Tag: Germany
Stevenson’s army, February 28
– David Frum explains the economic problems Russia faces.
– NYT notes Germany’s pivot.
– NYT explains Israel’s balancing act.
– WaPo notes Russian military problems.
– WSJ says Putin manifesto was required reading in Moscow last summer.
– Tears on K Street.for Russia’s lobbyists.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Russians are hell-bent on war crimes
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has slowed and perhaps even stalled. Ukrainian forces have proven tougher than expected. President Putin Friday appealed for negotiations, encouraged a coup, and yesterday mobilized Russia’s nuclear forces. These are signs he wants the fighting to stop. Moscow has agreed to talks today at the Belarusan border without preconditions. President Zelensky has concurred too, but he is still sounding feisty:
I need ammunition, not a ride.
Outcome uncertain
Russia is favored in resources, manpower, technology, and geography. Putin appears willing to pay whatever price for victory. The question is whether his own administration will permit it. The Russian home front is restive. The anti-war demonstrators won’t be the only ones who oppose him. Inside the Russian security forces there will be general officers unhappy with sacrifice of the army’s resources and capabilities. Putin has presumably coup-proofed himself, just as he has sanctions-proofed the Russian economy. But the protection that affords will not be 100%.
The plywood curtain
No one can predict, however, when Russia will give up on the occupation of Ukraine. It took years in Afghanistan for the mujahadeen to convince Moscow to withdraw. The talks today are unlikely to produce what Kyiv will require: complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine’s territory, including Donbas and Crimea.
In the meanwhile, a new curtain will descend in Europe. The newly drawn line will divide democracies from Russian-controlled autocracies. It won’t be an Iron Curtain. More like a plywood one. Strong, but not unbreakable. Europe “whole and free” will remain a Western mantra. It will not however be a serious proposition so long as Putin or someone of his ilk governs in Moscow.
Belarus and occupied Ukraine as well as Kazakhstan, the other ‘stans, Armenia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and at least part of Moldova will be behind the plywood curtain. The question mark will be in the Balkans. Will Serbia choose to remain on the Russian side? Or will it find ways and means to become a serious pro-EU state? So long as Milorad Dodik rules de facto in the Serb 49% (by area) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo will not be able to do what most of its population wants: side with the West.
The rest of the world has decisions to make too
China, India, and the United Arab Emirates abstained in the UN Security Council vote on a resolution denouncing Russian aggression. China will try to walk the fine line: against NATO membership for Ukraine but favorable to an (still imaginary) negotiated settlement. India is trying to stay neutral, which amounts to tacit support for Russia.
The UAE made a big mistake. No small country without the means to defend itself militarily against its big neighbors should be siding with Russia. That applies also to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Saudi Arabia’s autocracy is laying low for now, enjoying $100/barrel oil. Turkey and Israel have spoken out, but the latter worries about its relations with Russia in Syria as well as the relatives of its Russian-origin citizens still inside Russia. Zelensky has called for Israeli mediation.
The Germans have made theirs
The Germans took a big step yesterday: they will transfer Stinger anti-aircraft weapons and anti-tank weapons to Ukraine and allowing other countries to transfer German weapons. They have also reversed their postion on shutting the interbank payments system (SWIFT) to some Russian entities. These are major steps that betoken how dramatically the Russian invasion has unified and emboldened NATO.
But Moscow is hell-bent on war crimes
The invasion itself is a war crime. In addition, Moscow is trying to encircle Ukraine’s main cities and getting ready to bombard them. Siege is also a war crime, as it targets not only military objectives but also civilian ones. But it is up to the UN Security Council to decide whether aggression has taken place or to refer Russia to the International Criminal Court. The Russians won’t miss their opportunities to veto.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an exercise in raw power. It aims to replace a democratically elected government with a puppet regime answerable to Moscow. Putin will stop only if compelled either by domestic pressures or military defeat. The Russians are hell-bent on committing war crimes.
PS: Zelensky does have panache, or at least he did in 2006 when he won the Ukrainian Dancing with the Stars:
PSS: Then there is this too, which I wouldn’t call panache, but it takes balls and I’m sure Putin couldn’t manage it:
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Stevenson’s army, February 22
– Fred Kaplan analyzes Putin’s revanchist address.
– WaPo says administration argues over whether this is an “invasion.”
– NYT has good tick tock on administration plans since last fall for major information operations to expose Russian plans.
– Germany has halted NordStream2.
– WaPo has background on the contested Donbas region.
– Here’s background on “Putin’s enabler.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 1
– Summits lead to deals. Qatar’s leader met with Biden and won “Major Non-NATO Ally status” CNN has background. Qatar promised help with the Taliban.
– Archives confirmed what Politico and others reported previously: President Trump often shredded documents which by law should have been preserved; so they’ve been taped together.
– There’s also more evidence that Trump sought DOD or DHS to seize voting machines.
– North Korea is bragging about its missile tests.
– NYT looks for patterns in recent African coups.
– [This came up in class Monday] FT analyzes German internal debates over Russia and Ukraine.
– Location matters.Both Boeing and Airbus promise to build new tankers in US.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Invasion is likely, but its outcome is uncertain
Russian President Putin regards democracy outside Russia as his enemy. He also faces internal challenges from Russia’s many ethnic groups and subnational units. He is nevertheless forging ahead with the build-up of an invasion force on Ukraine’s borders. The question is whether he is overstretching. Can Russia sustain the effort required to bring Ukraine to heel?
Putin has reason to be confident
On material measures, Ukraine is a relatively small strain on an enormous country. Putin has built up reserves of more than $600 billion, so spending $10 billion per month or even more to mount an invasion of Ukraine he can afford. The number of troops involved is still relatively small at about 130,000. Overall Russian active duty military number something like one million, not counting another half million or more reserves.
The political measures are also favorable to Putin. His popularity remains high. The seizure and annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave him a bump upwards in popularity. It would be reasonable for him to think that a successful invasion of Ukraine would do likewise, even if Russian concern about war has increased.
Western reaction could alter the calculus, but only marginally. Deterrence is difficult. Putin has made big efforts to sanction-proof the Russian economy. The loss of the Nordstream 2 pipeline to Germany would be a blow, but not a gigantic one. Technology sanctions, not imposed in the past, could reveal Moscow’s Achilles heel, but the impact would not be immediate.
The invasion would however be risky
The real risk for Putin is the invasion itself. Even small setbacks could undermine his position at home and abroad. Moscow has done little to prepare its own population for war. Few Russians currently support an invasion of Ukraine. If things don’t go well quickly, Putin could find himself in a difficult position domestically, though there is no apparent threat to him at the moment. He has obliterated any real opposition with murder and imprisonment.
Putin has several objectives that an invasion could serve. Occupation of more Ukrainian territory is only one. He also wants to split NATO and force the US to deal with Russia as a peer. He presumably knows well that the Russian army will not be welcome in large parts of Ukraine, making the process of occupying the whole country messy. A major invasion would also solidify NATO rather than split it.
More limited suits Putin better
A more limited intervention would suit Putin’s purposes better and reduce the risk. For example, extending the separatist-held areas along the Sea of Azov coast to Mariupol or even to Crimea might be attractive. Infrastructure close to the separatist-held areas is another possibility.
Limiting the intervention would make consensus within NATO difficult. Germany might not think Mariupol is worth keeping Nordstream 2 shut forever. A quick but significant addition to Russian-controlled areas in Ukraine could make Moscow’s claim to peer status more likely to elicit an acceptable American response than a messy effort to occupy the whole country.
A limited invasion of Ukraine will not only involve kinetic means like tanks, airplanes, drones, and troops. Moscow is expert in “hybrid” warfare, which will include at the least disinformation, political disruption, cyberattacks, feints, and ideological challenges. Ukraine is particularly vulnerable on the issue of corruption, which can be used to undermine the legitimacy of its government. Moscow can presumably reveal things that will embarass Western-oriented politicians in Kiev.
Still, the outcome is uncertain
Ukrainians are going to resist any Russian invasion, not only with their half million or so troops but also with guerrilla efforts in any territory Russia manages to take. Defense will be difficult, as the Russians will presumably control the air. But in the end, will, cleverness, and luck are big factors. There is often miscalculation in going to war. While Moscow looks strong compared to Kiev, the outcome is uncertain.
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Stevenson’s army, January 23
– UK says its intelligence sees Kremlin plot to install pro-Russian leader in Ukraine. NYT reports; here’s WaPo report. Baltic states have been shipping arms.
-WaPo reports NATO help.
– But Germany blocks transfer of German equipment.
–Biden is meeting with advisers at Camp David.
– Conservative Ross Douthat urges”retreat from Ukraine”
-LAT sees few options for US in Yemen.
-CARE reminds us of under-reported humanitarian crises.
– FP has several experts grading Biden’s foreign policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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