Tag: European Union
Post-Qaddafi Libya
I’m traveling tonight, so I’m putting up tomorrow’s blog post today:
Politicians don’t like to answer hypothetical questions, but analysts do. When Paul Stares, who leads CFR’s conflict prevention efforts, asked me a month or so ago to write about post-Qaddafi Libya, I jumped at the opportunity. I’ve been thinking about Libya since the uprising there started six months ago, discussed it in my post-war reconstruction class here at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, and published a few pieces about it on www.peacefare.net.
To my great regret I’ve never been to Libya, but I did work on it at the State Department once upon a time (around 1994), trying to figure out whether we could convince our allies to tap a small portion of frozen Libyan oil assets to compensate families of Pan Am 103 victims. It was a flaky idea the Brits told me. They had what I regarded as an even flakier one: a trial for the perpetrators in a Scottish court convened in The Hague. Go figure.
That was Libya before Qaddafi decided to give up his nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs. But in one profound sense nothing changed. Qaddafi gave up his WMD because he feared the Americans would do to Libya what they had done to Iraq. He was still in power and wanted to stay there.
The rebellion in Libya is determined to deny him that privilege. I don’t know whether they are going to succeed. I could certainly write another paper treating a scenario in which he stays in place in Tripoli and central Libya, having lost control of Benghazi and the east (Cyrenaica) as well as parts of the west. But this one focuses on a scenario in which he and the regime collapse. I’ve tried to imagine the most urgent problems arising in the days after Qaddafi’s fall, outline options for dealing with them, and recommend appropriate policies.
The result is Contingency Planning Memorandum 12, the first CFR has done on what most people would define as a post-conflict situation, albeit one that has not yet come into existence. I prefer to refer to “societies emerging from conflict,” since conflict doesn’t end, even if you are relatively successful and violence does. That’s just the point with Libya: there are many ways in which post-Qaddafi Libya could be conflictual and even violent, unless we prepare carefully and take the necessary preventive measures.
I am convinced that American interests do not justify a major U.S. role in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall, just as they do not require a continued leading role in the military action the UN Security Council authorized. The Europeans stand to lose oil and gas supplies as well as investments in a chaotic Libya, not to mention the possibility of Libyan migrants reaching Italy, France and Spain in numbers that would cause serious political tension. The Europeans should lead, preferably with a UN Security Council mandate and lots of Arab and African support. We should be prepared to fill in, and step in with NATO intervention if the Europeans fail.
It will be interesting to see how much of what I’ve written holds up in the weeks after Qaddafi loses power. Analysts like hypotheticals more than they like reality, unless they get lucky and hit the mark. We’ll see, soon enough I hope.
PS: “Q”addafi is CFR’s (and the NY Times’) preferred spelling. “G”addafi is what I’ve been using, I don’t remember why. I guess I’m inclined to switch to the usage of my betters. Anyone want to tell me which one is closer to being correct?
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Anyone still think it was the downgrade?
Yesterday’s sharp bump upwards on the stock market following the Fed’s announcement that it would keep interest rates low for two years demonstrates all too clearly that the sharp falls the previous two days were not reactions to the S&P downgrade of U.S. government debt. I shouldn’t say it, but I will: I told you so.
The press this morning attributes the Fed action to concern about growth, which is surely in part true. But it also reflects concern about banks and the financial system, which are always close to the Fed’s heart. Low interest rates have helped to save the banks for several years now–their profits are soaring–and will continue to help in the future, as a result of the Fed’s commitment.
Does this change the picture for foreign policy? Is the Federal budget under any less pressure? The short answer is “no.” If Congress sticks with the debt deal, it still has to cut expenditures sharply starting in fiscal year 2013. All the Fed has done is to make monetary policy carry the burden of adjustment until then.
The longer answer is a bit more nuanced. Certainly U.S. government borrowing costs for the next two years will continue to be unusually low, unless the markets really do lose confidence in the dollar or inflation rears its you know what. Low interest rates will ease the government’s fiscal situation. I confess to relief about this, but it does not reduce the need for triage on foreign policy.
Nina Hachigian, who was overly optimistic about the American role in the world a few years ago, is overly pessimistic now. America is no less indispensable today that it was last week, but it is likely to be less available in the future. People who have grown to rely on the United States to help them out of the deep holes they dig for themselves–from the Balkans to Israel/Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan–are going to find us preoccupied elsewhere, with our own top national security risks.
This is not a bad thing–most of them will discover their own capacities to manage are greater than they had imagined. And it is high time some of America’s burdens shifted to Europe and the Arab League, even if the former has financial problems of its own and the latter lots of money but little experience. Far more often than in the past, the message from America will be handle it on your own, or figure out a cheap way to get it done.
What we need to be careful about is cheap shortcuts that end up of creating expensive longterm problems. In the Balkans, that expensive delusion comes from those who advocate rearranging borders to accommodate ethnic differences, a sure formula for instability if not war. In the Middle East, it comes from those who resist defining clearly the borders of the Palestinian state or want to turn a blind eye to the Arab spring, ignoring Egypt and Tunisia because the revolutions there have been “successful.” Backing a revolution doesn’t necessarily mean paying for it or bombing a regime into submission, as Robert Ford (our man in Damascus) has demonstrated with his deft visits to protesters in Hama.
Diplomacy is not inherently expensive. Military action is. In tight financial times, we’ll do better with a foreign policy that relies less on deployed forces and more on alert diplomats.
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Forget the downgrade
Forget the downgrade. It really is a non-event given the decline in U.S. government bond rates. If the world is still willing to buy USG paper, why should anyone worry about how S&P rates it? Though I hasten to add that I think S&P had a point: the Tea Party has demonstrated it will stop at nothing, including default, to try to ensure that President Obama is not reelected.
The downgrade did not cause the fall in stock markets. It is the shrinking prospects for growth that did that. The debt deal is clearly deflationary. It will reduce aggregate demand by reducing government expenditures. Reduced demand means less growth.
Among the more interesting but little noted things that happened yesterday was the European Central Bank purchase of Italian government bonds. This kind of central bank support for government finance is verboten in Europe. The Fed calls it quantitative easing, and it is precisely what the Germans think should not happen in monetary policy. They’ve got to be pretty desperate to go along with it.
Some of you will know that I spent 10 years in Italy, whose government paper is now declining sharply in value. That’s a problem because a lot of it is held by European (and American) banks. The big worry is that depositors will think the banks shaky and decide to withdraw their funds. A “run” on the banks–in Italy or elsewhere–could be catastrophic. As in: need a lot of government funds, potentially dwarfing the U.S. bank bailout.
So what does all this have to do with peace and war issues? Tight budgets and potentially large bailout costs make it hard for many governments to think about, much less execute, operations abroad. We are broke. The Europeans are broke. Some will welcome a major retrenchment; others will think it a really bad idea to pull troops from commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. But the pressures for retrenchment are going to be enormous.
The right approach is to see this as an opportunity to define our priorities more clearly. Triage is necessary: which commitments really do serve our national security interests? which don’t? are there alternative (and cheaper) ways to meet our goals? are there others who should pitch in more?
The United States has traditionally depended on its military to execute much of its foreign policy. Military spending has doubled since 9/11, not counting the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Are we using an effective but expensive military instrument in the best ways we can? is it the appropriate instrument for the purposes for which it is being used? are there alternatives?
The questions are obvious. The answers are not. I’ll be trying to offer some answers over the next few months, as this is precisely what the book I am writing is about. So stay tuned: we are going to explore American foreign policy in a century that is still young but is already challenging us think hard about national priorities and the instruments of foreign policy.
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Is Macedonia better off with Ohrid?
I am hoping to be in Ohrid Saturday. Here is an interview I did with Slobodanka Jovanovska of Utrinski Vesnik, a Macedonian daily. They planned to publish it today:
1. You will take part in conference about the ten anniversary of Ohrid Agreement. What will be your message there?
A. The Ohrid Agreement saved and consolidated the Macedonian state. That in my way of thinking is an excellent achievement. I find it hard to imagine that there are many people in Macedonia—Macedonians, Albanians or others—who think they would be better off today without the Ohrid agreement.
2. Macedonia celebrates the Ohrid Agreement, EU countries and US call it major achievement. If it is so good, why no one of the neighboring countries is not using this experience and, even implement the opposite policy? Greece is not recognizing minorities, Bulgaria didn’t allow questions about ethnic origin in the last census, Albania the same…
A. Each country has its own circumstances and will implement policies it thinks appropriate. I think it is a mistake to deny people the opportunity to define their own ethnic origin in a census, but I have to admit that the issue is a sensitive one also in the United States. We have moved in the direction of allowing more choices, but that is because we have confidence that the vast majority of citizens of all ethnic groups consider themselves first and foremost Americans. Maybe unwillingness to allow more choices reflects fear that some citizens will choose other identities as primary. Greece in particular seems to suffer from this fear.
3. There is a resolution in the US Congress calling for decrease of US aid to Macedonia, for conditioning it with the name dispute and referring to the country as FYROM instead of Republic of Macedonia. In Macedonia it was understood as a sign that Barack Obama’s administration is changing sides and inclining more to the Greek positions about the name dispute?
A. It is important to remember that the United States has separation of powers: the Administration is distinct from the legislative branch, where there has long been sympathy with the Greek perspective on the name dispute. It is also true that both President Obama and Vice President Biden have previously indicated sympathy with the Greek perspective when they were in Congress. The Administration clearly wants to see a compromise, and in the last year or two has come to the conclusion that Skopje is more an obstacle to compromise than Athens.
That said, the United States still recognizes Macedonia as Macedonia. I trust Skopje’s diplomats are doing everything they can to keep it that way.
4. How you you see Macedonia-American relations now? Good, excellent, downgraded…
A. So far as I know, relations are good, but I have to admit that few in Washington see Macedonia’s problems as among America’s top priorities.
5. From this time distance, do you think that the veto for Macedonia’s membership in NATO, initiated by Greece and supported by other countries, provoked some steps forward in the country?
A. I really don’t know, but I’d like to see Macedonia in NATO, where it belongs. If it remains willing to enter as FYROM, I think Greece should allow it to happen.
6. How do you comment the controversial project Skopje 2014?
A. I don’t. But I would note that Washington DC was designed in the late 18th century as the “new Rome.” Dreams of grandeur are not limited to Skopje. I just hope you have the money to pay the bills for it.
7. The leader of the Albanian coalition party DUI, Ali Ahmeti, last week said that he will not be able to guarantee the peace in Macedonia if Kosovo is destabilized and divided? Do you agree that the crisis in Kosovo inevitably will provoke crisis in Macedonia and what should be the role of Albanian leaders here?
A. Proposals to divide Kosovo cause strains not only in Macedonia but also in Serbia and Bosnia as well. The proper role of Albanian leaders in Macedonia will be to try to ensure that pan-Albanian political forces do not take advantage of the situation, but that will not be easy. One thing is clear though: the Albanians in Macedonia have a far stronger role in Skopje, partly due to the Ohrid agreement, than they would have in any Greater Albania.
8. This fall the International Court of Justice in Hague will decide about the case of Macedonia against Greece, about the veto in NATO. What you think could be decision and whether it will change something?
A. I really don’t know what the legal decision will be, but I think it is wrong for Greece to veto Macedonian (in fact FYROM) membership in NATO.
9. For the first time in the last US report for human rights there was a part about political prisoners in Macedonia. Independent media almost disappeared in the country, and instead of creating transparent and free society, the Government is hunting people, “collaborators to the secret services.” Why there is such a silence about this political climate in Macedonia in US and also in EU?
A. There are a lot of other problems in the world that affect the EU and US directly: Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, just to name a few. I think Brussels and Washington expect Macedonia to care for itself these days and not to rely too much on EU and US intervention.
10. Was the decision to give up the prosecution of war crimes in Macedonia during 2001 the right one? Is it possible to give amnesty for war crimes?
A. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that there is no amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But in many countries prosecutors have discretion. If Skopje has decided to exercise that discretion, I would want to think twice before suggesting it was a mistake.
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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Roadblocks with more than one significance
Herewith an interview I did for Bekim Greicevci of Kosovo’s Daily Express on the situation in northern Kosovo (you can play the Kosovo band Gillespie, subject of a nice piece on PRI’s The World yesterday here in DC, while reading):
Gillespie – E Di (Official Video)
Gillespie | Myspace Music Videos
- Kosovo Government took a decision to establish control over border crossings along Kosovo’s northern border with Serbia. What is your opinion on Government’s decision?
There is no question in my mind about the right of a sovereign state to control its own borders, but Belgrade has not recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty. That is the underlying problem that needs to be resolved. It will not be solved quickly or easily. Nor will it be solved by unilateral actions or the use of force. Belgrade’s acceptance of Kosovo’s customs documents would be a good first step in the right direction and ameliorate the situation in the north.
- EULEX refused to help Kosovo authorities to establish the control at Northern border crossings. Kosovars are very unhappy with the EU Mission. What is your comment on EULEX and its position about the North?
EULEX reflects division within the EU, in particular between the five non-recognizing states and the 22 recognizing states. As control of the border is a sovereign function, it should surprise no one that the five non-recognizing states do not want to be responsible for establishing sovereign controls there.
- Belgrade and some EU officials have called for the situation in the North to return to what it was before July 25. Kosovo Government says there is no turning back. In your view, how can this be resolved?
While I understand those who may not want to help Kosovo establish sovereign controls on the northern border, I find it hard to understand those who want a return to the previous situation. Belgrade cannot claim that UN Security Council resolution 1244 gave either Serbian officials or local hoodlums the right to control what it regards as the boundary between Kosovo and Serbia proper. That responsibility clearly should lie with the Kosovo institutions. The status quo ante should not be restored.
- Taking into account the statements by Serb high officials during past months advocating the change of borders do you think that Serbia’s final goal is partition of the North from Kosovo?
I think there is no question but that Belgrade’s goal is partition. It has been for a long time. Partition is a grave danger to peace and security throughout the Balkans, as it may precipitate problems in Macedonia, Bosnia, southern Serbia and Sandjak. Belgrade needs to get back to the Ahtisaari plan, read it carefully and specify precisely what more it wants than what is already provided there for the north.
- How do you see the role of the international community, namely the United States and the European Union regarding latest developments in Kosovo?
Washington and Brussels would like to see this problem resolved quickly and peacefully, with no partition. It is not clear whether those goals are all compatible. They are going to need to work hard to convince Pristina not to make unilateral moves and Belgrade to give up on partition.
- The international community is calling for discussions in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia facilitated by the EU. After the events in North, what chances does this dialogue have? The Serb chief negotiator Borislav Stefanovic is everyday calling local Serbs not to remove the roadblocks in the North.
You make peace with your enemies, not with your friends. Borko Stefanovic is not being helpful, but you still have to talk with him. I imagine he has some complaints about things that are said in Pristina, too. The EU-facilitated dialogue is the only show in town—it is important to try to make it a success. The Americans will look for a peaceful and mutually acceptable outcome and back it fully.
The Europeans have the ultimate leverage: control over Belgrade’s EU candidacy and the date for starting negotiations. Stefanovic, or one of his bosses, needs to worry that those northern Kosovo roadblocks might become obstacles on Serbia’s path to EU membership.
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