Tag: Germany
Stevenson’s army, July 24
The beach weeks with grandchildren are over. What news did I miss?
-Some in Congress want to claw back some foreign policy powers. Sen. Murphy [D-CT] describes the bill –with changes to war powers, national emergencies, and foreign arms sales.
– Looks like the House is hooked on remote voting.
– Sen. Cruz has a hold on several State nominations. Remember, holds are a norm. not a rule. But Senators do them because the party leaders dare not ignore them.
– WSJ notes that Democrats also use budget games.
-US will shift to formal advisory role in Iraq.
– But it’s giving air support to Afghans and new drone strikes in Somalia
– Influence peddling is alive and well. Haiti factions are hiring. Trump buddy was indicted.
-There’s a Nordstream2 deal, but some doubts about enforcement.
–Chip shortage may last until 2023.
– Quincy Institute tallies Middle East interventions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, July 15
In new book, WaPo reporters say Gen. Milley feared Trump was planning a “Reichstag moment” and had “brownshirt” supporters. More in WaPo CNN broke the story.
NYT has more on Haiti coup planning.
Angela Merkel gets honorary degree at SAIS today, then meets with Biden; Nordstream2 still at issue.
Biden wants US-China hotline.
Gallup has new poll on US trust in institutions, also links to time series.
Longtime SASC staff director, Arnold Punaro, has good ideas about defense.
Here’s more about Navy’s “ghost fleet”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
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The Alliance needs its members to get tough
In advance of the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting, it is a timely to discuss the Alliance as a political forum and its future cohesion. NATO’s strength and resilience derive from Allies’ shared committment to the values and spirit of the Washington Treaty, namely the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the development of peaceful international relations. As NATO grapples with a challenging security environment, it must also confront erosion of democratic norms within some member countries, which undermines NATO unity. On April 27, 2021, The Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a panel to discuss prospects for NATO cohesion in light of a changing strategic environment. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Ambassador Muriel Domenach: Permanent Representative of France to NATO
MdB Omid Nouripour: Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the German Green party.
Rachel Ellehuus (Moderator): Deputy Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Heather A. Conley (Introductory Remarks): Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic
Values and Principles Define NATO
One consistent theme of the panel was the centrality of democratic values and ideals for defining the character of the NATO alliance. Ambassador Domenach noted that a lack of ideological and political cohesion across NATO member countries is a detriment to Alliance structure. The increasing failure to agree on basic norms of good governance and democratic rule intensifies tension and undermines meaningful cooperation. Moreover, the failure to agree on basic values undermines the material ability of NATO and its member nations to engage in its core functions of deterrence and defense in two ways. First, ideological rifts are particularly significant in the context of NATO’s organizational structure, which requires unified decision-making. When any one country can block actions by the group, schisms within the group become increasingly problematic. Second, lack of ideological cohesion in NATO undermines credibility because it decreases the likelihood that NATO will be able to act decisively against its enemies.
Nouripour similarly argued that ideological divisions among NATO members has material implications for security. He pointed to Turkey’s current attempts to play the US and Russia off of one another. The most significant manifestation of this strategy of straddling with ideological opponents has been the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. However, Ankara has recently discovered that the black boxes in the S-400 will not allow them to target Russian planes. In essence, then, a NATO ally has ceded its air defense sovereignty to Russia.
Ellehuus pointed out, however, that NATO has not always relied on, or succeeded based on, ideological uniformity. In fact, at the outset NATO included members such as Portugal that did not at the time share the same democratic values as many of the other members. She argued that this might indicate that value cohesion is not necessarily crucial for NATO. However, both Nouripour and Domenach agreed that ideological cohesion is more critical now than it was in the early days of NATO. Nouripour argued that democratic backsliding and the rise of disinformation campaigns and other attempts to actively weaken democracies dictates that a stronger emphasis be placed on maintaining democratic values.
Compelling Good Behavior
One clear weakness of the NATO structure that emerged out of this panel’s discussion is the difficulty that the organization has in compelling good behavior from non-compliant member states. Domenach pointed to suggestions about creating a code of conduct or reviewing compliance with fundamental NATO values. Ellehuus similarly pointed to two proposed articles that would require NATO allies to 1) refrain from politically motivated blockages of NATO business, and 2) to report any interactions with third countries that might affect the security of allies.
However, she also acknowledged that these changes were highly unlikely to pass in any meaningful form, largely because non-compliant members can and most likely will veto any attempt to pass these measures. She also argued that the North Atlantic Council is a valuable forum through which to air disagreements and negotiate solutions. Recent attempts by the NATO Secretary-General have proven fruitful in this regard.
Nouripour disagreed with this assessment to some extent. While he agreed that NATO is unlikely to pass meaningful reforms that allow it to police the conduct of member states, he similarly found the prospect of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Secretary-General negotiating compliance to be unlikely. Instead, he argued more in favor of direct bilateral and multilateral engagement to push for democratic values. Given the constraints of NATO as an organization, he believes that states acting on a national basis can perhaps create greater leverage with member countries. Ellehuus ultimately agreed that national power might be an effective mechanism through which to encourage compliance
Therefore, while NATO faces a variety of internal and external threats to its political and ideological cohesion, member states are stepping up in innovative ways to tackle the new threats of the 21st century.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
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What if World War I had ended without US intervention?
SAIS Professor Charlie Stevenson writes:
Philip Zelikow, academic, diplomat, and executive director of the 9/11 commission, has written an excellent book with a deeply tragic story. The Road Less Traveled [Public Affairs, 2021] analyzes Woodrow Wilson’s failed effort to launch peace talks that could have ended the bloody conflict in Europe and kept the United States out of the war.
Zelikow knows how government works from the inside. He also co-authored the second edition of Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, the landmark work on bureaucratic politics analysis. He uses that background to explain the many ways in which good intentions for peace were scuttled by zealots for war.
Among his assessments:
- Woodrow Wilson wanted to shepherd a peace conference but didn’t understand how to craft the diplomacy. He was more angry with Britain than Germany as late as January 31, 1917.
- Wilson was undermined by his close adviser, Edward House, who miscommunicated many of Wilson’s views to European diplomats and personally wanted to join the war in support of Britain.
- Wilson was also undermined by his senior State Department officials, who also favored joining the war with the Allies and who failed to turn Wilson’s goals into a plan.
- Germany’s civilian government desperately wanted peace and offered substantial concessions, but they were ultimately overruled by the military high command, who promised the kaiser a quick victory through submarine warfare.
- The British government was ready to accept peace talks in the fall of 1916, only to be out-maneuvered and then replaced by David Lloyd George, who privately believed the war couldn’t be won yet publicly vowed a fight to the finish. [His plan for victory envisioned battles in the Balkans and Turkey.]
- The French and Russian governments faced growing public opposition to continuing the war and would likely have agreed to a status quo ante bellum peace.
If only experienced career diplomats had developed a plan for launching peace talks…
If only Wilson had pushed ahead and forced his subordinates to act on that plan…
If only the British had recognized their desperate financial situation and acted while Asquith was still prime minister…
If only the German Chancellor had persuaded the kaiser to delay the return to unrestricted submarine warfare…
The United States would not have entered the war. [Wilson had already cut off British access to US loans.]
Russia might not have had its revolutions and ultimately a communist takeover.
Postwar Europe would not have been so disrupted by political unrest and military conflict.
I’ve spent a lot of time over the years studying the outbreak of war in 1914. Since historians usually only write about things that have happened, it’s rare to have such a solid work about something that almost happened. Zelikow has profound lessons for practitioners on how ideas get turned into policies and policies processed into accomplishments.
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Stevenson’s army, April 7
– Next week, for the first time since 2019, the two intelligence committees will hold open hearings with the leading IC officials for worldwide threat briefings.
– No leaks from the Biden White House, WaPo says.
-No change for now on land mine policy.
– Russia talks to India about arms.
-An anti-waste group criticizes DOD’s unfunded priorities lists.
[Background: SecDef Gates tried to block them.]
– Academic study of Jan 6 rioters finds surprises.
Late additions:
Likely special envoy on Nord Stream 2.
While Xi appeals to Merkel.
And AP says US worries about Taiwan.
And USN does a FONOP.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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