Wow! The roads in north of #Kosovo are blocked with the trucks donated from EU-funded projects.
In an appearance at the Atlantic Council early last week, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Balkans said:
Any intelligent observer or analyst will recognize that Russia will not be a credible partner, that Putin will not be a respected figure in the world. So that betting on that relationship is a losing bet. I think you are seeing at least some very intelligent people pivot away from that relationship. Now that’s not to say that Russia isn’t working very desperately to keep some of the players in the Western Balkans within their orbit, but it’s really economically, politically, and geographically they are in a losing battle.
He is of course correct that the EU is a far better bet than Russia in the long term. For good reasons Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia have definitively chosen Brussels over Moscow. Albania and Macedonia are slated to begin accession negotiations with the EU. Despite the dim immediate prospects, Kosovo intends to submit its application for membership before the end of the year. Tirana, Skopje, and Pristina have made their ambitions clear. In all three, most of the opposition as well as the governing parties support EU accession. There is more likelihood of EU reluctance to enlarge than reluctance to join in these three prospective members.
But the situation is not good elsewhere
The situation differs however in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. I’m not seeing so many “very intelligent people” there pivoting away from Russia. In Bosnia, the de facto boss of half the country, Milorad Dodik, is a corrupt Russian asset. Croatia, already an EU member, is cozying up to Moscow, which supports its ethnic nationalist aims inside Bosnia. The result is a de facto alliance with Dodik that makes a mockery of Bosnia’s NATO and EU prospects. Montenegro, a NATO member, has a pro-Russian Prime Minister and governing coalition. They bend easily to Belgrade’s preferences, including recently in treatment of the Serb Orthodox Church.
Most important: Serbia has moved definitively in the Russian direction, even during the Ukraine war. Just to cite last week’s events, Serbia refused again to align with EU sanctions on Russia, its leadership denounced Kosovo’s Albanian leaders and Serbs willing to participate in its government in racist and scatalogical terms, and Belgrade’s minions trashed an office responsible for holding municipal elections in the Serb-majority part of the Kosovo. It is now the scene of a risky stand-off between Serbia’s gangster allies and the Kosovo special police forces. President Vucic has demanded that Serbian troops return to Kosovo. That would trigger serious violence. Vucic’s friends in Moscow are pleased.
The US needs to get real
American diplomacy has been betting on Belgrade making a definitive choice in favor of liberal democracy and the West. That isn’t happening. Serbia’s main opposition and most of its population are not pro-EU and certainly not America-friendly. They far prefer Russia and China, in the guise of a “neutral” stance. President Vucic hedges, on most days skillfully.
A large lithium deposit in Serbia is the latest prize he is toying with. In January the Serbian government cancelled the Rio Tinto licenses to develop it. He is now trying to entice the Chinese to take over, despite European protestations. Deals with Russia and China come without transparency, allowing lots of skimming. Serbian “neutrality” has a definitively corrupt and authoritarian bent.
As does Serbia. Freedom House now ranks it “partly free” (five years ago it was “free”). Belgrade has been slipping in a more autocratic direction throughout President Vucic’s presidency. There is limited political opposition. Media are government friendly and use hate speech on a daily basis (mainly against Kosovo Albanians). Courts are not independent. The government has a strong hand in the economy. The political opposition is hamstrung and risible, even if the intellectual opposition is courageous and serious.
Getting real
The Americans have not adjusted their policy to take into consideration the current reality: Serbia is lost to the West for now. Belgrade is not really pursuing EU membership, which Vucic regards as too far off to compensate for the power he would need to give up to meet its requirements. Instead he is pursuing the “Serbian world,” an effort to bring under Belgrade’s control the Serb populations in neighboring countries. He has succeeded at this in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. None of these countries will be able to pursue their EU dreams so long as Belgrade uses their Serb citizens to make them dysfunctional states.
The Americans need to get real. That means returning to a policy that energetically supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state functionality of Serbia’s neighbors. Today’s Serbia threatens those goals. Placating Belgrade will get the Americans nothing. Delusions don’t make reality.
With best wishes for a quick recovery to State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, who has had to postpone a trip to the Balkans this week because of a COVID infection,
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
This question for Ukraine has aroused a good bit of interest. President Zelensky has made it clear that achieving his war aims will require a Russian defeat. Many others think that is impossible, as Russia has so much deeper manpower resources than Ukraine. Few are still considering President Putin’s preferred option. He would like a clear-cut Ukrainian defeat, but Kyiv’s stalwart defense and now successful offense has muted the likelihood of that outcome.
Ripeness
The canonical conflict management response to the question is “ripeness.” Negotiations have a chance for success when they meet two conditions:
The parties are locked in a “mutually hurting stalemate” and are consequently looking for
A “mutually enticing way out,” one at least as attractive as continuing the fight.
For the observer, judging ripeness is more difficult than feeling a piece of fruit at the grocery store, though it bears some resemblance. What is the feel of the conflict? Are both sides really hurting? What alternatives to a negotiated agreement do they still have that they have not pursued? What kind of “way out” would appeal to the warring parties? If the conditions are not fulfilled, are there outside forces prepared to create the necessary pressures? Or are there events that might do so?
Not now
I see little sign the current situation is ripe and even less that outside forces or events will force a serious negotiation. Ukraine is still advancing, albeit slowly. Its citizens still support the war effort. @PetroBurkovskyi reports:
This was asked befoe the successful offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson.
Russian public opinion is more equivocal and harder to measure. But it doesn’t matter as much because Putin gets to make all the important decisions. He is is gearing up for another manpower mobilization this winter, including more prisoner brigades enlisted to brutalize their opponents. Putin has been explicit that talks will require as a pre-condition recognition of his claim to annexed territories.
Russia’s air attacks are persistent. Ukraine’s air defenses are improving and its ability to strike deep inside Russia developing. Both sides are escalating, within the limited means at their disposal. Ukraine’s minimal objectives–pushing back Russia to the February 23 lines–are still far off. Russia’s minimal objective of occupying fully the four provinces it has “annexed” are also far off.
Talk and fight
Lack of ripeness does not mean the sides shouldn’t or don’t communicate and even negotiate. It only means ending the war by negotiation is unlikely. The UN and Turkey have successfully negotiated with Kyv and Moscow an agreement that allows some export of Ukrainian grain, which will help to stave off famine in the Middle East and Africa. The warring arties no doubt also meet to exchange prisoners and allow civilians with urgent needs to cross confrontation lines. There is also non-verbal communication. The successful Ukrainian drone strike on a big Russian air base is a clear signal to Moscow of ability to escalate further.
It is common to “talk and fight,” since doing so can provide vital information on the enemy and his intentions as well as communicate messages of one’s own. Putin’s hints about the use of tactical nuclear weapons were intended to frighten. They did that in some Europeaan capitals and Washington, though not in Kyiv. The Ukrainian fight is already existential. The Russian one is not, except for Putin personally. It is unlikely that negotiations can produce an end to this war with him still in power.
There are two big known unknowns
Two key factors in deciding how this war ends will be what happens in Moscow and what happens in Washington. Putin won’t likely give in, but his successors might. Biden seems solid, despite his conditional offer to talk with Putin if the latter wants to end the war. That’s a big if. But Biden will come under a lot of pressure from some European and American experts to allow Russia half a loaf, on the unproven theory that will satisfy him. Biden will also face resistance from the substantial pro-Russian wing of the Republican Party, but they are unlikely to prevail.
So we are in for more war, and more jaw. Serious negotiations to end the war are not on the horizon.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
Vucic meeting the special envoy of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “The Russian people are our brotherly people, and centuries of history have proven this more than once. Therefore, Russian-Serbian relations cannot be destroyed under any pressure.”
I like the hat.
Washington is sending strange signals in the Balkans. It has supported a decision by the international community High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting a post-election change in the way votes determine outcomes. This favors ethnonationalist political parties aligned with Moscow. The Americans are canceling Kosovo ministerial visits with US officials. Washington wants their Prime Minister to delay insisting on Kosovo license plates in the Serb-majority northern municipalities of his country, without assurance that further delay will bring compliance.
All this seems disconnected, maybe even random and unimportant. It is neither.
It’s all about Belgrade
The through line here is Belgrade. Joe Biden was a strong supporter of Kosovo’s fight for liberation from Serbia. But he long ago decided Belgrade was the heavyweight in the Balkans. I testified in the Senate more than 15 years ago in front of him. He made it clear he supported getting Serbia into the EU accession process, even though it was patently unqualified at the time. Biden believed that would constrain Belgrade to move in the European direction.
He and his White House have now delegated responsibility for the Balkans to the State Department. There key players believe Serbian President Vucic is seriously committed to the EU accession process and also seriously concerned about the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. Pacifying Serbia has become a US policy objective. It welcomed recently a Serbian diplomat who used the occasion for notably undiplomatic remarks about Montenegro, a recent NATO member that has endured prolonged political instability. State cheers for Vucic’s unnecessary and divisive Open Balkans Initiative. That mostly empty box pretends to do things better done in other fora.
Too bad it isn’t so
There is little evidence that Vucic is serious about the EU. Serbia has made progress in recent years in implementing the technical requirements of the acquis communautaire. That is the easy part of qualifying for EU accession. The hard part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Those include democratic institutions, free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and an open, market-based economy. Serbia has made little progress on these and marched backwards on some. It has also failed to align its foreign policy with that of the EU, especially but not only on Russia sanctions.
On Serbs living in neighboring jurisdictions, Vucic’s minions advocate what they call the “Serbian world.” Yes, that’s just like the “Russian world” slogan that led Moscow to invade Ukraine. Vucic has sought and largely achieved dominance over Serb communities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all three, Russian “hybrid warfare” is helping Serbia push for de facto if not de jure partition. Vucic aims to limit the authority of his neighbors’ state structures and create an intermediate level of Serb-dominated governance Belgrade controls. That is what the license plate issue is really about.
The new dividing line in Europe
America after the end of the Cold War hoped for a Europe whole and free. It is not going to happen any time soon. Europe is dividing between a NATO sphere in the west and a Russian-dominated sphere in the east. Serbia is opting to remain in the Russian-dominated sphere, along with Belarus and whatever Moscow can hold onto in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Belgrade is also hoping to maintain the pipeline of EU accession funds it receives from Brussels. That is supposed to finance preparation for eventual membership, but Serbia uses it to fuel a state-dominated economy.
A Serb-controlled level of governance in its neighbors will be especially useful to Moscow. It The Russians will use it to de-stabilize present and prospective NATO members. That will make further Alliance enlargement a risky affair.
Ill-conceived and poorly executed
So what’s wrong with Washington policy on the Balkans? It is ill-conceived because based on faulty assumptions about Serbia’s EU ambitions and its activities in neighboring jurisdictions. US policy is also poorly executed. There is no excuse for changing the rules of vote counting after an election or failing to recognize the “Serbian world” for the peril it presents to Serbia’s neighbors and potential US allies.
The US needs to return to a Balkan policy that would support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the Balkan states, as well as respect for the human rights of their citizens. That should include their right to decide democratically, without interference from Belgrade, on which side of the new line dividing Europe they choose to be. We can hope Serbia will change its mind about alignment with Russia, but that will require strategic patience, not pacifying Belgrade.
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