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Not too much to ask

In today’s hierarchy of international challenges, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks low.  It is an out of the way place, off the main axes of current concerns:  terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, oil, shifting sands in the Middle East, economic crisis.  It had more than its 15 minutes of fame in the 1990s, when war in Bosnia attracted worldwide attention, NATO intervened and the international community at Dayton imposed and sustained a settlement that has more or less lasted until now.  Isn’t that enough?

Vlado Azinović, Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber argue forcefully in a report published this week by the Atlantic Initiative and the Democracy Policy Council that it is not.  They see real risks of renewed instability and spell them out in striking detail:  dismantling the Office of the High Representative and the extraordinary powers he once wielded, inflammatory rhetoric, capacity of the Bosnian state institutions (including the police and judiciary), the impact of the global economic crisis on the country’s weak economy, the Bosnian armed forces and the extraordinary dispersal in the country of weapons, football hooligans, minority returnees and Islamic radicals.  If war ever does break out again in Bosnia, no one is going to be able to claim there was no warning.

They also outline what they view as a necessary policy shift in the international community approach to Bosnia:

At the policy level, this shift would mean accepting, at least implicitly, that the path pursued since 2005 has failed and must be redesigned, starting from the identification of the strategic goal. That goal must be that BiH function well enough to meet the requirements to join the EU and NATO. Until that goal of durable functionality is reached by popular consent and demonstrated, it should be clear to all in BiH that the Dayton rules will continue to prevail and be enforced. That the country will not be allowed to fall apart, and that efforts in that direction will bring appropriately strong responses, needs to not only be articulated forcefully and clearly, but be believed.

What will that take?

– Additional troops from EU and non-EU members. EU/NATO member PIC SB countries not presently participating in EUFOR should make significant contributions.
– Sufficient helicopter lift for a quick reaction force based at Butmir of at least platoon, preferably company strength.
– Forward deployment in company strength to obvious potential flashpoints: Brčko and Mostar.
– Regular patrols between Tuzla airfield and Brčko, also to areas of minority return.
– De-emphasis of EUFOR activities not directly linked to the Chapter 7/Annex 1A SASE mandate.

Restoration of credible deterrence would not only prevent a return to violent conflict, but would create the potential for forward movement on the political and social fronts by stripping the entrenched political elites of their current ability to leverage fear. This would create space for citizens and potential leaders who want to find a way to make the country function consensually. Restored, credible deterrence is the sine qua non of any political and social progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This all makes a good deal of sense.  We are not talking giant resources here but a relatively modest increase in European commitments, including from non-members of the EU.

But the forces pushing against it are heavy.  The United States is understandably frustrated with years of trying to convince the Bosnians to fix the Dayton constitution and anxious to confront more substantial risks to American national security.  Distracted by the eurozone crisis, Brussels is happy to delegate Bosnia to its bureaucracy and entangle Sarajevo in the details of getting ready to make itself a candidate for EU membership. The longer that takes, the better from the perspective of those EU members hesitant about enlargement.

So we can’t expect much.  I’m hoping that at least EUFOR will strengthen its forces in the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, which would be a primary objective of opposing Muslim and Serb forces if there is ever a return to conflict.  The more important adjustment is less tangible but not less meaningful:  making all concerned understand that Bosnia will remain a single country and enter both NATO and the EU as such, or not at all.

This should not be beyond Brussels’ capacity to communicate, even with its current distractions.  And Washington will back it up.  It is not too much to ask.

Good facts, lousy policy

It wasn’t easy, but I managed to plow, or at least skim, my way through the 37 pages of ICG’s report on the 49% of Bosnia that constitutes Republika Srpska (RS), since I know you are all waiting for my verdict.

It’s mixed.  The report seems to me clear and compelling in portraying the profound corruption and extreme nationalism that dominate the RS as well the difficulties in the relationship between the RS and the governments in Sarajevo (both Federation and “state,” as Bosnians call what Americans would term the Federal government).  There are few better sources than this report, if any, for a comprehensive account of how RS has sought to weaken the state government and establish its own control over as many state functions as possible.  And the section towards the end on “The War: Facts” is a useful compilation.

But when it comes to policy, the report treats the RS as if neither corruption nor extreme nationalism is really a serious problem.  RS President Dodik’s efforts to block transfer of competences to the state are treated as mistakes from which it might be convinced to back off, not as a concerted effort to wreck any real prospect for a functional state government.  Dodik’s push for referendums on issues that clearly are intended to weaken the state are viewed as quixotic and erratic, when they are all too clearly purposeful and consistent.  Even the hope for independence is described as “vague”, when it in fact is clear and explicit.

Here’s a sample of ICG perceiving ambiguity:

The government in Banja Luka plays a strange game when it comes to independence – shifting from advocating a referendum on independence to reforms to return Bosnia to its
Dayton roots. While Dodik constantly publicly threatens secession,and the RS leadership continues to harden its positions, Dodik’s aides explain that his statements are meant for internal RS consumption and complain that Federation officials and internationals take them seriously. Yet,even far from the public and in bilateral meetings, Dodik and his closest advisers say they do not believe Bosnia has a future.

I am at a complete loss how anyone can think this “strange game” is anything but the usual one in which internationals are led around by aides who have placed a figurative ring in their nostrils. Dodik has publicly and repeatedly told his electorate that he intends to deliver them to freedom from Sarajevo. There is no ambiguity. The only thing that prevents him from doing this is the international community.

ICG can’t admit this because it has committed itself to dismantling the main international community barrier to Dodik’s secessionist ambition: the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  Instead, ICG thinks the EU will solve all.  Somehow this view creeps into the Executive Summary, though I looked in vain for any detailed discussion of the issues involved in the main text of the report:

The EU’s response, aided by the U.S. and others, to the political and legal challenge the RS posed in June offers a non-coercive alternative from which it will be difficult for any party to walk away.

This is almost comic: I can’t remember the last time I heard American diplomats angrier at their European colleagues than over Catherine Ashton’s ill-conceived and poorly executed maneuver to create this “non-coercive alternative,” a maneuver in which she managed not only to side-line the OHR but blind-side the Sarajevo government and provide a gigantic boost to Dodik’s claims of RS sovereignty. The only good thing about it was that it ended Dodik’s hope of an early dissolution of the OHR, because it  stiffened American spines and gave even Europeans second thoughts.

I won’t grace the recommendations with a detailed critique, though it is notable that they lack any for Belgrade even though the report itself highlights its role in supporting Dodik’s last electoral campaign. The recommendations that do exist amount to asking everyone in the RS  to do good things without providing any real reason why they should do so other than the goodness of their hearts. I think we all know how that will work out. But there is one recommendation that is downright pernicious:

Declare that neither partition nor greater centralisation is compatible with Bosnia’s early progress toward EU membership.

This is neither true nor wise. The Bosnian state is clearly incapable of EU membership without greater centralization, which is unquestionably compatible with early progress in that direction. Centralization of some functions is not the same as eliminating the RS, a canard that ICG should be savvy enough not to believe.  I am a strong proponent of decentralization and subsidiarity for those issues that can be handled at an entity or municipal level, but EU membership will require more functionality in Sarajevo than currently exists there. ICG’s effort at balance, falsely equating centralization with partition as two polar evils, has led it to err more than its fine leadership should allow.