Tag: European Union
Stevenson’s army, February 15
– The House intelligence committee has notified the chamber that members can see a highly classified report about an emerging Russian threat, reportedly a nuclear space-based anti-satellite weapon. Jake Sullivan is set to brief the Gang of 8 today.
– WSJ analyzes the deteriorating Biden-Netanyahu relationship
– DOD has some smart graphics defending Ukrainian aid
– Defense One notes how slow European artillery production is
– I don’t know House rules very well, so I was intrigued by Punchbowl News’ article noting that the Previous Question motion can be used to defeat a House rule resolution, thereby opening it to amendment — a possible way to get House consideration of the foreign aid package that passed the Senate, and much easier politically than a discharge petition.
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Difficult is better than the alternatives
All three of these fine commentators agree: stabilization requires a recognized Palestinian state and international forces in Gaza. The international forces are needed at a minimum to monitor the ceasefire, protect civilians, preside over unification of the West Bank and Gaza, and organize Palestinian elections or some other means of validating legitimate authority. Gershon Baskin wants an Arab-led force for only two years. Sultan Barakat wants the international presence for two or three years to be non-Arab and mentions South Africa, Belgium, and Finland. Any deployment of that sort is likely to last far longer.
But all three are vague about how this international presence would be constituted and organized. We have learned a good deal from the past almost 35 years of such interventions. How should we apply this experience in Gaza?
The international intervention
First things first: the mandate. A strong, detailed, and comprehensive mandate is vital. For Gaza, that likely means a UN Security Council mandate voted unanimously. That will be difficult. The US has consistently prevented any resolution that the Israelis object to. A resolution that assigns them responsibility for the destruction of Gaza, no matter how objective or restrained, will attract a US veto. Any resolution that doesn’t condemn what the Israelis have done and provide for their complete withdrawal will arouse Russian, Chinese, and other objections.
What we know beyond that is not scientifically validated but derived from the 20 or so international interventions over more than three decades, starting in 1990. Jim Dobbins summarized his conclusions about a hypothetical country of 5 million in this table:
Illustrative Costs of Nation-Building
| Sector | Personnel | Cost(millions of US$) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local | Int’l | ||
| Light peacekeeping | |||
| Military | 8,000 | 360 | |
| 15,000 | 50 | ||
| Police | 1,000 | 170 | |
| 11,000 | 18 | ||
| Rule of law | 18 | ||
| Humanitarian | 170 | ||
| Governance | 260 | ||
| Economic stabilization | 30 | ||
| Democratization | 50 | ||
| Development and infrastructure | 390 | ||
| Total, light peacekeeping | 26,000 | 9,000 | 1,520 |
| Heavy peace enforcement (additional requirements) | |||
| Military | 57,000 | 12,640 | |
| Police | 7,000 | 1,080 | |
| Development and infrastructure | 360 | ||
| Total, heavy peace enforcement | 26,000 | 73,000 | 15,600 |
NOTE: Estimated annual costs in a hypothetical country of 5 million people with a per capita gross domestic product of $500. Total costs do not sum due to rounding.
Gaza will require “heavy” rather than “light” peace enforcement, not least because remnants of Hamas and other violent groups will necessarily try to harass the intervention. Before the war Gaza had a significantly higher GDP per capita than this illustrative example, which complicates and increases the burden of peacekeeping.
Assuming about 2.2 million people in Gaza, Dobbins’ guesstimates would mean about 30,000 troops and 4,000 police. The troops could be from non-Arabic speaking countries. The force would then be more than twice the size of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in 2023 and perhaps the largest UN peacekeeping ever. Raising and deploying such a large force will be a monumental task. An effective police force will need to be capable in Arabic, which means literate as well as Arabic-speaking. For comparison, there are about 10,000 Palestinian Authority police in the West Bank, which has a population of 3 million, or 50% more than in Gaza. So 8000 is not excessive.
Trying to handle Gaza with fewer forces and a lesser mandate would be incredibly perilous. A return to extremist rule or chaos would be the likely outcomes.
Political conditions
Arab countries will only contribute to an international intervention with troops or money if the settlement guarantees at the least an eventual recognized Palestinian state, includingg by Israel and the US. It is going to be difficult for both even to promise that as a future step. Right now, President Biden cannot do it because it would undermine his political position in the US, even if it might help him among Democrats. Obviously Prime Minister Netanyahu won’t do it either. Recognition can only happen after his removal from power.
Even then, it would require a revolution in Israeli attitudes. A opposition-led government in Israel would certainly impose conditions. Those would include Hamas and other extremists out, nonviolence pledged, demilitarization accomplished. The Palestinians and most Arab countries will also condititon their cooperation. They will want Israeli troops out of Gaza and the West Bank, settlements withdrawn from much if not all of the West Bank, East Jerusalem clearly inside the Palestinian state.
All these are reasonable conditions lots of us would endorse. But getting Palestinians and Israelis to agree to them will, again, be a monumental task.
Humanitarian and economic requirements
The financing requirement Jim Dobbins cites is less daunting. In today’s world, $7-8 billion per year is doable. It might be more like $10 billion per year given the extensive destruction in Gaza. But getting humanitarian aid to the right people and money spent responsibly will still be challenging. Israel will want to inspect everything shipped into Gaza and monitor its use. Ditto with the funds. Israel will not again risk resources being used to dig tunnels and build rockets rather than feed the needy. Arab Gulf countries will not want Israel to maintain its stranglehold on their resources.
UNRWA is also an important issue humanitarian and economic issue. Once the fighting ends, it will be damaged but hopefully still capable. If you want to rid Gaza of Hamas, UNRWA or something derived from it is indispensable. But the Israelis are trying to destroy it. If they succeed, the difficulties of delivering aid after the war will be redoubled.
Neighbors are the good news
Another rule of thumb from previous interventions is that neighbors matter. If they are hostile to the post-war effort, they can and likely will hinder it. For both Jordan and Egypt, the neighbors with the longest borders with Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, success in Palestine would be welcome. They will try to be helpful so long as they believe Palestinian interests are well-served.
That will be less true of Lebanon and Syria, which have borders with Israel but not Palestine. Both Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria have their own issues. Neither is in a position to do much to undermine a serious peace settlement between Israel and Palestine. Even Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, other components of the “axis of resistance,” will be unable to do much to undermine a settlement that legitimate Palestinian leaders endorse.
The challenges are great but the alternative is worse
An international intervention isn’t a bad idea. It’s just a collosally challenging one. The alternative however is worse. In the absence of peacekeeping troops and police Gaza will see protection rackets, organized crime, and further radicalization. Hamas could revive. The only outcomes then will be autocratic, draconian, or both, not democratic. Neither Palestinians nor Israelis should welcome that. The difficult is better than the alternatives.
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The Kosovo Serbs need a hug
Kosovo is a young country, born from repression of Albanian peaceful protest and subsequent/consequent armed rebellion against Serbia. American-led NATO intervention made its travails shorter and less deadly than those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also made Kosovo perhaps the most pro-American, pro-EU country on earth.
But it is suffering a period of estrangement from both the US and EU. I first met its current prime minister, Albin Kurti, when he was a university student. He was working with Adem Demaci, who did not advocate Kosovo independence but rather a Balkan confederation. That would have included Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Albin in the past has advocated union with Albania. Day dreams of the past.
Today Albin is a vigorous advocate of Kosovo independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. I would even describe him as a “sovereigntist,” meaning that he prioritizes Kosovo behaving like a sovereign state, despite its lack of universal recognition and UN membership. He often seems unconcerned with the consequences.
What Albin wants
Many Kosovo Serbs still regard themselves as citizens of Serbia and do not want to acknowledge the Kosovo state, especially those who live in its northern municipalities. Those four are contiguous with Serbia and have Serb majorities. Albin insists the Kosovo Serbs use Kosovo license plates and pay their Kosovo electricity bills. He contests Serbia’s still dominant institutions in the north, the presence of Serb security forces there, the organized crime networks that Belgrade exploits, and Belgrade’s control there of education and health services.
He also wants to see transparency and accountability for the resources that flow from Belgrade to Serb majority municipalities throughout Kosovo. That is one reason the Central Bank is saying it will enforce the law requiring transactions in Kosovo in the legal currency (the euro). The police have confiscated cash and records of Serbian government shipments to Serbs in Kosovo.
Frictions
All this puts Albin at odds not only with many Kosovo Serbs but also with the Europeans and Americans. They worry about keeping Belgrade on side and stability in Kosovo. That means preferring the ad hoc arrangements that have allowed Serbs there, especially in the north, to live as if they are in Serbia. Albin’s inclination to act without consulting Brussels and Washington aggravates the situation. The Americans and Europeans aren’t used to a Kosovo leader who acts as if his country really is sovereign. They may or may not doubt the wisdom of insisting on euros for transactions, but in any event they want to be consulted and discuss the issues before implementation.
That may sound reasonable. But from Albin’s perspective, it is just as much an infringement on Kosovo sovereignty as the transactions in euros. A sovereigntist won’t want to comply, especially if his unilateralism garners popular support. That it does in Kosovo, which is far more democratic than Serbia has ever been. American diplomats can be certain that if they displace Albin again, as they did during the Trump Administration, that he will be back after the next elections with an even stronger mandate.
Winning hearts and minds
All this argues for a much better understanding of why the Kosovo Serbs are important to Kosovo and what can be done to win over those who are still resisting. Modern statehood in a democracy depends on popular support. The American constitution’s first three words say it well: “we the people.” There are not a lot of Serbs left in Kosovo–perhaps less than 6% of the population, as Kurti claims. But they are a key factor in Kosovo statehood.
They and their church and culture are a distinct characteristic of Kosovo that distinguishes it from Albania. Their attachment to Belgrade is a clear threat to Kosovo security. The Serbs have an outsized impact on Kosovo’s sovereignty and potentially its territorial integrity. Without their loyalty, Kosovo statehood will always be under threat.
Winning them over sounds like an impossible task, but it is not. The euro is a far better currency than the Serbian dinar, even if the latter is pegged to the former. Any reasonable person would much rather be using and receiving a currency managed from Brussels and accepted throughout the EU.
The Belgrade-inspired mass resignation of Serb judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff from their jobs and continuing boycott has seriously damaged the judicial system in northern Kosovo, to the detriment of the Serbs and others who live there. The Belgrade-instigated boycott of municipal elections in April 2023 was likewise damaging to Serbs, not Albanians.
Serbia’s security officials and organized crime gangs Belgrade directs impose indignities on Serbs in the north every day. Kosovo Serbs who join the Kosovo Security Force face intimidation and violence, not just targeted against themselves but also of their families.
Making peace
Much of the Serb population south of the Ibar River has made its peace with Pristina. They don’t love it. But many tolerate it and some are coming to appreciate at least its largesse if not its sovereignty.
Protection of the Serb church and private property is particularly important. Most of the important religious sites are in the south. The refusal so far of the Pristina authorities to implement a 2016 decision on the Decan/i monastery property has damaged their credibility in the Serb community. A unilateral decision to proceed would give Pristina an important patch of moral high ground to stand on.
But Kurti needs to go further. His government should work as closely as possible with the northern communities to win their acceptance and eventual loyalty. He has good cards to play. The Kosvo Serbs need a hug. Give it to them.
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Serbia is the problem, Serbs the solution
Where did they get this nice photo in my living room?
I did this interview for Arlinda Rrmoku of Pristina outlet Sinjali yesterday:
Dialogue
1. What progress has been made towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years?
A: Very little. Acceptance of documents and license plates. Payment of electricity bills. Good things that should have happened long ago.
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The main obstacle is Serbia’s resistance. But Kosovo has also failed to do all it could to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, which is a vital part of normalization.
3. How do you assess the role of the European Union in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The EU has failed to use its leverage with Serbia. It has used leverage with Kosovo, but inappropriately and without results.
Politics are an obstacle
4. What impact could the recent political changes in Kosovo and Serbia have on the normalization process?
A: Not much. In Serbia, Vucic remains very much in charge. In Kosovo Kurti and Osmani remain in charge.
Washington has been too
5. How do you see the role of the United States in promoting stability and peace in the Western Balkans, particularly regarding Kosovo-Serbia relations?
A: Washington has done poorly in recent years. It was a serious mistake to prioritize the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which in my view can only come with recognition.
6. What steps should be taken to address the remaining issues in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, such as the status of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo?
A: Pristina should be taking unilateral action to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb citizens, as indicated above. This will require much greater effort to meet their needs, allow Serbia’s legitimate subsidies to flow, and protect their property, in particular at the monastery in Decan/Decani.
As is Russia
7. How do you view the involvement of other regional actors, such as Russia and Turkey, in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process?
A: They don’t really play directly, but Russia is supporting Vucic’s illiberalism at home and irredentism with his neighbors. Turkey I see as a relatively minor player, though it occasionally will weigh in.
8. What are the potential implications of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue on the broader stability of the Western Balkans?
Security is at risk
A: The dialogue as conducted in recent years has not been a factor for stability. Its difficulties have echoed in the region.
9. How can economic cooperation and integration initiatives contribute to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: I believe it can: having populations and companies that prosper could lessen hostilities and open new possibilities. But Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo makes this difficult.
10. How do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans, particularly in light of recent developments?
A: It’s shaky, due mainly to Serbian malfeasance.
11. What are the main security challenges facing the region and how can they be addressed?
A: Serbia and Russia are the main security challenges in the region.
12. How do you see the role of NATO and other international organizations in ensuring security and stability in the Western Balkans?
A: NATO is the guarantor in Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the backup guarantor to the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That makes it pretty important to the region. The EU has the primary role in Bosnia.
13. What impact could unresolved disputes and ethnic tensions have on the security situation in the region?
A: I don’t worry about a big war or a long one, but localized instability and ethnic cleansing is a serious threat in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
Borders need improvement
14. How do you assess the effectiveness of border management and security cooperation among Western Balkan countries?
A: More would be better. Trade delays at the borders are too long, migration and trafficking too easy, and the border between Serbia and Kosovo too porous.
15. What role can the European Union play in promoting security sector reform and institution-building in the Western Balkans?
A: You’ll have to ask the EU, but my understanding is that the EU does a great deal on border management.
16. How do you see the potential for increased cooperation between Western Balkan countries and neighboring EU member states in addressing common security challenges?
A: I’d like to see more, especially between Croatia and Bosnia as well as Bulgaria and Macedonia, but political issues make that sometimes problematic.
Reciprocal reassurance is key
17. What are your recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to promote peace, stability, and reconciliation in the Western Balkans, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Kosovo needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Serb population, Serbia needs to ensure the comfort and loyalty of its Albanian population, and the two countries need to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. When they do those things, peace, stability and reconciliation will be far easier than today.
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Stevenson’s army, February 9
– Zelensky fired his top general. Eliot Cohen seems sympathetic to Zelensky
– Senate may miss Super Bowl for foreign aid fight
– Russia spreads disinformation in Africa
– Russia messages US civil war
– Biden stresses international law from aid recipients
– Army cancels helicopter program
– Europeans tell how to Trump-proof Europe
– Treasury sanctions some Ecuadorans
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Time to turn the policy around
There is no exaggeration in what Albin is saying. President Vucic financed, supported, and orchestrated the terrorist attack of September 24. The Kosovo police the EU wanted (and continues to want) withdrawn from northern Kosovo responded professionally, killed three of the perpetrators, and prevented worse from happening. Washington and Brussels know this but won’t say it. They prefer to allow Vucic to get off scot-free.
They are likewise allowing him to avoid responsibility for the unfair national and fraudulent Belgrade elections of December 27. The European Parliament has called for a commission to investigate. But so far the European Commission, the Council, and most of the Member States are keeping their mouths shut about an election that wouldn’t pass muster in any EU country. It didn’t come close to the relatively free and fair elections in recent years in Kosovo, including two that installed Kurti in office.
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil
Why this “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” approach to someone who is taking an EU candidate country into ever closer alignment with Russia and China? Many tell me the ammunition Serbia supplies to Ukraine is a factor. But Belgrade surely ships as much ordnance or other military supplies to Moscow as it does to Kyiv. It is unlikely Vucic would cut off Kyiv out of spite for Western criticism. Inat only goes so far when it is a question of profits for your arms manufacturer friends.
Support for “stability” is another possible explanation. But Vucic has no viable opposition, either on the liberal democratic side of Serbian politics or the ethnic nationalist side. Serbia’s problem is a lack of political competition, not an excess of it. He is the destabilizing force both in his country’s politics and in its relations with its neighbors.
The internationals are part of the problem
Lack of international political horsepower is another explanation. EU negotiator Miroslav Lajcak is exhausted and at the end of his rope. The dialogue he has led for more than three and a half years has played out. Belgrade has repeatedly and loudly renounced supposed “legally binding” agreements reached there. Yesterday he refused to sign them at the Security Council. Without real progress on de facto if not de jure recognition, Pristina refuses to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities that Lajcak and American negotiator Gabe Escobar unwisely made their top priority.
Many hope things will improve with Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien in charge. He has been appropriately blunt with the Bosnians. But it is not clear whether he is prepared to dial up the heat on Vucic about the Serbian elections, the dialogue with Pristina, Belgrade’s September 24 terrorist attack, or the kidnapping of three policemen on Kosovo territory. Jim recognizes the difficulty of any political settlement and tries to steer his efforts in the economic direction, hoping to flank the recognition issue.
So who cares?
None of this is a big problem, at least as seen from Washington or Brussels. But it isn’t a big problem until it is. Vucic is increasingly serious in his efforts to destabilize the neighboring countries with irredentist and self-victimizing claims on behalf of their Serb populations. The Russians will be pushing him in that direction, to echo and amplify their own claims in Ukraine. The atmosphere in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is increasingly tense. It would not take much effort to provoke instability even in all three, then justify the movement of Serbian tanks to protect the local Serb population from false rumors of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Even without revanchist moves into his neighbors, Vucic can exploit the Serbian domestic scene to promote violence. His security forces have been arresting and beating dissenters who dare to apologize for Serb atrocities in the 1990s. They have even lain flowers on the grave of a young girl killed by Serb security forces in Kosovo. The repression intimidates the Serbian opposition and ensures it will not retreat from hard-line Serbian nationalism on Kosovo. It is admittedly inclined not to do so anyway, but Vucic wants to make sure no one gets any fancy ideas about acknowledging the malfeasance of the Milosevic era. As Information Minister then, he was a mainstay of that regime.
What is to be done?
The right approach to this situation is to recognize failure and turn the policy around. I thought when he first came to power Vucic might be the guy to take Serbia in a democratic direction. He has chosen not to be. He instead decided not to befriend the West but rather to ally with the East. He dishes out just enough goodies to Washington and Brussels to keep them from calling his bluff. It doesn’t take much.
It is time to call him out, loudly and clearly. The US should insist on the transfer of the September 24 perpetrators to Kosovo for trial. As the European Parliament has proposed, the EU should stop its ample financing of Serbian efforts to prepare for accession until new elections are held, at least in Belgrade. The dialogue should be refocused on the economic issues O’Brien prefers. The EU and US should call out high-level corruption in Belgrade. The EU should lift the “consequences” it levied on Kosovo and acknowledge Pristina’s anti-corruption efforts. That would be a Balkans policy worthy of President Biden’s claims to supporting democracy.
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