in the Balkans, which often requires as much diplomacy among Brussels, European capitals and Washington as with Balkans capitals.  There is at least another 10 years of mainly civilian efforts required in the Western Balkans, with the Europeans providing most of the muscle and the Americans providing most of the backbone.

 

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The long shadow of European shoppers

If there is one thing I’ve learned in Rome over the past week, it’s that this morning’s headlines are correct:  the Euro zone is headed for more trouble.  While Rome’s streets are crowded and people are eating their fill, the cashiers are idle and the shopping bags empty.

That’s because of two factors:  taxes and uncertainty.  Prime Minister Mario Monti moved quickly once Silvio Berlusconi was out of the way to raise taxes and cut government expenditures.  The big tax hit comes at the end of June, when real estate taxes have to be paid.  People I am talking with claim they will double, but just as important is the uncertainty.  The complicated way they are calculated, and their different application in different localities, means that no one really knows yet how much they are going to have to pay.  The natural reaction is to cut back on expenditures until you are sure you can pay the piper.

Contrary to their image, Italians are big savers.  The savings rate has dipped to around 11 per cent recently, a high level compared to the U.S.  A lot of those savings have been plowed into real estate, which Italians generally buy mostly with cash.  It is common for people to own three or four abodes–a house they live in, one in the country, and one or two rented out until the kids are old enough to occupy them.  I don’t imagine it will be long before the costs of carrying all this real estate motivate a lot of Italians to sell, creating a bear market in real estate that hasn’t been seen since World War II.  Buyers will be few:  mortgage rates are rising in Europe, not low and sometimes falling as in the U.S.

The Italian government is trying to promote more growth, largely by loosening up what has been an extraordinarily rigid labor market:  Italian firms don’t hire readily because they can’t fire readily, or at all.  But there is still a lot of negotiating to do before the system begins to yield. And there is a serious risk of a two-tier labor market, with older workers holding on forever while younger ones never really get onto the first rung of the ladder.

In the meanwhile, Italian industry is losing competitiveness fast.  A stop in Deruta earlier this week suggested that the ceramics business is beyond rescue.  Dozens of firms have closed and the remaining ones have prohibitively high labor costs.  No one but the very rich is going to be able to afford the hand-decorated plates my wife and I bought 40 years ago.

Official projections for this year have the Italian economy shrinking one per cent.  That looks likely to be over-optimistic.  With the Euro still strong–easily 25% higher than its purchasing power parity with the dollar–I’d bet on a lot deeper recession than that.

This will have a serious impact beyond Europe’s borders.  First, in my beloved Balkans:  it is hard to find anyone here interested in seeing even Serbia become a European Union member.  Second, in the Arab uprising countries.  Libya is important to the Italians.  They are pleased that oil and gas exports are rebounding.  But Syria is ignored here.  In a week of lots of conversation with internationally-minded Italians, no one has mentioned it before I did.

But most importantly:  a big European recession could affect the recovery in the United States, crimping growth and increasing risks of another relapse, if not into recession then into very slow growth.  Barack Obama’s reelection prospects depend on at least moderate growth continuing in the U.S.  Republicans who see Barack Obama as a European socialist will think it only just if a recession in overly-regulated Europe leads to his defeat.

It is still far too early to count either Obama or the Europeans out. Even with empty shopping bags, the Italians are still living well and enjoying life.  Barack Obama has a difficult seven months ahead:  the Iran nuclear issue is likely to come to a head during that time, and he’ll have some tough choices to make on how fast to withdraw from Afghanistan and whether to intervene in Syria as well.  But the presidency is still the best place to be running for president from.  The consequences of a European recession will dim his prospects, but not rule him out.

Lots of people, less buying
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The view of Tehran from Rome

So, you might ask, how did the Italians react to my presentation today at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) on the Iranian nuclear program?

My co-presenter, Riccardo Alcaro, made a number of interesting points:

  1. A military attack would end International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and the information they provide, making uncertainty about it much greater and increasing the difficulty of repeated military action after the first effort.
  2. There is an important distinction between Israel’s concerns, which focus on the existential threat of Iranian nukes as well as the need to maintain Israeli strategic superiority, and American/European concerns that have more to do with an unstable Middle East.
  3. Europe has played a constructive role at several important moments in dealing diplomatically with Iran and will likely continue to do so, even if it cannot lead the effort.

Riccardo views Israel’s concern with the existential threat as exaggerated.  He also notes that nuclear weapons have never really given any state enhanced regional capability to compel others to do as the nuclear state wants. I think he is basically correct about this.  Nuclear weapons contribute to the frame in which power relations are determined, but they do not provide a practical diplomatic or military tool.

Questioning focused on the legal basis for military action, the significance of proposals for a nuclear-free (or WMD-free) zone in the Middle East, the reaction of Sunni Arabs to a military attack on Iran, and whether American aversion to containment might moderate after the U.S. election.

In response, I offered a few thoughts.  Harold Koh (the State Department legal advisor) will surely write a good memo on the legal basis, but it is also possible it would be fixed after the fact, as the intervention in Kosovo was.  The Americans simply don’t have the kind of prohibition on military action without UN approval that several European countries have in their constitutions.  The nuclear free zone is a lovely idea with no practical impact; it will be a consequence of peace in the Middle East, not a cause of it.  The Muslim Brotherhoods that have been the big political winners thus far in Tunisia and Egypt are still developing their relations with the United States.  The Sunni street, which is admittedly more important after the Arab spring than before it, may not respond sympathetically to Iran.  The successful use of force has its own logic.

On containment, the Americans will certainly turn to it if their efforts to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons (including military action) fail.  What other choice would they have?  In that case several Sunni Arab states may decide to develop nuclear weapons, unless the Americans provide a credible nuclear umbrella.  But that is precisely what the Americans do not want to do.  I can’t say failure to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons is not an option, since it always is a possibility.  But its consequences could be devastating to American hope of turning attention away from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific.

The Iranian embassy official present, first counselor Ahmad Hajihosseini, averred that Iran is a victim in all this talk about nuclear weapons and complained that no Iranian was on the panel.  I of course would welcome an Iranian speaker at Johns Hopkins, as IAI would in Rome.  And I don’t think it was so bad an idea for Tehran to get a report on this discussion among Americans and Europeans.

 

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Blink, or else

I am speaking tomorrow at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on Iran, the United States and Europe.  Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself.

1.  This year’s biggest foreign policy puzzle is how to handle Iran and its nuclear program.  The piece of this puzzle I would like to talk about is Washington.  What have the Americans got in mind?  What are they trying to achieve?  What will they do to achieve it?  What happens if they fail?

2.  The objective is clear:  President Obama aims to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.  He rejects containment.  He has broad support in the Congress and beyond for this position.

3.  There should really be no doubt about American willingness to use force to achieve this goal.  If diplomacy fails to stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons, the Americans will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and possibly much more.

4.  This would not be a one-time decision.  It would only set back the Iranian nuclear effort a year or two.  We will have to repeat the attacks, likely at more frequent intervals.  I don’t agree with Marvin Weinbaum that the Iranians will welcome military action, but it offers only a temporary and unsatisfactory solution.  That may be enough for Israel, as Richard Cohen suggests, but it is not good enough for the U.S., which has other priorities in the world and needs to tend them.

5.  Karl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, are also wrong to suggest diplomacy is the only option.  But it is a preferred option.  In a little noted passage in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this month, the President outlined what his preference:

…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.

6.  David Frum misinterprets this passage as meaning that the president is bluffing on the use of force.  That is a mistake.  But Obama is clearly saying he prefers a diplomatic solution, because it has the potential to be longer-lasting than the military one.

7.  From the Washington perspective, Iran is in diplomatic, political and economic isolation.  The P5+1 are united.  Sanctions are biting.  The Sunni Arab world has come to the realization that Iranian nuclear weapons will require a response, one that will make the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it has been even in the past several decades.

8.  Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to.  They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.  Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s.

9.  The trouble is that Iran, a state party to the NPT, has violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime and also working on nuclear explosives.  So President Obama will be looking for verifiable commitments reflecting a genuine decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on the calculation that Iran will be better off without them.

10.  How could that be?  Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates security dilemmas for Tehran.  The United States will target a nuclear Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons, greatly complicating Iran’s situation.

11.  Keeping its enrichment technology but giving up on nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems.  U.S. intelligence leaks claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President suggests.

12.  Such a diplomatic solution would require Iran to agree to rigorous and comprehensive inspections as well as limit enrichment to well below weapons grade, which is 90% and above.

13.  The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines.  As Martin Indyk points out, they are currently engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken:  Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….

14.  Can Obama deliver on such a diplomatic solution?  The Americans are hard to read.  Best to listen to is Senator Mitch McConnell, who as Senate opposition leader represents the anti-Obama position.  He declared earlier this month:

If Iran, at any time, begins to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level, or decides to go forward with a weapons program, then the United States will use overwhelming force to end that program.

15. This was generally read as a belligerent statement, since it makes explicit the American willingness to use military force if its red lines are crossed.  But in fact it is consistent with the kind of diplomatic solution Obama has in mind.

16.  But this Obama/McConnell proposition asks of Iran considerably less than Israel would like.  Israel wants to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability.  This means giving up the technology required to enrich uranium to weapons grade or reprocess plutonium.

17.  No country I know of has given up uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, once acquired.  It isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.

18.  If war is to be avoided, someone has to break the cycle Indyk refers to, putting a deal on the table.  Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine.  He is unlikely to blink.  Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran.  He has to appear ready and willing to use military force.

19.  This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that its parliamentary elections have been held. They marked a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program.  Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken.  He may even think nuclear weapons necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.

20.  It is really anyone’s guess what Khamenei will do.  But at least he has an undivided polity behind him.  My hope is that either he or Obama–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.

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