Tag: European Union
A rose is a rose
Gertrude Stein might just as well have said “Macedonia is Macedonia.” The trouble is, the Greeks don’t like to hear it.
This is one of the least interesting problems resulting from the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Its “Republic of Macedonia,” one of six republics that constituted Socialist Yugoslavia, became independent in 1991. But Greece, its neighbor to the south, objected to the use of “Macedonia,” claiming that appellation belongs exclusively to Greece and its use by the northern neighbor implied territorial claims to Greek territory. The newly independent country entered the United Nations as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (last time I was there it was alphabetized under “T” on the voting board at the UN General Assembly).
Athens and Skopje signed an “interim accord” in 1995 supposedly regulating the issue, but Greece claims Macedonia (oops, The FYROM) has violated it while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided last December that Greece had definitely violated it by blocking The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. There is an opportunity to correct this injustice at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. Efforts to resolve the issue have been ongoing since the early 1990s in UN-sponsored talks, mediated since 1994 by New York lawyer Matt Nimetz.
Macedonia already has a pretty good deal on the name issue. Just about everyone calls the country by the name Skopje prefers, and many countries (including the U.S.) have formally recognized it as the “Republic of Macedonia.” Greece does not, but why should anyone care about that?
The unfortunate answer is that Athens can veto Skopje’s membership in NATO as well as any further progress towards membership in the EU. Macedonia is already a candidate for EU membership but hasn’t got a date for the start of negotiations, which is an important milestone that Athens is holding hostage.
NATO membership is also important to Macedonia, which counts itself as part of the West and has deployed troops to Afghanistan under NATO command. Alliance membership is a goal sought by both Albanians (who constitute about one-quarter of the population) and Macedonians. It also, by the way, should end any lingering Greek fears of irredentist claims to its territory by Skopje.
The problem for Macedonia is the veto, not the name. While there is virtue in continuing the effort to resolve the name issue, it might be wise for Skopje to stop pounding on Matt Nimetz’s door this spring for a solution to a problem Athens has but Skopje does not. Skopje needs to go directly to Athens and mount a serious effort to convince Greece to allow it into NATO under the interim accord as The FYROM. The ICJ decision requires nothing less.
A Macedonian joked with me recently that he would personally push a statue of Alexander the Great that has offended Greek sensibilities from Skopje to the Greek border if Athens would allow Macedonia into NATO in Chicago. I doubt Athens is interested in the statue, but the joke points in the right direction. Skopje needs to find out what Athens needs that Macedonia can provide. If the government won’t discuss the issue of NATO membership, then Macedonia should find thinktanks and academics in Greece who will.
At the same time Skopje should be working with the Macedonian and Albanian American communities to make sure that the mayor of Chicago, once right hand to President Obama, raises this issue with the White House. So far it is studiously avowing support for Skopje but doing nothing to pry open the NATO door. Vice President Biden, when he was a senator, opposed use of “Macedonia,” which is too bad since he holds the Balkans portfolio.
Greece is vulnerable at the moment because of its parlous financial situation, but no one in Brussels or Washington wants to kick Athens while it is down. Greek Americans are well-organized and an important voting constituency. Macedonia has a “stick” it can’t really use. It needs to find some other way to put the squeeze on, or “carrots” that are attractive enough in Athens to open the NATO door. Then they can go back to not resolving the name issue at the UN for another 15 years or so, by which time everyone will have forgotten why it once seemed important.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The longer you wait, the higher the price
The 3.5 (sometimes called four) Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control, not Pristina’s. Milan Marinković writes from Niš:
The February 14-15 referendum in four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo is approaching. People will be asked whether they accept the state institutions of Kosovo, headquartered in Pristina and dominated by Albanians. An overwhelming “no” vote seems assured. Its potential implications may be damaging: it could alienate Belgrade further from Europe and make it more difficult for Pristina to establish even nominal authority in the north, strengthening Kosovar Albanian nationalists and reducing the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the disputed territory.
Political leaders of the northern Serbs fear the “parallel” institutions they control might be dismantled in response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s demand to Serbian authorities last summer. They see the referendum as a way to make these institutions more legitimate and thus fortify their own political position. The referendum could also block effective law enforcement in the north, where organized crime groups have exploited the situation to develop a highly profitable smuggling network.
With Serbia’s own spring parliamentary elections in sight and candidacy for the European Union still uncertain, the referendum could not come at a worse time for the Serbian government. Serb politicians in northern Kosovo who receive their salaries from Belgrade are now ignoring Belgrade’s appeals. On top of that, within the ruling coalition there are several factions with different approaches to how the problem of Kosovo should be dealt with. Serbian President Boris Tadić is expected to have the final word.
He and his Democratic Party (DS) are hoping Serbia will get EU candidacy so that they can win back credibility among the pro-Western part of the electorate. Somehow meeting Merkel’s demands, or nullifying them, is vital. But most of those who voted for Tadić and DS in the last elections because of their European agenda feel betrayed to such an extent that candidacy alone could hardly allay their disappointment.
At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the European Union gives rise to euro-skepticism, which the anti-European opposition parties in Serbia exploit. They insist that Serbia must give up on the European integration process, arguing that the EU sooner or later is going to dissolve. This anti-EU rhetoric is being increasingly met with approval in Serbia today.
President Tadić has limited options. He can continue what he is already doing–calling publicly on the local Serb leaders to abstain from the referendum–but that presumably will not be enough to persuade leading EU countries to reward Serbia with candidate status, unless the northern Kosovo Serbs unexpectedly decide to acquiesce to his request.
Belgrade could also threaten to stop funding the parallel institutions in the north should the referendum be held. While this would be welcomed by the West, it is hard to imagine such a radical shift in Belgrade’s policy on a “national” issue amid a pre-election campaign given the political risks it would entail.
Judging by previous experiences, whatever President Tadić chooses to do, he will wait until the last minute. What he would like most is to somehow preserve the status quo until after the election, but that could well prove to be infeasible. Serbia has so far missed several opportunities to adjust its policy on Kosovo to reality. And the longer you hesitate to do the inevitable, the higher is the price you pay in the end.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Plan B
Yesterday a treasured Twitter follower described me as optimistic on Syria, because I saw some promise of a serious transition in the current draft UN Security Council resolution. The caveats did not fit in 140 characters: I was optimistic if the draft resolution were to pass and if the Americans, Europeans and Arab League continued to insist that Bashar al Assad step aside and allow the transition to begin.
Today it is clear that the first of my caveats has not been realized: the Russians and Chinese have both voted against, with 13 other members of the Security Council voting in favor. This is a real setback, heading us into scenarios 2 or 4 of my previous post on how bad things could get: the regime wins or civil war. We’d be lucky now to get into scenario 1: divided sovereignty, with some areas held by the opposition.
Moscow and Beijing will no doubt sell the vetoes back home as necessary to defy the U.S. and stop Western imperialism of the sort that took down Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. In fact what they have done is to protect Bashar al Assad at a moment when he is killing more of his own people than ever. Over 200 are reported to have lost their lives in overnight shelling of a neighborhood in Homs, an epicenter of the uprising. Yesterday’s commemoration of the father’s slaughter of people in Hama thirty years ago has sadly led to ferocious confirmation that the son is struck from the same mold.
What is to be done now? Some will propose military intervention without Security Council approval. That was done in Kosovo, where the UN blessed the outcome in Security Council resolution 1244 even if had not blessed the intervention before it happened. I doubt the U.S., NATO or the Arab League have the stomach or resources for that. If they had wanted to do that, they would not have allowed a vote at the Security Council.
They are much more likely to feed the violent opposition to the regime by arming and perhaps training the Syrian Free Army, which appears to have liberated parts of the country but is unable to hold them if the unfree Syrian army strikes back. Encouraging the Syrian Free Army will unfortunately put the country on the path to civil war, with frightening consequences for minorities and secularism if the rebels win and even worse consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood if they lose. And terrible consequences for everyone if the fighting is prolonged.
Far preferable in my view would be a return to nonviolent protest, with Arab League observers once more deployed in an effort to protect demonstrators from the worst abuses. Certainly the situation has deteriorated badly since the Arab League monitors were confined to quarters. Getting them out into the main contested areas as soon as possible would at least provide the eyes and ears required to communicate what is going on to the rest of the world, even if Bashar al Assad now seems unlikely to accept restraints.
President Obama this morning issued a statement that includes this:
The Syrian regime’s policy of maintaining power by terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent weakness and inevitable collapse. Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community.
I agree that Assad has no right to lead Syria and has lost legitimacy, but unfortunately it does not follow that the regime’s collapse is inevitable. No doubt even a defeated UNSC resolution, when the vote is 13 to 2, confirms a loss of international legitimacy. But the father also lost legitimacy and nevertheless survived for many years thereafter, successfully passing power to the son.
What the United States, Europe and the Arab League need to do now is to keep up the pressure by maintaining and tightening sanctions, redeploying the observers if it is safe enough to do so and encouraging continued nonviolent protest in forms (boycotts in particular) that do not expose large numbers of people to the regime’s violence. They also need to consider new measures: blockade of arms shipments? extension of the financial sanctions used against Iran to Syria? Reinforcement of the Arab League observers?
Yesterday’s worldwide demonstrations focused on Syria’s embassies abroad. The next round should focus on Russia’s and China’s.
Some of the bodies from the massacre in Homs that the regime says didn’t happen:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Belgrade has to bite the bullet
I could quibble about details in the ICG’s latest report on Kosovo and Serbia. It minimizes Belgrade’s role in north Kosovo too much, it is too critical of the EU’s current posture on candidacy for Serbia, and it fails to take adequately into account the political pressure Albin Kurti is generating inside Kosovo. I disagree with ICG’s advocacy of “Ahtisaari plus,” a rubric guaranteed to face rejection in Pristina and lead eventually to partition. “Ahtisaari implementation” is a better approach.
But I won’t quibble. This is a good report full of interesting details and basically sound analysis, with some good policy conclusions. A little good will would go a long way, and good will is absolutely necessary. The problem in north Kosovo will not be solved until there is solid cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina as well as decent rapport between Pristina and the Serbs in the north. These are main messages of the report, and they are correct.
None of it is likely to happen any time soon. The referendum February 14-15 in the north on acceptance of the Pristina-based institutions will further poison an already toxic political environment. So too will Serbia’s spring parliamentary elections, especially (as ICG notes) the effort to hold them in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo. Albanian firebrand Albin Kurti will no doubt find a way to embarrass Prime Minister Hashim Thaci for not preventing the referendum and elections from happening. Northerners will continue to block routes and prevent implementation of the EU-sponsored customs agreement, unless Belgrade makes a truly concerted effort to cut them off.
ICG is at pains to suggest that Germany, the Netherlands and the UK should ease up a bit on their conditions for Serbia’s EU candidacy. My guess is that won’t happen. None of those countries is particularly anxious to proceed apace with EU enlargement. All have reasons to want to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that they are prepared to play hard ball and not lower the bar for EU candidacy. And Serbia’s refusal to allow proper customs collection at its boundary/border with Kosovo is a serious disqualification for candidacy. A bit more consistency in the EU approach would be helpful, but I don’t think that is really the heart of the problem.
ICG has it right when it says the fundamental issue is sovereignty. This is the bullet Belgrade has to bite. It doesn’t have to recognize Kosovo or establish diplomatic relations, but it has to accept the fact that the Pristina institutions are the legitimate governing authority on the entire, undivided territory of Kosovo. As ICG quite rightly points out, Serbia cannot otherwise continue to appeal to Security Council resolution 1244, which has no provision for dividing authority and no provision for continuing the presence in Kosovo of Serbian institutions.
This does not mean that Pristina would or could govern the Serbs in the north, who under the Ahtisaari plan that Pristina has accepted have ample room for self-governance. No doubt there will be some need for additional implementation agreements to reassure the northerners that money will flow to them from Belgrade without interference and that they will get fair treatment in Pristina-based institutions, especially the courts. These are legitimate concerns that Pristina should be prepared to discuss, provided the sovereignty question is resolved.
Until Belgrade is prepared to acknowledge that it has lost the right to station security forces or other state institutions anywhere in Kosovo without Pristina’s permission, I fear we won’t see much good will or the good things it could produce. But I am glad ICG, which I have criticized sharply in the past for its reports on Bosnia, has given me good reason to offer props this time.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria is coming to a head
The Arab League has suspended its human rights monitoring mission. The UN Security Council is discussing seriously a resolution on Syria. The anti-regime Syrian National Council is looking for international intervention to establish a safe zone. The Assad regime has amped up its violent repression, and the Free Syria Army is amping up its response. Civil war is in the air. This is a truly dangerous situation, but also one that could turn in a good direction.
The danger lies in further escalation of violence: the regime still holds the advantage in firepower and manpower. Increased violence will solidify support among regime loyalists and reduce the numbers of protesters in the streets. Frightened Alawite, Christian and other minorities will rally around the regime, dreading the consequences of a Sunni majority victory, especially one in which the Muslim Brotherhood plays a strong role.
Opportunity lies in the UN Security Council resolution. It needs to define a clear transition path away from the Assad regime that has the support of Moscow and no objection from Beijing. The Arab League is proposing a handover of power to Bashar al Assad’s vice president and formation of an inclusive government, followed by elections. This is vaguely similar to the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for Yemen, where its effectiveness has been less than 100%. The devil is in the details: how inclusive the government is determines whether it has real legitimacy, but broad inclusiveness is difficult to achieve (neither regime nor protesters will want to sit in the same room with their antagonists) and will likely limit its ability to make decisions.
The key to the UNSC resolution is Russian support, which depends on convincing Moscow that it stands to lose more by backing the Assad regime rather than abandoning it. Above all, Russia will want guarantees of continued access to port facilities in Syria. It is distasteful no doubt to the Syrian opposition to provide any guarantees to Russia, which has backed Assad shamelessly. But that is the price of the UNSC resolution, which takes priority right now.
It is not easy to follow the evolution of a UNSC resolution, but the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect is trying. It looks as if the European/Arab initiative will only come to a head next week, likely not before Wednesday. If they can get a resolution passed that defines a clear political path forward, along the lines of the Arab League proposal to be presented on Tuesday, that would be a tremendous step forward.
In the meanwhile, we can expect further escalation of violence in Syria, with the regime taking advantage of the suspension of the monitoring mission to do its dirtiest work and the Free Syria Army responding with the limited means at its disposal. I see no sign yet of an appetite for an international intervention like the one in Libya. While NATO may be doing some quiet preparations, the Alliance is not buzzing the way it normally does before taking action. The Russians will ensure that any UNSC resolution cannot be interpreted to authorize military intervention.
I continue to believe that nonviolent action is the best course of action for the anti-regime forces. A further slide to civil war is not to their advantage, both because they lack firepower and because it will discourage passage of a satisfactory Security Council resolution, defined as one that outlines a political way forward. I understand perfectly well the impulse (and justification) for self-defense and even for offensive maneuvers. But violence will lengthen the process of bringing Bashar down and reduce the odds of a peaceful and democratic outcome. For those who doubt this, consult Chenoweth and Stefan.
Some readers may ask, why should the U.S. care? The short answer is that sectarian civil war in Syria could create real difficulties in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and elsewhere, destabilizing a part of the world that is already requiring an inordinate amount of American attention. And just about any imaginable post-Assad regime is likely to be less friendly to Iran. The fall of Assad could be a big plus for American diplomatic efforts to weaken Hizbollah and Hamas as well as block Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Next week could be crucial. Neither the regime nor its opponents can endure much more. Syria is coming to a head.
RSS - Posts
