Tag: European Union

Talk should focus on the possible

Posted in Uncategorized - June 26, 2024 - 2 Comments

Here are the remarks I prepared for today’s panel in Pristina, Kosovo on “The Future of the Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: the possibilities for new dynamics in the process and the impact of new US and EU elections.” The Group for Legal and Political Studies sponsored the event.

  1. Here in Pristina I face a great challenge. I need to say something sensible about the Dialogue in front of people here in Pristina who have spent years observing it and engaging in it.
  2. Fellow panelist Sonja Biserko is also closer to the Dialogue than I am. She has been observing the political moods in Belgrade since before my first trip to Kosovo in 1998, as war was brewing.
  3. Anything I say will be from a more distant, professorial perspective.
  4. That perspective tells me there is no better alternative than a peaceful and friendly relationship between Belgrade and Pristina.
  5. When I said this to Kosovo Albanian friends during and soon after the war they laughed grimly. They said they would never want to talk with Belgrade again.
  6. But it soon became clear that Serbia was Kosovo’s biggest security threat, an important factor in its economy, and a major influence on its Serb population.
  7. Not to mention its influence on other countries, which has prevented universal recognition of Kosovo independence.
  8. Neighbors don’t have the privilege of ignoring their neighbors if they want security, prosperity, the loyalty of their minority populations, and international recognition.
  9. I participated in the first training for talks with Belgrade around 2004, for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Bajram Rexhepi, then Prime Minister of the provisional institutions, was a participant, along with several other ministers and directors general. Maybe some of you were there.
  10. I soon after helped to train Serbian foreign service officers for their engagement with Kosovo.
  11. But quite rightly the international community decided that independence needed to come first. And so it did, as Martti Ahtisaari recommended, along with his EU and American collaborators.
  12. Then of course there was the need to ensure implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, a process that the International Civilian Office supervised well.
  13. So it was 2011 before the dialogue with Belgrade officially began. This was the technical dialogue, which Edita Tahiri and Borko Stefanovic led.
  14. The goal of the technical dialogue was to improve the lives of people in both countries.
  15. It produced a lot of agreements by 2013, many of which were not fully implemented in the timeframes foreseen.
  16. These included agreements on civil registry books, cadastral records, freedom of movement, recognition of diplomas, custom stamps and duties, regional representation, telecommunications, and energy.
  17. In 2013, the participants raised the level of the dialogue and set a new goal: political normalization.
  18. This political dialogue resulted in the 2013 Brussels agreement, which famously included the Association of Serb Municipalities.
  19. But the Association was not a standalone, unilateral proposition.
  20. Kosovo agreed to create it in exchange for Serb participation in Kosovo’s institutions, especially municipal elections, the police and judiciary, as well as non-interference by either side in the other’s progress toward the EU.
  21. Since 2013 there has been some progress on implementing the technical agreements. But there has been virtually none in meeting the goal of political normalization. I would even say that Belgrade has reversed some progress.
  22. It has reneged on all the 2013 commitments. It has maintained de facto governance over the Serb population in the Serb-majority communities of northern Kosovo. Serbia organized the boycott of municipal elections there. Belgrade has withdrawn Serb officials from the police and courts. And Serbia has done everything it could to block and reverse recognition of Kosovo and its entry into the Council of Europe.
  23. Pristina has done nothing to implement its commitment to create the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities.
  24. For the past three years, Gabe Escobar and Miroslav Lajcak have tried to pressure Pristina into creating the Association, with no success. That should not be surprising, as the agreement to create it included obligations for Belgrade as well.
  25. Instead of fulfilling those, Serbia has chosen to make things worse, through purposeful violence. Last year it kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, rented a mob to attack NATO peacekeepers inside Kosovo, and organized a terrorist attack that was supposed to provide the excuse for a Serbian military intervention.
  26. Most recently, Belgrade has torpedoed the proposal to re-call the non-Serb mayors in the north and conduct new elections.
  27. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the technical dialogue was far more productive than the political one.
  28. I have to ask: why is this the case?
  29. Belgrade, it seems to me, is not ready for political normalization. By the end of last year, President Vucic was expressing his hope for changed geopolitical conditions that would enable Serbia to retake part or all of Kosovo. The newly inaugurated Serbian government includes vocal supporters of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It also includes the leading advocate of the “Serbian world,” a euphemism for Greater Serbia.
  30. President Vucic has de facto achieved the Serbian world in half of Bosnia and in all of Montenegro. Why wouldn’t he want to extend that success at least to northern Kosovo?
  31. I am not convinced that Pristina is ready for political normalization either.
  32. Albanian Kosovars first want to hear that Serbia regrets what Slobodan Milosevic did in 1998 and 1999. They want to see Belgrade encourage Kosovo Serbs to look to Pristina for governance, including law and order. Pristina wants Belgrade to be ready to give Albanians in southern Serbia comparable privileges and representation to those Serbia enjoys inside Kosovo for Serbs.
  33. I suppose if Belgrade were to fulfill its obligations under the 2013 agreement Pristina would too. But that isn’t going to happen.
  34. EU and US policy needs a reset. While I don’t expect diplomats to admit it, they need to return to a more practical, less political, dialogue. Political normalization is a bridge too far. Serbia won’t be interested in surrendering its sovereignty claims until the war in Ukraine ends the Russian annexations there. Kosovo won’t be interested in forming the Association until it is confident that Serbia accepts its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  35. But both Belgrade and Pristina can welcome smoothing movement of people, goods, and finance through their mutual border and enabling more licit trade, investment, and commerce.
  36. Pristina has rightly begun to insist on the use of its official currency, the euro, in transactions in Kosovo. But that is creating problems for the Serb communities, which receive subsidies from Belgrade for health and education—and likely other things as well—in Serbian dinars.
  37. This is the kind of practical issue the EU and US should focus on. Belgrade and Pristina need to agree on transparency for Serbia’s subsidies and a scheme for how they can proceed smoothly.
  38. Both Belgrade and Pristina should be interested in a serious crackdown on organized crime that exploits the lack of law and order in northern Kosovo.
  39. Now would be a good time for Belgrade to ensure that Milan Radoicic pays for his crimes and is unable to recover politically. Serbia should turn him over to Kosovo for trial. No doubt Serbia could name some Albanian candidates for similar treatment.
  40. Another issue I’d like to see discussed in the Dialogue is Belgrade’s intimidation of Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force or police. It is high time to put an end to the threats and violence that they and their families suffer at the hands of Belgrade’s proxies.
  41. That is the practical direction in which prospects for success lie. Saying farewell to failure requires getting the priorities right.
  42. Political normalization will come when Pristina and Belgrade are ready for it. My guess is that Belgrade will be first, because its EU accession will depend on recognition of Kosovo.
  43. More than one of the 27 member states of the EU will insist on it, even if the member states do not adopt it as EU policy.
  44. In the meantime, the Dialogue should focus on practical problems that can be solved in practical ways. It is a mistake to require politicians to do more than they are ready to do.
  45. That’s my professorial take.

I added a few extemporaneous remarks about the US election:

  • The good thing about American elections is that we know the outcome only after we count the votes.
  • Our 18th-century constitution makes predictions difficult, because of close races in a few battleground states.
  • A Biden election will lead to continuity in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Western Balkan states.
  • A Trump election will lead to surrender of Ukraine to Russia, unqualified support for Israel’s war on Gaza, and doubts about US commitment to NATO and Asian allies.
  • And it will lead to revival of partition ideas in the Western Balkans, with catastrophic consequences.
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Is the sun setting on the West?

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 24, 2024 - 1 Comment

These are the thoughts I offered at today’s University of Tetovo conference on “The Future of the Western Balkans after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be with you here in Macedonia, and in particular at the University of Tetovo.
  2. Yes, I said I am in “Macedonia,” because article 7 paragraph 5 of the Prespa agreement protects my personal right to call the country what I want. The “North” part is for official usage. I hope your new President will respect that.
  3. But her reluctance is part of the issue I want to talk about today: is the sun setting on the West? By the West, I mean those countries that are liberal democracies that base their open political systems on individual rights safeguarded by independent judiciaries.
  4. Lest I be misunderstood, let me say at the outset that my answer is “no.”
  5. But there are certainly a lot of reasons why someone might come to the erroneous conclusion that liberal democracy as a governing system is in trouble.
  6. First, there is the US: Donald Trump is seeking re-election on the false premise that the 2020 election was “stolen,” his recent trial was “rigged,” and everyone but him is “corrupt.”
  7. His campaign is anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and anti-Muslim. But the pollsters are telling us he may do relatively well among immigrants, minorities, and Muslims, all of whom are important in the “swing” states that will decide the election.
  8. He will certainly lose the popular vote. He did last time by about 10 million.
  9. But because of an 18th-century compromise embedded in the U.S. constitution he could still win in the Electoral College, where less populous, former slave states of the south get greater weight than their populations.
  10. Yes, the U.S. constitution contains an illiberal system for electing the president that makes some individual votes count more than others.
  11. A Trump win will unquestionably put liberal democracy as a governing system on the ropes. He has promised to govern as a dictator on day one. If he gets away with that, you don’t have to ask how he will govern on day two.
  12. He is skeptical about NATO, friendly to Vladimir Putin, and an enemy of free trade and international agreements and institutions in general.
  13. A Trump victory would have inevitable repercussions in the Balkans. He and his minions are ethnic nationalists. They will favor ethnic nationalists in the Balkans, in particular of the Serbian variety.
  14. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, will have good economic reasons to do so once he has his hands on prime property in downtown Belgrade.
  15. Richard Grenell, Trump’s handmaiden, has made no secret of his political allegiance not only to Trump but also to President Vucic.
  16. So yes, if Trump wins you can expect his second administration to back genocide-deniers, Serbian world supporters, and pro-Russian miscreants throughout the Balkans.
  17. But I don’t really think Trump will win. The campaign has begun but won’t peak until fall.
  18. One of the good things about American elections is that we don’t know the outcome until after the votes are cast. Polls this early mean little.
  19. The media loves the campaign horse race they create, but only Election Day counts.
  20. Whatever the outcome, the fate of Ukraine will be important to you here in the Balkans. Trump would no doubt surrender Ukraine, or part of it, to Putin. Biden will not.
  21. America is not the only uncertainty.
  22. The European Union election results forebode a shift toward ethnic nationalism in Europe this year and next.
  23. Germany and France are at risk of bringing to power people who would abandon Ukraine and, like Trump, befriend ethnic nationalists in the Balkans.
  24. That would make support for Ukraine and resistance to its partition more difficult.
  25. A partitioned Ukraine would promote similar ambitions elsewhere, including the Balkans.
  26. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be at risk. So too would Kosovo and Macedonia.
  27. The return of Trump, resurgent ethnic nationalism in the EU, and the outcome of the Ukraine war are the big far-away problems for the Balkans, but the nearer problems in the Balkans are worth noting too.
  28. First and foremost is Alexandar Vucic’s Serbia.
  29. I was among those who hoped when Vucic first came to power that he would turn Serbia in a definitively Western direction.
  30. I arranged his first public appearance in Washington at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where I teach.
  31. I went to see him a year later in Belgrade, after writing a paper on the things Serbia needed to do to consolidate its democracy: free the media, establish the independence of the judiciary, and commit itself to the reforms required to accede to the European Union.
  32. He has done none of those things. Quite the opposite.
  33. The media in Serbia are not only under government tutelage but are also blatantly pro-Russian and racist, especially towards Albanians and Bosniaks. They are not much better towards me.
  34. The judiciary is little improved, if at all.
  35. And progress on implementing the acquis communautaire has been minimal.
  36. Vucic today rules a Serbia that is ethnic nationalist, irredentist, and increasingly autocratic. It can’t even pretend to administer a decent municipal election in Belgrade.
  37. The Serbia Against Violence movement is courageous, but Vucic has for now no viable Western-oriented opposition.
  38. And Serbia is aligned increasingly with Russia and China on the international stage.
  39. In addition, Vucic has managed, without firing a shot, to take over the governments in Podgorica and Banja Luka, thus realizing de facto the first stage of the Serbian world.
  40. He won’t be able to do that in Kosovo, but he has tried with violence: the kidnapping of two Kosovo police, the rent-a-riot against NATO peacekeepers, and the September 24 terrorist action.
  41. All those efforts failed, but he will continue trying.
  42. Unfortunately, the Americans and Europeans are still seeking to pacify Serbia and have not done anything to punish its resorts to violence in Kosovo.
  43. Vucic will likely also be active here in Macedonia. Increasing tension between Macedonians and Albanians will be his preferred mode of operating.
  44. Russia will back these efforts. But I think it a mistake not to recognize that in addition to serving Putin’s purposes Vucic has his own reasons for stoking ethnic strife in the Balkans.
  45. A successful, democratic Kosovo next door that respects the rights of Serbs is unwelcome to Vucic.
  46. So too is a successful, democratic North Macedonia that can aspire to EU membership before Serbia.
  47. Exacerbating ethnic tensions in Macedonia could help Vucic to gain de facto control of Skopje, which would need Serbian backing if it steps back from the West.
  48. I hope that day does not come. But if it does, I hope the citizens of Macedonia will do as they have in the past. At critical junctures, they have chosen to support the Macedonian state and ensure that it treats all minorities with respect.
  49. That in my view is the right reaction to Serbia’s ambitions. Macedonia has little to gain from Serbia or Russia.
  50. It has a great deal to gain from NATO and eventually EU membership.
  51. The problem in Macedonia is common throughout the Balkans, as well as in the United States and the European Union. Our Western systems leave the electoral door open to people who don’t support liberal democracy.
  52. They prefer ethnic rule without any serious possibility of alternation in power.
  53. The counterweights to autocratic ambitions in liberal democracies are strong institutions, especially the justice system, and vigorous civil society.
  54. Both should be focused mainly on individual rights, which make the political system far more fluid and more difficult to dominate.
  55. But even in a long-established democracy like the United States institutions can be hijacked and civil society repressed.
  56. Doing that is easier in relatively new democracies like Serbia, which can no longer claim to be one.
  57. Montenegro is headed in the same direction: a democracy in form but an autocracy in practice.
  58. Bosnia has never really achieved what I would term a democratic system, and 49% of the country is an ethnic autocracy.
  59. This is despite the fact that among Bosnia’s citizens there is remarkably little ethnic tension.
  60. I came to Macedonia Friday night from Sarajevo, where an enormous gap is opening up between the politics and the society.
  61. Ethnic nationalism dominates the politics. Mutual respect and even friendship is more common among the citizens, who however have failed to vote out people who do not really represent their own respect for individuals and their rights.
  62. Your challenge as citizens is to prevent something similar happening in Macedonia. The sun will begin to set on the West here earlier than in the United States.
  63. I wish you well in meeting your responsibilities to defend the institutions, invigorate civil society, and protect the rights of all.
  64. That is what will prevent the sun from setting on the West!
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Getting to post-Dayton Bosnia

Posted in Daniel Serwer, Uncategorized - June 20, 2024 - 2 Comments

Here are the talking points I prepared for myself for today’s conference in Sarajevo on The Biden Administration’s Bosnia Policy: 30 Years of Federation of BiH sponsored by the US-Europe Alliance and the International University of Sarajevo:

  1. It is a great pleasure to be back in Sarajevo, truly one of the most beautiful and welcoming cities on earth.
  2. A great deal has changed since I first came here in November 1994, during the war, and even since I was here five or six years ago.
  3. I was the US embassy’s most frequent visitor during the war.
  4. The streets then were empty of both cars and people, the city was divided and isolated from its so-called suburbs, shelling was frequent, most shops were closed, heat and electricity were at best sporadic, telephones had stopped working, civilians needed to learn where they could walk without being targeted by snipers. Thousands of civilians were killed.
  5. Small arms fire hit my UN plane while landing the first time I came to Sarajevo.
  6. Things have changed a great deal. My compliments to those who have made it happen.
  7. I find Sarajevo much enlivened, younger, and more cosmopolitan. It is good that so many tourists are making their way here, that you have a Sarajevo School of Science and Technology that grants British as well as Bosnian degrees, that the Vijecnica is restored and occupied by a young woman who has more experience as a university professor than as a politician.
  8. But it is also true that the Dayton agreements froze the warring parties in place by institutionalizing the political divisions among Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.
  9. Each group has a veto on almost everything at the state level and in the Federation.
  10. Dayton also reduced the role of people who refused to identify themselves with one of the three major groups, preferring to think of themselves as individuals with inalienable rights.
  11. I believe it is high time to correct those mistakes.
  12. The two entities are the warring parties of 1995. One is now threatening secession. The other is threatened with division by those who want a third entity.
  13. These objectives are ethnic war by political means. That is better than war by military means, but it is still not the best option available.
  14. You will later in this conference discuss the legal strategy aimed at reforming Dayton Bosnia, which has been notably successful at the European Court of Human Rights but remains largely unimplemented, due to the ethnic nationalist vetoes.
  15. That however should not be the only strategy aimed at making Bosnia a more functional and effective state.
  16. Others may talk today about economic strategies. Any Bosnian enterprise with ambition should be unhappy with today’s Dayton Bosnia.
  17. A serious company should want a more unified economic space with improved relations with the rest of the world, especially Europe but also the United States.
  18. But I want to focus mainly on political reforms, which I think are needed in two dimensions.
  19. One is reform within Bosnia’s political parties, which are largely fiefdoms of the party leaders.
  20. More competitive contests for party leadership would open up the existing political parties, enable them to have more policy and programmatic focus, and reduce the dominance of the political parties within the Bosnian state.
  21. Political party reform would also reduce the risks of state capture by people exploiting public resources and patronage. And it would reduce the risks that state investigations of corruption would be blocked.
  22. The second dimension of needed political reform is cross-ethnic cooperation.
  23. This is not entirely lacking. Croat and Serb ethnic nationalists cooperate quite well these days, as they did in southern Bosnia during the war.
  24. What is needed is creation of a more civic-oriented multiethnic coalition, one that would reinforce the legal strategy that has produced good results at the ECHR.
  25. Such a civic coalition would focus on improving governance, not only at the national level but also in the municipalities.
  26. That is where citizens and government interact most frequently. A coalition that proves it can meet citizen demands at the municipal level will have a much greater chance of winning at other levels.
  27. Despite my wartime role as Mr. Federation, I am no longer a friend to the entities or the cantons. It seems to me Bosnia and Herzegovina could be more effectively governed at the municipal level and at the state level.
  28. The state government should have full authority to negotiate and implement the EU’s acquis communautaire.
  29. The municipalities, in accordance with the European principle of subsidiarity, should have responsibility for everything else.
  30. It is not clear to me how you get to that kind of post-Dayton Bosnia from where things stand now.
  31. It will take political courage and smart strategy, beginning with redefinition of Bosnians as citizens rather than ethnic groups.
  32. Yes, you are correct in thinking that the Americans imposed the Dayton system on Bosnia. Some of you will want to fix what we broke.
  33. But we imposed what the wartime leadership said they would accept.
  34. Twenty-nine years later neither the Americans nor the Europeans have the clout to change the system.
  35. Nor do they have the incentive to do so. Many fear instability and some have confidence in the transformational power of the EU.
  36. It is now up to Bosnians to change the political system. There are good legal, political, and economic reasons to do so.
  37. The simple fact is that Dayton Bosnia will not be able to join the European Union or NATO.
  38. Many in the current political leadership know that but don’t mind. They fear their own political and economic fortunes would end in a Bosnia with strong judicial, legislative, and executive institutions.
  39. It is Bosnia’s citizens who are going to have to do the heavy lifting.
  40. The Americans and European should be prepared to help.
  41. The Americans tried with European support in 2006 when they supported the negotiation of what became known as the April package.
  42. That failed to get a 2/3 majority in parliament by just two votes.
  43. The EU tried more recently with American support through the Citizens’ Assembly, municipal versions of which have also convened in Banja Luka and Mostar.
  44. Much more of this kind of effort is needed to build a cross-ethnic constituency for peace.
  45. Let me turn now to the hard part. I regret to say Bosnia also needs to be ready for war, in order to prevent it.
  46. Milorad Dodik and Aleksandar Vucic have made their intentions clear. They are creating a de facto Serbian world that would remove Republika Srpska from any oversight by Bosnian institutions.
  47. This is a clever scheme, with each step kept below the level at which it might stimulate a negative European or American reaction.
  48. Nor would I rule out a military dimension to the Serb strategy like the attempt at Banjska in Kosovo last September. That would be a provocation intended to provoke a reaction that enables Republika Srpska or Serbia to justify intervention.
  49. The Bosnian Army, EUFOR and NATO also need to be ready for what we call in Washington “little green men” used to infest Brcko in a kind of stealth takeover.
  50. Only if Dodik and Vucic understand that there will be a rapid and effective US and EU military reaction can we be sure they won’t try these Moscow-inspired gimmicks.
  51. Preserving the peace requires both military strength and political reform. Getting beyond the Dayton state in Bosnia will require commitment and inspiration.
  52. Bosnia has come a long way in the past 29 years. But it still has a way to go before it is a normal democratic country, one without a High Representative, one whose unity and territorial integrity citizens of all ethnicities defend, and one in which individual rights are protected for everyone.
  53. I am not suggesting something less than what I myself want. I would never trade my individual rights—protected by the judicial, legislative, and executive branches—for group rights.
  54. I wish you well undertaking the worthy effort of creating a post-Dayton, civic Bosnia. One that can join the European Union and NATO without looking back!
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What good is a norm if it will be breached?

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 15, 2024 - 0 Comment

My cousin by marriage, Bill Caplan, is an engineer and former hi-tech business owner. After selling his business, he dared in retirement to get a master’s degree in architecture. He has devoted himself for years to unraveling the mysteries of energy conservation in buildings and how the world should respond to global warming. He is convinced that our current efforts are inadequate.

Smarter and better

But he is not urging faster and more. He is urging smarter and better.

Watch the video above. Bill argues that just constructing a building that uses less energy is pointless by itself, and even sometimes counterproductive. This is because production and transportation of the building materials emit so much carbon dioxide even before construction starts. That’s my crude account of his argument. Best to listen to him.

I have no doubt that he is correct on the merits. But I doubt that his proposed solution is adequate. He has devoted himself to raising the consciousness of practicing architects. That merits applause. They could correct some of the worst abuses. But you would have to give a lot of American Institute of Architect lectures to reach any significant number of them. We can hope the video embedded here gets lots of viewers.

The solution

A carbon tax can be more widely effective. It could raise the cost of materials whose production and transportation uses carbon and discourage at least some of the practices Bill cites. The European Union is implementing a carbon tax in 2026. Canada and twenty of the EU member states had already levied carbon taxes by 2023. Here are the European numbers:

I don’t know if these taxes are high enough or sufficiently well-designed to avoid unintended consequences. But the US would be well-advised to figure it out and follow suit. Our national habit of bemoaning high energy prices and avoiding gasoline taxes slows the transition to non-carbon fuels. Refusal to tax carbon also incentivizes subsidies to wind, solar, and nuclear. Better to make the polluter pay and allow the market to drive carbon reduction.

A norm is better than none

Bill is discouraged, as he sees the breach of the 1.5 degrees centigrade norm looming soon. That is bad. But I still think we are far better off than in the past. We knew the mechanisms and prospects of global warming when I worked on the first UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Nothing was done to prevent the consequences for decades thereafter.

Now at least we have an agreed global norm that virtually every country on earth accepts, with the notable exception of Donald Trump’s America. Knowing that we are going to breach a norm is better than not having a norm at all. Avoiding 1.5 degrees of warming has mobilized a great deal more effort to slow global warming than previously. It might even eventually motivate a carbon tax in the US.

For more from Bill, see his Environmental Law Institute book Thwart Global Warming Now: Reducing Embodied Carbon Brick by Brick. For more on international norms, see my own Strengthening International Regimes: the Case of Radiation Protection, which discusses the 1.5 degree norm.

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Mealy-mouthed won’t work, riot act will

Posted in Daniel Serwer - June 12, 2024 - 0 Comment

Yesterday Nevena Bogdanović of RFE/RL asked for my comments on the “Declaration On The Protection Of National And Political Rights And The Common Future Of The Serbian People.” I find the full text in English at https://twitter.com/NationalIndNews/status/1799467259133317379). Her deadline was too tight for my schedule. So I am recording here my reactions not only to the Declaration but also to the contrasting responses of the American embassies in Sarajevo and Belgrade.

The Declaration is what it says it is

The Declaration is the product of an effort to institutionalize pan-Serb institutions in an Assembly (to meet every two years) and a National Council of the Serbian People. The Assembly includes representatives of the widespread Serb diaspora. But the Council is constituted of officials from the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade) and the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska (headquartered in Banja Luka). The purpose of their cooperation is spelled out:

The Pan-Serbian Assembly recommends that the institutions of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska act unitedly and in coordination and make efforts to stop the assimilation of Serbs in the countries of the region, as well as around the world.

https://twitter.com/NationalIndNews/status/1799467259133317379

The Assembly also recognizes the Serbian Orthodox Church as a pillar of “national, cultural, and spiritual identity.” It supports Serbia in efforts to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, declaring Kosovo and Metohija “inalienable.”

The Assembly also wants reversion in Bosnia to the Dayton peace agreements as signed. That means without the many decisions the High Representative, the Sarajevo parliament, and the entity assemblies have made since 1995. The Declaration explicitly challenges the appointment of the current High Representative.

Greater Serbia by another name

I could go on, but essentially this document is a manifesto for the Serbian World, or Greater Serbia. The references to the broader Serb diaspora are a thin veil. Most Serbs who live in Australia are already “assimilated.” They vote in elections there, serve in its armed forces and other Australian institutions, and describe themselves as Australian, even while preserving their identity as Serbs.

The real purpose of this declaration is to prevent Serbs in the neighboring countries (Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) from professing and acting on loyalty to the countries in which they live. That is a prerequisite for any future union, which is the ultimate Serb aim. The good news is that someone thinks the Serbs might be loyal to the countries in which they live.

The embassy statements, one right and one wrong

US Embassy Sarajevo got it right:

…the conclusions adopted at the All-Serb Assembly as they relate to the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are rooted in legal disinformation and riddled with errors. They do not constitute a defense of the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the authors claim, but are a deliberate attack on that agreement and the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is dangerous.

https://x.com/USEmbassySJJ/status/1800222971526623266

US Embassy Belgrade got it wrong. I am told this is what the Ambassador said in response to a question about the Declaration:

The focus of everyone who cares about Serbia and its future should remain on creating a peaceful and prosperous future for the entire Western Balkans, increasing regional cooperation with EU integration as the final goal. Serbia has a constructive role to play in that process and we welcome the many examples of its leaders pledging to do so.

While this is true, you wouldn’t know that Serbia is already “rapidly veering off course” for EU accession.

I haven’t found a comment from US Embassy Pristina. It correctly retweeted Sarajevo’s denunciation.

Squeeze Republika Srpska

Which is the real American position? At present, both are. Washington is trying to appease Vucic and burn Milorad Dodik, the secessionist President of Republika Srpska. This effort to distinguish between them has not worked. Nor will it, since their objective is the same: Greater Serbia, de facto if not de jure.

Embassy Sarajevo has consistently said the right things about Dodik, whom the US has sanctioned. But it has not really done anything more about him. Washington should be squeezing Republika Srpska’s finances as tight as it can. And getting the EU and UK to do likewise. My compliments if they are doing that quietly.

Read Belgrade the riot act

The Americans are appeasing Serbia these days because they want Belgrade to continue exporting ammunition to Ukraine. But Serbia is also exporting electronic components to Russia that are needed to manufacture weapons. Belgrade deserves little credit for doing what it should want to do, especially if it continues doing what it knows it should not do.

Some Americans also believe mollifying Vucic will work better than criticizing him. I know of no basis for this belief. It is inconsistent with his own past behavior as well as that of his mentor, Slobodan Milosevic. I had hoped when he first came to power that Vucic would become a real democrat. But he dashed those hopes long ago.

The Americans should read Vucic the riot act, that is warn him loudly and publicly. Washington should oppose European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funding for Serbia unless he decides to end irredentist claims to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The Americans should also lobby hard against European Investment Bank (EIB) and EU Growth Plan funding unless that condition is fulfilled.

Save some money and dignity

The Balkans are far down on America’s list of priorities these days. Saving some tens of millions there should be welcome. Cutting funding to those who oppose American and European objectives in the region should be easy. Benefits of Western institutions should go to those who merit them. It is embarrassing that they are going to people who don’t.

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Belgrade needs to do its part

Posted in Daniel Serwer - May 30, 2024 - 0 Comment

Besnik Velija of Pristina’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I responded yesterday:

Q: As an analyst with long experience and who has followed the politics of the Balkans for so long, what does the fact that Prime Minister Albin Kurti refused to move forward with the Association Draft even though it cost him the loss of membership in the Council of Europe. And what does it mean for the relationship of trustworthiness between the parties, given that the internationals were not even convinced by two letters with promises and demanded substantial and tangible steps for the Association?

A: The Prime Minister’s relationships with the Europeans and Americans is lacking confidence and effectiveness. That said, I think it is a colossal mistake for the Americans and Europeans to insist on creation of the Association of Serbian-Majority Municipalities, which is Belgrade’s top priority in the dialogue, without any benefits for Pristina. All concerned should reread the 2013 Brussels agreement, which required not only the Association but also Belgrade recognition of the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory, participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s institutions, and non-interference in Kosovo’s path toward the European Union. Belgrade has fulfilled none of those requirements.

Q: How do you see everything that happened around the Lajcak Draft for the Association? Do you think that Kosovo will ever implement that Draft, considering that Kurti was able to fail the membership in the Council of Europe and not send that Draft to the Constitutional Court?

A: I don’t see how the Association can move forward without at least de facto if not de jure recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.

Q: How did you see Foreign Minister Gervalla’s offer in the last few hours? She first said that Kosovo is writing a Draft inspired by the FES draft, then at the conference she said that there is nothing concrete and that it is only in the proposal phase. Does such an approach show frivolity on the Kosovo side and how do you comment on the fact that there was no coordination with the President of Kosovo for such a proposal?

A: I’ll leave the coordination issue up to those involved. I do think Kosovo should prepare a draft that it would find acceptable, provided Belgrade fulfills its obligations under the 2013 Brussels agreement.

Q: Now that the CoE application is gone, what do you think that the EU and US can do in order to convince Kosovo to move forward with ASM implementation?

A: They can convince Belgrade to do its part.

Q: If there will be no steps toward ASMM, Do you think that there could be space for a return of the land-swap idea if former US president Donald Trump will be back in office in WH?

A: I have no doubt the land swap idea will arise again if Trump is re-elected, whether or not there are steps toward ASMM.

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