Tag: France
Stevenson’s army, September 22
– House takes up the NDAA today. Here’s the rule governing time and amendments.
– RollCall says congressional budgets flat but demand for services rising. Here’s the CMF study cited in article.
– FP says State plans big expansion of its “China desk.”
-As some argued in class, Time says Macron anger helps his reelection candidacy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 21
Charlie says this is a PM edition, but I didn’t get the AM. Sorry about that:
Dan Drezner has more about AUKUS, including how France had done to Japan, what the US has now done to France.
Profs Barno & Bensahel says the AVF [All Volunteer Force] needs to rethink.
Air Force secretary reveals info about new B21 and raises doubts about hypersonics.
SCMP sees big drop in Chinese FDI in US
WaPo lists areas of US-Chinese tech competition.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 17
– China reacts by seeking to join TPP.
– Arms controllers get concerned.
-Latin American summit looks to replace OAS.
-LIndsey Graham looks to pull a Charlie Wilson.
And look at all the stuff Members want to put in the NDAA.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
Radicalization thrives as French Muslims lack a coherent identity
The position of French Muslims has become increasingly controversial. The experience of several terrorist attacks and the proliferation of Salafism met a government response. A new “Islamist separatism” bill, which would further expand separation of church and state, is currently being passed through the French parliament. It would prohibit any civil servant or contractor for the public sector from wearing religious symbols. Although the bill does not explicitly mention Islam as such, many fear that it could unfairly target and further alienate Muslims in France.
The Wilson Center June 16 held a seminar on the position of French Muslims in the French state. The panel agreed that the current bill is an attempt by President Macron to appeal to right-wing voters. He faces reelection in 2022. Extreme right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen is polling well. France’s “Muslim Question” emerged from the political tradition of laïcité, which enforces strict separation of church and state, and decades of marginalization and exclusion of French Muslims. If French society doesn’t find better ways to engage this community, radicalization will continue. Nonetheless, the panel conceded that internal discussions in the Muslim community to find alternative Islamic narratives are also needed.
The speakers were:
Amel Boubekeur
Sociologist
EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales)
Steven Philip Kramer
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Professor of National Security Studies
Eisenhower School, National Defense University
Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow
Institut Montaigne
Senior Partner & Paris Office Head
Brunswick
William Drozdiak (moderator)
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Author of “The Last President of Europe: Emmanuel Macron’s Race to Revive France and Save the World”
A history of laïcité
Drozdiak introduced the tradition of ‘laïcité’ (secularism) in French politics. He mentioned that it is central to French political life, as it is enshrined in the first article of the constitution since 1905. It is more far-reaching than the separation of church and state in most democracies, and essentially relegates religious affiliation to the private sphere. Today it is a controversial topic. To some it is the glue that allows the French to live together despite their religious differences, but to others it has become an anti-religious tool used to discriminate against Muslims in France. El Karoui further nuanced this controversy. To him there are three visions of laïcité:
- Laïcité as an essentially legal term: the separation of church and state, a core democratic right.
- Laïcité as a historical battle between the Catholic church and the state that some think is being waged today between Islam and the state.
- Laïcité as a tenet of the Enlightenment. Here the discussion is cast in terms of reason as opposed to religion. The protection of the rational political process requires the exclusion of religious considerations.
Failed integration of Muslims in France
Muslims today often feel disconnected from the French state and society. Kramer outlined five historical reasons for this based on his forthcoming book:
- The shadow of colonialism and harsh decolonization processes scarred and uprooted huge populations of Muslims in the 20th century. Around a million Muslims left for France from Algeria alone. The atrocities of colonialism left deep impressions on these migrants.
- The historical timing of Muslim migration to France also affected their integration. The major wave of immigration came during the industrializing boom after World War II. Muslim men migrated to France to work and eventually brought their families. After this initial boom, however, the economy slowed down and began to deindustrialize, leaving many Muslims unemployed and marginalized.
- French urban policy also pushed Muslims to the fringes. During the boom period, massive social housing projects were set-up on the peripheries of cities. Many French natives left these areas when mortgages became more easily attainable in the 1970s, leaving behind Muslim ghettos in the ‘banlieues’.
- Kramer sees laïcité as part of the issue as well. He believes that opposition to public religiosity has turned anti-religious ideas against Muslims in particular. This is worsened by the Rassemblement National party, which was founded by returning white settlers from North Africa and has always held anti-Islamic sentiments.
- Most recently, the impact of Islamic terrorism on the Western world and in France has led to a mutual cycle of distrust and alienation between French society and its Muslim members. This has also pushed politicians such as Macron into security-based thinking surrounding Islam to counter the political rise of his main rival, Marine Le Pen.
The position of Muslims today and the new law
Boubekeur and El Karoui then spoke on the current issues the Muslim community in France faces. Boubekeur believes that the way the French state engages with Muslim communities has been entirely unsuccessful. It focuses on using appointed representatives of the Muslim community to speak for Muslims. However, this treats French Muslims as believers, rather than citizens. Furthermore, these representatives (often foreign Imams) lack local legitimacy. Their inability to address Islamophobia in France has left young Muslims disillusioned with their leadership.
Further adding to Muslims’ alienation is the fact that the state’s relationship to them has always been led by political agenda:
- In the 1970s, this meant Islam was seen as an immigration issue (not French, but migrants);
- In the 1980s and 90s it was seen as a banlieue issue;
- In the 2000s it has become securitized and linked to threats of radicalization and terrorism.
El Karoui identified three main issues among the current Islamic community in France:
- There is now a real Muslim middle class (10% hold a Master’s degree or higher, 1/3 a Bachelor’s) but there remains an undereducation problem among Muslims.
- A portion of young Muslims are looking for an identity. They don’t feel fully French, but also don’t feel Algerian, Tunisian, etc. They have increasingly started to identify primarily as Muslims, and some have made a very conservative interpretation of Islam their identity.
- Other Muslims feel that there are no adequate representatives for them in society. They are not tied to foreign states, nor do they identify as Muslims (i.e. they don’t want the Islamic community leaders to represent them). If this group cannot be represented and engaged, Islamism will continue to be an issue and the far right will continue to abuse it.
New ways to engage Muslims and new narratives to counter radicalization
The panel offered some solutions. Boubekeur focused on the ways in which the French state interacts with Muslims. El Karoui emphasized the need for new, authentic, Islamic counternarratives.
Boubekeur said the state has two options:
- Let Muslims engage in discussions with the French state as citizens (whomight have certain special needs, e.g. their desire to wear the veil in public spaces) or;
- Stick to a neutral, secular state, and let French Muslims express themselves without the weight of being associated with terrorists. Also allow them to organize themselves better, which is now frustrated in the name of countering Islamist networks.
According to El Karoui, the current proliferation of Salafist and Islamist ideologies can only be solved if Muslims find their own solutions in the struggle between Salafism, Islamism, and faith. The solution is in their hands. Muslims need to create symbols against Salafism and alternative narratives of Islam that appeal to young people.
Watch the recording of the event here:
Stevenson’s army, June 19
Politico says WH froze aid to Ukraine just before the summit. WH denies story. You decide.
WSJ says US is withdrawing significant military assets from Middle East. No denials yet.
Iranian ships no longer heading to Venezuela.
Hard-liner wins Iran presidency.
FP says France & US differ over Sahel policy.
Lawfare writer discusses legal aspects of US China sanctions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).