Tag: European Union
Heading for Belgrade next week
I haven’t been to Belgrade for a long time. I am looking forward to seeing many friends, meeting new ones and participating in a conference on “What Next for Dealing with the Past in Serbia?” sponsored by the Fund “Biljana Kovacevic-Vuco.”
Here are the questions that are on my mind. As usual I am open to suggestions of others that I should be asking, and any reading I should be doing:
1. What is the political lay of the land? Who is going up, who is coming down? Why? What role do different issues play: economic issues, Bosnia, Kosovo?
2. How far has Serbia’s democratic transition progressed? Are its courts independent? Is its parliament doing the kind of oversight that a European parliament should do? Is its government being held accountable? Are its institutions reformed? Are its army and other security forces under civilian control? Is its press free? Are its civil society organizations having a real impact?
3. What are Serbia’s long-term objectives? Does it continue to believe in the prospect of European Union membership, or is that fading? Is there interest in NATO membership, or not? Is anyone seriously interested in aligning Serbia with Russia?
4. What is Belgrade hoping to achieve in Bosnia? In Kosovo? How does it balance those aspirations with its interest in good relations with the U.S. and Europe? How can the U.S. best use its influence to ensure satisfactory outcomes?
During one of my last trips to Serbia, a prominent civilian of the more nationalist (but anti-Milosevic) variety showed me around Belgrade, pointing out with satisfaction the damage NATO did to security force targets. He praised the accuracy of most of the strikes and bemoaned the hit on the Chinese embassy. I gather attitudes have turned more sour since then. This is not surprising. I don’t expect anyone to appreciate bombing, even if it is accurate. What caused the shift? How far will it go?
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Happy new year, Balkans!
I seem to have developed the habit of doing a piece for Kosova Sot‘s New Year’s edition. Here is what I sent Magarita Kadriu on December 20:
Friends in Kosovo and the Balkans often ask me what I think about events there. The truth, if I care to tell it, is that people in Washington don’t think much about the Balkans these days. The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a list of 30 conflict prevention challenges for the United States in 2012. None involved the Balkans. I follow events there—mainly from B92’s coverage and many Balkans visitors—but only with peripheral vision. I am far more focused on the Arab spring, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. And this week North Korea.
I am well aware that there are still war and peace issues in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and in Kosovo. But they are relatively small ones subject to a lot of international monitoring: Milorad Dodik is not going to be able to take Republika Srpska in the direction of independence without a lot pressure being brought to bear against the idea, and Belgrade is not going to be able to formally annex northern Kosovo without suffering substantial consequences.
That does not mean however that the underlying problems can be resolved. Resolution really depends on the Europeans, who have often shown little stomach for using their leverage to good effect. I say that, and yet just yesterday German Chancellor Merkel made it clear, once again, that the European Union will not accept partition of Kosovo (or the persistence of the parallel structures in the north) and expects Belgrade and Pristina to collaborate in finding solutions. Her steadfastness is a great contribution.
I only wish we were seeing the same strong European voice in Bosnia, where Catherine Ashton has been far more tolerant of Dodik’s antics than I would like. This is partly because the Europeans don’t take him seriously. They know he knows there will be no recognition if Republika Srpska makes the mistake of declaring independence. But they underestimate the frustration and annoyance on the Bosniak side of the equation. Bosnia is stagnating, a condition that is not good for peace and security.
That said, I don’t expect dramatic developments in 2012. Pristina and Belgrade need to continue their dialogue and the search for mutually acceptable solutions, which can be found in implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. Bosnia is reaching the end of its financial rope, which may encourage at least formation of the new state government, so long overdue. Much of the rest of the Balkans is enjoying a relatively good holiday season: Croatia is entering the EU, Macedonia won its case in the International Court of Justice against Greece, Montenegro is moving faster than most thought possible towards the EU and NATO.
Serbian President Tadic yesterday acknowledged that neither partition nor restoration of Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo is possible. Now he is talking “dual sovereignty.” I’ll be glad to hear what he means by this—certainly dual citizenship is not only possible but desirable. But I don’t know of any places that enjoy peace and stability without clarity about sovereignty.
Kosovo’s citizens have every right to be frustrated that their sovereignty and independence has not been recognized at the United Nations or by Belgrade. But the best revenge is simply this: govern well, improve the lot of all of Kosovo’s citizens, and enjoy freedom each and every day in 2012.
Ten days later, I don’t have much to add, but my message would be the same to Belgrade and Sarajevo: govern well, improve the lot of your citizens and enjoy freedom each and every day in 2012. The Bosnians have apparently reached agreement in principle on forming their government. So far as I know, everything else is more or less where it was before Christmas. Things move slowly in the Balkans, except when they move fast.
Slow is probably safer right now, but I do hope Serbia will make a decisive turn in 2012 in favor of a European future. Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić gives me some hope this morning with this from B92:
We are going to the EU because of Serbia and only if it is in our interest. Serbia will not be destroyed if it loses Kosovo. That happened in the Serbian history before, that fanaticism about being in love with Europe or masochism that we cannot live without Kosovo or the Republic of Srpska.
Then he dashes my optimism with talk about “demarcation.” Hard to know what that means, but it presumably refers to his partition ambitions. Giving up on partition, both of Kosovo and Bosnia, is absolutely essential if Serbia and the rest of the Balkans is going to thrive.
I’ll be in Belgrade in mid-January and hope to get a feel for how likely that is. Stay tuned to peacefare.net for reports on what I find.
With very best wishes for the New Year to friends of all flavors in the Balkans,
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Ten places ICG neglects
I don’t entirely agree with ICG’s “Next Year’s Wars,” their choice of conflicts is idiosyncratic, and they don’t really predict anything, but it is hard to compete with an organization that has smart people on the ground in difficult places. I’ll focus on 10 places they don’t mention:
1. Russia: Putin doesn’t make it over 50% in the March 4 election but wins the second round. Demonstrations continue but he resists new parliamentary polls. Weakened, Putin lashes out at his opposition and makes things worse. Who knows where this ends, but it will probably not be in 2012.
2. Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Nayef succeeds to the throne and tries to roll back King Abdullah’s modest reforms. Demonstrations break out but are brutally repressed. Oil prices, already high due to Iran’s threats to the strait of Hormuz, skyrocket.
3. Iraq: The Sadr bloc’s call for new elections in Iraq is echoed by the Kurds and eventually Iraqiyya. Maliki tries to avoid it, but he eventually falls to a vote of no confidence in parliament and elections are held towards the end of the year. I’m not going to predict the outcome.
4. Egypt: The constitutional process is difficult and delayed, but presidential elections are held in the fall (postponed from June). Secularist candidates split their constituency, the Muslim Brotherhood blows its lead by pressing social conservatism and Abdel Fotouh, a relatively moderate Islamist, wins.
5. Libya: Continues to implement its established roadmap, elects the “National Public Conference,” prepares a constitution and succeeds in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating most militias.
6. Bahrain: The Americans continue to support the regime. Iran, stung by tightened sanctions, sponsors demonstrations against the Fifth Fleet.
7. Sudan: War, between north and south. South wins, takes back Abyei and part of South Kordofan. President Bashir is shipped off to The Hague by his generals.
8. Zimbabwe: Mugabe dies, his loyalists hang on but can’t manage the economic collapse. The opposition takes over.
9. Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
10. United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
And for extra measure:
11. China: Big real estate crash late in the year cripples Chinese banks and causes bigger problems for the world economy than the euro, which muddles through.
12. Israel/Palestine: Big but largely nonviolent demonstrations on the West Bank. Israelis say “genug ist genug” and unilaterally withdraw from Palestinian population centers.
That should give me something to write about a year from now! None of it should be mistaken for advocacy, and a good bit of it is based on feel rather than analysis.
I reviewed last year’s predictions yesterday.
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Macedonia and Greece, again
Longstanding friend and now deputy prime minister for european integration of Macedonia Teuta Arifi stopped by SAIS this morning for a chat. That naturally set me thinking about Skopje’s problems again. It is hard to find anyone in Washington who remembers, but Macedonia was for years a source of considerable anxiety here, because of its potential to create the conditions for a generalized war in the Balkans, including between NATO members Greece and Turkey. This was why the United States, in an inspired moment of coercive diplomacy, issued in December 1992 the “Christmas warning” to Slobodan Milosevic to lay off Macedonia. The UN deployed its one and only explicitly “preventive” peacekeeping mission, UNPREDEP, there in 1995.
Considering its potential for precipitating difficulty, Macedonia has been remarkably successful in extracting itself from dicey situations. As the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved, it became independent in September 1991 without war, a fate Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia did not escape. It weathered Milosevic’s expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, it suffered a near breakdown into civil war as Albanian insurgents presented a military challenge. That ended with the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation has gone a long way to consolidating the Macedonian state and ensuring equality among its citizens.
One problem has proven insoluble: Greece objects to Macedonia calling itself Macedonia. Many years of UN mediation have failed to resolve the problem, though some claim the differences have narrowed. Macedonia is called The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM) in the UN General Assembly. In 1995, Greece and The FYROM signed an interim agreement allowing that name to be used for membership in other international organizations. Earlier this month, the International Court of Justice found Greece in violation of the accord, in particular when it blocked The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.
That should have settled the matter, but it has not, yet. Greece hasn’t budged. Its former ambassador in Washington has suggested publicly that Athens should renounce the interim accord rather than fulfill its provisions. Skopje says it is offering to meet any time, any where to discuss the name issue.
I am biased on this question. I believe countries and people have a right to call themselves what they want. The notion that Macedonia’s preference for that name implies territorial designs on Greece is risible. It does however reflect a claim to cultural and historical affinity with Alexander the Great, a monumental statue of whom may or may not now grace Skopje, even if ethnic Macedonians are mainly of Slavic descent. The Slavs were late comers to the Balkans, entering about a millenium after Alexander.
Why would an American, other than one of Greek, Macedonian or Albanian heritage, care about all this? The main reason is that Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s entry into NATO is holding up the expansion of euroatlantic institutions. With the important exception of Croatia’s accession to the EU now scheduled for July 1, 2013, NATO and EU expansion are stalled. Keeping that process moving is vital to maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Summit in Chicago next spring, along with Montenegro, would reassure the region and help nudge Serbia in the euroatlantic direction, even if it never decides to join NATO.
So what should Greece do? Be gracious. You lost in court. You’ve got far bigger problems with the euro and your economy. Unload this one. Go back to the negotiating table and hammer out a solution. Or step aside and allow The FYROM (and Montenegro) to enter NATO in Chicago. The technocratic government in Athens may not have the political mandate to do this, but neither does it run the sorts of risks that a more political government would face.
I’ll be surprised, but delighted, if my advice is taken.
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Let’s not lose Iraq now
No, Iraq has not been “worth it.” Even a majority of its veterans don’t believe that. President Bush launched the war believing that there were weapons of mass destruction. That in any event was the only argument that really held water. Neither Saddam Hussein’s marginal role in supporting international terrorism nor his gross mistreatment of the Iraqi people would have garnered the broad support that the Bush Administration managed to assemble for the invasion.
The Iraqi toll is huge: more than 100,000 killed seems to be the consensus. The American toll, though much smaller, is deeply felt: almost 4500 killed and more than 33,000 wounded, not counting civilians. In a decade of financial collapse the economic costs, projected to reach trillions, cannot be ignored.
That said, the right thing to do now is to make the best of a bad thing. The Bush Administration put in place both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that expires at the end of this month and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which will now govern the Iraq/U.S. relationship, including the substantial office of security cooperation that will provide training to the Iraqi army and police. While Republicans are complaining that President Obama did not do whatever was necessary to extend the SOFA and enable a small (10,000?) U.S. contingent to remain in Iraq, they certainly would not be patting him on the back if he had caved to Iraqi demands that American forces give up de facto immunity from prosecution, which is what the current SOFA provides. Both Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki decided it was politically more palatable to allow the SOFA to expire and use the SFA for the future defense relationship.
The SFA is more than adequate for that and broader purposes, if it is implemented energetically. It covers not only defense and security but economy and energy, education and culture, health and environment, information and communications technology, and law enforcement and judicial cooperation. I keep hearing of meetings happening and efforts being made, but so far as I can tell no one has prepared a comprehensive review of what has been accomplished and what is planned under the SFA. That makes me suspicious that it is little more than whatever the stovepiped agencies of the U.S. government happen to want to do in Iraq, rather than the strategic effort its label suggests.
What would be strategic in Iraq today? First and foremost in my view is pipelines. Yes, pipelines. Most Iraqi oil, especially of the cheaply produced kind, is in the south, and for decades Iraq has exported it via the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz, where it runs a gauntlet of Iranian guns. Iraqi exports are now reaching the limit of the existing export capacity and there are plans to expand it. More leverage to Iran.
Far better, or more likely in addition, Iraq should be expanding export capacity to the north. This requires repair of its aptly named “strategic” pipeline, a two-direction pipeline that links oil facilities in the south to those farther north. It would also require construction of a major new pipeline to get oil to Turkey, where it can be sold into European markets more economically than through the Gulf route. Tying Iraq to European oil and eventually gas markets would do more to ensure Baghdad’s future political and diplomatic orientation than dozens of persuasive diplomats. Maybe more than 10,000 American troops would have done.
The SFA also invites the United States to “work with and through the democratically elected government of Iraq” to strengthen democratic institutions. This is important, as it opens the door to assistance to the court system, the parliament, provincial and local governments that are vital counterweights executive power. The SFA also welcomes American diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq’s international and particularly regional role. This is something the Iraqis highly value–they haven’t got a lot of other pals to lend a helping hand–and it would help to preserve American influence in Baghdad.
I won’t attempt a comprehensive review of the SFA here, though it is something I hope someone will undertake, but maybe there is room for one more item: educational and cultural cooperation. Getting more Iraqis to the U.S., especially for educational purposes, would help enormously in the long term to ensure a more modern and Western oriented Iraq. Our current visa regime needs some loosening to allow it to happen. But just as important is getting Americans to Iraq without wearing BDUs (Battle Dress Uniforms). Most Iraqis have had contact with few American civilians–it is high time they saw more of America than military might. Apart from the very real security issues, the Iraqi visa regime, at least in Washington DC, is prohibitive–I know the ambassador and haven’t been able to get a visa for more than a year (most of my dozen or so trips into Iraq have been on Pentagon ID, but that presumably will no longer work after the end of this year).
You don’t have to be a Bush voter to recognize that Iraq is an important country in the Middle East: its geographic position, its long border with Iran, and its vast oil resources (on the order of those in Saudi Arabia) give it real weight in how the region will evolve. It is disturbing that the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations hasn’t held a hearing on it (except for confirmation of new ambassadors) in three years.
The Americans need to do something now that doesn’t come naturally: pursue a mutually respectful relationship with Iraq through civilian means even as its troops complete their withdrawal. Nothing about the giant and expensive embassy convinces me that we are doing it effectively and efficiently. Give me a comprehensive report on the implementation of the SFA–I’m wonk enough to look forward to reading it.
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What does Kosovo’s president represent?
Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga’s speech today at SAIS was what I had hoped. She was forward-looking, even while reviewing the sad history of oppression from 1989 until the NATO intervention in 1999. She was clear about Kosovo’s status as a sovereign and independent state, even if it has not achieved universal recognition and membership in international organizations. She was hopeful about Kosovo’s European aspirations, while recognizing the many challenges that have to be faced, including normalization of relations with Serbia through the EU-sponsored dialogue. She was forceful about Kosovo’s territorial integrity, while emphasizing the rights of the Serbian community under the Ahtisaari plan. She underlined the importance of reintegration of the northern muncipalities, but called for an economic development plan encompassing south Mitrovica as well.
Plucked from a successful career in the Kosovo police, President Jahjaga is quickly establishing herself as a symbol of Kosovo’s youthful aspirations. She is trying hard to represent all of Kosovo’s ethnic communities, not just the majority Albanians, and to stay above the political fray. She embodies commitment to rule of law–her entire career prior to becoming president was spent in law school and the much-respected police service. And though she did not mention it today, she symbolizes the aspirations of Kosovo’s women for a stronger role in a society in which male politicians dominate.
What more could I have asked for? In response to my opening question about pursuing criminals responsible for crime against Serbs south of the Ibar, she emphasized mainly Pristina’s inability to get the full benefit of cooperation with international police organizations, of which Kosovo is not yet a member. I might have liked to hear something more about encouraging all citizens to protect their neighbors and support the authorities in maintaining law and order.
She was clear about protection of minority communities, but a colleague noted that he would have liked to hear more about how all the ethnic groups of Kosovo share a common history and culture. The beautiful Serb monasteries of Kosovo should be a source of pride to Albanians as well as to Serbs. The maintenance of separate, and conflicting, historical narratives is a serious obstacle to reconciliation in Kosovo, as it is elsewhere in the Balkans.
Asked whether she would come to Belgrade to meet President Tadic, she responded she would go anywhere to meet anyone so long as it was clearly understood that she is the president of a sovereign and independent state. That is not likely to happen soon, since Serbia will have elections next spring. But the time will come. If Jahjaga is still president when it does, Kosovo will be well represented.
A few minutes in the “green” room before the talk with President Atifete Jahjaga and Minister for European Integration Vlora Çitaku (that’s Ambassador Avni Spahiu hiding behind me):
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