Alma Baxhaku of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: PM Kurti presented six conditions for establishing the Association of Serbian Majority of Municipalities yesterday. How do you comment on this move? A: I think it is helpful for the Prime Minister to have stated clearly what his conditions are. That is far better than simply rejecting the Association.
Q: Do you think Kurti finally is responding positively to Western pressure or these conditions are a new obstacle to establishing ASMM and achieving an agreement based on the Franco-German plan? A: This is a positive response, but some of the conditions will clearly represent obstacles to an agreement. Negotiations should focus on those.
Q: One of the conditions set by PM Kurti is that the Association will enter into force after mutual recognition. Opposition parties suggest that he’s deceiving opinion and that by this he’s referring to the Franco-German plan which doesn’t contain mutual recognition. How do you see this? A: You have to ask the Prime Minister to clarify this point. Unfortunately, we don’t have an official version of the plan, so it is difficult to comment. But I agree with the Prime Minister that the Association will look different to Pristina in the context of recognition.
Q: Do you think Serbia will accept an Association that is in accordance with the Kosovo Constitution and has no executive and legislative powers? A: I don’t know. That is clearly not the kind of Association Belgrade has in mind. So you’ll have to ask President Vucic.
Q: And the final question, do you think that Kosovo should change its Constitution to accommodate Association and Franko- German if the parties reach an agreement? A: I don’t yet see any reason for changes in the Kosovo constitution, which can accommodate an Association that accords with the Constitutional Court decision. Certainly there should be no changes in the Kosovo constitution without changes in the Serbian constitution.
PS: I understand some media in Kosovo have portrayed me as opposed to the Association. I am certainly opposed to it becoming a Republika Srpska inside Kosovo and think there is a serious risk, as that is what Belgrade wants. The Americans have promised that it won’t be allowed to become a de facto Republika Srpska, so I expect them to act as guarantors of any agreement on the Association. It is clear that only with recognition will the Kosovars feel comfortable with an Association that meets all the requirements of their Constitutional Court. Anything less leaves the door open to shenanigans.
The US and EU are exterting a lot of pressure on Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti to agree to create an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in negotiations with Serbian President Vucic. Kurti has set six conditions:
1. The association must be by the Constitution and laws in force in the Republic of Kosovo.
2. The association cannot be monoethnic, must change its name, cannot have/carry any public (or executive) power, and must only serve the horizontal cooperation of municipalities according to the Constitution and the law on local self-government (Chapter 5).
3. The association is part of the final agreement and is implemented after mutual recognition. And, in connection with the latter, only after Serbia accepts the principles of the UN Charter in its interstate relations with the Republic of Kosovo.
4. Before the establishment of the Association, the illegal structures of Serbia in the north of Kosovo are extinguished and all illegal weapons are handed over.
5. The rights of national minorities and the relevant protective mechanisms should strengthen the principle of reciprocity between the two respective states, as well as take into account European standards and models.
6. The President of Serbia withdraws the letters sent to five (and other) EU member states for not accepting the application of the Republic of Kosovo for EU membership (which also represents a violation of the same Thaçi-Dacic agreement of 19 April 2013).
One by one
These conditions are a step forward, even if they fall short of the Pristina proposal for the association that I have suggested. Let’s examine the conditions one by one.
The requirement that any association conform to the Kosovo constitution is now well-establshed. As for Kosovo’s laws, I am not certain what conforming to them would entail. In any event, laws can be changed, if mutual interest requires it.
Here too there is some consensus that the association should not be monoethnic. There are non-Serbs who live in Serb-majority municipalities. Municipalities in Kosovo have subsantial powers that in theory might be pooled through horizontal cooperation. But the powers should remain with the individual munipalities. I understand why the Prime Minister might like for the association to have a different name, but a rose by any other name smells just as sweet (or sour).
This is a vital point. The association will pose a far lesser threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity if it is implemented after Serbia has accepted that sovereignty and territorial integrity. I have no reason to believe that Serbia has accepted this point.
Yes, creation of the association should be the occasion for disbanding all illegal structures and armed groups that Belgrade supports inside Kosovo. This should include all employees of the Serbian security services. All activities of Serbia inside Kosovo should become transparent and accountable.
Yes again. Whatever Serbs get inside Kosovo Belgrade should offer inside Serbia to Albanian-majority municipalities. Reciprocity is the rule between states. Serbia has not accepted this point, to my knowledge.
Serbia’s efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the EU, will have to cease once an agreement is reached. Without this, there is no normalization.
Overall
I have no reason to believe that Belgrade is seriously considering meeting several of these conditions. Whether it does so will depend on pressures from Washington and Brussels. So far, the pressure on Belgrade has been sporadic and inconsistent. The Americans and Europeans fear pushing Serbia further into the philo-Russian, pro-China camp. The pressure on Pristina is high and unrelenting. I call it diplomatic bullying, undertaken because Kosovo has no alternative but to look West. Now that Prime Minister Kurti has met the Americans partway, I hope they will forget some of their resentments of his past. Most of his six conditions are eminently reasonable, though I would add a seventh: the US and EU should act as guarantors of any agreement, ensuring its good-faith implementation.
The problem is that Brussels and Washington are unlikely to be able to convince President Vucic to accept even the most reasonable of Kurti’s conditions. Vucic has intentionally stoked his nationalist opposition with a daily media diet of accusations and vituperation against Kosovo Albanians. He faces no serious threat from Serbia’s relatively small liberal democratic opposition. Nor does he see much upside to resolving the conflict with Kosovo. Serbia would then need to institute serious reforms in order to prepare itself for EU accession. Some of those reforms would pose political and judicial risks to Vucic’s hold on power.
I continue to hope I am wrong. But a decent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia still seems far off.
Winter has mostly frozen the front lines this winter in Ukraine. But preparations for the spring are well under way.
Dozens of recent-model NATO tanks are heading for Ukraine. Its air defenses are already taking down most Russian missiles and drones. More and better are on their way. Ukraine still needs longer-range artillery and missiles, but the US is resisting sending those that could target Crimea or Russia proper. Ukrainian war aims are clear: to regain control of its entire sovereign territory.
In Russia, a second mobilization (read “draft”) is under way. This will increase Moscow’s manpower by perhaps 200,000 untrained personnel. Iran has been sending drones to Russia, but China is sending little. It is unlear whether the weekend attack on Iranian drone-production facilities will have a signifiant mipact. Signs of Putin’s desperation are apparent: changing commanders, recruiting prisoners for cannon fodder, attacks on civilian infrastructure rather than military targets, crackdowns on dissent and economic protest at home. Russia intends to outlast Ukraine and hold on to Crimea and as much of Donbas as possible.
On the merits
The military, legal, and moral merits of the case favor Ukraine. Its military has proven far more capable, far better led, and far better motivated than anticipated a year ago. Russia attacked Ukraine on the basis of demonstrably false claims that its Russian-identifying population was at risk. President Putin’s “special operation” is patently a war of aggression, whichis a war crime. Ukraine’s efforts to regain control over its entire sovereign territory are a legitimate exercise of force, so long as they are conducted in accordance with the well-established laws of war.
Russia’s forces have proven a shadow of their reputation. They are poorly equipped, supplied, motivated, and trained. Their manpower is low quality, including a substantial number of convicts released from prison in order to fight. Their leadership is divided and competitive. Russia has conducted its war of aggression without regard for civilian casualties. It denies Ukrainian identity and has plundered Ukrainian cultural artifacts, kidnapped Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia, and ethnically cleansed territory it seizes.
On the battlefield
This war’s outcome will not however be settled on the merits, but rather on the battlefield. Neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have concluded it would be better to negotiate. The Ukrainians are now racing to master and absorb all the new kit they are receiving from NATO members. The Russians are racing to incorporate their new recruits.
Ukraine will likely allow Russia the first offensive move this spring, as fewer forces are needed to defend. Only after destroying part of the attacking Russian forces will Ukraine launch its own offensive. If I had to guess the spearhead would aim somewhere along the Sea of Azov coast between Mariupol and Crimea. Dividing the Russian forces along the coast would enable Ukraine to target either Donetsk or Crimea. Russia might even have to decide between defending one or the other.
Russia is simmering with discontent. While the Kremlin maintains its dominance of the information space, Russian citizens know the war is not going well. Military bloggers are focusing on ineptitude. Even television is rife with complaints about military performance. The economy is sputtering. Increasingly, non-Russian citizens are doubting why they should be involved in invading Ukraine. Many would prefer to seek more autonomy from Moscow for themselves.
Ukraine is in better shape on the home front. The economy is in smithereens, but morale is high. Ukrainians support President Zelensky’s anti-corruption campaign. They want to regain control over Ukraine’s entire sovereign territory, including Crimea. There is little appetite for compromise. Ukrainians know all too well that would leave them exposed to future aggression.
Our home front
Perhaps even more important is the home front in the US and in Europe. American and European support is vital to Ukraine’s prospects in this war. In Washington, some philo-Russian Republicans would like to cut or end American support for Ukraine. Their only real opportunity will be in the budgetary battles to come this year. The outcome is unpredictable, but the Demcrats remain united and the Republicans divided. That bodes well for aid Ukraine. In Europe, solidarity with Ukraine has remained strong, despite serious differences among the allies on whether and when to negotiate. Putin has long hoped the US and Europe would crack. They haven’t yet.
It won’t be over until it’s over
States fight wars because their outcome is uncertain. On the merits at home and abroad, this one should be a win for the Ukrainians. But we’ll have to wait until at least mid-summer to know whether the merits will prevail. It’s all over but the fighting.
Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”? Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects. Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is uncertain but easy to imagine. Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF, and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable change in President Vucic’s tone:
Have been following many of these conferences. This was the most realistic by far. Vucic spoke about need for Serbia to stop “lying to itself” and “open its eyes” and understand the consequences of rejecting French-German proposal.
He noted that Serbia can not stop Kosovo membership into NATO, CoE, etc. He underlined that if Serbia rejects French-Gerrman proposal: (1) EU accession process will be stoped, incl visa ban, (2) withdrawal of EU investments, (3) overall economic sanctions.
I think what we saw tonight is a first clear step in prepping the the ground for agreement with Kosovo.
Let me echo Demush. Something is beginning to move. Branko, a keen observer of the Balkans even if he mostly focuses on inequity worldwide, is opting for taking the agreement rather than suffering the consequences. It is not however yet clear whether the push will be sufficient. We’ll have to wait and see whether hopes are realized or dashed.
Derek Chollet, Counselor at the State Department, is the highest-ranking US government official dealing with the Balkans these days. He was in Pristina and Belgrade last week. What should we understand from his tweets about the trip?
The caveats
First: the caveats. We don’t know whether Chollet tweets for himself or has staffers do it. He surely supervises the tweeting, but that might be after the fact, not necessarily before. Nor should we expect tweets to reveal anything the US government regards as confidential. But tweets have become a main vehicle for getting into the public domain a diplomat’s narrative about trips and meetings. So it is worth some time and mental energy to interpret them.
Pristina
Derek began his trip on January 11 with this meeting and tweet:
Had a wide-ranging conversation with Kosovan journalists today. Once again commended for immediate and strong solidarity with Ukraine & discussed our perspective on ASM and next steps for the EU-facilitated, US-supported Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.
That “Kosovan” may signal that there was at least one Serb journalist in the group. Albanians in Kosovo refer to themselves as Kosovars; Kosovan is accepted way of referring to “citizens of Kosovo,” regardless of ethnicity. I can’t imagine why he would commend journalists for solidarity with Ukraine. More pertinent was his mention of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM), which the Americans are pressing hard. So no real surprises here, but a pretty clear indication of priorities: Ukraine, dialogue, ASM.
Next up was a meeting with Prime Minister Kurti:
Important conversation with @albinkurti on Dialogue. Appreciate engaging constructively and flexibly. Looking forward to continued partnership on advancing ongoing efforts towards normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
This is pretty friendly to Kurti, who has aggravated the Americans a great deal in the past. It appears not only to acknowledge some flexibility and constructiveness on his part, but also states that the objective of the dialogue is normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. That falls short of mutual recognition, which is what Kurti wants. But it corresponds to EU objectives and goes much further than Serbia has been willing to go so far. An “important” conversation in diplomatese means one that pointed in the right direction.
President Vjosa Osmani is less directly engaged in the dialogue but has played an important role in staking out the Kosovo state’s posture on many issues:
Good to meet with VjosaOsmaniPRKS. Our partnership is steadfast. We commend Kosovo for solidarity with Ukraine in enacting sanctions, supporting refugees and journalists, and condemning Putin’s war. Grateful for Kosovo’s generosity in hosting Afghan evacuees & refugees.
That acknowledges Kosovo’s solidarity with the West on two key issues. It’s a good look for Pristina.
From here things get a bit harder to interpret. Chollet met next with the Kosovan Serb political party sponsored by Belgrade whose members have withdrawn from Kosovo’s state institutions:
Informative meeting with Srpska List members. Valuable to hear the concerns of all communities in Kosovo. Need Kosovan Serbs in Kosovan institutions. We continue to emphasize the importance of an ASM consistent with Kosovo’s Constitution.
This underlines the importance of the Serbs’ return to their official jobs and offers an ASM consistent with the Kosovo constitution as incentive. That last point on the constitution has not always been clear in US statements, but of course it reduces the incentive, as Srpska Lista has no interest in an ASM that isn’t controlled by Belgrade.
Chollet went on to meet with political opposition and civil society leaders:
Appreciate hearing from Kosovo’s opposition leaders. Constructive dissent is essential to a strong democracy. Grateful for the opportunity to engage and hear their views.
Really enjoyed the discussion with representatives of Kosovan civil society. Appreciate the important role you play in advocating for all citizens & holding institutions accountable. Your efforts advance the EU-led Dialogue & support inclusion of all communities in Kosovo.
These are pretty pro forma statements. It is good, standard practice for US diplomats to meet with opposition and civil society leaders. It tells you something mainly when it doesn’t happen, as we’ll see in Belgrade.
Belgrade
There Chollet stuck with protocol order, which means President Vucic first:
We seek a strong relationship with Serbia based on respect and a shared commitment to democratic principles. Thanks to @predsednikrs Vucic for good conversation on US-Serbia partnership.
This is not enthusiastic. He states the American objective without any hint that it was shared by Vucic and he refers to a “good” conversation, which in diplomatese connotes disagreement.
No one should agree to be photographed with Vucic standing up:
The contrast is immediately apparent in Chollet’s meeting with Foreign Minister Dacic:
Great conversation with FM Dacic. We value Serbia’s commitment to peace and stability, and we are committed to helping Serbia realize its European future.
This is odd though, as Dacic is a prime Russophile who may have been smart enough to quot the State Department statement on Chollet’s trip, which cited peace and stability. But his political commitments are far closer to Moscow than Brussels.
Things get worse at the next meeting:
Pleased to meet PM @AnaBrnabic and DPM/Minister of Defense @VucevicM to talk key issues from energy security to economic integration, to U.S.-Serbia defense relations and ensuring peace and stability.
Brnabic was particularly antagonistic toward Europe and the US during last month’s Belgrade-instigated blockade of northern Kosovo while Vucevic mobilized Serbian forces on the boundary/border. I suppose that soft reference to ensuring peace and stability betrays a bit harder line in private, but these two are prime movers behind Belgrade’s opposition to sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and many other anti-Western Serbian government positions. Why no hint of that?
Chollet met with the press in Serbia and tweeted this:
Free and independent press is key to a flourishing democracy. Happy to spend time tonight talking with #Serbia’s dynamic press corps about where we can take relations in 2023 and beyond.
Serbia’s press is far from free and independent. It’s “dynamism” is manifest in finding ways every day to pump up fake fear of Kosovo Albanians and do the bidding of the government in myriad other ways.
Civil society in Serbia is in far better shape, in part because it lacks political weight. Chollet tweeted this:
Civil society is crucial to ensuring the rights of all citizens in every democracy. Enjoyed hearing from a diverse group about their important work here in Serbia.
But there was no photograph. Maybe someone wasn’t comfortable with being seen at that meeting.
One big difference between Belgrade and Pristina: no meeting with the political opposition in Belgrade. It is weak, but exists. It includes some ultra-nationalists as well as more liberal democratic folks. But not meeting with opposition is a notable departure from normal US diplomatic practice. Why not?
It might of course have happened in private. But even that tells us what we need to know. Unlike Kosovo, Serbia is no longer a democracy but is well on the way to autocracy. That should inform American policy. It doesn’t yet.
With respect to Wigemark, I disagree about a “vacuum” in northern Kosovo. Belgrade controls it, not with rule of law but with ruleof security services and organized crime.
What you do about a problem depends on how you perceive the forces at work creating it and the possibilities for solution. Perceptions often diverge. Here are some issues in the Balkans today where that is the case, including my own views:
Did President Vucic control this month’s Serb rebellion in northern Kosovo?
He claimed not. He told Western diplomats that if they press him too hard about northern Kosovo without offering him something he might lose control there. That would presumably make things worse. Vucic is expert at playing this game. What he wants is the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). That would be an institutional vehicle for maintaining Belgrade’s control over the Serb population in Kosovo permanently.
In my view, it’s nonsense to pretend Vucic doesn’t control what happens among the Serbs in northern Kosovo. It is true Vucic is not liked by many of them, because he has delivered nothing they want. But the barricades erected there in recent weeks came down the day, nay the hour, in which he said so. The Serbian security services and organized crime they control are the main instigators in the north. Anyone who bucks them will be arrested, beaten up, fired, or worse.
Is the problem Kurti?
Many American and European officials dislike Albin Kurti, the prime minister of Kosovo. There are several reasons for this. In opposition, he was a firebrand and his political movement used violence both inside and outside the parliament. He has advocated a referendum on union with Albania, something Washington and Brussels won’t permit. He is often uncompromising, or as he says “principled.” He does not, as his predecessors did, bend easily to American and European preferences.
In my view, Kurti is a sovereigntist. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but it is still not completely sovereign. A NATO-led force defends its territorial integrity. Foreigners still play roles in its judicial system. Kurti wants to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty, in part by reaching a “final” agreement with Serbia that includes strict reciprocity in all matters and mutual recognition. He doesn’t want to settle for the half measures Washington and Brussels encourage. That frustrates their diplomats.
Can KFOR solve the current crisis?
The NATO-led force in Kosovo, KFOR, now has about 3800 troops from 27 countries. In principle, that force concentrated in the north and properly equipped and trained could have readily taken down the barricades and calmed the situation. Its responsibilities also include Kosovo’s territorial defense. Serbia mobilized its forces along the border/boundary with Kosovo. Were the Serbian Army to enter Kosovo, KFOR (not the still nascent Kosovo Security Force) would be responsible for pushing them back.
In my view, KFOR is lacking what it needs for both its civil and territorial defense roles. Its troops are not all in the north, they are not all trained and equipped for civil unrest, and many of the troop-supplying countries would not want to see their forces in violent conflict. Belgrade understands this and exploits KFOR’s weaknesses. KFOR needs more capacity, not just to push back demonstrators (Albanian or Serb) and the Serbian Army but also to negotiate from a position of strength.
Is the solution two Germanies?
Paris and Berlin have been working for months on a proposal for a half measure that is usually referred to as the “two Germanies” model. The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic in the early 1970s agreed to live and let live, without mutual recognition. The idea to use this as a model for Kosovo and Serbia has been around for a long time. A version of the French-German proposal leaked in November, but there is said to be a more recent version that includes the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
In my view, the leaked document isn’t too bad, but it is not two Germanies. Both Germanies became members of the United Nations in 1973. No one thinks Serbia will concede on UN membership for Kosovo. Even if Belgrade were to cave, Moscow won’t without exacting a high price from the West. The model discussed is “two Germanies minus.” It might have some virtues, but the ASM should be included only in a final agreement that provides for mutual recognition. In that context even a sovereigntist like Kurti should be open to considering the proposition.
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