Tag: Gulf states
Winners and losers from Assad’s fall
The success of Syrians in deposing Bashar al Assad poses the question of who wins and who loses. Inside Syria, Hayat Tahrir al Sham is the big winner for now. It led the breakout from Idlib and inspired the many risings elsewhere in Syria.
There are lots of other countries that stand to win or lose something in the transition. Let’s assume Syria remains reasonably stable and its government basically inclusive and not vindictive, which appears to be HTS’ intention. We can try to guess the pluses and minuses for the rest of the world.
Turkiye is the big winner
In the region, Turkiye is the big winner. President Erdogan had been ready to negotiate with Assad, who refused to engage. Erdogan lost patience and backed a military outcome. He unleashed both Turkish proxies and HTS, which could not have armed and equipped itself adequately without Ankara’s cooperation. He does not control HTS 100%, especially now that it is in Damascus. But he will have a good deal of influence over its behavior. Let’s hope he uses it in the democratic and less religious direction. That however is the opposite of what he has been doing at home.
Erdogan has two primary goals in Syria. First is achieving enough stability there to allow many of the three million Syrian refugees in Turkiye to return. Returns will take time, but there is already a spontaneous flow back into Syria. The second is keeping the Syrian Kurds associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) away from Turkiye’s border with Syria. Erdogan would also like its Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) dissolved. Or at least as far from power as possible.
Refugee returns look like a good bet. Disempowering the Kurds in eastern and northern Syria does not. They are well-established and cooperate closely with US forces in that area. Future President Trump will want to withdraw the Americans. But the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will remain essential to fighting the Islamic State (IS). HTS, IS, and the PKK all carry the “terrorist” label in the US and Europe. But HTS and IS are rivals. HTS will want the Kurds to continue to fight IS. They will also be vital, at least temporarily, to preventing Iran from re-establishing a land route through Syria to Lebanon.
Israel wins and loses
The Israeli government would have preferred to see the Assad devil it knew stay in power. But his fall means the Iranians and their proxies will no longer be stationed along the northeastern border of Israel. The Israelis have already moved their troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone inside Syria. They didn’t want some known or unknown force filling that vacuum. That advance might give them a stronger position in future negotiations with Damascus, whenever those occur.
But Israelis have to be worried that a jihadist group led the overthrow of Assad. Ahmed al Sharaa, the birth name of HTS’s Abu Mohammed al Jolani, was born in Riyadh to Syrian parents. They were displaced from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The second Palestinian intifada motivated his conversion to jihad. It is hard to picture someone with that background more pliable than the impacable Assad on border and Palestinian issues. Jolani himself appears to have said little about Gaza or the Lebanon war. But some of his followers are clear about where they want to go next:
Lebanon and Jordan
Lebanon and Jordan, two key neighbors of Syria, can hope to be winners from the change of regime . Both will want to see Syrian refugees return home, as they were a strain on their economies. They will also stand to gain from reconstruction and eventually a more prosperous Syria.
Assad had been financing his government and his cronies with proceeds from the export of the stimulant Captagon. Decent people in both Beirut and Amman will welcome relief from that flood of poison into and through their societies. Some of their corrupted politicians may regret it.
Lebanon will have to reabsorb Hezbollah fighters who supported Assad. They will be a defeated and unhappy lot. But the Lebanese Army and state stand to gain from any weakening and demoralization of Hezbollah. Anyone serious in Beirut should see the current situation as an opportunity to strengthen both.
Iran and Russia are the biggest losers
Apart from Assad, Tehran and Moscow are the biggest losers. They backed Assad with people, force, money, and diplomacy. They are now thoroughly discredited.
Iran has already evacuated its personnel from Syria. Tehran has lost not only its best ally but also its land route to Lebanon.
Russia still has its bases. Almost any future Syrian government will have a hard time seeing what it gains from the Russian air force presence. Moscow’s air force brutalized Syrian civilians for almost 10 years. The air bases will no longer have utility even to Moscow. Moscow will prioritize keeping the naval base at Tartus, which is important for its Mediterranean operations.
The Gulf gains, Iraq loses
Gulf diplomacy was trying to normalize relations with Assad in the past year or two. But few Gulfies will mourn his regime, provided stability is maintained. Qatar may be more pleased than Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi. The Saudis and Emiratis are less tolerant of political Islam. Nor do they like to see regimes fall. Qatar is more comfortable with political change, including of the Islamist variety.
Iraq’s Shia-dominated government loses a companion in Damascus. It won’t welcome a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus. But Baghdad, like the Gulf, is unlikely to mourn the fall of Assad. He did his damnedest to make life difficult for Iraqis after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The United States and Europe gain but will need to ante up
The US and Europe have long viewed Assad as a regrettable but necessary evil. They hesitated to bring him down for fear of what might come next. Now they need to step up and fund Syria’s recovery, mainly through the IMF and the World Bank. They will want Gulf money invested as well. The best way to get that is for them to ante up matching funds.
That is also the best way for them to gain leverage over the political settlement. If they want an inclusive outcome, they’ll need to be ready to pay for it. Hesitation could open the door to malicious influence.
Let the Syrians decide
That said, the details of the political settlement should be left to the Syrians. They will need to write a new constitution and eventually hold elections. The extensive constitutional discussions the UN has hosted for a decade may offer some enlightenment on what Syrians want. Just as important in my view is how the new powers that be handle property issues. Only if property rights are clearly established and protected can Syria’s economy revive. But who rightfully owns what and what to do about destroyed property are complicated and difficult issues.
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Assassinations could mean war with Iran
Israel killed Fuad Shukr, military deputy to Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in Beirut yesterday with a targeted air strike. Though they have not confirmed their involvement, the Israelis apparently also killed Ismail Haniyeh, political leader of Hamas in Tehran today, likely also with an air strike. There is I suppose some possibility that this was not their doing, but rather an Iranian maneuver due to displeasure with his leadership of Hamas, but that is 100% speculation.
The ultimate impact of these two assassinations, if such they be, is uncertain. Sometimes decapitation works. Sometimes it doesn’t. But the success of both operations tells us a good deal about Lebanon, Iran, and Israel.
Lebanon and Iran have weak air defenses
That Lebanon has ineffective air defenses is not surprising. The country has been on the ropes at least since the Beirut port explosion in 2020, but even before that its army could not match the Israelis on the ground or in the air. Lebanese Hizbollah is the main threat to Israel from the north. Its air defenses are improving. But the killing of Shukr demonstrates that Israel has the intelligence capability to track Hizbollah leadership and the precision strike capability to hit a single building in crowded southern Beirut without apparently activating either Lebanon’s or Hizbollah’s air defense.
The same is true, and even more impressive, for Iran, if in fact the Israelis did it. Haniyeh was killed in a residence facility of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Israelis would have had to track him there, evade Iranian air defenses, and strike accurately at a distance of almost 1000 miles from Jerusalem. Iranian inability to prevent this in the aftermath of the presidential inauguration yesterday suggests weak air defenses. Or a special forces unit might have penetrated on the ground.
Israel wants war with Iran
The Israeli willingness to undertake these two assassinations, if in fact Haniyeh was their doing, would suggest that Prime Minister Netanyahu is prepared to risk escalation of the already simmering regional conflict. The two assassinations may well provoke another direct attack from Iran, which tried and failed in April to punish Israel for an earlier Beirut assassination. Escalation this time could be rapid.
There is no question that Tehran backs Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Yemeni Houthis. This is the much-vaunted “axis of resistance,” whose leaders were in Tehran for the inauguration of a new president. Netanyahu earlier this month in his speech in Congress blamed Iran bluntly for their activities. He appears to want a direct confrontation with Tehran, rather than dealing only with its allies.
The Americans do not, but what they can do about it at this point is not clear. Netanyahu sees an opportunity to damage Israel’s enemies while the Arab states stand by. They too want to see Iran diminished. He likely figures the Americans will be pleased if Israel is successful. He appears little concerned with the possibility of failure.
Implications for the US
It will be hard for the US to stay aloof if Netanyahu is successful in provoking Iran into entering the regional war. The Middle East would once again have to take priority. Ukraine and China would have to wait. American military supplies to Israel would be vital.
An Israel/Iran war would likely affect the US presidential race. Kamala Harris would find Democrats divided. The aging leadership in Congress would want to back Israel. But many Democrats, like most Israelis, want Israel to end the war in Gaza by cutting a hostage deal with Hamas. Donald Trump would gain some advantage in the presidential race, even if his running mate has wanted to shift attention from the Middle East to the Pacific. American popular opinion will heavily favor Israel if there is war with Iran.
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Gaza questions are easier than answers
The New York Times has already described how Netanyahu’s plan for postwar Gaza clashes with everyone else’s thinking. Netanyahu wants a full-fledged re-occupation of Gaza, complete with puppet Palestinian government there. He is already clearing a buffer zone inside the Gaza fence and wants to control the Egyptian/Gaza border as well. He imagines that UNRWA can be abolished. Israeli-selected local officials would manage an Israeli-imposed deradicalization process.
What is this really all about?
This is nothing but a formula to continue the Gaza conflict indefinitely. Netanyahu figures that as long as the war lasts he can delay his political downfall. So he is defying President Biden’s pitch for Palestinian Authority revitalization and takeover of Gaza, which would also be a difficult maneuver. Netanyahu has also repeatedly and forcefully ruled out a Palestinian state, which the US supports in principle. Israel and the US are not aligned, diplomats would say, except on Israel’s right of self-defense.
Inside Israel, Netanyahu’s policies are finding a good deal of support, even if he is still wildly unpopular. A lot of right-wing Israelis appear to be looking for revenge, not peace. While Gazans are suffering the horrors of indiscriminate and grossly disproportional attacks, Israel’s soldiers are celebrating the destruction of homes and mosques. Things will only get worse if the Israelis send ground forces into Rafah, where much of the Gaza population has taken refuge from attacks further north.
What is the alternative?
The diplomatic world is struggling to produce an alternative. That would apparently entail a longish pause in most of the fighting to permit a series of hostage exchanges. It is not a bad idea, but there are obvious limits. Hamas will not surrender all of the hostages, because once it does it fears Israel will restart the full-scaled assault on its cadres. But Israel won’t want to surrender all of its prisoners either, so perhaps there is a middle ground with some common interest. Hamas will be finding some of the hostages burdensome and Netanyahu is under political pressure to get some back.
If a pause and additional prisoner exchange does prove feasible, the Americans, Qataris, and Egyptians will want to use the occasion to try for a negotiated end to the war. That too is not a bad idea, but it is hard to see how they could get Netanyahu or Hamas to agree to it. It would either entail Israeli acceptance of a continued presence of Hamas in Gaza or Hamas agreeing to surrender. The former isn’t going to happen with Netanyahu and his rightwing allies in power. The latter isn’t going to happen without a more thorough military defeat than Hamas has suffered so far.
What if Netanyahu were no longer in power?
If Netanyahu and his coalition were to fall from power, other alternatives might emerge. A new Israeli government less committed to Jewish supremacy might conclude that the Netanyahu plan for postwar Gaza is nonsense. It might better understand that the war is creating chaotic conditions in Gaza that will be difficult to manage, never mind repair. Ever more radical groups could emerge and take over from Hamas. Or localized gangs and protection rackets could exploit the situation to establish drug and other smuggling operations.
Israel’s minimal goal in this war should include being at least as secure as it was before October 7. That will require local and international security forces, competent Palestinian governance, international humanitarian relief, Gulf economic assistance, and other inputs to stability that are already difficult to imagine. Continuing the war at this point is predictably counterproductive because it will make them more difficult, not easier.
But ending the war will require the Israelis to summon the political will and courage to get rid of Netanyahu sooner rather than later. That should now be President Biden’s top priority. Getting rid of the prime obstacle to peace is not optional. Continuing to cater to Netanyahu will only bring more grief to Israelis, Palestinians, and ultimately Biden himself.
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What is needed to stop the fighting in Gaza
As Shibley Telhami underlines, the priority right now is to end the fighting in Gaza. But war is an enterprise with political objectives. So we need to consider what the parties involved want and what might bring the fighting to a negotiated end.
Hamas objectives
Hamas’s heinous mass murder and mayhem on October 7 likely had several objectives: to claim leadership of the Palestinian movement, to counter the Israeli occupation both in the West Bank and Gaza, to garner credit for a spectacular act of “resistance,” and to block impending Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli right-wing infringement on the Haram al Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem and settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank provided an attractive opportunity. All Hamas’ main objectives were at least partially achieved on the day.
But the successes came with consequences. The Israelis have responded by destroying much of Gaza and displacing most of its population, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The IDF has killed, wounded, or captured many Hamas fighters. Saudi Arabia has not entirely forsaken normalization and none of the Arab world has done much more than talk smack about the Israelis. Only Iran and its partners (mainly Lebanese Hizbollah, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq) have provided any military support. They would like to use this occasion to drive the US out of the Middle East, regardless of the harm to Palestinians.
Palestinian objectives
The war has predictably and understandably rallied Palestinians to their cause, more in the West Bank than in Gaza. On the use of violence, support for Hamas, and disdain for the Palestinian Authority (especially President Mahmoud Abbas) attitudes have hardened. No doubt the Hamas military leadership is celebrating that as success, but the Palestinians desperately need aid and relief. Small anti-Hamas demonstrations have started up and could grow. Ordinary folks unaffiliated with Hamas will want an end to the war sooner rather than later.
Armed groups are not monolithic. Some in Hamas will be starting to worry about survival. As the Israelis push south, they will kill, wound, and capture more militants as well as civilians. Hamas’ “resistance” ideology can survive that push and even prosper, if need be among organizational successors. But its current leadership and at least some of its cadres will be worrying about their own lives and fortunes. Once physical survival becomes unlikely, some will turn to negotiations. They will hope a pause or end to the war will do what continuing seems unlikely to do. Consolidating Hamas’ position as the leader of the Palestinians and the main negotiating interlocutor with Israel would spell success.
Israeli objectives
Israel’s announced objectives are to destroy Hamas so that nothing like October 7 can ever happen again and to free the hostages Hamas and other more militant groups in Gaza still hold. The war is still far delivering those outcomes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu knows that perfectly well. He welcomes it. A hardened Hamas and divided Palestinians help him to justify continuing the war and hold onto power. Israelis so far have not wanted to replace Netanyahu while the fighting continues. Palestinian division, the growth of West Bank sympathy with Hamas, and a hardened Hamas help him to claim that Israel has no viable negotiating partner.
But Israel is a pluralistic society, so not everyone shares Netanyahu’s objectives. The right-wing of his governing coalition (and perhaps Netanyahu tacitly) is using the war as thinly veiled cover for collective punishment, including by blocking humanitarian assistance, supporting the IDF in loosening its targeting, and encouraging the expulsion of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza. While they complain that Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea,” violent Jewish settlers in the West Bank are doing it.
Many in the much-diminished liberal Israeli opposition want to prioritize hostage release. Opponents of Netanyahu, they prefer negotiations sooner rather than later, as they recognize the risks to the hostages of delay. They presumably also understand that negotiations now will allow Hamas to survive. Many will think that inevitable even if the war continues.
American objectives
The US government, in particular President Biden, shares the Israeli objectives of destroying Hamas so that it can no longer attack Israel and ensuring release of the hostages. Most of the Congress supports those objectives, with some also supporting Netanyahu’s remaining in power and collective punishment of the Palestinians.
But President Biden also wants to be re-elected. The widening regional conflict threatens an unwanted war with Iran. The Gaza war is weakening his support among younger people countrywide and among Muslims, most consequentially among Arabs in the “swing” state of Michigan. It no longer suffices to claim, accurately, that the US is the biggest funder of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and that Washington is pressing the Israelis to let more in.
That has made at least a pause in the fighting a priority. It also makes renewed talk of a two-state solution important, because that is the one area in which the Americans can agree with the change in Palestinian attitudes. It in addition provides a welcome area of agreement with Arab and Muslim states, in particular Saudi Arabia:
The spoiler is Netanyahu, as he has made clear in his reaction to the Hamas proposals:
He is dead set against a Palestinian state and has said so. He has also rejected President Biden’s suggestion that the issue can be fudged. It is true, as Biden claimed, that there are many varieties of “states,” some with limited sovereignty, but Netanyahu won’t accept any of them.
The elephants aren’t leaving the room
This puts Biden in a tough spot. He needs Netanyahu and his right-wing sidekicks gone. Only then will it be possible to pursue some sort of more permanent ceasefire. A pause would be an important first step, but negotiations won’t end the fighting until its main protagonist has departed from power. Only Israelis can engineer that. None seem willing yet.
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The cacophony is deafening but unnecessary
It is hard to make good sense of the varying perspectives on the Gaza war. Let me try to suggest they need not be so cacophonous.
Israel and the United States are diverging
The dissonance between Israel and the United States is get louder. They agree on the war objective of destroying Hamas in Gaza, whatever that means. But President Biden is pressing Israel to allow more humanitarian aid, protect civilians, ease the crackdown on the West Bank, and agree to turn over Gaza eventually to a renewed Palestinian Authority. Biden is also worrying out loud about declining international support for Israel and about the extreme nationalists in Israel’s right-wing government.
Prime Minister Netanyahu will have none of it. He wants Israel to be responsible for Gaza security after the war and to conduct a deradicalization operation, whatever that is. The Prime Minister claims Israel is already doing everything reasonable to allow humanitarian assistance and to protect civilians. He is uninterested in bringing the Palestinian Authority into Gaza and is continuing the crackdown in the West Bank. He hopes to stay in power, at least so long as the war lasts. That will make it last longer.
Arab disharmony
This is not the only disharmony evident around Gaza issues. Arab countries are anxious to signal support for a ceasefire in particular and Palestinians in general. But they in fact have done little to pressure Israel or Hamas for one. The Abrahamic accords remain in place and the Arab signatories (and possible future signatories) are not doing anything to limit Israeli economic and military capabilities. Nor is there any sign they are helping to block Hamas from resupplying.
Gaza has split the Arab world. Syria, Hizbollah-conditioned Lebanon, and Houthi-ruled parts of Yemen are trying to aggravate Israel’s challenges. Iran is supplying and cheering them on, thus prolonging the agony of the Gazas the “resistance axis” claims to support.
Others would be happy to see the destruction of Hamas, which is especially non grata in Egypt and the UAE. Those two countries loathe Islamist politics, especially the Muslim Brotherhood version from which Hamas descends. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and even Qatar don’t want to see Hamas win and thereby seize the banner of Palestinian liberation.
Even within Israel and in the West Bank, there are conflicting Arab views. Some Palestinians within Israel came to the aid of Jews on October 7. In the West Bank, however, Hamas has gained support.
American Muslims, Christians, and Jews
Inside the United States, there is growing discomfort among the majority of Jews, who lean heavily Democratic, with Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza. That contrasts with the Christian right solid support for Israel. Liberal American Jews largely agree with American Muslims on a ceasefire and on a two-state solution. The vast majority of American Jews differ from more radical Muslims and supporters who are pro-Hamas or oppose the idea of a Jewish state.
Harmonizing
The cacophony is unnecessary. Here are a few propositions that many would support:
- Hamas has proven itself devoted to mass murder of civilians. Disempowering it is vital, though its Islamist ideology will survive.
- The current conduct of the war is not the only way to disempower Hamas and does not appear to be succeeding. It is killing a disproportionate number of civilians relative to modest military accomplishments.
- Israel should end the military attacks and hunt Hamasees responsible for the October 7 murder and mayhem individually. Many Arab states would be prepared to cooperate, quietly, in that effort.
- A massive relief operation is already needed for Gaza. The requirements will increase once the war stops. The US, Europe, the Gulf, and Israel need to prepare to meet those requirements.
- American and Israeli Muslims, Christians, and Jews should unite in supporting humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.
- Governance of Gaza after the war will be an enormous challenge. If it is not met, guys with guns, many of them former Hamas, will run local protection rackets, trade in drugs and other contraband, and continue to attack Israel when the opportunity arises.
- Chaos of that sort on Israel’s border is in no one’s interest, especially Egypt and Jordan (because of the likely infection of the West Bank) but also the Gulf.
- A clear roadmap to a two-state solution would offer a political outcome most Palestinians would find attractive and most countries, other than Iran’s proxies, could support.
- This would need to start with renewal of the Palestinian Authority, through presidential and parliamentary elections as well as convening the Palestinian Legislative Council.
- It will also require replacement of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his extreme right-wing coalition in Israel with politicians prepared to deal with the Palestinian Authority once renewed.
Not everyone will agree with these propositions. But they are a start in building a consensus among today’s dissonant voices.
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Justice can’t substitute for politics
Anwar Albuni, Director of the Syria Center for Legal Studies and Research in Berlin, gave an overview today at the Middle East Institute of prosecutions in Europe for serious crimes over the past 12 years of revolution, repression, and civil war in Syria. These include at least 60 indictees for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including Bashar al Assad if I understood correctly, as well as many others for money laundering.
Justice as a substitute for political progress
Albuni’s view is that these prosecutions worry the Syrian leadership and send a powerful message to human rights abusers worldwide. He hopes that in the absence of any progress in the constitutional talks in Geneva, the prosecutions in Europe and one potential prosecution in Chicago will exclude abusers from the political process and prevent diplomatic normalization with the Syrian regime. The Russians and Chinese are blocking any action in the UN Security Council. But he hopes the General Assembly may create a special court, at least to prosecute use of chemical weapons.
The diplomatic normalization the Arab countries are pursuing with Syria should be, he thought, expected. The Gulf in particular wants no democracies in the region. Its monarchies even supported extremists in Syria in order to prevent a real democracy from emerging there. An audience member noted that Turkiye today is on a similar wavelength and is preventing Syrian witnesses from leaving Turkiye to testify in European courts.
Hope is not a policy
I might be inclined to hope Albuni is correct. But I don’t see much evidence for his perspective. There are certainly instances where indictments have given pause to abusers, but Syria isn’t likely to be one of them. Twelve years of civil war with only a few dozen lower-level convictions is not going to stop Bashar al Assad from his homicidal ways any more the International Criminal Court indictment will stop Vladimir Putin from kidnapping Ukrainian children.
Human rights abuses are not incidental for Assad and Putin. They are part of the war-fighting strategy and well-documented, including by an organization on whose board I sit. Bashar used chemical weapons because he found them effective. Like barrel bombs, they are cheap and indiscrimately deadly. If you are trying to terrify a civilian population, that is what you want.
Assad won’t soften
So it is unlikely that justice will do for Syria what politics has failed to do so far. Getting some of the worst abusers out of the picture and sending a message to the rest is a good idea but will just as likely stiffen Assad’s resolve as weaken it. Assad knows that softness will get him nowhere. The prosecutions may make some of his cronies think twice, but like Putin’s they can easily find a window to fall out of.
Syria’s Arab neighbors are likely to continue diplomatic normalization, in exchange for Assad’s fake promises of cracking down on the drug trade his regime now uses in lieu of taxes. The Americans show no interest in normalizing but are turning a blind eye. They are convinced that the Arab neighbors will do it even if Washington objects. The constitutional committee is likely to remain stalemated, because Assad thinks he has won the war. He has nothing to gain from the political process. Justice, justice you shall pursue, but don’t expect it to solve political problems.
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