Tag: European Union

Bosnia’s fate

Milan Marinkovic writes from Nis:

What is to be done about Bosnia?  The divided country seems unlikely to survive without life support from the international community.

The half of Bosnia’s territory called Republika Srpska (RS) is dominated by ethnic Serbs. An overwhelming majority of them do not regard Bosnia as their homeland; rather, they are dreaming of secession. The number of non-Serbs in RS is too small to affect this prevailing political trend.

The other half, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), is shared between Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats. A still undetermined percentage of the latter are hoping for the creation of their own separate entity along the lines of Republika Srpska.

Bosniaks are the only among Bosnia’s so-called “constituent peoples” who are united in thinking of Bosnia as their beloved country. Unlike Serbs and Croats, Bosniaks do not have a reserve motherland. But given that Bosniaks are thought to account for less than a half of the overall population, they constitute only a relative, not the absolute majority.

Another reason why Bosniaks appear unlikely to decide the future of Bosnia on their own is that they are deeply divided among themselves on how the country’s political system should be organized. Although Bosnian Muslims are traditionally considered moderate and secular, the war and its consequences have radicalized some of them.

Bosniak nationalist political parties are increasingly flirting with Islamic clericalism, much to the liking of Bosnia’s Islamic community.  Its leader, Reis Effendi Mustafa Cerić, recently gave an interview to the Radio Free Europe complaining that Bosniaks are the only people in the region who do not have their exclusive nation-state.

That’s obviously true, but there is no feasible way to make Bosnia the nation-state of Bosniaks except by allowing Republika Srpska to secede.  Even if Bosniak political and religious leaders might accept  secession of RS, most ordinary Bosniaks relentlessly oppose any possibilty of changing Bosnia’s existing national border.

Major EU powers also would not like to see Bosnia divided into two independent states. The secession of Republika Srpska would make an already problematic Serbia all the more difficult to manage, while at the same time increasing the likelihood that the rest of Bosnia turns into an Islamic state.

The fates of Bosnia and Serbia are in many ways interconnected. Albeit rhetorically aggressive, President of RS Milorad Dodik is wise enough not to make any hasty move that could undermine his position. Dodik will therefore refrain from either declaring or holding a referendum on independence until he receives a green light from Belgrade.

While the potential unification with RS would undoubtedly help Serbia materialize an old dream of growing into the dominant power in the region, Belgrade is aware that it cannot afford to be deprived of continual financial support from the EU without which its economy would become virtually unsustainable. Serbia is looking to use both RS and (northern) Kosovo as trump cards to get as many concessions from Brussels as possible on the path toward EU membership. So long as the West can keep Serbia part of the European integration process, the threat of secession by RS is going to remain just a threat.

Saving Bosnia from dissolution is the easier part of the job. Helping the country overcome its internal malaise is a much tougher challenge. While the EU may be able to maintain the current status quo in Bosnia for some time, the Europeans do not seem capable of improving the situation. A more serious engagement on the part of Washington would be more than welcome, but is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future, due to priorities elsewhere.

Turkey could play a significant role in Bosnia. As a rising economic power seeking to expand its influence in the Balkans through strategic investment and close cooperation with local governments, Turkey has an interest in contributing to stabilization of the region. Turkey especially wants to see progress in Bosnia, with which it has strong historical, cultural and religious ties.

A problem for Ankara is that many South Slavs – particularly those of Christian denominations – are suspicious of Turkey’s action in the Balkans because of its imperial Ottoman past. The Turks need to convince Christian Slavs that their intentions today are different. If they succeed, it would not immediately solve the Bosnian puzzle, but would probably move it closer to a solution.

The worst thing to happen is that Serbia at some point reverts to retrograde nationalism and decides to ultimately withdraw from all European projects. Then it would be just a matter of time before Dodik – or whoever is in charge of RS at the time – is given the green light to declare independence.

The question remains whether Sandjak, a Bosniak/Muslim-dominated sub-region in southwestern Serbia, constitutes a trump card that could be used to counter a potential attempt by Banja Luka and Belgrade to divide Bosnia.  The answer is:  not likely.

Sandjak is incomparable to Republika Srpska for a variety of reasons. RS occupies a far larger territory than Sandjak – both in terms of total size and relative to Bosnia’s and Serbia’s respective areas. Serbs account for almost ninety percent of Republika Srpska’s population and about one-third of Bosnia’s; Bosniaks, though the majority ethnic group in Sandjak, make up only between two and three percent of Serbia’s overall population.

Unlike a great majority of the Serbs in RS, most Bosniaks from Sandjak are loyal citizens of their country – Serbia. Bosniaks and Serbs in Sandjak in most cases have good and mutual relations, completely different from those between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia – and especially different from those between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

Some of the Bosniaks from Sandjak feel dissatisfied due to Belgrade’s institutional discrimination against them, but their displeasure is directed at Serbian authorities rather than their Serb neighbors. Even among the young, who are more prone to extreme ideologies and behaviors, interethnic incidents are minor and infrequent.

While some political tensions do exist in Sandjak, they are low intensity and not ethnically motivated. Serbian intelligence services and security forces maintain a relatively strong presence, primarily because of Sandjak’s geographic location and terrain, which have made the area a traditional smuggling route. Another reason for the increased security measures is that the Wahhabist movement has its local cell in Sandjak.

But most importantly, unlike Republika Srpska, which shares by far the longest section of its eastern border with Serbia, Sandjak is not contiguous with Bosnia’s Muslim-dominated entity, from which it is separated,  ironically, by Republika Srpska.

The bottom line:  Sandjak could at best serve to put additional pressure on Serbia if everything else proved ineffective, but probably nothing more than that.  That is the trouble with frozen conflicts such as the one in Bosnia. When you leave them in limbo for too long, new carrots and sticks are less and less likely to work.

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Seconda casa

I rarely write about Italy, where I spent 10 years (during three tours) at the U.S. embassy.  We left via Pinciana 21, the deputy chief of mission’s residence, almost 20 years ago, while I was Charge’ d’affaires ad interim, which gets loosely translated on resume’s as “acting ambassador.”  I moved first to Villa Taverna, the ambassador’s residence, with then 11-year-old Adam, because they wanted to renovate the DCM’s apartment, across from the Villa Borghese.  I learned quickly why American ambassadors in Rome decide to work in the afternoons at home.  “The residence” is Capri in Rome.

I’m tempted to write today because we are leaving for Rome tomorrow for a 10-day vacation.  Have no fear:  I’ll continue to post from there.  I’ll give one talk–at the International Affairs Institute on the American approach to Iran’s nuclear program–but I’ll be seeing lots of people and no doubt talking about today’s other big problems:  the euro, Syria, North Africa will I imagine be among them.

The Italians have to take North Africa more seriously than we do.  They get a lot of gas from Algeria and Libya, where they have giant investments.  I’ll be interested to learn how they view the ongoing transition in Libya, a country they know particularly well as a former colonial possession.  Ditto for Algeria, where modest reforms and upcoming elections raise the question of whether what is now Africa’s biggest country (now that Sudan has split) can avoid a popular revolution and find a soft landing.  Syria will seem less important to most of my friends, though some will realize both how dangerous the current situation is and how beneficial the fall of the Assad regime could potentially be.

On the home front, Italy is recovering, at least for now.  Interest rates on government debt are far below their peaks now, the banks haven’t suffered too much, the budget has been at least temporarily straightened out, and the country has a prime minister, Mario Monti, who is more than welcome in Brussels and the White House.  I think they disinfected after Silvio Berlusconi’s visits. Monti, whom I knew as a professor when I was economic minster of the embassy in the late 1980s, is the model of decorum and integrity, almost an anti-Berlusconi.

But none of that makes ordinary Italians feel better off.  Unemployment and underemployment is high, taxes are up, and growth is worse than anemic.  Monti is a kind of bankruptcy trustee–he was put in to prevent the worst and will be allowed to stay until things really start looking up.  Then the politicians will engineer his fall and take back the helm, as they did after the previous trusteeships of Bank of Italy Governors Ciampi and Dini.  Giorgio Napolitano, the president who is credited with putting Monti in place, has limited powers under normal circumstances, and his term ends in 2013, when he will turn 88.  The European Union Germans are right to try to put in place a permanent restraint on deficit spending.  Otherwise, it’ll be back.

The question for Italy is whether it can live within those restraints.  My guess is it can if it wants to–the Italians are amazingly ingenious entrepreneurs.  I remember once visiting a textile manufacturer–his company made Blumarine, which was then all the rage, and I gather may still be–who explained to me the incredible network of small contractors who enabled him to stay competitive in a world that was already being inundated with cheap clothing from Asia.  I had arrived at his office from a visit to the Ferrari factory, where I saw a lot of numerically controlled machine tools manufacturing the world’s supposedly “hand-made” car (the boss explained that only the upholstery was handmade, as there were real quality advantages to robots in making the rest).  My Blumarine friend said he had a Ferrari in the garage.  Where did he drive it I asked?  “Drive it?” he replied.  No, no, no, he said. It is a great investment just sitting there.  You wouldn’t want to run up the mileage or take any risks.”

Clever they may be, but recent events have demonstrated some serious flaws in the Italian character.  The Costa Concordia off Tuscany and the Costa Allegra off the Seychelles are emblematic.  The first shipwrecked apparently because the captain was showing off the ship to his friends on shore.  The second suffered a crippling fire.  Berlusconi’s long tenure as prime minister was just as devastating to the ship of state.

Much of recent Italian history betrays neither good judgment nor good luck.  Italy needs both to stay afloat these days.  But Rome wasn’t built in a day, and it won’t collapse before we walk its vicolo del divino amore again.  May it ever be thus.

 

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Careful what you wish for

My friend in Niš, Milan Marinković, has been watching north Kosovo from a perch not far away.  He writes:

Last summer Serbian Interior minister Ivica Dačić proposed that the problem of Kosovo should be solved by dividing its territory between Serbia and Albania. Dačić argued that there was no point in forcing Serbs and Albanians to live together when history had shown they could not coexist peacefully.

Minister Dačić should have been careful what he wished for.  A few days ago, political representatives of Albanians from a region in southern Serbia adjacent to Kosovo adopted a declaration in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the way Serbian authorities treated the ethnic Albanians and demanded the incorporation of the region into Kosovo. The idea of territorial division is thus threatening to turn into one of a territorial swap.

Such ideas are not only unacceptable from the perspective of European integration that both Belgrade and Priština aspire to. They also put at risk both Serbs and Albanians in areas where they are in the minority.  In Kosovo, for example, the Albanians are the majority south of the Ibar, but the minority in the north; the opposite is true for the Serbs.  Any ethnic-based attempt at either territorial division or swap is certain to instill fear into members of the local ethnic minorities, increasing the risk of mass migrations reminiscent of those in 1990s.

There is also a security concern. The Serb-dominated area in northern Kosovo is a no-man’s land ideal for smuggling and other illegal activities. Priština virtually wields no authority there, while Belgrade has only a limited impact. The local Serb politicians appear to be more loyal to nationalist opposition parties than to the Serbian government, as demonstrated by the referendum they held last month despite Belgrade’s strong disapproval.

The Ahtisaari plan, which provides for a wide degree of municipal autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, is increasingly proving to be a feasible solution for the Serbs from the enclaves. Nevertheless, those in the north refuse to give it even a thought, and Belgrade also continues to claim that the plan is unacceptable, even if it were supplemented to allow a special status for the northern Serbs.

Still, some positive signs are emerging. Belgrade and Priština finally reached the agreement on conditions under which Kosovo can be represented at regional conferences. This progress in the negotiations contributed decisively to EU candidate status for Serbia. More importantly, it provides hope that, with assistance of the international community, the two sides might find common ground on the issue of the north sooner than many would expect.

The Serbian elections in May will pose a critical test for Belgrade. Should Serbia abstain from holding the elections on the territory of Kosovo, it will be a clear indication of the country’s willingness to substantially change its policy toward the former province. In that event, the northern Kosovo Serbs would find themselves under unprecedented pressure to soften their position and become part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

At the moment, all options remain open. In just a few months Serbia will get a new government. A new government at the beginning of its mandate is usually in a more comfortable position to take bold steps on sensitive issues than an outgoing one. If these bold steps happen to be the right steps, Serbia could be rewarded with a date for accession talks as early as in December.

A right step, to begin with, could be to explain to the Serbs from northern Kosovo that anything can be possible if you want to make it possible. When Mr. Dačić invoked historical experience to defend the assertion that they could not live together with Albanians, he apparently forgot the example of Germans and French. The formerly fiercest enemies jointly laid the foundation for what eventually would become the European Union.

Not only Serbia and Kosovo but all countries in the region share the same underlying problem which most of their troubles stem from. That problem is called – the economy.  If they are to recover economically, they will have to cooperate closely rather than confront one another.  The sooner we grasp this simple fact, the better.

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Serbia, Kosovo and 1244

1244 is the UN Security Council resolution that ended the NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo in 1999.  Today in Brussels, Pristina and Belgrade agreed that Kosovo would be represented internationally as Kosovo, with a footnote referencing both UNSC resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that found no prohibition (in 1244 or anywhere else) on its declaration of independence.

Belgrade is anxious to portray this as a victory.  B92 quotes President Tadic:

Kosovo will not be presented in regional fora and institutions as an independent country, but in line with UN Resolution 1244 on Kosovo and the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

He is entitled to his interpretation of the agreement, but mine is different.  Let me explain.

Belgrade has long been anxious to drag 1244 into all discussions of Kosovo because it makes reference in the preamble to Yugoslav sovereignty.  But preambular language is not legally binding and the substantive text of the resolution clearly foresees a political process to decide Kosovo’s status.  It is the claim of those states that have recognized Kosovo as independent and sovereign that the Marti Ahtisaari-led negotiations, in which Russia and Serbia participated fully, constituted that political process.  The terms of 1244 have therefore been fulfilled, even if no new UNSC resolution has passed.  Last year’s ICJ opinion advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law, confirming that 1244 does not prevent Kosovo from sovereignty and independence, despite the preambular reference to Yugoslav sovereignty.

So I see no loss to Kosovo in a footnote requiring reference to 1244.  To the contrary, it seems to me Kosovo’s right to a political process that would determine final status is rooted in 1244–that is what makes Kosovo different from all those other provinces around the world that would like independence.  Coupled with the ICJ decision, the footnote should be read as a clear and unequivocal statement that Kosovo is entitled to seek recognition as a sovereign and independent state.

It now has that recognition from more than 85 other sovereign and independent states, which is more than have bilaterally recognized many other states on earth.  Bilateral recognitions generally stop once a state is a member of the United Nations.  That is the next hurdle for Kosovo.  It needs membership in the UN General Assembly, which requires a positive recommendation by the Security Council.

So far, Russia has put its veto at the disposal of Serbia to prevent Kosovo’s UN membership.  But I’ve got to wonder out loud how long that will last.  Russia’s recognition of Abhazia and South Ossetia deprives its stance of any moral rectitude.  Once Kosovo is accepted in Balkans circles, including by the five non-recognizing European Union states, as Kosovo* {that * is meant to represent the footnote referencing two things that together confirm Kosovo’s right to seek international recognition}, why would Moscow continue to block membership under the same formula in the UN General Assembly?

There is another aspect to this agreement that is positive for Pristina.  It opens the door to a “contractual” relationship between Kosovo* and the EU, one that should certainly include an agreement on trade, visas and other key items.  Pristina has good reason to celebrate, even if no one can enjoy having their state identity footnoted.

 

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Bear apparent

The Russian role in the Balkans has long been of great concern to some of my Western-oriented friends there, even though it arouses little interest in Washington, DC.  Milan Marinković tries to explain why it is important:

Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin is chiefly known for incidents he occasionally makes. His public warnings to Belgrade as to the consequences Serbia will face should it dare to join NATO no longer raise eyebrows.

The more aggressive stance Konuzin takes, the more popularity he wins among Serbs. At a recent pre-election convention of the Serbian progressive party (SNS), Konuzin was a guest together with several Western diplomats. Even though SNS declares itself pro-EU, the party stalwarts booed the Westerners in attendance but greeted Konuzin with a standing ovation.

According to opinion polls, SNS is the most popular party in Serbia and the main rival to the currently ruling Democratic party (DS) of President Boris Tadic in the forthcoming elections. SNS’s possible rise to power could afford the Kremlin an opportunity to further increase its influence in Serbian politics.

Serbia hopes to benefit from the risky tactic of balancing between Moscow and Brussels.  In 2008 Belgrade sold its oil monopoly NIS to Russian state-owned behemoth GAZPROM – many believe in return for Russia’s support on Kosovo.  Whatever was behind the decision, the transaction has allowed Moscow to pursue its interests in Serbia more assertively.

The monopoly in energy supplies is one of several levers Russia has at its disposal. Others include various historical ties between the two nations, most notably religious and cultural ones.  Serbia is dubbed “little Russia” in the Balkans. Russophilia is widespread among Serbs, which facilitates lobbying for Russia’s interests. The most active pro-Kremlin lobbyists in Serbia are senior officials of conservative nationalist parties along with several prominent members of the dominant faction within Serbian Orthodox Church – by far the most influential (nominally) non-governmental institution in the country.

At this point, Serbia is not counted among top priorities of Russian foreign policy. Russia plans to expand its sphere of influence in concentric circles.  Moscow is currently looking to consolidate its power in the former Soviet Union’s periphery in order to set the stage for a prospective “Eurasian union.”

The second phase of Russia’s geopolitical expansion would involve ex-member states of the Warsaw Pact from Central and Eastern European.  Serbia – and Balkans in general – most likely are scheduled for the third round. Until then, the Kremlin will seek to maintain the level of influence it already has in Serbia and will not hesitate to augment it whenever an opportunity presents itself.   Keeping Serbia out of NATO is a vital part of this strategy.

The natural counterbalance to Russian power in the Balkans is Turkey.  The two countries already compete in Bosnia.  Belgrade and Ankara have significantly strengthened bilateral relations in recent years, as Serbia wants to attract Turkish investment.  Pro-Russian circles in Serbia vehemently oppose Turco-Serbian rapprochement as harmful to Serbia’s national interests.

Russia’s Balkan aspirations could be undermined by the country’s internal constraints. Moscow is already facing serious challenges, such as growing discontent over corruption and social inequalities, as well as seething Islamist militancy in the Caucasus region. Whether Russia will manage to regain its old glory and continue to expand its influence in the Balkans largely depends on how it deals with its own domestic issues.

 

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Hard choices

My friends at Reuters published today my reaction to Dennis Ross’ New York Times piece yesterday on negotiating with Iran under the heading “What does Iran want?”:

 

Dennis Ross, until recently in charge of Iran in the Obama White House, has outlined why he thinks strengthened sanctions have created an environment in which diplomacy may now work to block Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is being reported that Iran has finally responded to a European Union letter requiring that renewed talks focus specifically on ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

These are important developments, but they leave out half the equation. What can Iran hope to get from nuclear talks with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China — plus Germany? Iran will certainly seek relief from sanctions, which have become truly punishing. But they will want more.

It is clear that Tehran’s first priority is an end to American efforts at regime change. This is not an issue Americans know or think much about, but it obsesses the Iranians. They believe that Washington has tried to bring about regime change in Tehran for decades. Iranian officials can entertain you for hours with stories about American (and Israeli) assistance to Azeri, Baloch and Kurdish rebels. The Arab Spring uprisings took their inspiration in part from Iran’s own “Green Movement,” which protested fraud in the 2009 presidential elections before being brutally repressed. While some in Congress view President Obama as insufficiently supportive of the Greens, the regime in Tehran thought the Americans were behind the whole movement.

The nuclear program, in addition to beefing up Iran’s military muscle and regional prestige, is also intended to end attempts at regime change, as it is thought in Tehran that the U.S. will not attack a nuclear weapons state for fear of the consequences. To those looking for it, there is ample supporting evidence: Witness the contrast between North Korea, a severely repressive regime that has obtained nuclear weapons, and Libya, which gave up its nuclear efforts and suffered a NATO air war that brought about regime change.

So the question becomes this: will the Americans be prepared to take regime change off the table if the Iranians are prepared to give ironclad and verifiable assurances that their nuclear program is entirely peaceful? The answer to that question is not obvious. While it is barely possible to picture Washington recognizing Tehran and re-establishing diplomatic relations after a 32-year hiatus, it is far harder to picture a bilateral agreement promising mutual noninterference in internal affairs. Certainly an agreement of that sort would not find ready approval in Congress.

Another key question is whether the U.S. is prepared to accept Iran holding on to sensitive nuclear technology, in particular, uranium enrichment, even if Tehran can use that technology only under tight international controls. Many countries have this arrangement: No one took uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology away from Argentina and Brazil when they mutually agreed to back off the development of nuclear weapons. Japan, South Korea, Sweden and many others are presumably no more than a couple of years (and probably far less) away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon.

Iran, however, is not Sweden. It isn’t even North Korea, a country far more readily sanctioned and bribed back into line and unable to produce more than a few relatively primitive atomic bombs. Iran, once it has the capacity to enrich uranium to bomb grade (90 percent or more), will be no more than a few years from getting an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In the meanwhile, it will presumably continue to develop and deploy longer-range missiles that could target Israel and Europe, if not the U.S. Can the United States, and Israel, live with that short a fuse?

The hard choices in dealing with Iran on nuclear issues are not only up to the Iranians. There are hard choices for the U.S. as well.

P.S.  Anyone who doubt that the U.S. will have trouble signing on to a diplomatic solution should read this from Jennifer Rubin at the Washington Post.

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