Tag: European Union
Make partition unacceptable to the Serbs in northern Kosovo
Yesterday I wrote about what Serbia should be doing to atone for its unsuccessful insurrection in Kosovo. Today is I am writing about what Pristina should do to ensure that such a plot will never succeed. The Kosovo police should not be the only institution committed to preventing more terrorist attacks.
The secret sauce is budget and budget execution
The key for Pristina is gaining the acceptance, if not the affection, of Kosovo Serbs. To be fair, Pristina has already done a great deal to achieve this in communities south of the Ibar river. According to the Prime Minister himself:
Ten Serb-majority municipalities in have received on average 62% more budget (as a whole) per capita, as well as 89% more in capital expenditures per capita than the other 28 municipalities, 27 of which are Albanian-majority.
This is shown by Ministry of Finance Budget Dept. data from the last 14 yrs (’08-’22). When it comes to budget utilization, the 6 relatively well-integrated Serb-majority municip. in the south of have consistently performed better than the 4 in the north.
Tweeted February 7
Serbs, mainly from south of the Ibar, participate in Kosovo’s government and benefit visibly from doing so, even if they remain unsatisfied.
Last time I was in the four northern municipalities, admittedly a few years ago, the difference was apparent. The north was decrepit. Belgrade had mercilessly exploited it while Pristina largely ignored it. That needs to change: more budget execution and less interference from Belgrade are key. The EU and US need to do much more to convince Belgrade to withdraw its security forces and end their cooperation with local crime bosses.
Money won’t be enough
But more than cash and restraints on Belgrade are needed. Pristina should “reach out” to the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But what does this mean?
First and foremost it means establishing the rule of law there. The 2013 Brussels agreement between Belgrade and Pristina ensured it would be under the authority of Pristina’s police and courts, suitably integrated with Serbs. Belgrade has withdrawn the Serb personnel. Those who meet objective criteria for professionalism should be reintegrated and new hires recruited. Intimidation of Serbs who work for the Pristina institutions needs to be prosecuted, with help from EULEX.
Second, it means enabling free and pluralistic political discourse in the north. Pristina should aim to end the Srpska Lista political monopoly. The US and EU should provide assistance to other organizations of Serbs and others in the north to organize and campaign effectively. No new elections should be held before pluralism is ensured. It will do no good if the people who organized the insurrection win. In the meanwhile, Pristina should provide the non-Serb mayors with strong financial and political support to improve living conditions in their municipalities.
Third, Pristina should welcome dissent in the Serb communities, not only in the north. Opposition Albanian parties in Pristina should reach out to Serbs in the north to form coalitions. That would introduce a refreshing change in Kosovo politics.
Serbs are essential to Kosovo’s identity and independence
Most Kosovo Serbs do not like Kosovo’s independence. But so long as they remain in Kosovo–I hope forever–they are a vital piece of it. Without the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most live and most Serb religious sites are located, Kosovo as a separate state would lose an important reason for its separate existence. The Serbs are, in addition to a distinct history of the Albanian populations, one of the important factors that distinguish Kosovo from Albania. A Kosovo patriot today will want all Serbs and other minorities protected and even cherished.
I have the sense that Kosovars increasingly appreciate that point. Belgrade does not. President Vucic shows little concern for the welfare of the Serbs in Kosovo, especially those who live south of the Ibar. He uses their falsely portrayed plight to pump up war fever in Serbia. Belgrade is committed to partition. It wants the north, de facto if not de jure. Pristina should aim to make that something the northern Serbs reject.
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Presidential clarity in video
I try hard to keep an open mind and to understand opposing perspectives. But there are moments when doing so denies reality. This is one of those moments in the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. If Pristina had done anything like what Belgrade has done, you can be sure I would be just as tough with Kosovo.
The attempted Serbian uprising in northern Kosovo weekend before last was just that. Belgrade trained and equipped 30 or so paramilitary cadres, who murdered a Kosovo policeman before losing three of their own men. Likely they intended to spark much more violence and a crackdown, with a view to justifying a Serbian military intervention. Serbia mobilized its forces and sent them to the border/boundary, which suggests an invasion was planned.
Two dozen or so perpetrators escaped to Serbia, where they still harbor. They include he ringleader, Milan Radoicic. He is a close political partner of Serbia’s President Vucic, supposedly now under house arrest. I haven’t seen anything on the whereabouts of the others.
Verbal reactions aren’t enough
So far, the US and EU public reactions have been exclusively verbal. Both Washington and Brussels know that the Serbian state was responsible for an attempted violent insurrection with political purposes, aka terrorism. Kosovo President Osmani in the above video is right to be calling for sanctions. If Serbia gets off scot free in public, it will only incentivize similar behavior, perhaps not only by Belgrade. There are lots of capitals that might like to foment rebellion in neighboring democracies.
This attempted insurrection is only the latest in a long series of Serbian efforts to destabilize the situation in Kosovo. It is high time to impose serious sanctions. What might that mean? Here are a few thoughts about items that should be on the options menu:
- Suspend Air Serbia flights to the US and EU.
- Freeze World Bank and EBRD projects in Serbia.
- Suspend EU and US official financing for economic (not democracy) projects in Serbia.
- Freeze Serbia’s negotiations for EU accession.
- Suspend military cooperation between the Serbian Army and the Ohio National Guard.
- Impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals who ordered and supervised the training of the paramilitaries.
Expectations should be clear
Just as important as sanctions are the expectations they are intended to support and what Serbia would need to do to end them. Here are a few suggestions for those:
- An official, public apology by the President of Serbia to the President of Kosovo.
- Delivery to the Kosovo authorities for trial of all of the alleged perpetrators harbored in Serbia.
- Disbanding of the Srpska List political party.
- A documented end to all arming and equipping of insurrectionary forces inside Kosovo.
- Documented withdrawal of all covert Serbian security forces from Kosovo territory.
These aren’t much more than random thoughts. There are many other things that could be done, either by way of sanctions or demands. The point is that verbal denunciations alone will not suffice. The EU and US should be aiming to permanently weaken Serbia’s hold on northern Kosovo.
Right the balance
Kosovo is currently suffering substantial EU “consequences”, for its failure to comply with Brussels demands for removal of elected mayors from municipal buildings and reduction of Kosovo police presence in the Serb communities of Kosovo’s north. I don’t know how the mayors are doing, but it was presumably the police presence that enabled a quick, effective, and professional reaction to the attempted insurrection. The EU should lift its sanctions on Kosovo. The circumstances that led to their imposition have evaporated.
The time has come to recognize that “consequences” for Serbia are far more important and entirely justified. The moment has come to right the balance in EU and US policy, which parliamentarians in both have declared unfairly weighted in favor of Serbia and against Kosovo.
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It’s not only about Kosovo
Serbia’s effort to destabilize Kosovo so that it can claim control of its Serb-majority north should today be apparent to all. The license plate brouhaha of last year, the boycott of municipal elections in the spring, the subsequent rioting against the elected non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO peacekeepers in May, the kidnapping of Kosovo police–these were all prelude to the foiled insurrection last weekend.
Hear and see no evil
But the US and EU have so far failed to draw the necessary conclusions. They continue to call for dialogue without any consequences levied against Belgrade. The American Ambassador in Belgrade has even seen fit to suggest Serbia should join NATO. The overwhelming majority of Serbs reject that prospect. Their government’s recent behavior makes it not just illogical but nonsensical.
Within the EU, holding Serbia accountable is difficult because it requires unanimity. Viktor Orban’s pro-Russian Hungary is the usual spoiler. The outcome of yesterday’s election in Slovakia will make Bratislava Moscow’s next best friend.
In the US, it is the Biden Administration’s dogged and fruitless offer of goodies to turn Serbia towards the West that blocks any serious reevaluation of Balkans policy. The officials concerned simply do not want to accept failure. They continue to pursue appeasement, blind to Belgrade’s malfeasance.
It’s not only Kosovo
This blindness will have consequences. Serbia, like Russia, sees the West as divided and weak. Belgrade may back off temporarily in Kosovo in order not to provoke a serious reaction. But Serbia will continue to pursue irredentist aims in Montenegro and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Montenegro, government formation is blocked. The new president there wants pro-Russian parties in the coalition. The prime minister-designate is resisting, under pressure from Washington and Brussels. But he also rejects cooperation with the Western-oriented former ruling party. The country is in a dangerous limbo. Belgrade, working with the Serbian Orthodox Church, could well create chaos there, as it has repeatedly in recent years.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community High Representative has taken a series of unwise decisions that have damaged his own standing. He can no longer freely enter the 49% of the country’s territory known as Republika Srpska (RS). Its leader has taken the entity to within a few short steps of secession. He awaits only Moscow and Belgrade approval to declare de jure independence. He has already separated the RS from the country’s judicial and executive authority.
What’s next?
The Ukraine war will be an important factor in what happens next in the Balkans. The omens are not favorable in any of the possible scenarios.
If Russia were to lose in Ukraine, Moscow might well try to get compensation in the Balkans. The method would be destabilization, not naked aggression. Serbia could be given the green light and covert assistance to create chaos in northern Kosovo, force installation of a pro-Russian government in NATO member Montenegro, and allow RS to declare full autonomy if not independence.
If Russia wins in Ukraine by holding on to Crimea and at least part of Donbas, the precedent will reinforce Serbia’s push for at least de facto if not de jure control of Serb populations in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
If the war in Ukraine continues for another year, Moscow could decide to refocus on the Balkans and set a precedent there for what it wants in Ukraine.
All these scenarios would entail major losses for the the US and EU. They can be prevented. But only if current policies are reevaluated now and a much tougher approach taken to counter Serbian irredentism.
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Stiffening the approach to Serbia
Kosovo police and NATO forces in the Serb-majority north of the country over the weekend foiled an armed uprising. One Kosovo policeman and three terrorists were killed and others arrested. But most seem to have escaped. Serbia and its Srpska Lista political proxies in Kosovo have declared a day of mourning. That confirms their support for the insurrection. The little green men appear to have found safe haven inside Serbia.
Serbian President Vucic met subsequently with the Russian Ambassador. Vucic complained about “brutal ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, for which there is no evidence. We have no confirmation that Vucic ordered the armed uprising. But one of his mainstays in northern Kosovo was involved. Such things don’t happen without Belgrade’s knowledge. Vucic could have stopped it in advance or denounced it after the fact. He did not do either.
What this incident tells us
This incident is confirmation that Vucic does not intend to normalize relations with Kosovo. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue with that objective is a cover for his real goal. He wants separation of the four northern Serb-majority municipalities. He would prefer de jure partition and hopes that Russian success in annexing parts of Ukraine will validate that objective. But he would settle, for now, for de facto separate governance, in the form of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
Pristina has demonstrated that its police can handle, with NATO backing, a heavily armed group of several dozen determined militants. But it is just as clear that Serbian armor could move into Kosovo with ease. It is less than 25 miles, maybe an hour’s tank drive, from the nearest Serbian border crossing to north Mitrovica. NATO has recently beefed up its forces in Kosovo. But it is not clear whether they are equipped or trained for anti-armor warfare.
American and European diplomats think Serbia will not attempt such a move because of the political consequences. But Vucic knows better. He is trying to convince the world that Serbs are being ethnically cleansed from Kosovo. That could validate a claim his tanks protect civilians. That is why he repeatedly claims, without evidence, that such ethnic cleansing is ongoing, as he did yesterday in a meeting with the Russian Ambassador.
The American and European response
The Western response has been weak so far. Brussels and Washington have appealed to “both sides” to prevent further violence and escalation. This implicitly equates the sterling performance of the Kosovo police with an illegal armed uprising that could have caused instability throughout the Balkans. Those responsible for Balkans policy in both capitals are unwilling to admit failure of their efforts to lure Serbia westward. Instead, they are urging a quick return to “the dialogue.”
An alternative approach would denounce Belgrade’s support for the armed uprising, labeling it a terrorist act and levying sanctions against Vucic and his defense and national security officials. NATO would prepare its forces in northern Kosovo for defense against an armored invasion. The West would praise the Kosovo police and urge a fair and speedy trial for the perpetrators in Kosovo courts. Ambassadors to Belgrade would be withdrawn for consultations.
A new policy is needed
They could be sent back quickly with a single message: the era of appeasement is over. If Belgrade wants EU membership, Serbia needs to quickly:
- arrest and turn over the terrorists to the Kosovo authorities.
- drop its insistence on separate governance of Serbs in Kosovo.
- align with Ukraine sanctions on Russia.
- support Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the United Nations.
If Belgrade refuses, the EU should announce it is freezing accession talks. The US should suspend military cooperation with Serbia, including cooperation with the Ohio National Guard.
Washington and Brussels should also prepare to spur Pristina to reach out to northern Serbs to find alternatives to Srpska Lista. In addition, Pristina should seek to ensure that there are no anti-Serb incidents throughout Kosovo, in order to invalidate Vucic’s claims of ethnic cleansing. Pristina should promptly investigate any incidents that do occur. The courts should promptly try perpetrators.
It is time to reconfigure Western policy on Serbia and Kosovo. Renewal of the current approach will bring new failures. A firmer approach with Belgrade is the necessary first step.
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Stevenson’s army, September 19
– Politico’s story on the farm bill shows how lobbyists work.-
– National review shows Europe is helping Ukraine.
– NATO members have also been increasing their own defense budgets
– WSJ says Chinese Foreign Minister was fired for having an affair while ambassador to US
– NYT says US wants a security treaty with Saudi Arabia modeled after Japan treaty
– House GOP pretends they have a plan to balance the federal budget
– Meanwhile the House GOP has failed to move either its spending package or the DOD appropriations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A fruitless approach that will continue
- It is a great pleasure to be able to participate in this launch of the New Lines Western Balkans Observatory. I am an admirer of New Lines, which has brought fresh thinking to Washington, especially but not only on Middle East issues.
- I hope to see the same devotion to new perspectives, deep analysis, and trenchant critiques from the Balkans New Lines.
- However I am an old Balkans hand. I fear I will not live up to my own expectations.
- I see in the Balkans today more of the same ethnic nationalist ambitions that haunted the region in the 1990s. The homicidal will and capacity have declined.
- But the effort to channel politics towards enabling autocrats to exploit the region’s ethnic polarization is all too familiar.
Belgrade’s ambitions
- The most ambitious effort of this sort is headquartered in Belgrade. Backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian security services allied with Russia, Alexandar Vucic is aiming to make himself an elected autocrat and the godfather of Serbs throughout the region.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, he does this by seeking full control of Milorad Dodik, who is struggling to maintain his autonomy. But Dodik needs Serbia’s financial and ideological backing.
- In Montenegro, Vucic does it through recently victorious and willing electoral proxies. These include both President Milatovic and Prime Minister-designate Spajic.
In Kosovo, Vucic’s focus is on the north
- I have been asked to focus on Kosovo. There Belgrade has continued to control the Serbs of the four municipalities north of the Ibar since the end of the war in 1999.
- Belgrade decides their cooperation and noncooperation with Pristina. North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvecan and Leposavic have little say.
- The refusal to accept Kosovo license plates, the boycott of the last municipal elections, the rioting against non-Serb mayors, the attack on NATO soldiers, the kidnapping of Kosovo police in the north, and the refusal to guarantee participation in new elections have all been decided in Belgrade.
- The message is that Serbia will not allow the Serbs of the north to be governed within Kosovo’s constitutional framework unless they get—through the Association for Serb Majority Municipalities—virtual autonomy that removes them from that framework.
Russia likes it, but what about the EU and US?
- Either way, Pristina loses, de facto or de jure.
- It is clear why Russia would want this. Ethnic partition of Kosovo offers a precedent that could be useful for Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.
- It also undermines a Western achievement, the state-building project in Kosovo.
- Despite its many imperfections, Kosovo is the most successful of the democratic enterprises in the Balkans since 1995, and perhaps worldwide.
- It is less clear why the EU and US are backing this ethnonationalist ambition for separate governance in Kosovo.
- Of course, Brussels and Washington deny they support ethnic partition.
The facts belie the denials
- But have you heard a peep out of them about return of the Albanians and other non-Serbs to North Mitrovica, which was plurality but not majority Serb before 1999?
- Have they insisted Belgrade offer the same accommodations to Albanians in southern Serbia that they want for Belgrade in northern Kosovo?
- The Americans write op/eds about guaranteeing that the Association will not be allowed to become a second Republika Srpska. But are they prepared to commit the U.S. government in writing to precisely what that means?
- They cite arrangements similar to the Association that exist within the EU. But all those arrangements are between states that recognize each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- So why shouldn’t Serbia and the five non-recognizing EU states recognize Kosovo first, before creation of the Association ?
The EU is understandable
- The position of Brussels is, I fear, all too understandable.
- It is in the hands of a High Representative who has never been willing to see Kosovo recognized or enter the UN.
- With the UK gone, Germany distracted, Hungary and Croatia backing him, and five non-recognizers, Borell feels he has adequate support from the member states.
- I expect better of Miroslav Lajcak, who played a key role in the independence of Montenegro.
- However, he also promised when he first became Slovak Foreign Minister that Bratislava would recognize Kosovo. But he failed to deliver.
Washington is more mysterious
- The position of Washington is more mysterious. It seems to derive in part from people who have spent too much time listening to Serbs moaning about how the United States is unkind to Serbia.
- Some diplomats believe all Belgrade wants is a better deal for Serbs in the neighboring countries.
- It also reflects the ambition for a “Europe whole and free,” with Serbia in the West. With no evidence at all, American diplomats are claiming that Belgrade has embraced the West, even as it increases alignment with Moscow and Beijing.
- I have little doubt that whatever Serbian ammunition ends up in Ukraine more goes to Russia.
- Vucic’s summertime visit to President Zelensky aimed not to support Ukraine but to prevent Kyiv recognition of Kosovo.
The result is Kosovo isolation
- Kosovo is more isolated than ever. That is a problem.
- However much you oppose Serbia’s ethnonationalist ambitions, Pristina has lost traction with Brussels and Washington.
- It gets no credit, even when putting forward at last week’s dialogue with Belgrade a step in the direction of forming the Association. Albeit in accordance with Kosovo’s own requirements.
- I confess I do not know how to solve this problem. I thought the August letter from the American and European legislators urging a rebalancing of EU and US policy toward more evenhandedness was correct.
- But so long as current personnel are in place, I expect the biased, counterproductive, and wrong policies to continue.
Reset is needed
- The Biden Administration needs a policy reevaluation and reset. But that would require courage and tenacity. Someone would have to tell the Secretary of State that current policy is not working.
- That someone would also need to develop a new, more even-handed, and more effective approach.
- I am not expecting that kind of courage and tenacity in the leadup to a national election.
- I would however argue it could garner more Bosnian and Albanian votes in 2024 than it would lose among Serbs and Croats.
Ukraine is the best hope
- The best hope for the moment is Ukraine’s victory. That would end Russian territorial ambitions, take the wind out of ethnonationalist sails worldwide, and give Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo a leg up in contesting Serbia’s regional ambitions.
- But Ukrainian victory is not imminent.
- I conclude, sadly: we are going to have to continue to put up with a fruitless approach to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.
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