Tag: European Union
Saleh won’t go
President Saleh of Yemen today again refused to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement that would have him step down in 30 days. This time he is insisting on a public signing, while flooding the streets with loyalists who have trapped the American and EU ambassadors along with others in the United Arab Emirates embassy in Sanaa.
It is anyone’s guess how today will wind up. Brian Whitaker, who certainly knows Yemen better than I do, sees little possibility of the president wriggling out, mainly because the Saudis won’t let him. But I think it is a pretty good bet that we are more than 30 days from Saleh stepping down.
If he is smart–and generally he is at least wily–his security forces are likely to “rescue” the American and other ambassadors, after letting them stew a while. Even if he ends up having to sign the agreement, implementation is going to be difficult. He has slipped the leash before and will certainly try to do it again. Only when he sees the real possibility of needing the immunity provided for in the agreement will he go.
In the meanwhile, there are tensions between the opposition political parties and the protesters who have sustained the effort to oust Saleh. They have never really been united. It is the opposition parties, not the protesters, who have signed the agreement. They will need to retain the capability of putting large numbers of people in the streets if they want the transition to be a real one and not just a reshuffling of the Yemeni elite.
That is certainly what the Saudis have in mind, though that may give them more credit for a coherent view than Ginny Hill of Chatham House did in an appearance last week at the Middle East Institute. The aging and health problems of the Crown Prince seem to have cut off payments to the Yemeni tribes and reduced Saudi Arabia’s ability to impose a solution in Sanaa. Maybe Saleh’s latest maneuvers will awaken them to the need for decisive action by the GCC. Failing that, Saleh could continue to not go for a while yet.
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The Yugo-second is over
A friend in the Balkans, whose perspective is not far from mine, writes:
Richard Holbrooke often referred to the “Yugo-second,” the amount of time that passed between when a Balkan politician made a promise and broke it.
The EU’s High Representative for foreign policy Lady Katherine Ashton and her Balkan Director Miroslav Lajcak, traveled to Banja Luka last Friday in a poorly planned, poorly conceived and poorly executed trip, where they met with Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik. The official purpose of the trip was to dissuade Dodik from holding a referendum and to have him revoke the 24 problematic RS National Assembly (RSNA) conclusions. Lajcak’s hidden agenda was to demonstrate the EU’s ability to take over from the OHR and prove that Bonn Powers are not necessary.
The EU came away with a “triumph” that represents a contemporary “peace in our time.” Rather than have Dodik travel to Sarajevo and meet Lady Ashton at the EU House, Lady Ashton was forced to travel to Banja Luka and have a photo op in front of a large map of RS that shows Brcko belonging to RS. The meeting also took place with only RS flags present — no Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) state flags. Dodik was accompanied by a large entourage of more than ten people. And after the meeting Dodik emerged triumphant in the RS media, touting victory.
A longtime pro-Serb activist in Washington, Obrad Kesic, hit the nail on the head when he described the outcome of the Ashton/Lajcak visit. “The agreement reached in Banja Luka presents a great achievement for the RS. When I look at that agreement, I see three already recognizable results. Firstly, the High Representative has been completely excluded, not only from the process of negotiation, but from all future actions… Secondly, this is the first time the RS has been given legitimacy by the EU when it comes to one of the more important state issues… Thirdly, this presents affirmation of political and legal status of the RS, not only as a negotiator, but as a partner.”
The EU came away thinking that Dodik had committed to annulling the referendum conclusion by the end of this week. The EU also thought that Dodik would annul the RSNA conclusions shortly thereafter. In exchange the EU had committed to send enlargement commissioner Fuhle to Banja Luka to negotiate with RS over the state courts and prosecutors.
Within only hours of the Dodik/Ashton meeting, RSNA president Radojcic announced that he wouldn’t call a special RSNA session before the end of the month. Dodik hinted then that the RS would only delay the referendum and would wait until Fuhle arrived to see what those discussion produced. Only then would they consider annulling the referendum.
Today Dodik came out and made it official: no annulment of the referendum until they see what gifts Fuhle has to offer.
My own guess is that the RS objective is to begin a conversation with Fuhle that will enable RS to claim that it is applying the acquis communitaire on its own and doesn’t need the dysfunctional Sarajevo government to qualify for EU membership.
What should Brussels do? It should agree to schedule the Fuhle meeting only in Sarajevo with the BiH authorities present and only after annulment of the 24 conclusions and the referendum decision. Odds of that are very long.
PS: Lady Ashton and Hillary Clinton discussed Bosnia today in Washington. According to the State Department,
Mrs. Clinton “…raised concerns regarding the political deadlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina and any efforts that could undermine the Dayton Peace Accords and the stability of the country. We fully support the authority of the Office of the High Representative Inzko in Bosnia and Herzegovina and want to see the people there realize their hopes for necessary reforms, effective government, and a European future.”
Note the emphasis the Americans put on the the High Representative.
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Here are some bright ideas
This is OPI (other people’s ideas) day:
- Reinventing the Palestinian struggle as a nonviolent protest movement has been a good idea for a long time, but the Arab Spring may make it viable as a mass movement. It would put the Israelis in a tough spot: a harsh response would make them look like worse than your garden variety Arab autocrat. Real democracies don’t shoot at nonviolent protesters.
- Rethinking the war in Afghanistan in light of Osama bin Laden’s death was the subject of an excellent piece this morning: no evidence yet of changed attitudes among the insurgents (Biddle), but the personal connection with bin Laden was an important factor in the alliance with the Taliban. And Pakistan might stiffen its attitude toward al Qaeda presence (Khalilzad), if only to prevent further American raids.
- North Africa is Europe’s backyard. The Bertelsmann Foundation has asked eight North Africans for their views of how Europe can help the political transitions there. The resulting report makes interesting reading and reminds us that we need to follow the lead of host country nationals in thinking about how to make the Arab spring last into a more democratic summer and fall.
Still, there is a dearth of good ideas on several subjects: how to manage the U.S./Pakistan relationship in a more productive way (but see Dennis Kux’s blog post yesterday), how to hasten Gaddafi’s exit from Libya and what to do to stop the killing of demonstrators in Yemen and Syria, as well as their mistreatment in Bahrain. Anyone want to offer thoughts?
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Red card
The High Representative for Dayton peace agreement implementation in Bosnia has submitted two reports to the Secretary General, one more a routine update and the other finding that one of the two entities constituting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srspska (RS), is in breach of the Dayton agreements. HiRep Valentin Inzko adds:
The recent decisions taken by the RS authorities represent the most serious violation of the GFAP [General Framework Agreement for Peace] since it was signed more than 15 years ago.
This is the more or less the equivalent of giving Republika Srpska a red card. The problem of course is that RS’s sin is refusing to recognize the authority of the referee, by calling a referendum that will reject his decisions and those of Bosnia’s state court.
This puts Inzko, and the international community, in a difficult spot. What would a soccer ref do if a player refused to leave the field? What if the player suspected the referee did not have sufficient force or sanctions to make it happen? And the player knew half the stadium was full of people ready to back him up, while the other half would not want to fight?
The issue was raised at my discussion this afternoon at the Woodrow Wilson Center with Jim O’Brien and Gerald Knaus, two experienced Bosnia hands for whom I have a great deal of respect. Nida Gelazis was in the chair.
Gerald argued that Inzko is playing into Dodik’s hands by making a big deal about the referendum. We should oppose it in a more low key way, saying that it violates Dayton and would only delay progress on the EU accession project. Inzko should not try to stop it, since he doesn’t have the power, but he should make it clear we will not respect its results.
Jim O’Brien wisely suggested that we make clear to Belgrade that its path to the EU will be encumbered if Dodik crosses whatever the international community decides is its red line. He also suggested we should focus on the consequences of Dodik’s move, which will hurt prospects for trade and investment. We should continue to build consensus on technical issues to recreate the positive dynamic evident in the case of visa liberalization policy.
I imagine that the internationals will find a way to muddle through this one, yielding a bit more ground to RS while trying to reassure the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims to the American press) that it really doesn’t make much difference. That is basically what we’ve been doing for years–accommodating Serb and Croat nationalists while soothing those among more Dayton-friendly forces who might want to stand up and object. In my view, this is taking us down a path to state dissolution, which is the RS’s stated objective.
The real problem will come the day the Bosniaks decide to engage rather than yield. I have no idea when that will be.
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Bosnia: fix thyself
Sead Numanovic of Dnevni Avaz, a Bosnian daily, has suggested I address the question I asked Friday about the Arab protests–how long can this go on?–about Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “it” I take to be President Milorad Dodik’s threats to take Republika Srpska (RS) in the direction of independence, whether by referendum or other efforts to assert that the Bosnian state and the international community have no say in how the RS is governed, denying in particular that jurisdiction of the Bosnia and Herzegovina judicial system extends to RS.
This has already gone on for a long time. Dodik has been unequivocal in his assertions of RS’s defiance of the High Representative–the international community’s designated guarantor of Dayton agreement implementation–for a couple of years now. He has made it absolutely clear that he rejects any constraints imposed by the High Rep or by the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus asserting de facto independence of an entity that in the international community view gave up any chance of independence at Dayton, in return for international community acknowledgement of its existence and authority within the limits imposed by the Dayton constitution.
But the international community has foolishly disarmed itself and no longer possesses the tools required to enforce its decisions on the RS. It has become a paper tiger, and Dodik is calling its bluff.
So what are the remaining limits on Dodik’s push for RS independence? There are three: the presumably limited patience of the majority of Bosnians, the financial resources at the RS’s disposal, and the unwillingness of other states to recognize an independent RS.
I am no expert on either of the first two limits, but people who are tell me that the crunch is coming.
Republika Srpska got 49 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory at Dayton. This was a dramatic increase from the territory it actually controlled at the end of the war, which was down to 34 per cent and shrinking rapidly as Croat and Bosniak (aka Federation) forces advanced towards Banja Luka. The Federation forces gave up 15 per cent of the territory to RS at Dayton, in exchange for RS’s incorporation in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If RS is now trying to leave that state–whether de facto or de jure–I would expect a substantial number of people, especially in the Federation, to oppose its effort. It is clear enough to me that a majority of Bosnians want to continue to live in a single Bosnian state: best guesstimates put the percentage of Muslims and “others” in Bosnia and Herzegovina today at over 50 per cent. They favor a single Bosnian state by a wide margin. Substantial numbers of Croats in Central Bosnia and Serbs wherever they live in the Federation also favor a single Bosnian state, since partition would mean they would likely have to move.
If a majority of Bosnians favor a single state, some percentage of that number will be prepared to take up arms to oppose Dodik’s attempt to walk away with 49 per cent of the territory. Their focus will be Brcko, which links the two wings of the RS. So long as it is not in his hands, Dodik cannot hope for independence. That is why he is aiming to squeeze Brcko dry, hoping to preempt his opponents by ending the multiethnic administration there.
Before it gets to violence, RS may well run out of money. Its finances are far from transparent, but those who study them tell me they can’t last long. The belt-tightening measures instituted so far are unlikely to buy the RS much time. This is one reason why Dodik so aggressively pursues state and defense property, which he hopes to sell off to refill his coffers, as he has done previously with other state assets. We are talking here about no more than a year or so more before the RS faces the real prospect of going to Sarajevo for help. Obviously that help would come only if Dodik abandoned his push for independence.
The third limit is the one I know most about: the prospects for international recognition of the RS as an independent state. Here I can be unequivocal: unless there is a dramatic change whose cause I cannot imagine, few sovereign states will recognize an independent RS. While there are people in Belgrade egging on Dodik, including Foreign Minister Jeremic and sometimes President Tadic, even Serbia would have to think three times before recognizing the RS, as doing so would end Belgrade’s hopes for EU membership for the foreseeable future. Serbia absorbing the RS would have the same result.
So Dodik’s best bet is to achieve as much autonomy as possible, desisting from a formal move towards independence until the moment is ripe, while trying to raise the funds he needs to keep the RS going and stopping just short of provoking Bosnians committed to the current state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from taking up arms. That seems to me an accurate description of what he is up to. I can’t tell you how long the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina will put up with this, but they should not rely on the international community to take action. It figures there is no need, as it has the final say by withholding recognition.
If Bosnians want to save their state, they’ll need to do it for themselves, either by cutting a financial deal with Dodik or enforcing the bargain made at Dayton. Dodik is serious about seeking independence for RS. How serious is the rest of Bosnia about preserving the Dayton state? If it is, it will need to do something definitive within the next year.
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What good is the European Union?
Yesterday afternoon SAIS hosted a discussion of “Europe, Italy and the Libya” crisis to celebrate the publication of Federiga Bindi’s Italy and the European Union. I couldn’t stay the whole time–I had to go teach my post-conflict reconstruction seminar–but I’ll try to give a sense of the hour and a quarter of the proceedings that I was able to attend.
The question on my mind, and I suppose on the minds of many of the Americans in the room, was “what good is the European Union?” When we need help from it, can we get it? And to what extent does it even exist on an issue like Libya, where disarray has been more apparent than the Common European Security and Defense Policy? Will the EU be prepared to take over the post-conflict reconstruction once the war is over? No one will be surprised I trust that the answers are uniformly gloomy.
I confess that the three Italian presenters are people I know and respect, as is Marta Dassu’, who chaired. The gloom I felt should not really be blamed on them–they are more observers than participants.
Roberto Toscano, former Italian Ambassador in Tehran now at the Wilson Center, led off noting that the heady days when we were talking with abandon about “revolution” are already over. In Egypt, the Army and at least part of the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be conspiring to chill revolutionary fervor while in Libya we really don’t know who the rebels are. The outcomes there could be partition, or a failed state. Contradictions and double standards hound the intervention there. There are questions also about Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Our interests in these places often conflict with our principles. Maybe we went too far with humanitarian intervention in Libya, and also in Ivory Coast. Can we say we are protecting civilians and then use military means that necessarily kill some of them?
I was relieved when Roberto finally got around to mentioning the positive part: people who have been subjects are demanding their rights as citizens, things are beginning to change even if we are nowhere near the end of the transition process. And then the inevitable but obvious: the EU will find this a difficult challenge to meet and will require a major military, political and security effort.
Erik Jones of the SAIS center in Bologna, in response to a query from Marta, denied that the U.S. financial crunch would affect the American effort–after all, Defense is the one department of the government still getting an increase, and the Iraq and Afghanistan war expenditures are not included in the budget deal. U.S. leadership, he went on to note, will still be needed. There is a broad political consensus in the U.S. in support of U.S. global leadership, but President Obama has been wise to seek contributions from others. In focusing on that, though, he failed to do all that was needed to line up domestic support for the Libya operation.
The key issues for the U.S. have to do with the timing of when it gets involved, and when it gets out. It is now out of the direct combat operations but continues to provide unique capabilities like intelligence and refueling, even including close air support in some instances. One of the contradictions in U.S. policy is that it asks the Europeans not to duplicate U.S. capabilities, but then the U.S. is stuck doing things that the Europeans can’t do. The Americans really don’t care who does what among the allies, so long as someone picks up a good chunk of the burden. The Europeans though are preoccupied with who does what–whether it is the French or British, the EU or the member states.
The big problem now is when to declare victory. This is especially important to the Europeans, since what frightens them most is the prospect of emigration from North Africa. The longer the war goes on, the more likely that problem will grow. Maybe regime change isn’t necessary?
Federiga Bindi noted that the public discourse in Italy, which for many years shied away from discussion of the national interest because it was associated with the Fascists, now allows for the discussion, but without firm conclusions to date. Italy’s history in Libya is fraught with problems, from the time of the 1911 occupation, through the colonial period, to Gaddafi’s accession to power and expulsion of the Italians. Italy depends on Libya today for important slices of oil and gas supplies and would have preferred a negotiated solution. But that won’t work now, and the Foreign Minister at least (but perhaps not the Prime Minister) is betting on the Benghazi authorities, whom Rome has now recognized.
Italian interests are much more complex than French and British interests. Essentially Paris and London had nothing to lose by intervening, Federiga thought, while the EU has remained largely silent and Turkey is using this and other developments as a means of emerging as a regional power.
Francesco Olivieri, who now represents the Italian electrical company ENEL in Washington but is a thoroughly experienced Italian diplomat, doubted that oil and gas had much to do with the intervention. Libyan exports at 1.6 million barrels per day were not very important during the recession, the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear crisis has sharply reduced Japanese demand, and OPEC has increased production to make up in part for the shortfall. Whatever the outcome of the Libya crisis, its oil and gas will reach the market, as it did under Gaddafi.
One real issue, Francesco suggested, was what happens to the $60 billion dollars per year, more or less, that flows to Tripoli in payment for its oil and gas. This could be used for bad purposes if the wrong kind of regime ends up in power. A second big issue is the problem of refugees–so far the numbers are manageable, but the EU should recognize that it has a common purpose in making sure it stays that way.
European friends: I appeal to you to stop worrying about whether we should have intervened or not, about why the French went first and the British soon thereafter (with the Germans ducking out), about whether oil and gas were the real issue (or not), about Italy’s complicated relationship with Tripoli, about our interests and our values. This is all water under the bridge.
The issue now is to make this “humanitarian intervention” come out right. There are two things required for that: get Gaddafi and his family out of there (I suspect the Americans, as Hillary Clinton has been implying, are still taking the lead on that, likely with help from the Turks) and begin planning for the post-war stabilization and reconstruction. That is something the EU can really help with, as it has lots of experience in many difficult places.
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