Tag: gaza
Beyond ceasefire, what can really happen?
The Gaza ceasefire went into effect today, after a few hours delay. Reports are that humanitarian supplies are entering. Hamas and Israel are arranging or exchange of hostages and prisoners. This phase is to last 6 weeks, after which a more permanent cessation of hostilities is to commence. What are the prospects for a longer agreement?
The next phase
Secretary of State Blinken helpfully outlined the Biden Administration’s plans for phase 2 at the Atlantic Council last week:
We believe that the Palestinian Authority should invite international partners to help establish and run an interim administration with responsibility for key civil sectors in Gaza, like banking, water, energy, health, civil coordination with Israel. The international community would provide funding, technical support, and oversight. The interim administration would include Palestinians from Gaza and representatives from the PA—selected following meaningful consultation with communities in Gaza—and would hand over complete responsibility to a fully reformed PA administration as soon as it’s feasible.
The administrators would operate in close cooperation with a senior UN official, who should oversee the international stabilization and recovery effort.
An interim security mission would be made up of members of partner nation security forces and vetted Palestinian personnel. Its responsibilities would include creating a secure environment for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and ensuring border security, which is crucial to preventing smuggling that could allow Hamas to rebuild its military capacity. We would stand up a new initiative to train, to equip, to vet a PA-led security force for Gaza to focus on law and order and gradually take over for the interim security mission.
These arrangements would be enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution.
Some of our partners have already expressed their willingness to contribute troops and police for such a mission—but if, and only if, it is agreed that Gaza and the West Bank are reunified under a reformed PA as part of a pathway to an independent Palestinian state.
This depicts a fairly conventional late 1990s style “integrated” intervention. The UN Security Council authorized interim administrations like this in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (1999). They were not brilliantly successful, but they markedly improved the situation in all three places. Blinken omits one essential ingredient for success: executive authority. The UNSC will need to empower the interim authorities to issue laws, arrest people, and use force to protect civilians.
One new wrinkle here is the Palestinians, who are divided politically and geographically. Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas has already declared its readiness to take on its assigned role. I don’t know anyone who would agree with that proposition, as he has done little to reform it. Besides, it is going to have trouble gaining traction in territory ruled by Hamas for almost two decades. Hamas has said it is prepared to give up its governance role. But at least some of the remaining Hamas militants are going to make sure the PA has a hard time.
Other new wrinkles
I see little prospect that the current Israeli government will accept what Blinken proposes. Netanyahu will not want the ceasefire to last past 6 weeks. That would mark the beginning of the end for him. His right-wing coalition partners had a hard time accepting the ceasefire. They will not accept an international administration whose mandate includes eventual creation of a Palestinian state. In addition, if the war ends or his government collapses, Netanyahu will have to face prosecution and elections. He doesn’t want that.
It will not be possible to start up an international administration without Israeli cooperation. Neighbors are vital factors in determining the success or failure of post-war stabilization and reconstruction. Arab Gulf states won’t agree to contribute troops, police, and money without Israeli approval.
What remains of Hamas will also oppose the next phase, which threatens to end its rule permanently. After 6 weeks of recuperation and attempts to re-arm, extremists in Hamas will try to derail the process. It will only take an attack or two on innocent Israelis to restart the war.
The final new wrinkle
If ever we get to the next phase, it will be in the Trump Administration. In his first term, Trump gave the Israelis 100% support. He abandoned support for the two-state solution and moved the US embassy to Jerusalem. He accepted annexation of the Golan Heights and West Bank settlements as legal. His negotiators put forward a peace plan that paid little attention to the Palestinian goal of statehood.
Trump is reputed to have played a key role in getting the ceasefire. But he did that by threatening Hamas, not the Israelis. Blinken in his remarks at the Atlantic Council suggested that
Israelis must abandon the myth that they can carry out de-facto annexation without cost and consequence to Israel’s democracy, to its standing, to its security.
Trump isn’t going to tell them that. It will happen only if Israelis go to the polls and elect a government committed to Israeli democracy. That is what Netanyahu and his right-wing allies will try to prevent. If they succeed, the war will go on.
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An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
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Democracy doesn’t favor a serious peace
The headlines today say Hamas and Israel have reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that will
- allow exchange of hostages/prisoners,
- get Israeli troops to withdraw, and
- infuse humanitarian assistance.
All that is good.
What it is
But it is still only a ceasefire, not even a formal end to hostilities never mind a peace settlement. The ceasefire is to last seven weeks, during which negotiations on future arrangements for Gaza are to continue. As Tony Blinken put it yesterday:
The ceasefire deal itself requires the Israeli forces to pull back and then, assuming you get to a permanent ceasefire, to pull out entirely. But that’s what’s so critical about this post-conflict plan, the need to come to an agreement on its arrangements, because there has to be something in place that gives Israelis the confidence that they can pull out permanently and not have a repeat of the last, really, decade.
That is a good reminder. A ceasefire won’t last if there is no mutually enticing way out of the conflict. What might that be?
The rub
Therein lies the rub. The obvious way out would be a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. It could be run by a successor to the hapless Palestinian Authority. The current Israeli government is dead set against that. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu could accept it, which is doubtful, his coalition partners would not. A new Israeli government will be needed for any post-war settlement that appeals to most Palestinians.
But this government has been successful in doing what Israelis wanted in Gaza and Lebanon. It has diminished Hamas and all but disemboweled Hizbollah. It has also weakened Iran. Netanyahu would likely win a new election, but have no clear path to a parliamentary majority. Nor would anyone else. The pattern of indecisive Israeli elections would continue. There is no sign of a majority that favors a Palestinian state. Democracy does not favor a serious peace settlement.
Trump’s challenge
This is a big problem for the newly elected Trump Administration. It has assembled a mostly pro-Israel diplomatic team. It is difficult to picture Ambassador Huckabee bludgeoning the Israelis into accepting a Palestinian state. Trump’s threat that “all hell will break lose” absent an agreement was intended to threaten Hamas, not Israel.
Trump could turn the table and speak out for a Palestinian state. He did it at least once in his first term. But then he deferred to the Israelis:
If the Israelis and the Palestinians want one state, that’s OK with me. If they want two-state, that’s OK with me. I’m happy if they’re happy.
That is not resounding support for a Palestinian state.
The Saudi factor
It will be up to Riyadh to make it happen. Saudi Arabia wants normalization with Israel as well as a defense and nuclear agreements with the United States. It would be willing to help finance Gaza reconstruction. But it has to get a “concrete, irrevocable steps in a three to five year time horizon” to a Palestinian state in the bargain.
Israel wants normalization with the Saudis as well. Can fragmented Israeli democracy, American pro-Israel diplomats, and a Saudi autocrat combine to produce a Palestinian state? Anything is possible.
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A stronger American still fumbles
President Biden made a farewell appearance at the State Department yesterday. As a former Foreign Service officer, I’m of course delighted that he did this. It is especially important and timely because the Department now faces Donald Trump’s threat of loyalty tests and mass firings.
Biden’s understandably directed his remarks at justifying what his Administration has done on foreign policy. So how did he really do?
The bar was low
Certainly Biden can justifiably claim to have strengthened America’s alliances. The bar was low. Both in Europe and Asia the first Trump Administration had raised doubts. Allies could not depend on Washington’s commitment to fulfill its mutual defense obligations. Biden’s claim that compared to four years ago America is stronger because of renewed and expanded alliances is true. He is also correct in claiming he has not gone to war to make it happen.
The extraordinary strength of the American economy is an important dimension of this strength. Voters decided the election in part on the issue of inflation. But the Fed has largely tamed that and growth has been strong throughout. Manufacturing is booming, including vital semi-conductor production. Investment in non-carbon energy sources has soared. The defense industrial based is expanding.
Biden is also correct in asserting that America’s antagonists are worse off. Russia has failed to take Ukraine because of the US effort to gather support for Kyiv. Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria are weaker. Only the Houthis in Yemen are arguably stronger than four years ago.
China is facing serious domestic economic and demographic challenges. But I don’t know why Biden claims it will never surpass the US. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, it already has, though obviously per capita GDP in China remains much lower.
Some claims gloss over big problems
Biden is rightly proud that there is no longer war in Afghanistan, but he glosses over the chaotic withdrawal. He also doesn’t mention the failure of the Taliban to keep its commitments.
He vaunts progress on climate change, but without acknowledging that the goal of keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees centigrade will not be met.
Biden talks about infrastructure in Africa. But not about its turn away from democracy, civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and the unresolved conflict in Libya.
He urges that Iran never be allowed to “fire” a nuclear weapon. That is a significant retreat from the position that Iran should never be allowed to have one.
Biden mentions the impending Hamas/Israel ceasefire. But he says nothing about Israel’s criminal conduct of the war in Gaza. Nor does he blame Israel’s right-wing government for the long delay in reaching a deal.
Biden’s legacy
At the end, Biden seeks to bequeath three priorities to Trump: artificial intelligence, climate change, and democracy. He no doubt knows that Trump isn’t going to take the advice on climate or democracy. He might on artificial intelligence, as his Silicon Valley tycoons will want him to.
Sad to say, Biden’s legacy will lie in other areas. Fearful of nuclear conflict with Russia, he failed to give Ukraine all the support it needs to defeat Russia. He was reluctant to rein in Israel for more than a year of the Gaza war. He failed to stop or reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. America is stronger than it was four years ago, but it has not always used that strength to good advantage.
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Wrong and wrong, maybe wrong again?
I could of course be wrong again. But that’s the gloomy picture I am seeing on the day after an election gone wrong.
I was 100% wrong about the outcome of this election. I expected Harris to win the battleground states. She lost them. I expected her to win the popular vote by a wide margin. It’s not yet clear, but it appears she lost it.
I should have known better
I spent the last week in deep red Hall County, Georgia, doing “voter protection” for the Georgia Democratic Party. That entails monitoring paper ballot processing as well as helping adjudicate ambiguously marked ballots. I also duplicated a few dozen so that the scanner can read them. This is done in cooperation with Republicans and County election officials. Yesterday I was a poll watcher in a precinct whose voters include both a retirement community and mostly Mexican immigrants. The electoral mechanism both in the county government center and at the polling place was professional, efficient, and thus boring.
The demographics were more interesting. Hall is a county of more than 42,000 people that depends heavily on two industries. Chickens are first. Medicine is second. Both industries use large numbers of Mexican immigrants. There are not many native-born Americans feeding and slaughtering the chickens or tending the bed pans. Nor I imagine would you get on well doing construction, another thriving sector, if you didn’t speak Spanish.
By the time I got to the polling center yesterday about 11 am the early rush was over. Mid-day belonged mainly to the retirees, many of whom looked like they were patrons of the medical center. The late afternoon saw a rush of mostly younger Mexican Americans. A young US-born Mexican American poll worker provided translation whenever needed. I observed no tension of any sort between the two demographics. The mostly retired poll workers were impeccably correct and helpful to the immigrants, all of whom were US citizens. I hope they all recognized the symbiosis between the two communities.
My precinct voted more than 60% for Trump. Symbiosis doesn’t extend to the ballot box. I have no doubt about where most of the Trump and Harris votes came from.
It’s identity politics
Trump has found a way to make voting for him a question of identity. His racist dog whistles were vital to his first election. His macho man displays are vital to this second, as they shifted male votes in his direction. I find both difficult to understand, as I don’t regard white, male identity as anything more than an arbitrary classification. You could just as well call me short and old, with much more physical evidence to back the claim. I’m not proud of being white, male, short, or old.
I am proud of being an American. To me, that means having lots of individual rights and collective responsibilities. During my lifetime, I have seen the rights expanded. Younger people, Blacks, Latinos, women, and LGBTQ Americans now enjoy far more freedom than they did in my 1950s childhood. It seems to me the responsibility of white males to adjust to those changes. “All men are created equal” is not ambiguous (even if it should now read “all people”). “Make America Great Again” is a slogan that appeals to those who want to return to segregated, male-dominated, heterosexual America. I don’t share that aspiration.
I expect Trump to try to fulfill many of his promises. He made them to cater to interest groups that own him. He will try to deport large numbers of undocumented immigrants and end asylum. As President, Trump will impose more tariffs, raising the cost of living and inducing retaliation by other countries. He will fire large numbers of civil servants. His allies in Congress will try to end abortion country-wide and repeal Obamacare. They will give more tax relief to the rich and burden the middle class. Trump will welcome cryptocurrencies and try to manipulate the Federal Reserve, undermining monetary stability. His Supreme Court nominees will be people prepared to adjust their jurisprudence to his policy preferences.
I could be wrong again
As bad as I think the re-election of Trump is for America, I fear it is worse for the world. Trump will do at least some of what he has promised. We will see an end to American support for Ukraine and surrender of part of it to Putin. That will encourage Russia to try again in Moldova or the Baltics. He will withdraw American troops from South Korea and Japan, encouraging them to get their own nuclear weapons.
The Balkans, which concern many of my readers, will not be top priority. But Trump’s re-election will encourage ethnonationalists throughout the region. If Ukraine is partitioned, why shouldn’t Serbia to try to capture northern Kosovo and Republika Srpska? Why shouldn’t Kosovo join Albania? Washington might even help. War will be a real possibility. Ethnic cleansing and state collapse will follow. All the while, the Trump family will be benefiting financially from Jared Kushner’s Saudi-financed investments in Serbia and Albania.
In the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will get Trump’s full support. The new Trump Administration will not restrain Israel in Gaza, the West Bank, or Lebanon. Trump will likely encourage military confrontation with Iran. That is the only option left to deter Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Trump will try to get the Saudis to recognize Israel. They will string him along. It remains to be seen whether they will accept Netanyahu’s “less than a state” for Palestine. That proposition is essentially the continuation of the status quo: one state with unequal rights. It is what many call “apartheid.”
I could of course be wrong again. But this is the gloomy picture I am seeing on the day after an election gone wrong.
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It will end when Israel wants it to
Israel continues to enjoy military successes in both Gaza and Lebanon, but its adversaries fight on. The death of Yahya Sinwar leaves Hamas without clear leadership. The death of Hassan Nasallah likewise left Hezbollah without clear leadership. But both Islamist movements continue to attack. Their cadres seek “martyrdom.”
The options
Americans, official and unofficial, are urging Israel to take the win and embark on the day after. Israel has done enormous damage to both Hamas and Hezbollah. The Israel Defense Force has decimated, but not eliminated, their underground facilities, drones, rockets, and missiles, leadership, and personnel. Ending the fighting in Gaza as well as Lebanon would open the possibility of a prisoner/hostage swap in Gaza. It would also put pressure on the UN Security Council to move Hezbollah north of the Litani River. UNSC resolution 1701 requires that. It is the declared Israel war objective in Lebanon.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu isn’t buying. He wants to go after Iran, which is a state sponsor of both Hamas and Hezbollah. Israeli retaliation for Iran’s massive military attack on October 1, which did little damage, is still pending. His Defense Minister has promised it will be “lethal” and “surprising.” But it has also been delayed. The Americans want the Israelis not to target Iran’s nuclear program or its oil production facilities. The former will trigger an Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons. The latter would bump up world oil prices.
The politics
The wars in Gaza and Lebanon are not going to end before November 5. That would give Kamala Harris a big boost at the polls. Netanyahu doesn’t want that. He wants Donald Trump back in the White House. President Biden is threatening to withhold military assistance to Israel unless humanitarian assistance starts flowing again to Gaza. Trump would not do that. Judging from past experience, he would not seek to restrain Israel at all.
No matter whom the US elects, Netanyahu has his own political calculus. His only hope for remaining in power is a military victory so overwhelming Israelis will forget his faults. They include his personal malfeasance and his government’s failure on October 7. A dramatic blow to Iran would do the trick.
The civilians
In the meanwhile, civilians are suffering the brunt of war. The situation in Gaza is unprecedented. Virtually its entire population is displaced. Most of its housing stock, its educational and health systems, as well as its economy are destroyed. People are desperate. Some are starving. There is ample evidence the Israeli army has targeted civilians and children.
In Lebanon, the destruction is less extensive so far, but Netanyahu has threatened to make it like Gaza. The Israelis have obliterated some border communities. They have also hit Beirut, including areas that are not Hezbollah strongholds. Many Lebanese are displaced. Several thousand are dead.
How does this end?
Most Israelis want a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange. Most American Jews and Arabs have wanted that too. But Netanyahu wants to continue to fight Hamas and Hezbollah. He would also like to hit Iran hard. President Biden will to try to restrain him. A President Harris would do likewise. Trump would not.
Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated that he does what he wants. The Middle East wars won’t end until the Israeli government wants them to. That isn’t going to happen while Netanyahu is in office.
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