Tag: European Union
You won’t hear sorry from me, Mr. President
Courtesy of Kosovo Online and Googletranslate:
The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, commented on the statement of Danijel Server, a professor of international law [sic], which he gave to the Voice of America, which is that he “expects that Serbia will refuse the introduction of sanctions against Russia, and that it is more realistic for Serbia to turn to China than to the West.”
– Serbia is on the European road. I believe that Serbia will go more strongly on that path and that’s why there are people there who are less tired than me, and they will have my support, to pull Serbia towards Europe. As for our Chinese partners, we tell our Chinese friends that we are on the European path and we have no problem with that – said Vučić and added:
– With that, he wanted to say: the Serbs might leave the Russians, but they might look for someone else just so they wouldn’t be in the West. Well, this is the man who said that we are a danger in the region and that we are just waiting for someone to attack, on Putin’s order, but for 250 days now, that has not happened. I listened to those senseless stories and lies about Serbia and read and saw them in many Western countries.
But I’ve never heard the word “sorry” from anyone when none of that happens. We are continuing our path, the European path, and we will try to preserve our traditionally good relations with China and principled positions in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. In any case – Let Mr. Server do his job, we’ll do ours. May God bless him, and above all, may he bless our beautiful Serbia.
https://www.kosovo-online.com/vesti/politika/vucic-odgovorio-serveru-srbija-nastavlja-svoj-evropski-put-28-10-2022
Note two things:
- He confirms that Serbia will continue to refuse to impose sanctions on Russia. That is its “principled position,” though what principle it maintains I am not sure.
- He confirms that Serbia will keep its good relations with China. That is crucial now that Russia is pursuing partition of a sovereign state inconsistent with Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.
In any event, China wants to use Serbia as a trade and investment route into the EU. Of course it doesn’t object to Serbia’s European ambitions.
Vucic will implement the acquis, but not the Copenhagen criteria
The question is whether you can do these things and still pursue membership in the EU. The answer is yes. I expect Serbia to do its best to implement the acquis communautaire, which is necessary but not sufficient for EU membership. Much of the acquis consists of technical requirements, down to curb cuts on city streets. Vucic should have no problem with allowing Brussels to decide things Serbia has little capacity to deal with on its own.
The harder part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria and aligning its foreign policy with the EU. The former require a democratic political system, an open economy, free media, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights. This is the part Vucic ignores. Serbia’s media are not free, its economy is far from open, its judiciary is not independent, and the political system is semi-autocratic.
On all of these dimensions, Serbia has gotten worse, not better, since Vucic first became President in 2017. In addition, his affection for what his minions term the “Serbian world” threatens the territorial integrity of three of Serbia’s neighbors: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, each of which have Serb populations advocates of the “Serbian world” want annexed to Serbia. Doing that is not “good neighborly relations.” The fact that it has not yet led to large-scale violence should be no comfort.
The crucial test
The crucial test is likely to come in Kosovo. The Europeans and Americans have backed off the demand for immediate diplomatic recognition. They are now toying with the idea of transitional steps short of that. These would include recognition by the five non-recognizing EU countries, Kosovo membership in international organizations as well as creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo consistent with its constitution. This is sometimes referred to as a “two Germanies” scenario, but that is a misnomer. Both Germanies were members of the United Nations. Even without Belgrade’s opposition, Moscow and Beijing are certain to veto Kosovo’s UN membership.
Serbia is skilled at heaping blame for the lack of progress in the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue on Kosovo. The question is whether it will be prepared to go in a more accommodating direction. A clear indicator will be its response to Kosovo’s decision to phase in over three months the requirement that Serbs in Kosovo’s north start using Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones. The Americans wanted a longer delay–10 months. But Belgrade’s obligation to allow this long-delayed exertion of Pristina’s authority is clear.
No apologies
President Vucic is correct to call on me to do my job. What is it? To analyze the parts of the world I know well in realistic terms and to suggest ways of improving their prospects. That is what I did in the interview. The question is whether he is doing his. Is he taking Serbia in the direction of liberal democracy? Or is he hoping the EU will relax its standards and allow Serbia to accede without meeting the Cophenhagen criteria?
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Kosovo under pressure needs a strategy
Arbnore Zhushi of Bota Sot asked questions. I replied:
Q: Recently, we have seen frequent visits by people of the most important allies of Kosovo (emissaries and government officials) whose main message was the progress of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. How do you see their visits?
A: Kosovo’s friends are trying to encourage progress in the dialogue. That’s their job and I wish them success. It is not clear however that they are producing the kinds of responses in Belgrade that would enable Pristina to reciprocate. Both capitals seem to me unready for compromise.
Q: The US and the EU have asked Kosovo to postpone the deadline for the re-registration of vehicle license plates for a period of 10 months. Prime Minister Kurti said today that the deadline for this is October 31. Do you think that Kurti is wrong with this decision? Should he postpone the deadline?
A: Kurti is exercising Kosovo’s sovereignty. I hope he is prepared to deal with the consequences. I certainly understand his impatience–I’ve even suggested that 10 minutes is too long. But being right works only if the move you make does not create bigger problems.
Q: EU envoy Lajcak mentioned 2024 as the last time Kosovo and Serbia should sign a comprehensive agreement. When do you think an agreement will be reached based on recent developments, when do you think an agreement will be reached?
A: Whenever Pristina and Belgrade decide it is in their interests. They are not there yet. I have no idea whether they will be ready in 2024.
Q: Should Kosovo accept a non-recognition agreement?
A: I can imagine lots of agreements short of recognition that would be advantageous for Kosovo. Even with recognition, there will be a need for many other agreements. I see no reason to wait for recognition to get things done that will improve the lives of citizens in both countries. That was the philosophy behind the “technical” phase of the dialogue. While many of those agreements have not been fully implemented, some did result in real benefits.
An idea: why don’t the US and EU constitute a commission for implementation of dialogue agreements (like the International Civilian Office that supervised implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after independence). With assistance from knowledgeable NGOs in both Kosovo and Serbia as well as the two governments, such a commission could make real progress in implementing the agreements and improving relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: In Kosovo, there is also talk of a possible fall of the Government. Do you think that the Kurti Government can fall under pressure to sign the agreement with Serbia?
A: In a parliamentary system it is always possible for the government to fall. In this instance, that would require a break in the governing coalition, either within Vetevendosje or with the other coalition partners. You know better than I do whether such a break is likely. Those who would like to engineer the fall of the government should remember however that last time they did it Albin returned to parliament strengthened.
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The Iran enigma post-November 8
I am no expert on Iran. I’ve never even visited. But it is an important country that interests me. So let me review what I perceive of its current situation, subject of course to correction by those more knowledgeable.
Widespread protests
The protests are widespread. The initial impetus for the demonstrations was the death of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, whose hijab was supposedly not worn correctly. It allegedly did not cover all of her hair. She died after physical abuse in police custody.
This triggered the current wave of protests, which have retained a focus on women’s rights. But they also have a distinct political direction. Some are calling for an end to the Islamic Republic, with slogans that focus on the Supreme Leader (“down with the dictator!”).
The regime has responded with violence against the protesters, killing something like 250, arresting thousands, and injuring many more. Demonstrations and regime violence have been particularly intense in Iranian Kurdistan.
Iran’s economic situation is not a focus of the demonstrations, but it is certainly a contributing factor. Suffering from both international sanctions and internal mismanagement, many Iranians are impoverished while regime supporters thrive. The contrast is glaring.
Power projection
Even as it tussles with domestic unrest, the Islamic Republic is increasing its power projection abroad. Iran joined in OPEC+’s decision to maintain high oil prices as the world economy declines. It is helping Russia use Iranian drones in the Ukraine war and mobilizing forces on the border with Azerbaijan. Tehran has maintained support for Syrian President Assad and continued its assistance to the Houthis in Yemen.
The JCPOA is at risk
These are fairly low-cost operations in financial terms, but they are high-impact in political terms. They signal a growing alignment with Russia, which also wants to maintain oil prices, supports Assad, and favors Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The EU, which has a mediating role at the nuclear talks, has imposed new sanctions on Iran because of its drone exports to Russia.
Iran’s current power projection also signals disinterest in renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka Iran nuclear deal). The repression inside Iran and power projection in the region and Ukraine make it difficult for the Biden Administration to revive the JCPOA even after the November 8 election.
Failure to renew the JCPOA will leave Iran free to continue to enrich uranium to levels needed for nuclear weapons. It is already at the nuclear threshold. It could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkish President Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both stated that they will pursue nuclear weapons if more countries in the region do.
Uncertainties are unsettling
Some hope that the demonstrations will collapse the regime and lead to one that does not pursue nuclear weapons. But hope is not a policy. The relevant timeframe is short. Iran could have the material it needs for a nuclear weapon within 6 months if the JCPOA is not renewed. No one can be sure the demonstrators will succeed. Nor can we be sure the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will not dominate a successor regime. That could lead to an accelerated nuclear program.
If Iran does gain the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will likely want to maintain ambiguity about whether it has actually made them or intends to deploy them. This would mirror the Israeli stance, which has been successful in reducing awareness of its wepons and protests against its nuclear power status. But Iranian adoption of such an ambiguous stance would introduce one more uncertainty into the Middle East.
The Iran enigma
Iran presents a puzzling problem for Washington. Renewal of the JCPOA is certainly the best currently available answer to the nuclear issue. The demonstrations give some hope for internally-generated regime change. But even that would not guarantee a non-nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, the current regime’s commitment to power projection abroad and violent repression of the demonstrations makes JCPOA renewal difficult.
It will be interesting to see how the Biden Adminstration solves the Iran puzzle once the November 8 election is over.
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Life is unfair, so you need a strategy
Bledë Krasniqi from Television Tëvë 1, based in Prishtina, Kosovo, asked questions. I responded:
Q: As an expert on the issues of the Western Balkan, how have you seen the frequent visits to Kosovo and Serbia by the US emissary for the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, and the EU emissary, Miroslav Lajcak? Are these visits an indication that the final agreement between the two countries is near the end?
A: The envoys are trying to deliver a substantial agreement, but I’ll be happily surprised if they deliver a “final” one.
Vucic is not committed to stabiliity
Q: Escobar said that the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, is committed to regional stability? Do you agree with this statement?
A: No, I don’t agree. I think Vucic is committed to what he calls the Serbian world, in other words de facto greater Serbia. This threatens instability in both Bosnia and Kosovo [I should also have said Montenegro].
Why not ten minutes?
Q: The United States of America has asked the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, to postpone the implementation of the decision on the issue of license plates for another 10 months. In your opinion, should Kosovo take such a step?
A: Ten minutes is too long in my view. What is the reason for this American request?
No, the dialogue won’t end this year
Q: Do you believe that the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue will end this year? If so, under what conditions? Do you see relations between the two countries as tense recently?
A: Relations are certainly tense. I doubt the dialogue will end this year.
Yes, to the Association with conditions
Q: Should Kosovo establish the Association of Serbian Municipalities?
A: Yes, but only as part of a package that includes recognition and only with two conditions: 1) reciprocity for Albanian communities in Serbia and 2) compliance with the Kosovo Constitutional Court criteria.
Q: If the Association of Serbian municipalities is conditioned by the internationals, should the leaders of Kosovo accept this condition or do they have to look for other solution.
A: See my response above.
Q: Recently, the European Commission has also asked Kosovo to implement the Association without delays and obstacles? Should this count as a condition for visa liberalization?
A: I hope not.
Life is unfair
Q: Is it unfair to Kosovo the non-liberalization of visas by the European Council?
A: Yes it is unfair, but life is often unfair. Kosovo needs an improved strategy for getting what it wants from the EU.
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Reciprocity is vital, but not everything
A visit last Saturday from a group of Albanian citizens of Serbia got me thinking again about the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. It is stuck. While French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz are supposedly working on a new grand proposal, I’m inclined to think that neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti (this originally said ”Thaci,” apologies to both!) wants to do anything big at the moment. They are both busy consolidating power, using their mutual hostility as a means. I’ll be the first to applaud if the Macron/Scholz initiative succeeds. But if something big isn’t possible, smaller propositions may be worth considering. Here are a few, ranging from the mundane to the daring.
Reciprocity should be the rule
Reciprocity is a fundamental diplomatic principle. My visitors told me people at the State Department prefer the term “symmetry.” I confess I don’t understand the difference. The point is that whatever you ask of someone else you should be willing to give something equivalent in return, if an equivalent exists. So if there are ten reserved seats for Serbs in the Kosovo parliament (there are), Belgrade should be prepared to offer some proportional number of reserved seats to Albanians in the Serbian parliament (where there are none today).
This principle should apply as well to the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, which Belgrade wants formed inside Kosovo. It should have no more executive authority than a comparable association of Albanian communities inside Serbia.
Reciprocity should also apply to military forces along the boundary/border between Serbia and Kosovo. The international community has restricted Kosovo from deploying its Security Force in the northern Serb-majority municipalities. Serbia should be likewise restricted from deploying its Army in Albanian-majority municipalities of southern Serbia. That is not the case today:
Lack of reciprocity is a mistake
The international community violated the principle of reciprocity/symmetry in establishing the Special Chambers to investigate crimes that occurred 1998-2000. Their mandate was limited to the territory of Kosovo. That was a serious mistake, not only for Kosovo but also for the United States. Serbian forces killed three Albanian American brothers (the Bytyqis) shortly after the war on Serbian territory. Despite Belgrade’s many promises, its prosecutors have not indicted those who ordered the murders. Two lower-level indictees have been acquitted. Washington should be telling Belgrade that it expects Serbia to prosecute the commanders or to accept the jurisdiction of the Special Chambers.
Some more reciprocity propositions
Here are a few more reciprocity propositions that would enliven the moribund dialogue process. They could also become steps towards eventual mutual recognition in any future Macron/Scholz proposal. Belgrade and Pristina should
- initiate military to military relations consistent with OSCE principles. Their chiefs of staff should be meeting regularly to exchange information on equipment, training, and deployment of their forces.
- agree and demarcate the boundary/border between them, without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Good fences make good neighbors, as Kosovo discovered when it agreed and demarcated its border with Macedonia.
- base the Open Balkans initiative on equality among the entities participating, again without prejudice to the ultimate outcome of the dialogue. Kosovo would participate without the infamous asterisk (*) and footnote.
It’s not all about reciprocity
Reciprocity won’t settle everything between Pristina and Belgrade. There are some inherent asymmetries.
Belgrade has persistently harassed Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Forces. The Serbian secret services and their proxies threaten both them and their families. The EU should be telling Belgrade that if the harassment doesn’t cease Serbia’s progress towards EU accession will stop. The Americans should end Serbia’s cooperation with the Ohio National Guard if the harassment continues.
The rape of tens of thousands of Kosovo women and girls by Serbian forces during the 1999 war has no comparable crime committed by Albanians in rebellion against Serbia. Belgrade should make a formal apology and offer compensation. The 1998/99 expulsion of Albanian civilians from Kosovo, and the murder of close to 10,000 of them, was a clear breach of the laws of war. On that issue too an apology and compensation would go a long way.
The historic Serb churches, monasteries, and other monuments in Kosovo have no comparable Albanian equivalent inside Serbia. The Kosovo government needs to be prepared not only to protect them from harm but also to convince the remaining Serb population in Kosovo that they will be fairly treated.
It’s not all about reciprocity. These items require political courage and unilateral action. But Serbian apologies and compensation would vastly improve Kosovo Albanian attitudes towards the country’s Serb population as well as its religious institutions. If Vucic is truly concerned about the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo (as he claims), he should consider apologies and compensation as a means to that end.
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Embellishing reality isn’t helpful
Genc Pollo, former minister and member of parliament in Albania, reacts to this “debrief” with US Ambassador to Belgrade Chris Hill:
“War is too important to be left to the generals” is a bon mot attributed to Georges Clemenceau. As French Prime Minister, he oversaw the victory of his country and the Entente Alliance in the First World War.
I would hesitate a lot to apply his wisdom to diplomats dealing with the Balkans, especially with former Yugoslavia problems. Diplomats here means primarily European and US officials trying to find solutions to challenges ranging from bloody conflicts to dangerous political impasses.
We ought to be thankful for their well-meaning efforts and should celebrate the ones with successful outcomes.
Still listening to this interview of Christopher Hill, the US Ambassador to Serbia, with the Atlantic Council I was a bit perplexed. Disclosure: he’s a good friend of mine from the early 90s when he was a cooperative a helpful Deputy Head of Mission in Tirana. Chris Hill is connoisseur of the region with a lot of experience in difficult situations. He is right in most of what he says. But some of his assertions could be problematic. Let us take these issues one by one.
Issue 1: “There is a criticism that you sometimes hear in the Balkans that somehow this is some effort by Serbia which is so big to dominate the others. That’s the kind of criticism you might have heard in the European Union decades ago about Germany….I’m not sure it’s that valid a criticism.”
Germany is big for sure, but in the initial EEC of six and the actual EU of 27 member states, she finds herself in a balanced structure in terms of political power, economic weight, and population. Berlin carries much weight but can’t and doesn’t rule single-handedly. Look at the European Central Bank.
Besides post-war Germany is a friendly democracy.
By contrast, within the Open Balkans trio (Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia) Serbia would rule unchallenged.
Issue 2: “[Open Balkans] does support EU standards, in terms of the rule of law, in terms of regulations.”
It remains a mystery to many why supporters of Open Balkans are silent about the Common Regional Market of the Berlin Process. Or trash it along with defunct initiatives. The Berlin Process has all the pretended virtues of Open Balkans and none of its serious downsides. Simple question: would you trust the observance of EU standards in a Western Balkans initiative where the EU is institutionally involved rather than in a local get-together hosted by two corrupt autocrats? Lobbyists might paint a Potemkin village, but Serbia and Albania are well advanced in their latest trajectory towards one-person rule.
Issue 3: “I would say that the Serbian relationship with Albania is as good as it’s probably ever been in history.”
The relationship between Albania and Serbia has generally been always excellent or normal, Including during the rule of Enver Hoxha and Josip Broz Tito. It went awry when things in Kosovo turned terrible. The current rapprochement between Prime Minister Rama and President Vučić is solves a problem that doesn’t exist. It hasn’t contributed in any meaningful way to “normalization” between Kosovo and Serbia, let alone mutual recognition, which is the crux of the matter!
Issue 4: “But I think, if you look at the broad sweep of this issue and the broad arc of where Serbia is going, it’s heading West. You point out the opinion surveys that suggest that Serbia that many Serbs have sympathies that lie further east. …if you look at where Serbian young people are going for their education for jobs, for their training and what type of model they see themselves focusing on, it’s very much toward the West.”
Past are the days when people in the West should believe globalization and economic engagement wwill tame China and Russia, nudging them towards becoming responsible actors in the rules-based world order. We’ve seen Chinese and Russians, including the nomenclatura’s offspring, enjoying life or studying in the West only to return home to embrace autocracy and imperial revisionism.
This to some reasonable extent applies to Serbia. Because the nature of the Serbian regime has not changed much, and its propaganda has worsened.
If the model of post-Milosević Serbia applied to post-war Germany, it would mean having Joseph Goebbels as West Germany’s chancellor in the 60s. He would have refused to adopt Western policies toward the Soviets.
This is reality, and embellishing it isn’t helpful.
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