Tag: European Union
The Balkans are coming apart
I’ve been too committed to book-writing to comment much lately, but the deteriorating situation in the Balkans prompts this post.
Bosnia faces the risk of secession
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb member of the state presidency, Milorad Dodik, is reiterating his intention to declare independence. He nominally seeks incorporation into Serbia. His current issue is that the state judiciary won’t allow him to expropriate public land in Republika Srpska (RS), which he needs as collateral for the loans he will be refinancing from Russia and other dubious sources this summer.
But that contingency should not distract from the main objective. Dodik has long aimed to be free of the scrutiny that comes from both the state and the international community. His theft of RS resources and abuse of the funds Russia supplies make him vulnerable to prosecution. Dodik needs to free himself from Bosnia and find a home where he won’t risk arrest. It is unlikely Serbia will open its doors, as that would offend Brussels and Washington too much. But Dodik will be content with an independent RS.
Kosovo does too
In Kosovo, the situation has gone from bad to worse. Serbian President Vucic has demonstrated in two ways that he controls the Serbs who live north of the Ibar River. First, Sunday’s elections were peaceful. That could not have happened without his orders. Take it as confirmation that Belgrade ordered all the rioting there in the past. Second, the overwhelming majority of Serbs did not vote. Vucic ordered that too. Those citizens who did vote elected four Albanians as mayors in Serb-majority municipalities. Vucic and his prime minister reacted with the fury of ethnic nationalists offended that the minority decided the outcome, because of the boycott they ordered.
I wouldn’t want to be one of those mayors. They will get little or no cooperation from either local Serb officials or the majority populations. Vucic’s fury is intended to hide the fact that he will continue to de facto govern the four northern Serb-majority municipalities from Belgrade, using its network of security agents and organized criminals. Pristina will have a hard time getting anything done there.
Montenegro has already fallen
Vucic has already captured Montenegro. He has used savvy hybrid means with Russian support to elect a new president. Jakov Milatovic claims to be pro-EU but is more than affectionate towards Serbia. The Serbian Church, pro-Serbian political parties, and populist mobilization against corruption combined to chase from office Milo Djukanovic. He had held power for most of the last three decades, governing with ethnic minority group support. Upcoming June 11 parliamentary elections will give Milatovic a deeply pro-Serb, anti-minority majority in parliament.
Montenegro is a NATO member. Serbia claims militarily “neutral” status. This should be enough to prevent any annexation, but it also weakens the Alliance, inserting in its midst another spoiler like Hungary.
No accident
It is no accident that parallel efforts at removing Serbs from non-Serb governing authority are occurring in three countries. President Vucic is pursuing the “Serbian world,” that is a state for all Serbs that incorporates territory that lies in neighboring countries. This is “Greater Serbia,” Milosevic’s goal, by another name. In Bosnia, he needs only allow Dodik to do his thing. In Kosovo, he is taking advantage of Prime Minister Kurti’s reluctance to begin negotiations on a “self-management” mechanism for the Serbs in Kosovo. In Montenegro, elections have delivered what Vucic wanted.
While the Americans and Europeans continue to avow that Serbia is embracing the West, in fact Vucic has turned his country definitively to the East. For the “Serbian world” to become a reality, Belgrade needs to hope Russia will win in Ukraine. That would provide the precedent Vucic needs for annexing parts of Kosovo and Bosnia. He will also need China to provide the financing Greater Serbia will require. Montenegro he needn’t annex–just remarry to recreate the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which existed 2003-06. Or cohabitate with lots of bilateral agreements an inch short of amalgamation.
The weak-kneed Americans and Europeans
Vucic knows the Americans and Europeans won’t want to accept de jure a Greater Serbia. But he hopes they will learn to live with a de facto one. They in turn are proving soft. Washington has been trying to ignore Dodik and mollify Vucic. American diplomats vigorously advocate for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities he sees as the vehicle for Serb “self-management.” The Americans have also revivified military cooperation and provided lots of financing through multilateral European development banks. Complaints about corruption in Serbia are few and far between. This appeasement has gotten no positive results.
Splits handicap the Europeans. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban acts as a protector for both Vucic and Dodik, preventing sanctions against both. France and the Netherlands have slowed enlargement prospects for Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia. That diminishes the EU’s appeal also in Serbia and Montenegro. The five EU member states that have not recognized Kosovo prevent a real consensus in its favor, even in the relatively non-controversial vote this week at the Council of Europe to Pristina’s membership process.
A change of direction is needed
The US and EU are failing in the Balkans. They need to change direction. Their basic analysis is flawed. They have been relying on Serbia as the pivotal state in the region to bring stability, in cooperation with Croatia and Albania. But Serbia is a revisionist power. It wants to govern all Serbs in the region. Croatia and Albania have lesser ambitions, but in the same direction: to control their compatriots in neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo.
Washington and Brussels need a far more vigorous, united, and principled approach. That would support the rights of individual citizens, whatever their ethnicity. It would counter ethnic nationalism wherever it abuses minorities. It would reinforce the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the region’s states. And it would welcome to the West only those who demonstrate real solidarity with the West.
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Stevenson’s army, April 5
– FP warns Northern Ireland deal likely to fail.
– China’s EU ambassador explains PRC policies.
– WSJ says Russia isn’t getting aircraft spare parts.
-Defense News says China it outselling Russia in arms.
– Our brownbag guest, Mike Mazarr of Rand has a piece on the Middle Powers.
– David Ignatius says the Saudis are sending us a message.
– It’s always good to check on recent CRS products. You’ll find things like this report on International Trade and Finance.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Montenegro begins a test that won’t be easy
Last time I talked with Montenegrin President Djukanovic, maybe 7 or 8 years ago, I told him he lacked only one thing: a pro-European opposition that could alternate with his own coalition in power. Yesterday’s election will determine whether Montenegro has in the interim acquired it. A recently elected candidate for mayor of Podgorica, Jakov Milatovic, won with 60% of the vote, defeating Djukanovic after he had dominated politics in Montenegro for more than a generation.
There are serious doubts
Milatovic leads a party with the right name, “Europe Now!,” and the right professional career. He has been Economy Minister, after a stint in various private banks as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He holds an Oxford MPhil in economics and has spent time in the US and Austria as well.
But there is good reason for doubt. Milatovic’s supporters include the pro-Russian and pro-Serbian segment of Montenegrin politics. Many opposed independence and NATO membership. Some celebrated with Serbian flags, not Montenegrin ones. Those are Serb ethnic nationalists and resent Montenegro’s minorities, who have long supported Djukanovic. Even if Milatovic is seriously pro-Europe, it is not clear whether that will be the direction he can lead the country in.
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 11. The outcome will likely determine whether Europe Now can deliver. Dritan Abazovic, the current caretaker prime minister, is hoping to lead a centrist coalition thereafter. But Abazovic himself has been beholden to the pro-Serbian political parties in the past. He signed an agreement that privileged the Serbian Orthodox Church and has cozied up to Belgrade, while offering himself to Washington and Brussels as a sincere, Western-oriented reformist.
Keep the pressure on
Montenegro was until recently the Balkans front-runner for EU accession. Now Western pressure and incentives will be vital to ensuring a pro-European outcome. The Serb nationalist minority in Montenegrin politics is large and well-funded. The Russians will try to use it to destabilize NATO and poison the relationship with the EU. The all too necessary corruption investigations will cast doubt on many in the former governing coalition and damage its prospects.
Alternation in power is the ultimate test of any democracy. Montenegro has so far passed, ironically due to Djukanovic. He managed the transitional governments of the past two years skillfully. Now that Djukanovic will be out of the picture, Milatovic should aim to do as well, while keeping the country moving in the European direction. It won’t be easy.
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Fantasy diplomacy is failing to appease
Chris Hill, the American Ambassador to Serbia, tweeted Friday:
I’ve dedicated my life to diplomacy – to finding diplomatic solutions to seemingly intractable problems. In the course of my career, I’ve learned that sometimes diplomacy fails. When it does, the results can be tragic. (1/4)
I offer my personal condolences to the families of those who lost their lives during the wars of the 1990s, including as a result of the NATO air campaign. I know that the Serbian people will never forget that terrible time, nor should they. (2/4)
The Serbian people will never set aside their grief, but I believe they are strong enough to set aside their grievances. The United States’ dedication to our partnership with Serbia is unwavering, as is our commitment to diplomacy. (3/4)
Together, we can build the better future the Serbian people deserve and want for future generations. (4/4)
He had previously tweeted:
The most important outcome from the Ohrid talks: Serbia has embraced its European future and a clear plan for how to get there—a decision that took wisdom, integrity, and courage. Much work remains, and the United States will be with you every step of the way.
If this last were true, his tweets Friday would have been unnecessary.
Fantasy diplomacy
This is fantasy diplomacy. There is no evidence in the Ohrid talks or elsewhere that Serbia has embraced its European future. To the contrary, Belgrade continues to refuse to align with EU foreign policy and leans heavily in the direction of Moscow and Beijing. The former provides military help and the latter investments. Here is Vucic with his favorite “European” a week after the Ohrid meeting:
Serbia no longer meets the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, if it ever did. Its “partly free” polity is moving in an authoritarian direction. Media are not free. The judicial system is not independent. And the opposition comes mainly from ethnonationalists who care not a whit about Europe. Belgrade has done nothing to apologize, or make amends, for the Milosevic regime’s brutal crackdown on Kosovo in the late 1990s.
It isn’t working
It is hard then to imagine what justifies condolences now for the action NATO took in 1999 to stop the murder and ethnic cleansing of the better part of a million Albanians from Kosovo. NATO caused around 454 civilian deaths (including more Albanians than Serbs and Montenegrins), according to the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center.
The condolences come from someone who was part of the team that initiated the bombing in response to the Serbian failure to sign the agreement negotiated at Rambouillet. American diplomats then argued that Milosevic would only respond to the use of force. If I stretch, I imagine Chris is thinking his tweets will assuage his own conscience, appease Serbia, and soften its attitude toward normalization of relations with Kosovo.
I see no sign yet that this is working. President Vucic has refused to sign the two agreements recently reached with Kosovo,. Though he has said his oral agreement is legally binding, it isn’t clear just what he verbally agreed to. He has said explicitly he will oppose UN membership for Kosovo, despite a provision in the normalization agreement that reads:
Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.
He has denied that Serbia has implicitly recognized Kosovo, even though the first agreement includes recognition of its documents and symbols, and has made it clear he will pick and choose what provisions of the agreement he implements or not. The EU will be incorporating the requirements in the agreements into its accession process, but that could mean postponing Serbia’s compliance by years if not a decade or more.
Ukraine could make the difference
Vucic is still trying to walk with Washington and ride with Moscow. That’s a difficult game these days. Rumors have it that Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine, but Belgrade denies it has sold a single bullet there. Nor has it aligned with EU sanctions against Russia, which it is obligated to do. Still, if your lobbyists can keep the American ambassador and Washington believing that you are sincere in seeking a Western future, the game can work for a while. Putin is blessedly distracted and the US committed to appeasement, which is easier than the alternative.
The question is when the State Department and White House will wake up to reality. Serbia is not choosing to come West. Only if Russia loses in Ukraine will Belgrade reassess. Until then, it would be best to forget the fantasy diplomacy. Realism dictates that the US back countries that back Ukraine. Belgrade doesn’t.
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Smoke and mirrors make confusion, not peace
According to EU High Representative Borrell, Saturday’s meeting between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti was a success. It resulted in an “Implementation Annex” to the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations. There are two macro problems:
- It is focused on process, not substance.
- Serbia again refused to sign.
Process not substance
The major procedural innovation is incorporation of the obligations in the two agreements into both country’s EU accession obligations. The new agreement also foresees an EU-chaired monitoring group. These provisions have been implicit all along. They obligate the EU more than they obligate Serbia and Kosovo. Moreover, the obligation does not extend to recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, since the normalization agreement falls short of that benchmark.
The implementation annex also obligates Pristina to begin negotiations “immediately” on self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo. This reformulation of the 2013 agreement to create an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities has two notable features:
First: it avoids the specific institutional form of the original. That in Pristina’s eyes represented a potential threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Second: it references the “Serbian community.” This suggest it applies not to existing municipalities but rather only to those inside Kosovo who consider themselves Serbian citizens.
The first is clearly to Kosovo’s advantage. The second is to Serbia’s, since it eliminates obligations to most non-Serbs.
The new agreement adds other procedural niceties. The obligations of the original agreement are to be implemented independent of others and the order in which they are mentioned. None are to be blocked. All that is good.
No signatures
Once again, President Vucic refused to sign the agreement. Vucic’s motives are clear. He fears domestic reaction in Serbia, where ethnic nationalist passions and hatred of Albanians reign supreme. He wants to avoid any formal equality with someone who will insist on being identified as the Prime Minister of the (independent and sovereign) Republic of Kosovo (or maybe even Kosova, the Albanian preference).
EU and US officials would have you believe this does not matter. But it does. Under international law, signed agreements obligate a state. Unsigned ones do not. Serbia could walk away from all the agreements with Kosovo, as they are unsigned. In fact, it has not implemented many. Nor has Kosovo. Signatures would make a big difference. That is why Vucic resists.
The Americans and Europeans have pressed Kurti hard to obligate Kosovo. They have withheld goodies and criticized him publicly. It shows. He is willing to sign.
Brussels and Washington have taken a different approach with Vucic. It also shows. They have rewarded him in advance. Neither criticizes Serbia’s drift towards autocracy or its corruption. Both welcome Vucic and his minions for visits and provide ample assistance, including more than one billion recently for railroad reconstruction. This appeasement gives him the diplomatic space he needs for refusal to sign. Even the donor conference promised in the more recent agreement is of marginal interest, as Serbia has most of what it wants already.
What is missing
We always need to ask “what is missing?” That is often more significant in assessing a diplomatic maneuver than what is apparent. Here are a few missing elements:
- There is no reciprocity. Serbia gets its “self governance” for its citizens in Kosovo but the Albanians who live in southern Serbia do not get anything comparable.
- Serbia’s harassment of Serbs who participate in Kosovo institutions is not mentioned. This includes municipal governments as well as the Pristina institutions, including the Kosovo Security Force.
- There are no deadlines to accomplish the goals set out. An implementation agreement is only as good as its timetable.
- While a signature on this agreement might amount to virtual recognition, that possibility is not mentioned, even as a remote goal. Nor is there any sign of recognition by the five EU non-recogniers.
A process-focused agreement without signatures leaves a lot to future negotiations. This one is more smoke and mirrors than substance. It is more likely to generate further confusion than peace.
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The easy way out leads to failure
I spoke yesterday at a US-Europe Alliance panel on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the Western Balkans. Here are my notes:
Let me start by making three point I regard as obvious:
- Russian military aggression in Ukraine has a counterpart in the Balkans There the aggression is via hybrid warfare directed from Serbia, mainly against Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.
- If Russia succeeds in gaining territory in Ukraine, we should expect a far more aggressive effort in the Balkans.
- If Russia fails in Ukraine, it will fail as well in the Balkans.
Why?
Why then, you should ask, has the State Department been so soft on Serbia, Russia’s main agent in the Balkans? The US has allowed billions of dollars of development bank investments to go to Belgrade. The Pentagon is trying to revive military cooperation with the Serbian army. The State Department backed unproductive and unjustified decisions by the HiRep in Bosnia that favored Croat extremists and sanctioned Serbs. American officials befriended and encouraged a narrowly elected pro-Russian government in Montenegro. They have insisted on early formation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo, a proposition that would weaken the still young Kosovo state.
Some regard these moves as recent. But they are better regarded as part of a long history of taking the easy way out in the Balkans. As difficult as they were, the Dayton accords seemed easier to Washington in 1995 than defeat of Republika Srpska. After Milosevic fell to the 2000 election in Serbia, the Americans quickly gave unequivocal support to his successors. They cut off funding to the Otpor Resistance movement that intended to keep a sharp eye on the democratization process. Senator Biden argued in a hearing several years later that it would be better to get Serbia into the EU accession process than to insist it earn candidacy on the merits.
Serbia’s response
The Serbian government took advantage of that support to reject the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo’s independence. It instead established Serbia as a militarily “neutral” country. Belgrade rearmed as best it could, mainly with Russian help. When Serbia’s disappointing but relatively liberal “democrats” lost the 2012 election, Washington lined up behind their nationalist successors.
Many thought they could be convinced to resolve the Kosovo issue in a “Nixon to China” move. Presidents Nikolic and then Vucic declined to do so. President Vucic’s minions now talk openly about a “Serbian world.” That is analogous to Vladimir Putin’s “Russian world” and a synonym of Greater Serbia. It is only a matter of time before Serbia walks away from the French-German proposed agreement that Vucic refused to sign last month.
Washington however has been unresponsive and ineffective. Vucic’s unwillingness to sign, Republika Srpska’s “national day” display of force, Belgrade’s threats of military action in Kosovo, the Bosnia HiRep’s decision to change the way votes are counted the day after an election, the compromise of NATO secrets by Montenegro’s pro-Russian government, control of the press, harassment of liberal democrats, and corruption in Serbia—none of these developments have elicited an effective response from Washington.
Unedifying
The explanation is far less than edifying. Washington doesn’t give a hoot about the Balkans. The region is too complicated, too peripheral, too aggravating. So it delegates hegemony to a “pivotal state.” The State Department thinks that is Serbia, which is central geographically, larger than its neighbors, a bit better off economically, and a far more consolidated state than the other former Yugoslav republics.
If you delegate a pivotal state to control a region, you have to put up with most of its behavior, both in the region and at home. If the pivotal state in addition maintains good relations with your adversaries, you will fear a tilt in that direction. Hence the US government’s reluctance to call out Belgrade, even when it sides with Moscow and Beijing in foreign policy and slides inexorably toward autocracy at home.
This is a sad commentary, not only on American diplomacy. It sadly favors a Russian proxy over states truly aspiring to join the West. That’s ugly. But it is also sad for the region, which has good reason to fear instability. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro all face threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as a result of America’s treatment of Serbia as the pivotal state in the Balkans.
But it is sad also for Serbia, which no longer meets the Copenhagen democracy criteria for EU membership. Vucic can do what he pleases domestically, without concern about constraints on his power. And it is sad for Kyiv, which should worry that whatever the Americans agree in the Balkans they may copy in Ukraine. How about an Association of Russian-majority municipalities in Donbas?
To put it plainly: the easy way out leads to failure.
PS: Take a moment to look at Demush Shasha’s pertinent tweets from today:
Four important takeaways from today’s @freedomhouse “Freedom in the World 2023” report.
1. Kosovo is democratic trailblazer of the region. Kosovo made record annual democratic improvement and ranked as third most improved democracy in the world in 2022.
2. Kosovo and Serbia democracies are heading to totally opposite directions.
3. Looking at a longer time scale, only Kosovo and North Macedonia have today a better democracy then a decade ago. Albania has made no progress, while Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia have worst democracies today then a decade ago.
4. Serbia’s democratic collapse is in particular staggering. A decade long democratic nosedive has put it now in a category with Afghanistan and Myanmar.
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