Tag: European Union
A step forward, but only one
Here are the agreed conclusions on Integrated B(oundary/order) Management (IBM) reached between Pristina and Belgrade. No question but that these are a step forward: an agreement for joint management of whatever you want to call the line between them. The heart of the matter is this:
4. The joint, integrated, single and secure posts will be located within a ‘common area of IBM crossing points’, jointly delineated, where officials of each party carry out relevant controls. Exceptionally, and limited to the common IBM areas, the parties will not display symbols of their respective jurisdictions;
The EU will chair the implementation group. The arrangement is not intended to decide or influence the question of status, and the agreement does not cover revenue or fiscal questions. It only provides a mechanism through which Belgrade and Pristina will presumably each meet its own revenue and fiscal requirements.
So far, so good. What is the agreement’s broader significance? It is one more step on the way to Belgrade’s acceptance of the Pristina authorities as the legitimate government on the undivided territory of Kosovo, whatever the status of that territory is. It is also a step by Pristina towards problem-solving cooperation with Belgrade.
It is not however more than that. There is still a long way to go in achieving the kind of cooperation, and mutual respect, that will allow both Serbia and Kosovo to proceed in their ambitions to join the European Union.
Is it enough to gain Belgrade candidacy status for the EU? On the merits, I think not: this is far short of Chancellor Merkel’s demand that Belgrade dismantle its parallel structures in northern Kosovo and give up on partition. There may of course be additional assurances on those points, but I would want to hear them said out loudly and unequivocally, if not signed and sealed, before accepting them as dispositive. If the EU decides to go ahead without those assurances, it will only be harder to get them in the future.
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Responding to the Islamist wave
Islamists have now won pluralities in recent Tunisia, Morocco and the first round of the Egyptian elections. There is every reason to believe they will continue to do well in Egypt and in Libya. How should the U.S. and Europe respond?
Calmly. It is not surprising that relatively well-organized Islamists, who for decades led often underground opposition to nominally secularist and nationalist autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (and to the monarchy in Morocco), are doing well in the first sort-of free and fair elections. Yes, relatively secularist youth led the protests earlier this year, but they are not reaping the electoral fruits. There has not been nearly enough time for them to organize, and in Egypt they have been more inclined to protest in Tahrir than to get out to the hustings. Secularism, stained by autocrats and often viewed as synonymous with atheism (not only in Muslim countries), faces a long uphill struggle. Separation of mosque and state is not even on the horizon.
In Tunisia and Morocco, the parties winning pluralities seem determined to avoid the worst excesses of Islamism, but there are going to be constant tussles over veiling, alcohol, status of women and other religious/social issues. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has also been toeing a relatively moderate line, but the far less moderate and Salafist Nour party is also doing well. In all three countries, at least some of the Islamists would like to imitate the success of the ruling Turkish Islamists, who have managed to gain a clear majority by moderating their once more militant views.
The Islamists who do well this year will have an enormous challenge ahead of them, as economic conditions are going to be difficult. This may force some degree of moderation, or at least reduce the saliency of social/religious issues and give secularists some time to get their act together.
The key battleground in my view will be rule of law. Rule of law is where secular regimes in Muslim countries have most obviously failed. It is also the area where many Muslims regard Islamists as offering a credible alternative.
Islamists think Sharia should be the basis of law in Muslim countries, as in fact it nominally was even under supposedly secular autocrats. The question is one of degree and interpretation. If Europe and the United States want the 2011 Arab spring to result in democratic regimes that respect human rights and see eye to eye with the West, they are going to need to engage seriously on rule of law issues. This would mean helping the judiciaries of these countries to rid themselves of corruption and enabling them to establish the kind of independence from executive authority and moderate interpretations of Sharia that might lead to legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
Sincere secularists have advantages in this struggle for hearts and minds. The more than 50 per cent of the population that is female cannot expect equal rights under the more extreme interpretations of Sharia. It is hard to picture the substantial middle classes of Tunisia or Morocco accepting public stoning of adulterers. Egypt’s Christian minority will want a more moderate legal regime.
But to take advantage of these advantages, secularists and more moderate Islamists will need to regroup after these elections and get serious about protecting individual human rights and independence of the judiciary. Their friends in the West should provide support.
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Say WHAT?
Across my desk yesterday came this policy brief, in which the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies in Belgrade appeals to the international community
to consider our invitation to Serbian authorities to release citizens of northern Kosovo from the mandatory presence at the barricades disguised as a compulsory service
Say WHAT? Serb citizens of northern Kosovo are being obligated by the local authorities (who report to Belgrade, not Pristina) to man the barricades as “compulsory service”? I’ll be glad if someone can tell me definitively that this is not true, that in fact they do it purely out of (misguided) personal passion and commitment. But otherwise it is pure outrage. If the organs of the Serbian state, established in contravention of UN Security Council resolution 1244 on the territory of Kosovo, are requiring citizens to man protests against those charged with implementing 1244, we are truly beyond the realm of the reasonable. That is not behavior worthy of a European state, or of one that aspires to be a candidate.
The barricades in question have been blocking roads in northern Kosovo, where the local population is resisting the authority of NATO, EULEX and Pristina, fearing that they will enable collection of customs duties at the Serbia/Kosovo boundary/border.
That is certainly something they intend to do, and should do. As Ambassador Rosemary Di Carlo said at the UN Security Council Tuesday:
we echo the Secretary-General’s call for KFOR to continue its efforts to ensure freedom of movement throughout Kosovo. This Council has affirmed that Kosovo is a single customs space. This is fully in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1244 and was a key point in the Secretary General’s November 2008 report on UNMIK, a report that the Council welcomed in its presidential statement of November 26, 2008. Kosovo therefore has the right to control its borders and uphold rule of law in full cooperation with the international community. It cannot be considered unilateral action for Kosovo to enforce its customs controls. Moreover, Kosovo also coordinated its activities with the international community, including KFOR and EULEX.
It is time for Belgrade to end behavior that puts its own aspirations for European Union membership, which are supposed to be decided December 9, seriously in doubt.
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The Balkans in Europe whole and free
My colleague here at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Kurt Volker, testified earlier this month in the House on the Balkans. Kurt and I don’t agree entirely on some policy points in his presentation, but I think the analysis was spot on and the policy recommendations–as would be expected from a former ambassador to NATO and principal deputy assistant secretary for Europe at the State Department–were well crafted in the broader context of Europe whole and free. So I am delighted he has given me permission to post his written statement. It is well worth a read for the Balkan-watchers (and inhabitants) among you.
Here are Kurt’s main policy points:
• In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton framework has stalled out. It is time to launch a new, major push from the international community to go beyond Dayton and establish lasting, effective governing structures – a Dayton Two. The Butmir process of a few years ago was a good effort, but ultimately did not succeed. We should go further.
There are plenty of positive forces for change in Bosnia today – from reformers and young people to civil society to businessmen and so forth. The conditions for progress have never been better. But the current political structures have guaranteed long-term divisions inside the country that play to the hands of nationalist and separatists. We should not close down the Office of the High Representative, or phase out the EU Force, until political structures are settled and functioning. So we should make a major push to settle these very issues.
• Likewise, we need a fresh push for political progress on Kosovo – in particular arrangements for Mitrovica in the north. Ethnic Serbs in southern Kosovo are well-protected and able to participate actively in society in Kosovo. There is no reason ethnic Serbs in the north could not do the same, but they are radicalized and held back. Criminal interests – both local and from Serbia proper – Serbian interior ministry police, and of course the nature of the Kosovo government and international community’s past engagement, have all played a role. But it has gotten worse with time, not better, and it is time to push for a more wide-reaching resolution.
Here, one needs also to push the European Union on its role. Despite years of history and the ruling of the International Court of Justice, five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, as the United States and 22 other EU members have done. This serves to perpetuate the belief in Serbia, and in Mitrovica, that Kosovo’s independence can be un-done. It can’t. And neither can partitions or territory swaps solve Kosovo’s problems. Indeed, such steps would add new problems in the entire region. While no one can force any state to recognize another, the sooner the EU develops a stronger and more unified position, the sooner both sides in Kosovo can stop looking backward and start looking forward. With all the other problems Europe has to tackle right now, it makes no sense to continue contributing to this one.
• I want to add a word on Macedonia as well. In 2008, Macedonia was ready to be invited to join NATO, but there was no consensus within NATO to do so, because the name dispute with Greece was unresolved. Under the interim agreement of 1995, Greece had supported Macedonia’s participation in international organizations under the temporary name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” But Greece broke with this practice when it came time to admit Macedonia to NATO. Since then, Macedonia itself has slid backwards on some reforms, and has ramped up its use of controversial symbols of ancient Macedonia as a means of rallying the public and distracting from other issues at home.
Macedonia should be a vibrant crossroads of the Balkans – linking Greece to the north and linking the Western Balkans to Greece and the Mediterranean. The current stand-off serves no one’s interests: Not Greece, not Macedonia, not Europe, not the people of the Balkans, and not the United States. For years, we have supported the UN lead in negotiating a possible solution to the name issue. All of the elements have been put on the table at one point or another. It is time for the U.S. and EU together to make a concerted effort to (a) re-assert the validity of the 1995 interim agreement and use of FYROM as a temporary name, which – with Greek agreement – would allow Macedonia to join NATO and progress toward the EU; and (b) simultaneously, launch a major political push, including with incentives and disincentives, in support of the UN process, to get both sides to a final settlement.
Where would I differ?
Mainly on Bosnia: I would not be able to tell the Secretary of State that she should risk another failure like Butmir. Dayton 2 is much more likely to lead in a more ethnic nationalist direction, which is the wrong one in my view.
On Kosovo, only in nuance: I think we should make resolution of Kosovo issues–at least of the north–a condition for Serbia’s EU candidacy, which should not go ahead December 9 unless there is a clear and irreversible Belgrade commitment to cooperate in reintegrating the north with the rest of Kosovo.
On Macedonia, not at all: the interim accord is the way to go. I understand an International Court of Justice decision on this is due December 5. Let’s hope it is clear and unequivocal in Skopje’s favor.
Thank you, Kurt for a terrific overview!
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The third law of holes
The first, well known, is that when you are in a hole, stop digging. The second, less known, is to fill it in to keep it from becoming a hazard.
The third: a hole not filled in will cause more damage in the future than it would cause if you took care of it now.
Europe needs to keep the third law in mind as December approaches. That is when the European Union, already facing an existential challenge from the euro crisis, is to decide on Serbia’s candidacy for membership. The EU can choose to ignore what is going on in northern Kosovo, where local Serbs are insisting on remaining part of Serbia, and go ahead with candidacy. Or it can insist on a clear and enforceable commitment by Belgrade to accept integration of the north with the rest of Kosovo, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan. If it fails to do the latter, it will be violating the third law of holes.
Europe does not need another candidate for membership in this difficult moment. Serbia has done well in meeting many EU requirements since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, but Serbia’s small population and its aging demographic make it a marginal addition to the Union, at best. At worst, it could become a financial burden on the other 27 or 28 members (Croatia is already slated to become the 28th). While certainly not a candidate for the euro zone, Serbia’s economic performance is not going to contribute much to European vitality: the latest IMF projection is 2% growth in 2011 with 11.3% increase in consumer prices. Next year the IMF is projecting 3% growth and 4.3% increase in prices, which sounds unlikely in both dimensions.
The counter-argument is this: getting Serbia irreversibly on track for EU membership will ensure that problems like Kosovo and Belgrade’s relationship with independence-minded Republika Srpska (the Serb-controlled 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina) fade rather than grow. These issues will evaporate as Serbia gets closer to EU membership. Besides, Serbia has parliamentary elections next year. It would be better if Boris Tadić’s pro-Europe Democratic Party were to win once again. Giving Serbia EU candidacy will help.
I repeat these arguments for the sake of completeness. I don’t know of any evidence that they are true. Tadić has had more than ample opportunity to choose Europe over Kosovo, something he has steadfastly refused to do. Maybe someone with less tarnished nationalist credentials would be able to accept what everyone knows: Kosovo is lost. But this unsubstantiated pro-Tadić reasoning provides ample justification for kicking the can down the road, which is where most of the 27 EU members would like to see it. They don’t have any stomach for worrying about additional bits of Balkan real estate when their common currency is on the verge of going down the drain.
I am hoping that there is at least one EU member that will see the situation differently and invoke the third law of holes. This is one of those odd situations–like the Dutch insistence on turning Ratko Mladić over to the Hague Tribunal–when a single EU member can have a profound impact by standing on principle. That’s what the third law of holes requires.
I know you are wondering: no, there is no fourth law of holes. That’s it!
PS: I’ve corrected in the above text a mistake in the original that said presidential elections will occur next year. In fact, parliamentary elections will occur next year (the rumored date is May 5–certainly there is no reason to rush candidacy for that deadline) and presidential elections will occur in 2013.
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Hold the line
Sonja Biserko, the courageous chair of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade, announces The End of the Kosovo Myth in a paper written for the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society project “Communicating with Europe”:
In order to secure a candidate status (provided it is genuinely interested in it), the Serbian Government will have to make efforts to repair the damage caused by the imprudent radicalization of the situation in northern Kosovo and to show readiness for a constructive continuation of dialogue with Pristina. It will have to do this by December, before the EU member countries vote on the Commission’s proposal for Serbia’s candidacy.
The Serbian Government and President have yet to dissociate themselves from the ‘log revolutionaries’. A firm position of the Government to this effect would help ease tensions and calm passions among Serbia’s citizens, who have long realized that Kosovo cannot be returned within Serbia’s borders. Serbs in Kosovo, including those living in the north, have no confidence in Belgrade’s policy and are much more realistic about the situation. As it turns out, ordinary people both in Kosovo and in Serbia have proved far more realistic and rational than government itself.
I hope she is correct in believing that the day is near when Belgrade will align itself with the more realistic expectations of ordinary people. In the meanwhile, it is important for Washington and Brussels to hold the line, insisting on a resolution of the northern border/boundary issues before candidacy and looking forward to resolution of all other Kosovo issues before Serbia achieves EU membership.
More on this Saturday, when I put up a piece I’ve done for Serbian Pravda on the Kosovo situation and Serbia’s EU candidacy.
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